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Abstract 
 
While the promotion and growth of global public-private partnerships (PPPs) is indisputable, 
the same enthusiasm has not fuelled their disciplined study; thus, their potential to deliver on 
their promise of being effective and legitimate governance entities is far from established.  
Addressing this lack, this work investigates the universe of transnational PPPs in form, 
functioning and effects. It suggests that as PPPs are institutional innovations, partnership 
analysis can benefit from applying theoretical constructs from international regime research 
complemented with adjacent literature from management and organisational studies.   
Building an analytical framework based on the notions of input and output legitimacy, the 
work analyses how variation in partnership inputs (focus, actors involved, organisational 
dynamics and institutionalisation) interacts with varying internal management processes to 
result in varying outputs. The thesis utilises the operational notion of effects rather than the 
more subjective notion of partnership effectiveness, and considers effects related to goal 
attainment and problem solving.  
 
Applying a systematic methodology, the work also defines and describes the universe of PPPs, 
creating a transnational partnership database (TPD) which pulls together all existing sources, 
thus encompassing 757 partnerships.  
 
The resultant analysis reveals a marked variation across the universe of transnational 
partnerships as well as distinct differences in their operational capacity. It also highlights that 
while highly institutionalised PPPs are more likely to produce tangible outputs and effects, the 
extent of these is highly dependent upon internal management. By building a cumulative 
understanding of these institutional models, the work furthers debates regarding the role of 
PPPs as legitimate and effective governing actors.  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
Changing patterns of governance: Introducing partnerships 
 
Transnational public-private partnerships (PPPs) are increasingly gaining prominence 
as governance engines due to their unparalleled ability to bring together diverse resources 
from the public, private and social domains and generate synergistic relationships.
1
  Despite 
the positive rhetoric surrounding their perceived role, however, whether or not global 
partnerships
2
 will prove a model of effective and efficient governance in a new world of 
complex interdependence has yet to be seen.  Though there are prominent cases of success, 
their growing role has not been matched with an equivalent amount of systematic study.  The 
argument that PPPs effectively address global challenges is still rather a normative idea than a 
methodologically sound and theoretically grounded empirical fact. 
 This work addresses this lack of rigorous analysis with its ambitious goal of 
undertaking a comprehensive study of these institutional innovations in order to present a 
clearer picture of the state of global partnering.  It addresses key questions regarding the 
contribution of PPPs to global governance, and specifically asks: what does the universe of 
transnational PPPs encompass? How can this diverse body of PPPs be analytically assessed?  
What do we know regarding their variation in form, functioning, processes and effect? How 
can the diverging characteristics across PPPs account for their varying level of institutional 
effects?  Finally, what do these findings suggest regarding PPPs’ role as effective and 
legitimate tools of governance? 
This introductory chapter briefly presents these global partnerships and the resultant 
study.  It first reviews the emergence of PPPs within these changing contours of global 
governance; places PPPs within existing theoretical and analytical constructs; and then 
discusses the research design and methodological approach that will be used to analyze these 
concepts.  The following section highlights the overriding questions and key findings; and 
then concludes with a presentation of the overall layout and design of the thesis.  
 
 
                                                 
1 See, among others, Benner, Reinicke and Witte 2002b; Benner, Streck and Witte 2003; Reinicke and Deng 2000; 
Andonova and Levy 2003. 
2 The term ‘partner’ is inherently value-laden; the notion of a public-private partnership implies joint operations 
and shared commitment under a public-private framework; using the term also implies that actors are working at an 
equitable level in terms of power and status, which is a debatable assumption.  Though a widely accepted term, 
given the rhetoric, “public-private partnerships” (PPPs) will remain in quotation marks for the duration of the work; 
however, for the sake of readability, henceforth the term partnership and PPP will be used interchangeably.   
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1.1 Global dynamics, global governance and debating the role of partnerships 
The increasing complexity of global economic challenges continually transforms the 
system of interdependent countries and placing increasing pressure on states and their existing 
national institutions (Reinicke 1998).  As the limitations of purely intergovernmental efforts to 
coordinate effective public policies become ever-more apparent (Hewson and Sinclair 1999), 
corporations and global civil society organisations have begun to claim a growing presence in 
global affairs, leading to profound reconfigurations of global power and authority.  
Consequently, where these processes of interdependence and globalisation interact, public and 
private actors are coordinating to form new governance arrangements (Buse and Walt 2002, 
43). 
Governance concerns the manner through which a society or organisation ‘steers’ 
itself to achieve common goals (Rosenau 1995), but even using the term ‘governance’ implies 
a movement away from authoritative state-based governance towards one characterised by 
interactions between actors (Peters 2005) and a shift towards a cooperation state (Börzel and 
Risse 2005, 196) or even in the direction of a world of “governance without government” 
(Rosenau and Czempiel 1992).  Yet this shift from government to governance marks ‘a 
significant erosion of the boundaries separating what lies inside a government and its 
administration and what lies outside them’ (Shapiro 2001, 369) and enhances the role of 
partnerships, which ignore the boundary between state and market (Tilly 1992; Polanyi 1957; 
Schwartz 2000).  The increasing promotion of PPPs can be seen as a furtherance of trends 
towards greater reliance on multi-layered, multi-playered patterns of governance.  
As it became more widely recognised that global problems necessitated global 
solutions, growing support for these new forms of networked governance developed.  
Uniquely structured to overcome market and government failure and leverage the capacities of 
the varied sectors, partnerships are supposed to create synergies and results not possible 
without collaboration.  However, public-private governance arrangements do not only the 
counter state-led steering of the past.  From an academic perspective, they challenge both 
traditional International Relations (IR) theories and the analytical tools used in its assessment.  
Transnational PPPs present a paradox: as innovative institutional arrangements, they 
should bring together diverse actors to address pressing global governance deficits; on the 
other hand, their growing presence can lead to a fragmentation of policy authority and 
challenge the foundation on which global governance is based.  At the crux of this paradox are 
persisting debates regarding partnership legitimacy.  While the concept of legitimacy is 
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furthered in later chapters, drawing this distinction is especially significant at the onset: input, 
or procedural, legitimacy, versus output legitimacy, commonly associated with effectiveness.  
When considering the role of PPPs in global governance, the implications of potential 
tradeoffs between these elements are paramount.  Can PPPs compromise on democratic 
notions of accountability as long as they fulfil their promise of being pragmatic delivery 
mechanisms?  Or, will PPPs be accepted as legitimate governance actors only if they bring 
enhanced elements of these procedural elements - participation, representation and 
transparency?  These challenges are not unique to partnerships: governance arrangements 
always involve tradeoffs, but unlike traditional structures of international and national 
governance, we know little regarding how these are manifest within and across partnerships.   
PPPs challenge both traditional notions of legitimacy, and there is a growing body of 
critiques which debate notions such as their participation, representation and accountability, as 
well as effectiveness more broadly.
3 Researchers have begun to tackle these questions, though 
largely from a theoretical rather than an empirical perspective, at best utilising a few case 
studies as examples.  Emerging works suggest that partnerships have indeed led to substantial 
gains (Caines 2005; Buse and Tanaka 2011) and contributed to addressing these pressing 
global problems.  Yet evidence on whether PPPs are truly “win-win” solutions, succeeding 
where both states and markets have failed, is far from clear. The cumulative positive impact of 
partnerships is neither established nor properly tested (Biermann et al. 2007b).  Given their 
diverse nature and ranging focuses, more needs to be done to systematically study the impact 
of these unique collaborative institutions.   
These debates will certainly continue, and this work does not promise to settle them 
here, but what is clear from the onset is that transnational PPPs need a thorough examination.  
Systematic analysis must address their contribution to global governance, and in particular 
address whether these institutions are legitimate and effective mechanisms for governance.  
Doing so involves placing these institutionalised interactions under a critical lens and 
developing an evaluative framework which addresses both the pragmatic questions at hand 
and the broader theoretical debates.   
Crafting such an institutional model and theory which examines the varying 
characteristics of PPPs’ forms, functions and democratic mechanisms is a necessary first step 
of analysis. Only after this is done can a proper evaluation of their effectiveness be properly 
undertaken.  As Marra acknowledges, “Evaluation could, in fact, help define the appropriate 
                                                 
3 See, among others, Bäckstrand 2006; Chan and Pattberg 2008; Utting and Zammit 2009.  The second chapter of 
this work furthers these debates. 
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policy role for the private and public sector suggesting when each should have the principal 
responsibility, where the two can work together, and the extent to which they can share 
responsibility” (2000, 153).  Transnational partnerships could be an effective answer to many 
global governance issues, but without a proper understanding of their variance and potential 
effectiveness, addressing where, why and how they can be successful will remain elusive.   
 
1.2 Theoretical applications and alternative explanations  
From a pragmatic standpoint, it is worth knowing if partnerships actually work: that 
is, do they fulfil the promise of effective delivery?  From a political grounding, what are the 
potential trade-offs between improved democratic legitimacy and environmental effectiveness.  
How can PPPs be assessed from an analytical perspective, especially in terms of their 
variation in institutional design and effects in a framework that makes sense.  What are the 
broader effects of transnational partnerships from a sustainability perspective, and what are 
their actual and future impact on global governance, sustainable development and global 
challenges likely to be? 
This thesis adds value to these debates regarding the promise, practice and potential of 
PPPs.   It enhances the conceptual and normative understanding of PPPs by providing a multi-
disciplinary framework and related approach to evaluating their variation in form, functioning 
and effects.  This section reviews the conceptualisation of PPP and applicable theoretical 
constructs and analytical frameworks which will be furthered in subsequent chapters.  
 
1.2.1 Conceptualising PPPs  
One of the most challenging aspects of partnership evaluation relates to the 
ambiguities and contestations surrounding the term.  The analysis of partnerships is made 
difficult by the contested definition of the notion and the current fragmented nature of 
partnership-related publications. The term “partnership” and its subsequent study within the 
literature have been approached from a variety of perspectives, which has led to “an analytic 
cacophony” (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2011, 3).  The resultant empirical confusion 
contributes to a polarised and rather incomplete nature of current PPP research (Van Huijstee, 
Francken and Leroy 2007, 85-87) making it difficult to sort to sort rhetoric from reality (ibid; 
see also Brinkerhoff 2002; Wettenhall 2003).  Thus it is fair to say that a cumulative 
understanding of transnational partnerships is still underdeveloped (Biermann et al. 2007b).   
Unifying most approaches, however, is the idea that partnerships bring together varied 
actors in voluntary interactions, though the extent, involvement and commitment of the actual 
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partnering arrangement is – and can only be – assessed through targeted research.  The second 
chapter of this work will detail these definitional issues and their implications in greater detail.  
This work begins with an encompassing definition of partnerships, but the research interest is 
on transnational partnerships, those operating beyond the nation state.  This work attempts to 
represent the universe of PPPs in its constructed Transnational Partnership Database 
(TPD); the details of which are discussed in chapter four.  A subset of partnerships was also 
created for additional analysis, termed institutionalised, transnational partnerships (ITPs), 
which includes all PPPs within the universe that are transnational in scope and involve tri-
sectoral base of actors (encompassing representatives from the public, private and social 
sectors) (Table 1.1). 
 
Table 1.1 Partnership definitions employed 
 Main partnership definitions employed throughout this work  
Public-private 
partnerships  
Voluntary, horizontally structured and minimally institutionalised 
arrangements that bring together actors from distinct sectors that join for 
an actual partnering arrangement rather than only more informal 
interactions 
Transnational 
Public-private 
partnerships 
Voluntary, horizontally structured and minimally institutionalised 
arrangements transnational arrangements that bring together actors from 
distinct sectors organised with a global/ transnational reach and purpose 
of providing collective goods 
Institutionalised, 
Tri-sectoral 
transnational 
public-private 
partnerships 
(ITPs) 
(Sampling Frame) 
Voluntary 
Horizontally structured and minimally institutionalised 
Tri- actor based 
At least one actor from the public, private and social (not-for-
profit) sector 
Transnational 
Global scope, and 
Actors join across more than one country or region 
Public policy focused 
Aim or goal is providing a collective good or addressing global 
public policy need/issue  
 
 
 
1.2.2 Analysing institutional influence: Theoretical constructs and relevant applications  
While a large body of research has focused on the reasons for the formation and 
existence of partnerships (Andonova and Levy 2003; Bäckstrand  2005; Broadwater and Kaul 
2005), more recent attempts are turning to understanding whether or not PPPs matter.  As this 
questions the extent to which these are effective governance tools, engaging with these 
debates means first clarifying what is meant by effectiveness. 
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While considerable progress has been made in attempts to evaluate institutional 
effectiveness, thanks notably the growing body of work analysing international environmental 
regimes (Breitmeier, Young and Zurn 2006; Young, King and Schroeder 2008), varying and 
debated approaches still compose the field (Underdal and Young 2004; Miles et al. 2002).    
Generally, researchers utilise a version of effectiveness as the dependent variable and attempt 
to explain ranging partnership effectiveness given varying factors and inputs (Witte and  
Reinicke 2005; Ruggie 2003; Druce and Harmer 2004).  Lacking standardisation in regards to 
the specification and measurement of the main explanatory (independent) variables, however, 
it is difficult to generalise findings across studies.  Thus there has been less cumulative 
progress made towards the goal of explaining variation in partnerships and their effects, and 
even less in the predictive sense.    
As argued in subsequent chapters, defining, measuring and comparing institutional 
effectiveness is a research area wrought with severe methodological and operational 
challenges (Underdal 2004; Biermann et al. 2007b).  To define effectiveness as the dependent 
variable involves addressing issues surrounding concept formation and variable definition, 
hypothesis development and causal inference (Young 2004).  Moreover, it is far from clear 
that effectiveness should even be the dependent variable of focus.  Others note the need to 
assess institutional influence on a broader scale, attempting to approach what Young refers to 
as broad versus merely simple effectiveness (Young 1994).  This is methodologically and 
analytically more challenging, and relatively few partnership studies have worked towards 
this. 
Once a notion of effectiveness is defined and measured, the more pressing question 
relates to what explains the resultant variation.  Regime analysis has advanced the 
development of several conceptual and practical tools to utilise in such regards (Underdal 
2008; Mitchell 2008), however, and a range of variables which do seem to make a difference 
have been identified.  The relevance of these approaches and related constructs are furthered 
in chapter three.    
The issues of institutional design, variation and effectiveness are not new for regime 
theory, but are more novel when addressing new forms of governance, particularly PPPs, 
which do not fit clearly within the current lexicon of institutions, regimes and organisations.  
Yet we should not view PPPs as radical departures from these conceptions (Andonova 2007).  
Partnerships, as regimes, are social institutions in the sense that they are assemblages of rights, 
rules, decision-making procedures, and programmatic activities that guide or govern human 
actions in a given issue area (North 1990); thus the established body of IR theories, 
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specifically those analysing international regimes and recent developments in the new 
institutionalism lend considerable value.   
It is also becoming more accepted to analyse PPPs within sets of traditional IR 
theories (Biermann et al. 2007b; Schäferhoff, Campe and Kaan 2009).  As this work argues, 
while conventional IR approaches remain relevant, PPPs are distinct institutional forms from 
regimes or institutions more broadly, and traditional constructs are insufficient to fully account 
for the exhibited variation in PPPs.  Given their unique structuring, varied operations and 
inner dynamics, assessing partnerships necessitates constructing a hybrid research framework 
and set of related approaches, which stand within the body of studies from management, 
behavioural economics and organisational studies.  While there is an obvious need for a 
coherent theoretical grounding and set of refined techniques, partnership analysis stands to 
benefit from a multidisciplinary approach combining macro-level international regime theory 
with micro-level theories on management and organisation.     
 
1.3 Research design and methodology 
Explaining complex phenomena such as partnerships requires applying multiple 
theories connected within a common framework.  However, existing analytical frameworks 
are inadequate when it comes to fully capturing PPPs’ institutional variety, something that is 
especially the case regarding frameworks applicable on a large-n basis.  While creating a 
common framework which encapsulates the diversity of PPPs is difficult, there are benefits to 
applying an analytical framework which captures specific elements of partnerships, their 
variation and contributions to perceived and/or actual effectiveness.   
Partnerships operate on multiple levels, and as such require multi-level focus for 
evaluation.  This work’s methodology analyses PPPs as institutions operating at the micro, 
regime and environmental level, which allows us to incorporate their multi-level, multi-
playered nature.  This thesis also takes a pragmatic, operational-based approach to analysing 
partnerships: it focuses on systematic empirical investigation of partnership effects rather than 
the more subjective notion of effectiveness.  As such, it analyses variation across the range of 
inputs, processes and effects through identifiable, tangible outputs within each. 
Any research design, especially one that combines quantitative and qualitative 
methods across a large universe of cases, faces a number of difficult choices.  Analysing PPPs 
across these multiple levels involves combining varying methods of data collection, review 
and analysis.  Together, these varying strategies build a set of methods which work together to 
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more fully analyse and compare PPPs.  Given the methodological substance of this work, 
discussion is reserved for that dedicated chapter.  (See Figure 1.1. for an outline). 
 
Figure 1.1 Methodological steps taken 
PPP Platform: Summary of Methodological Steps  
o Define and describe the universe of transnational PPPs by creating a global database of all claimed 
global partnering initiatives. 
 Establish the numerical and structural  base of the universe; 
 Describe PPPs along range of Inputs, including typology, actor, 
institutional, governance, organisational and other descriptive variables; 
 Analyse specific set of variables related to “input legitimacy” including 
participation, representation and transparency ; 
 Segment universe into a narrowed sampling frame of those previously defined 
institutionalised transnational partnerships (approximately 150). 
 
o Construct a conceptual framework for analysis of partnership inputs; “procedural legitimacy” 
elements; management practices and processes; and effects. 
 
o Establish a basic framework of evaluation for transnational PPPs : 
 Distinguish PPP effectiveness into goal attainment and problem solving and 
segment each into outputs, outcomes and impacts 
 Categorise outputs as organisational and performance outputs 
 Define, collect and analyse a set of comparable organisational partnership 
outputs for the sampling frame of ITPs 
o Measure and evaluate the management practices of the transnational PPPs by utilising a 
conceptual management measurement tool and a double blind/ double scored methodology of 
interviewing operational managers and directors in PPPs through a structured conversation 
on internal management processes and practices.   
 
o Use the evaluative framework and information on ranging PPP foci, inputs, and processes to 
compare across partnerships.  This allows for understanding variations across PPPs and also 
makes inroads into analysing the influence of PPPs at large.   
1 ITPs are those PPPs that are: Voluntary, horizontally structured and minimally institutionalised arrangements that bring 
together actors from distinct sectors organised with a global/ transnational reach and purpose of providing collective goods 
  
1.4 Effective and legitimate? Overriding questions and highlighted findings 
Do partnerships live up to these promises of effective and legitimate governance?  
Will strengths on certain aspects account for deficits in others? What is specifically of interest 
is also whether the perception of these institutions having legitimacy will enhance 
effectiveness (Stokke and Vidas 1996).  Asking these questions implies that enhanced 
democratic or procedural elements of legitimacy further the PPPs’ effectiveness, but the 
relationship could go the other way, or exhibit little significance. This study addresses these 
central issues and contributes to the debate on the promise, practice and potential of 
partnerships.  Not only do the findings of this work support many earlier sectoral-based 
studies on partnerships for sustainability or health, but they also challenge many traditionally 
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held assumptions.  Significantly, the findings highlight key areas of focus for both our 
theoretical and practical understanding of transnational partnerships.  These main findings, 
explored in subsequent chapters, are highlighted in Figure 1.2. 
Figure 1.2 Transnational partnerships: Highlight of key findings  
Partnerships are challenging to assess: Conceptual issues and methodological difficulties prevail; multiple 
approaches to their study ensure cumulative understanding is slowed 
Little is known regarding the universe of transnational partnerships: Current information sources are sorely 
lacking, existing studies are still largely case-study based or sectoral-focused. 
Partnership growth is undisputed but evidence as to operational activity is lacking: 
--Of the 757 partnerships pulled together from the main existing listings of PPPs, only 440 have evidence of 
operational activity post 2008; the majority of these began with open ended timeframes;  
--This is especially troubling for UN-CSD partnerships, for which 169 have no evidence or information 
outside of their self-reported CSD listing. 
Transnational partnerships are operating globally; but they are heavily concentrated, especially in certain 
sectoral areas, notably health, energy, sustainable development and the environment. 
Participation within the PPPs and representation on governing boards is dominated by public sector actors;  
--Over 70% of PPPs have a government actor as a main partner compared to 50% with at least one NGO or 
business representative;  
--Across the universe of PPPs, only 45% are truly tri-sectoral in their claimed partner base; 
--Governing body representation is even more publically dominated, as only 16% of transnational PPPs have 
tri-sectoral decision making, and one-quarter of transnational PPPs only have government actors on their main 
governing body. 
 
Partnerships are varied institutional forms; but across the universe of PPPs the majority – over 60% - are 
hosted within another organisation, mainly the UN and its agencies. 
 
Internal management practices are varied but generally weak; especially for hosted PPPs who significantly 
underperform in terms of management performance to their independent peers; PPPs struggle the most in 
management areas related to managing processes of learning, sharing resources and reviewing performance. 
 
“Input” legitimacy, notably transparency and accountability is lacking; especially for hosted PPPs; 
--Less than half of operational PPPs publish an annual report or statement and slightly less than one third of all 
PPPs tracked have publically available finances. 
 
Performance tracking, review and evaluation are varied across PPPs; while there are top performers, only 46% 
of the sampling frame of ITPs publish their performance indicators and only 36% have been subject to 
external evaluation. 
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1.5 Roadmap and Outline of study 
The next chapter introduces transnational partnerships and explores the debates 
surrounding their emergence, current governance role and ability to address persisting 
governance gaps.  It highlights that little is known on a cumulative basis regarding these PPPs, 
especially as to their established effects.  The third chapter elaborates on the theoretical 
argument and argues that PPPs, as institutional innovations, can benefit from applying 
frameworks from international regime research complimented with adjacent literature on 
management and organisational dynamics.  The fourth chapter presents the study’s 
methodology and framework, and it also details the methodological challenges encountered, 
decisions made and methods employed. 
The fifth chapter begins the empirical results section of the thesis.  The findings from 
the Transnational Partnership Database (TPD) are presented, and the universe of transnational 
PPPs is discussed through variation in operational capacity, focus and coverage, actors 
involved and institutional design and structure.  The chapter also details the governance and 
decision making forms and processes within these PPPs before addressing key arguments 
related to partnerships and input legitimacy, mainly focusing on participation, representation, 
accountability and transparency.  The sixth chapter moves inside the partnerships to analyse 
the internal management practices and processes of a set of these PPPs.   
The seventh chapter returns to the question of partnerships’ effects, which are 
distinguished between goal attainment and problem solving.  After reviewing the framework 
the chapter analyses the range of goals, missions and visions set across these PPPs.  The 
chapter then assesses a set of comparable organisational outputs of the ITPs as well as their 
efforts towards performance tracking and evaluation. 
The final chapter brings the work back to the questions that drove the study: are PPPs 
effective and legitimate tools of governance?  What do we know about these institutional 
innovations?  The key findings of the empirical work are reviewed as well remaining 
analytical, theoretical and methodological considerations.  The conclusion discusses the 
implications of this work as well as the potential avenues for further research and the outlook 
for transnational partnerships more broadly.   
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CHAPTER 2: 
Rise of public-private partnerships in global governance 
 
Promoted as the appropriate response to address pressing global challenges, public-
private partnerships are fast becoming “the development approach of our time” (Kjaer 2003, 
13).  Yet though the partnership paradigm has firmly taken hold within the international 
political economy (IPE), their rampant proliferation raises several questions regarding their 
promotion, unexplained diversity and questionable eventual impact.  While the growing body 
of research surrounding the emergence of transnational PPPs highlights the empirical richness 
of the partnering phenomenon, both the current practice and eventual impacts of transnational 
PPPs remain far from clear.  
The aim of what follows is to introduce transnational partnerships, their rapid growth 
within the international system and the overriding concerns surrounding these institutional 
innovations.  This chapter begins by defining the conceptions associated with partnering and 
then presents the main theories attempting to explain their growth and promotion.  The third 
section presents a brief overview of the diversity that characterises the universe of 
transnational PPPs, especially highlighting their increasing engagement with 
Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs).  This is followed by a brief consideration of the 
debates surrounding the potential risks of partnerships while the chapter concludes by 
highlighting the lack of partnership evaluation. 
 
2.1 Understanding and defining partnerships 
 
Employed for its “mobilising capacity” (Utting and Zammit 2006, 9), the term 
partnership is “undoubtedly one of the most mis-used in the contemporary administrative 
lexicon” (Langford 2002, 69; in Wettenhall 2003, 106).  Given the term’s positive 
connotation, partnerships are assumed to involve shared goals or agreement, cooperation 
leading to a form of synergy and joint operation which is preferable to unitary action.  The 
nature of this collaboration and extent of mutual benefit is contentious, however, and one 
should not assume there are equitable contributions across partners.  Further, despite 
becoming “the new mantra for the new millennium” (Tennyson 1998, 3), there is no 
prevailing consensus on what public-private partnerships constitute, and the term is applied 
to a wide range of relationships.  In its most neutral conception, PPPs are arrangements of 
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roles and relationships where public and private entities combine complimentary resources to 
achieve a certain outcome.  While current utilisations of the term lack specificity, it is helpful 
to consider the notion through partnerships’ mode of decision making, actors involved and 
overriding aim or goal.
4
  
Partnerships are distinguished by their mode of governance, as they employ non-
hierarchical methods rather than top-down or authoritative modes of steering (Börzel and 
Risse 2005).  While this implies decision making based on collaboration rather than coercion, 
the extent of actors’ separate roles are rarely specified.  UN partnerships, for example, have 
been defined as “voluntary and collaborative agreement … in which all participants agree to 
work together to achieve a common purpose or undertake a specific task and to share risks, 
responsibilities, resources, competencies and benefits” (Nelson 2002, 47), but it cannot be 
assumed that all parties/partners agree on the purpose, or even the general activities, of the 
arrangement, nor that there is equal sharing of either risks or benefits.  This is troubling, as 
given the value-laden nature of the term, it could lead it to being “easily abused and exploited 
to disguise the real power dynamics of an unbalanced relationship” (Malhotra 1997; in Hailey 
2000, 315).    
PPPs can also be distinguished by considering actors involved.  While distinct 
differences are claimed to persist in the incentives, mandates and operations of the public and 
private sectors, there is no clear boundary between public and private in the partnership 
literature.  One approach defines public actors as “individual agents or organisational entities 
whose main mandate is to undertake activities that generate social returns, or put differently, 
generate benefits for society at large” in contrast to private actors “whose main rationale for 
engaging in economic activities is to generate private returns” (Broadwater and Kaul 2005, 4).  
While some account all non-governmental actors within the private sector (Nelson 2002; 
Utting and Zammit 2006), others consider only formal market participants.  Private 
foundations and business associations are also accorded varying sectoral placement.
5
  Given 
their close ties to profit seeking firms, these associations are often placed within the private 
realm (Bull and McNeill 2007, 6), but others associate them with civil society and insist they 
should be clearly separated from other corporations.       
                                                 
4 For more detailed discussion on the terminology associated with partnerships see Mcquaid 2000 and Caplan 2003; 
for other definitional issues, Buse and Walt 2002.  For a full list of words that are used interchangeably with 
partnership, see UNED (2001), Multi-stakeholder Communication: Clarification of Terms. 
5While some clearly place these within the private realm (Bull and McNeill 2007; Martens 2007) others consider 
them public enterprises (Ridley 2004); the UN further distinguishes between private foundations and corporations, 
despite the close ties between the two (Ollila 2003, 43). 
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To fully explore these actor dynamics and enhance clarity to the research, this work 
segments “private” into the commercial and non-commercial (termed social) and includes 
civil society organisations, mainly NGOs, along with academic centers and foundations within 
the latter.  While attempts to distinguish commercial, for-profit based actors (those with a 
market-orientation concerned with generating private returns) from the not-for-profit or social 
sector (those who have voluntary and non-commercial aims) are made, the reality is that many 
actors will not fit clearly into one camp, and sectoral base does not necessarily speak towards 
for-profit or “for-public” interest.6  
Overall aim or objective is a consideration, as while some assume that public and 
private partners interact to achieve separate objectives (Vigoda-Gadot 2003, 64), others assert 
“[PPPs] are not about the narrow plan of any one partner: true partnerships are about shared 
agendas as well as combined resources, risks and rewards (World Economic Forum 2003, 3).  
By including governmental actors, PPPs are assumed to have an overriding public policy goal, 
but the term can also be applied to commercial arrangements.  That said, most conceptions and 
this work attempt to exclude for-profit arrangements from the analysis, as well as those 
arrangements that provide “public bads” (Börzel and Risse 2005).   
 As many organisations attempt to classify PPPs, varying definitions emerge that are 
highly context-specific depending on the actors involved.
7
  The UN defines public-private 
partnerships as ‘voluntary and collaborate relationships between various parties, both State 
and non-State, in which all participants agree to work together to achieve a common purpose 
or undertake a specific task and to share the risks and responsibilities, resources and benefits” 
(United Nations 2005). This contrasts slightly from UN-Business partnerships, which are “a 
mutually beneficial agreement between one or more UN bodies and one or more corporate 
partners to work toward common objectives based on the comparative advantage of each, with 
a clear understanding of respective responsibilities and the expectation of due credit for every 
contribution” (Tesner with Kell 2000, 72).  This latter definition takes a more normative 
                                                 
6 Many argue that conceptualising public versus private, or state versus non state involves problematic normative 
assumptions regarding the incentives of these actors, as it cannot be assumed that public actors are always acting in 
the state interest and non state actors (NSAs) are not.  Dingwerth and Hanrieder (2010) recommend distinguishing 
between public and private governance techniques.  
7 The definitions of partnerships employed by IOs are highly dependent on their operations and engagement with 
them.  Only the World Bank offers specific guidelines on what constitutes a partnership, defining “an agreement to 
work together for common goals, with all parties committing resources (financial, technical, or personnel) to agreed 
activities, with a clear division of responsibilities and distinct accountabilities for achieving these goals.”  The IMF 
classifies PPPs as “arrangements where the private sector supplies infrastructure assets and services that 
traditionally have been provided by the government” (Hemming 2006).  Other IGOs consider topical focus: the 
WHO defines them as means to “bring together a set of actors for the common goal of improving the health of 
populations based on mutually agreed roles and principles” (WHO 2000).   
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understanding in assuming shared values and norms of the partners, or the development of the 
“we-feeling” in the relationships. 
 Supplementary conditions, mainly in regards to scope or issue focus are also often 
integrated into the definition.  Thus, in short, even when formally defined, the term partner 
continues to incorporate a variety of engagements and values.  This has led several authors 
(and many PPPs themselves) to forgo use of the term partnership, referring instead to public-
private institutions (Andonova 2005), public-private policy networks (Reinicke and Deng 
2000; Messner 1997; Thatcher 1998), multistakeholder alliances or transnational interactions, 
multi-stakeholder processes (Hemmatti et al. 2002), as exemplified in Table 2.2 below. 
Due to the wide diversity of partnerships and to avoid normative preconditions, 
public-private partnerships are here considered voluntary, horizontally structured and 
relatively institutionalised arrangements that bring together actors from distinct sectors 
through an actual partnering arrangement rather than only more informal interactions; 
however, this work focuses on transnational public-private partnerships.
8
  This latter 
definition, which the work utilises to compile the related database, incorporates the universe of 
PPPs with global scope (operating across more than one country or region) and an overriding 
public policy goal.
9
 
As the focus is on governance beyond the state, the term transnational rather than 
global is employed, but this does not imply the exclusion of governmental actors.  Further, 
while “partnership” is utilised to focus only upon formalised partnering initiatives, the term 
here is value-neutral: it does not necessarily imply that there is a convergence or compatibility 
of interests, incentives or intended aims. As the empirical chapters of this work showcase, 
these not only diverge greatly across PPPs and their respective partners but should also not be 
assumed as given or necessary.   
This work’s Transnational Partnership Database (TPD) attempts to capture all 
partnerships within these definitions.  This partnering universe is then narrowed to a sampling 
frame of institutionalised, tri-sectoral, transnational partnerships (ITPs), which is a subset 
of the “universe” of PPPs and allows this work to conduct a deeper probe and subsequent 
                                                 
8 Kaul’s (2006) work considers global public-private partnerships where global refers to those that address a global 
challenge, have operations that span several countries or regions and/or include actors joining forces across several 
countries/ regions.  Others distinguish PPPs as governance beyond the state and employ the term transnational to 
signify either operations that span more than one country or the actors join forces across more than one country 
(Biermann et al. 2007b).  This work utilises the term transnational, though it is acknowledged the words are used 
interchangeably in the literature.     
9 The provision of a public good or public policy goal is criterion, but this work separates the intended function 
from actual effects, as otherwise failing PPPs would be excluded from the definition.  See Keohane (1993) for a 
discussion of the methodological issues in assuming standards within definitions as applied to international 
regimes. 
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analysis on this set of relatively institutionalised structures.  What is significant is that sectoral 
or functional lines are not utilised to reach this universe; instead, the sampling frame 
represents all PPPs within the universe (collected in the TPD) which involve actors from the 
public, private and social sectors, are transnational in that their operations span more than one 
country/region and the actors involved join across one or more country or region, are not-for 
profit and focus on addressing a global challenge or provision of collective goods10 (Table 
2.1). 
 Table 2.1 Partnership definitions employed 
 Main Partnership definitions employed throughout work  
Public-private 
partnerships  
Voluntary, horizontally structured and minimally institutionalised 
arrangements that bring together actors from distinct sectors that join for 
an actual partnering arrangement rather than only more informal 
interactions 
Transnational 
Public-private 
partnerships 
Voluntary, horizontally structured and relatively institutionalised 
arrangements transnational arrangements that bring together actors from 
distinct sectors organised with a global/ transnational reach and purpose 
of providing collective goods 
Tri-sectoral 
transnational 
public-private 
partnerships 
(ITPs) 
(Sampling Frame) 
Voluntary 
Horizontally structured 
Tri- actor based 
At least one actor from the public, private and social (not-for-
profit) sector 
Transnational 
Global scope, AND 
Actors join across more than one country or region 
Public policy focused 
Aim or goal is providing a public good or addressing global 
public policy need/issue  
 
 
 
2.2 Promotion of transnational PPPs 
The essence behind partnering is that collaborative effort will result in additional 
value and effects unachievable without cooperation.  Motivation for these synergies, or the 
“perception that acting in collaboration with like-minded partners is more effective than acting 
alone” (Vigoda-Gadot 2003, 72), fuels their promotion. While partnerships have long played a 
role in governance, especially on the national scene (Pierre 1998), recent dynamics have 
proven conducive to a renewed partnering between business, governmental and social groups.  
The partnership “boom” has now firmly taken hold at the transnational level as well, and 
global PPPs are quickly becoming new authority models that are changing patterns of 
governance worldwide (Giddens 2000; Hirst and Thompson 1999; Pierre and Peters 2000).   
                                                 
10 Public goods are traditionally defined as those that are nonrival and nonexsclusive, see Kaul 1999 and 2001, 
where she argues for an expanded definition of the terms.  Other works consider PPPs those that aim for the 
provision of collective goods, which have at least one of the two traditional characteristics (Schäferhoff, Campe 
and Kaan 2009).    
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The rampant promotion of transnational PPPs has fuelled heightened interest and a 
growing body of research studying PPPs from varied academic and practitioner-based 
disciplines.  As PPPs are approached from different theoretical perspectives and ranging 
empirical motivations, there are several competing theories attempting to explain this trend 
towards public-private partnering. Thus, despite heavy treatment, and perhaps in some part 
stemming from it, the reasons surrounding the emergence of partnerships remain complex and 
contested.  As PPPs are multi-level, multi-playered institutional arrangements, it is not 
surprising that no unified account can fully encompass this trend towards public-private 
governance.  Thus varying accounts should be seen as providing complementary rather than 
competing perspectives, as it is also likely that linkages between these different conditions 
provide the most coherent explanation for PPPs’ emergence.   
 
2.2.1 Structural changes and macro accounts 
From a macro-level, structural perspectives attribute the recent partnering trends to 
changing forces within the political, economic and societal context.  The competing pressures 
emerging from globalisation, the enhanced presence of non-state actors (NSAs) in 
authoritative roles and the continual blurring of formerly held notions of governance authority 
highlighted the complexity of governing a global system.  As the issues facing global leaders 
become too demanding to handle alone (Reinicke 1999; Kaul 1999, 2006; Buse and Walt 
2000a), there was a gradual shift towards relying on new governance arrangements in the form 
of partnerships. 
Economic globalisation is often associated with the liberalisation of markets and the 
increasing reach of corporate and technological power.  Rampant innovations in technology 
and communication have facilitated the international exchange of goods, information and 
services interlinking countries and societies.  Furthered by lowered barriers to capital flows, 
increased market opening and loosened regulations, the impact of financial globalisation has 
changed how countries interact and enhanced the reliance of states and global leaders upon 
each other (Held et al. 1999), which paved the way for eventual partnering between them.  
Increasing interaction amongst people and nations also connects formerly isolated groups and 
communities, allowing them to organise in new ways, and with this heightened interaction, the 
ability for social groups to form networks has been facilitated (Castells 2000). 
Such dramatic changes facilitated the increased presence of new actors, who were 
now taking on roles once firmly held within the ciphers of governmental control.  Partnerships 
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further reflect the way transnational corporations (TNCs)
11
 have fundamentally altered the 
global landscape.  With over 82,000 TNCs operating internationally as of 2008, an increase 
from 37,000 in 1992 (UNCTAD 2009),  their enhanced roles not only challenge the power 
balance between the public and private sectors but the regulatory framework of international 
commerce and activity (Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999).  More than economic effects, 
globalisation also brought civil society to the forefront.  The number of nongovernmental 
associations (NGOs
12
) operating globally also continues to grow,
 13
 with the worldwide NGO 
directory listing over 79,000 in 2011.
14
  Yet while their increasing engagement in global 
interactions cannot be denied, critics continue to question NGOs’ lagging standards in 
accountability and legitimacy and even their actual success.
15
  
With rising corporate profits and an increased attention to social concerns, the nature 
and flow of financial monies related to philanthropy and developmental aid also changed (Bull 
and McNeill 2007, 46-51).   Growing amounts of aid are now channelled through private 
means, with estimates of as high as a 13:1 ratio between private and public net flows (Bull and 
McNeill 2007).  Beyond corporate and individual initiatives, private foundations are becoming 
dominant international players, especially in global health governance.  Largely through their 
role in coordinating increased financial and technical resources, foundations are increasingly 
seen as critical to the partnering process, the financial flows from foundations continue to rise: 
even despite the recent global recessions estimated giving for international purposes was $6.7 
billion in 2009 from US foundations alone (down only 4% from the year prior) (Lawrence and 
Mukai 2010).  Enhanced roles and increasing power leads to legitimate concerns not only 
about the reliance on foundations for resources but also the possible distorting affects these 
players have (Rushton and Williams 2011), especially given their new-found capacity to shape 
the global agenda.   
 While globalisation did not create NSAs, it has certainly empowered them.  These 
actors challenge traditional conceptions of governance as they increasingly assume power in 
                                                 
11 The term TNC is distinguished from a multinational corporation (MNC) to represent firms where the production 
process itself is globalised with a world-wide intra firm division of labour, while within an MNC the production 
process is complete within each regional base.  
12 Civil society is defined as “a political space where voluntary associations seek deliberately to shape policies, 
norms, and deeper social structures” (Scholte and Schnabel 2002, 3).  NGOs are generally defined as organisations 
that are independent from government control, non profit making, and non criminal (Willetts 2004).   
13 For more on the rise of civil society see Wapner 1995; Scholte 2000; Steffek and Nanz 2008 and Bestill and 
Corell, eds 2008. 
14 http://www.wango.org/resources.aspx?section=ngodir  Accessed August 1 2011. 
15 For recent overviews analyzing legitimacy and accountability of Transnational NGOs see Steffek and Hahn 
2011; for accounts of limitations at the global level see Keck and Sikkink 1998; and O’Brien et al., 2000 for global 
social movements and their access points but limited results. 
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traditional government roles,
16
 which leads to a reconfiguration of global political power 
(Ruggie 1993).  Partnerships emerge from this system and also reflect this rebalancing of 
authority relationships.  As Kaul (2006) notes: “the wave of government reengineering and 
market state rebalancing that has swept across many countries in recent decades has now 
reached the arena of international cooperation.  Global public-private partnerships are an 
expression of this change and contributors to it” (2006, 2). 
   
2.2.2 Pragmatic partnership response 
The perceived limited resources of governments, and the “ rise of a new regulatory elite 
emphasizing flexibility and voluntarism,” all allowed multistakeholder partnerships to 
“logically emerge as a promising governance approach” (Inanova 2003, 17).  Public-private 
partnerships emerged as a “pragmatic approach” and a needed movement towards results-
based governance.   
Engaging with partnerships complemented an increasing trend towards cooperation and 
interaction already existing within and across sectors.  Governments have long coordinated 
actions, exemplified even further in recent years with a growing number of inter-state treaties 
and agreements (Andonova 2007).  TNCs operate in complex webs of competition and 
collaboration, which often entails forming both horizontal and vertical networks.
17
   They are 
also increasingly cooperating to establish international frameworks for their activity (Cutler, 
Haufler and Porter 1999).  NGOs also form alliances to consolidate resources and gain wider 
attention (Florini 2000). Especially from the mid 1990s, global leaders began crossing these 
sectoral lines: as Kofi Annan proclaimed to the World Economic Forum, “The UN once dealt 
with governments.  By now we know that peace and prosperity cannot be achieved without 
partnerships involving governments, international organisations, and the business community 
and civil society” (UN 1998).   
As once diverse groups of actors increasingly interacted, there was an influx of networks 
representing collaboration that was not only multi-actor but multi sectoral, multi-level and 
transnational as well (Zadek 2006; Witte, Reinicke and Benner 2002).  Partnerships further 
institutionalise these ties and provide more concreteness to transnational relations (Steets 
2005).  More institutionalised than informal alliances or networks, they are often longer 
                                                 
16 For works analysing rising private authority in governance see Cutler Haufler and Porter 1999 and Hall and 
Bierstecker 2000 and Pattberg 2007 regarding rise of private environmental regimes.    
17 In efforts to enhance their representation and interests in the global forum, these firms also increasingly 
cooperating in international business associations, such as the ICC which represents more than 7,000 companies 
and has enjoyed consultative status with the UN since 1946 (Bull and McNeill 2007, 63). 
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lasting than networks but still maintain a level of operational flexibility, which is often seen as 
one of their main benefits (Witte, Streck and Benner 2003, 65).   
The move to results-based governance through partnerships was not only a search for 
increased institutional stability but also a response to the perceived failure of traditional state-
centered governance solutions to pressing international problems (Streck 2002).  While they 
have similar functional advantages to transnational networks (Slaughter 2004; Cashore 2004), 
PPPs are generally focused on specific problems.  The ability to add specificity with targeted 
goals allows greater focus in operations, which should lead to more tangible results (Widdus 
2003; Reinicke and Deng 2000). An “absence of legalism” (Andonova 2005, 8) also 
characterises most partnerships.  This allows for more flexible and efficient working structures 
and faster response times, but as noted in the introductory chapter, it raises questions 
regarding their legitimacy (Reinicke and Deng 2000; Bruhl 2007), which is furthered below. 
 
2.2.3 Actor-based approaches  
Though linked to the accounts above, rather than focusing on structural conditions or 
the “partnership phenomenon itself,” another set of theories looks into rather than at 
partnerships.  These perspectives view partnership arrangements as “advancements of actor-
specific goals” (Van Huijstee, Francken and Leroy 2007, 81).  The emphasis is on the 
incentives that led governments, corporations, IGOs and civil society groups to collaborate, 
and partners are seen as rational actors engaging within the partnership to maximize their own 
interests. 
Financial concerns and access to resources are certainly at play, but governments also 
turn to PPPs to increase efficiency of by harnessing private market practices.  More than 
monetary incentives, the combined skills and resources should “achieve a common goal that is 
unattainable by independent action” (Widdus 2003, 235).  Even though they demand increased 
services or performance, many citizens remain wary of corporate influence on government, 
and public officials fear losing touch with citizens if their roles are undertaken by private 
actors.  Combined, partnerships should channel the efficiencies of the private sector while 
maintaining public principles on citizen accountability and a focus on public good. That said, 
while the promise to bring more “businesslike” practice and thinking into traditional 
government roles is tempting, these incentives can be based on misguided normative beliefs 
regarding private versus public sector efficiencies and competencies (Brinkerhoff and 
Brinkerhoff 2011). 
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Frequently subject to attacks for failing to address global concerns, or even 
contributing to them, IGOs and their agencies are often blamed for the “ongoing crisis of 
multilateralism” (Therien and Vincent Pouliot 2006, 60).  While IGOs promises to reach and 
embrace some of these aforementioned global changes, their efforts were often seen as 
insufficient (Slaughter 2001; Archibugi and Held 1995; Held 2005; Woods 1999).  Thus while 
these organisations are challenged to “reinvent” themselves if they wish to continue to 
complete and fulfil their aims (Witte, Reinicke and Benner 2002), they face dwindling 
budgets, lagging public support and growing contests over both their agenda and forms 
(O’Brien et al. 2000).  
While IGOs had long engaged with civil society through partnering arrangements, the 
number of these relationships amplified in the past decade.  IGOs engagement in PPPs is 
driven by multiple incentives ranging from acquiring or borrowing business expertise and 
resources to improving their image, among others.  It is also argued that through partnerships,  
IGOs can ensure they are not neglected from global governance; indeed, far from diminishing 
their authority, engaging in partnerships could even strengthen their role if they become the 
“nodal points” in this “complex network of governance” (Bull, Boas and McNeill 2004, 493). 
Firms were increasingly embracing partnerships as well, and the growing 
interdependence between business and society is a dominant feature of the past decade (Van 
Huijstee and Glasbergen 2010), especially as it become increasingly recognised that “social 
responsibility, social programs can enhance the profitability of the firm” (Kanter 1999; in 
Samil et al. 2002, 991). Enhancing their public relations, addressing social concerns and 
charitable giving are becoming core strategy, as “a social license to operate is critical for many 
companies and protecting it certainly represents a core business interests” (Caplan 2003, 34).   
Firms were also increasingly recognising that they were embedded within networks of 
interlinking stakeholders.  This growing sense of interdependence in large part furthered a 
push towards Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and its related initiatives. Originally 
associated with the notion of enhancing stakeholder instead of only shareholder values 
(Freeman 1987), the term is now more encompassing to consider companies’ broader 
economic, social and environmental impacts.
18
  Cross-sectoral partnerships further these 
trends (Seitanidi 2005)
19
 for companies to address global challenges within their CSR 
initiatives.   
                                                 
18 See, for example, the Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-
rcbg/CSRI/index.html 
19  See also Seitanidi and Crane 2009; Selsky and Parker 2005; and Hurrell and Tennyson 2006 regarding business-
NGO or nonprofit partnerships. 
40 
 
IGOs, especially the WHO are also especially appealing partners for firms, as they can 
bring an enhanced profile and provides needed resources, such as cutting costs in research and 
development, and information.  Especially given the reach of PPPs in less developed countries 
(LDCs), partnerships provide TNCs with access to new markets and regions, often deemed 
crucial for future competitiveness.  Brand enhancement and reputation building are also 
dominant concerns (Witte and Benner 2006), and firms enter partnerships to improve their 
internal (Davis 1999) and external image (Murphy and Bendell 1997; Tholke 2003).  More 
than pure self-interest, however, firms also recognise that this “new paradigm of innovation” 
between private and public can “produce[s] profitable and sustainable change for both sides;” 
(Kanter 1999; in Samil et al. 2002, 991).  
Not only are civil and social groups boosting cooperating with public sector bodies 
(Cashore 1994; Matthews 1997), but alliances between businesses and NGOs have 
proliferated rapidly as well (Heap 2000).  Traditionally viewed as confrontational foes, NGOs 
and businesses are increasingly collaborating with each other at heightened levels, and often 
without any government actors.  While most of the related literature explores motivations for 
collaboration, generally focused on resources, both financial and capacity based, shared 
missions and furtherance of related CSR goals are also factors. Especially as NGOs often 
claim they are neglected in global decision making, they see partnerships as ways to further 
increase their involvement in global governance and becoming more respected global players.   
 
2.2.4 Ideational forces  
The shift from government provision of public goods to governance through networks of 
private and social actors also marks ‘a significant erosion of the boundaries separating what 
lies inside a government and its administration and what lies outside them’ (Shapiro 2001, 
369).  The proliferation of partnerships can also in part be attributed to changes in the 
corresponding set of ideational forces within the political economy that occurred along with 
these structural shifts. 
The past quarter century was associated with an increasing wave of Neoliberal ideology 
sweeping across many OECD countries.  Especially with the abrupt end of the Cold War, the 
tightly held notion of a state-market divide began to fall which fuelled the general acceptance 
of the role for the private sector in formerly publicly controlled functions as well as 
heightened reliance on market resources (Campbell and Pedersen 2001).   Strongly associated 
with the “New Public Administration” and “New Public Management” trends of the early 
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1990s, partnerships embody new methods of delivering public services in efforts that reinforce 
the perceived win-win logic of combining public and private interests (Steets 2005). 
A paradigm without a rival (Ivanova 2003), these neoliberal trends spread far beyond the 
political and economic realms, as there was a growing realisation of the need for balance 
between increased economic efficiency and social equity.  Social and environmental concerns 
became institutionalised within this setting, especially in the now established concepts of 
sustainable development (Glasbergen and Groenenber 2001; Arts 2002) and CSR.   
Even further, as they undertake increasing authority, non-state actors also shape the 
norms of the global agenda.  Applying a constructivist approach to PPPs, others associate the 
rise of partnerships with the emergence of a “new global public domain” (Ruggie 2004, 519) 
where public finance is “adopting to the expanding globalising nature of its main deliverables, 
public goods and equity, and reinventing itself along the way” (Kaul and Concericao 2006, 
19).  Collaboration between NGOs and TNCs represents more than just reconfiguring global 
political power but also the “engendering and instituting [of] new expectations concerning the 
global social responsibility of firms” (Ruggie 2004, 510).  Ruggie further notes that the Global 
Compact exemplifies these trends on a macro-level while the increased action of TNCs in 
HIV/Aids treatments points to this on the micro level (ibid, 513). 
Further, it is this broad coalition of stakeholders that is seen as a precondition for 
realising sustainable development efforts.  As Annan further argues, “These partnerships are 
changing strategies and practices in both the business and NGO sectors, with important 
implications for future sustainable development efforts and broader coalition and partnership 
building” (UN Secretary-General 2001).  Partnerships are also about helping to “develop a 
range of trustworthy, reciprocal relationships which bind individuals, groups, and 
communities and society together” (Hailey 2000, 316), and thus public and corporate actors 
utilise partnerships to further “build broader social capital” (Ruggie 2004, 514) on a global 
level.   
While less commonly applied to analysing PPP emergence, these sociological 
perspectives lend additional tools, especially where these structural and actor-based 
approaches cannot fully account for this rampant promotion of partnerships.  The notion of 
path dependency attempts to explain why institutions develop then persevere, even if altering 
them would lead to more effectiveness in the long run (Powell 1991, 192).  Path dependency 
suggests that “particular courses of action, once introduced, can be virtually impossible to 
reverse” (Pierson 2004, 251).  Applied to partnerships, it becomes more clear how the notion 
of partnering became fixed as a “win-win” paradigm, leading to their proliferation even 
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without adequate examination (Bäckstrand 2010).  Buse and Harmer (2004) makes a similar 
argument, noting PPPs can become constructed within a “dominant discourse, furthering their 
“win-win” appeals despite little to no evidence of their effects.   
Given the evolving political and social context and surrounding PPPs, assuming its 
participants are rational, self-interested participants is inadequate, as “beliefs in norms and 
principles – even beliefs only held in the past – can profoundly affect rational action in the 
present” (Keohane 2000, 8).  To determine if PPPs promote emerging principles of conduct, 
“in that they assist in process of mutual adjustment of policies and practices between 
multilateral organisations and the private actors” (Bull and McNeill 2007, 42), or reinforce 
existing principles, this qualitative dimension on norms and values must be kept.    Such views 
add a normative component to the analysis that further explains how the “PPP paradigm” 
became such an accelerating political process (Buse and Harmer 2004), even though PPPs 
themselves have been largely untested.   
Of course these divisions are not clear cut; while there is a general distinction between 
rational accounts within the literature, neo-Gramscian and constructivist approaches 
(Schäferhoff, Campe and Kaan 2009), there are variants within each.  While functional-based 
accounts are the most developed, they are obviously limited in their explanatory power, and 
they are criticised for the narrower set of outcomes they would assume.  They also fail to 
account for the resultant institutional variety that encompasses the universe of PPPs 
(Andonova 2010).
20
  Despite relevant overtones, few constructivist accounts have been 
empirically tested, and these also offer less in explaining resultant institutional variation, 
though there are many related constructs increasingly applied.  Arguing that these constructs 
are still too state-centric to encapsulate the partnership trend, Boas, Bull and McNeill (2004) 
apply a “neo-gramscian” approach which is based upon a constructivist reading to examine 
multi-sectoral governance.  Other similar accounts associate emergence of PPPs with the rise 
of corporate hegemony (Levy and Newell 2002) and corporate globalisation (Utting and 
Zammit 2006; Utting and Zammit 2009; Boas, Morten and McNeill 2004), issues returned to 
in subsequent chapters.   
 
2.2.5 PPPs: Global governance gaps 
A movement away from authoritative government to a system characterised by 
interactions between actors (Peters 2005) and a world of “governance without government” 
                                                 
20 Subsequent chapters in this work will also expose their lacks when empirically tested against the universe of 
PPPs. 
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(Rosenau and Czempiel 1992) introduced in the first chapter, may also be leading away from 
the actual principles of governance.  Even as they are gaining acceptance in authoritative 
roles, these newer actors are not only accused of lacking democratic principles, their ability to 
properly address global challenges is called into question.  As the global political arena lacks 
one recognized authority, global governance is further defined as “the process of creating a 
legitimate political order in the absence of supranational authority or world government” 
(Bäckstrand 2005, 6).  One of the challenges of establishing this order in the absence of 
modern statehood is “the lack of congruence between those who are being governed and those 
to whom the governing bodies are accountable” (Risse 2004, 1).   
PPPs are professed to meet these challenges.  To the extent that they are democratic, 
representative and transparent, partnerships could even enhance governance legitimacy  
(Börzel and Risse 2003).  As the introduction prefaced, legitimacy can be considered via both 
its “inputs” of accountability, transparency and representation – and the “outputs” of 
effectiveness or problem solving achievement (Scharpf 1999).
21
  These two aspects can often 
be at odds; that is, “while efficiency and [input] legitimacy are not necessarily contradictory, it 
is obvious that international organisations face a stiff uphill battle in their attempt to please 
and deliver on both ends” (Benner, Reinicke and Witte 2002, 4).  As the rest of this work 
furthers these arguments, only a brief snapshot of the key points is provided below. 
Partnerships are promoted with the promise they can bridge these aforementioned deficits 
in global politics (Andonova 2005; Buse and Walt 2000a).  Given that in PPPs, unlike more 
informal interactions, “there are specific actors to hold accountable” (Hale and Mauzerall 
2004, 222), accountability should be increased.  Since PPPs operate with horizontal rather 
than top-down accountability mechanisms (Bäckstrand 2005), the range of stakeholders they 
are accountable to is increased which should allow for enhanced reputational accountability.  
Partnerships also improve decision making as they “spread the ownership of the decision 
making process and ensure that there is a broader accountability for actions taken” (Hailey 
2000, 317).  Transparency should be increased as public spending is made more visible to 
the public.  This is furthered through the involvement of newer sets of actors if private sector 
methods of public reporting are preserved. Most foundations are also held accountable through 
public tax filings.  NGOs involvement should also increase the “bottom-up” nature of decision 
making and lead to increased public knowledge sharing (Bäckstrand 2005, 5-7).   With their 
claim of a wider base of representation, partnerships broaden participation in governance 
                                                 
21  Similar classifications into input versus output legitimacy are detailed by Kahler 2004 and Bäckstrand 2005; 
Zurn 2004 presents a breakdown into its normative and descriptive aspects.  See also Biermann and Gupta 2011 for 
an introduction to legitimacy challenges as applied to private governance regimes. 
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processes.  They also promise to increase not only the representation of actors involved in the 
decision making and operations but also of those receiving the services or benefits.   
Especially with the inclusion of NGOs, it is promised to bridge the lack of participation in 
current governance (Andonova 2005; Benner 2002; Reinicke and Deng 2000).   
 At the end of the day, citizens and states are calling for results, or more “bang for their 
buck” (Benner, Reinicke and Witte 2002, 4); eventual achievements and output matter.  There 
is a need for focused, results-based governing entities that prioritise the provision of global 
public goods and deliverables.  Perhaps most promising is the potential for PPPs to close the 
implementation gap.  The ability to draw together actors from across borders also addresses 
the jurisdictional gap hampering many current development efforts.  Bringing together these 
diverse actors leverages diverse resource, information and skill sets; thus, it should improve 
lagging governmental effectiveness (Reinicke and Deng 2000).  Achieving these results is 
possible by combining the strengths of the parties involved, and this implies more than just 
monetary resources but also combined expertise and commitment.  As mentioned at the onset 
of this work, at issue are the possible tradeoffs between the two, especially related to those 
who argue that PPPs as emerging forms of governance are trying to improve output legitimacy 
through increased input legitimacy (Risse 2004, 16). 
 
2.3 PPPs: Public-private partnerships: Current landscape 
The varied approaches taken to conceptualising PPPs inevitably leads to disjuncture in 
the use and understanding of them.  This subsection emphasises the marked diversity of 
partnerships by briefly reviewing the timeline of PPP emergence, the key role of IOs in 
promoting and hosting PPPs and existing attempts to numerate and categorise them. 
 
2.3.1 Landscape and categorisation 
Given the encompassing nature of the term, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
pinpoint the precise number of existing transnational PPPs.  A large discrepancy prevails 
between the rampant attention given to promoting partnerships and that given to focusing on 
conceptual clarification.  Though all PPPs represent some form of institutionalised interaction 
between public and private actors, the extent of the interaction, level of institutionalisation and 
diversity of the partners involved are highly varied, even among those arising in similar issue 
areas.  Even more so, public-private relationships are also described via a multitude of terms 
(Table 2.2).  
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Table 2.2 Partnership Terms:  Common applications 
 
Public-private partnerships: Treatments and terminology 
Acronym Full Name Reference 
CO Consortium Organization Updegrove 1995 
CP Civil Partnership Zadek 2004 
CSCA Cross-Sectoral Collaborative Alliance Gray 1996 
CSOC Cross-Sector Organizational 
Collaboration 
Johnson 2002 
CSP Cross-Sectoral Partnership Googins & Rochlin 2002 
GAN Global Action Network Waddell 2003 
GHP Global Health Partnerships Buse and Walt 2000a, 2000b; Buse and 
Harmer 2007 
GIN Global Issue Network Rischard 2002 
GPPN Global Public Policy Network Reinicke 1999; Reinicke & Deng  2000 
Witte, Reinicke and Benner 2002 
IP Inter-sectoral Partnership Waddell & Brown 1997 
LP Local Partnership Kjaer 2003 
MAC Movement Advocacy Coalition Ruzza 2004 
MN Multi-sectoral Network Benner et al. 2004 
MSI Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives Oldenziel et al. 2003 
MSP Multi-Stakeholder Process Hemmatti et al. 2002 
NSP New Social Partnership Nelson & Zadek 2000 
PPO Public-private institutions Andonova 2005 
SP Strategic Partnership Ashman 2001 
none Self- governing networks Stoker 1998 
SPO Social Partnership Organization Waddock 1991 
none Transnational partnerships and/or 
networks  
Biermann et al. 2007a 
UNBP UN Business-Partnerships Varied 
 
 
 
While definitional issues are largely to blame, misunderstandings are also 
compounded by the diverse range of partnerships, their varying forms and attributes and the 
multitude of usages and treatment they accord.  Few authors or reviews adequately elucidate 
the concept, so attempts at comparisons are thwarted. As Weihe (2006) argues, PPPs are also 
approached by distinct research traditions, and as such it is not logically possible or even 
sensible to construct an authoritative definition.
22
  From a global perspective, Kaul estimates 
over 400 global PPPs are in operation, a rise from 50 in the mid-1980s (Kaul 2006).  Her 
consolidated listing, however, does not account for the majority of the UN CSD-based 
                                                 
22 Weihe (2006) summarises these approaches as the policy, economic and local regeneration, infrastructure, 
development and governance approaches.  Osbourne (2000) presents a similar review and summarises the 
divergent theories as the nature of collaboration, public management, public governance, local development or 
empirically based case studies. 
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partnerships, of which 348
23
 are currently registered, though not all are operating. Witte and 
Reinicke’s (2005) review of UN-Business partnerships estimated over 125 active partnerships, 
but this also does not include the UN CSD partnerships.  
Given these overlapping sources and definitional ambiguities, considerable confusion 
surrounds attempts to account for the PPP universe.  The TPD provides clarity to the universe 
of PPPs by consolidating all existing data sources, databases and other listings.  Based on the 
sources utilise, it enumerates the PPP universe at 757, though only 439 were operating at the 
time of writing. Remaining discussion is reserved until the fifth chapter which details these 
issues and presents the TPD.  
 
Diversity and typologies  
What is immediately apparent is that PPPs represent a diverse and varying body of 
institutions.  As partnerships cover a myriad of issue areas, differentiating amongst them is a 
useful starting point.  PPPs should first be distinguished by actors involved, mode of steering 
and overall aim or goal, which often includes scope.   Further categorising can include 
breaking down by nature of activity, membership, time scale and/or level of 
institutionalisation.  In existing works, many separate by purpose, actors involved, phase of 
operation, location and structure (McQuaid 2000, 13), but partnerships still vary greatly within 
these classifications.  Similarly employed categories are based upon constituency, 
organisational form, nature of activity or variety of partners involved (Reich 2002, 5). 
Most existing studies employ functional breakdowns.  As an example, the UN 
distinguishes between partnerships focused on advocacy, developing norms and standards, 
sharing and coordinating resources and harnessing markets for development, while the OECD 
notes that the CSD partnerships perform seven functions (OECD 2006).  Bull and McNeill 
(2007) divide PPPs into those focused on resource mobilization, advocacy, policy and 
operations, which they term harnessing markets for development.  Benner, Reinicke and Witte 
(2005) provide a similar breakdown and consider the following: facilitating the negotiation 
and settlement of global standards, allowing for the multi-sectoral sourcing of knowledge, 
making new markets where lacking and deepening markets failing to fulfil their potential and 
innovative implementation mechanisms.   
Though functional breakdowns are useful,
24
 many partnerships fit into multiple 
categories, and categories reveal little about actual functioning.   Other attempts segment PPPs 
                                                 
23 The CSD websites notes 348 partnerships registered; the number 352 is the number of CSD based PPPSs in the 
TPD, which includes 4 additional partnerships originally included within this listing that have been removed from 
the main website [Last accessed 30 July 2011].   
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by institutional status (Mitchell-Weaver and Manning 1990) or structural models.
25
   One of 
the most comprehensive attempts at classification is  Kaul’s (2006) work covering more than 
400 global partnerships finds seven types by considering purpose, venture class, nature of 
funding, nature of product, mode and legal status across.   
While useful to enhance our understanding of the coverage and focus of global PPPs, 
a point returned to in chapter four, categorisation should be seen as a means to an end rather 
than an end in itself. As PPPs are such a diverse body of institutions, they cannot always be 
neatly placed into segments.  Especially when only simple taxonomies are developed, crucial 
aspects of partnership functioning and operations remain unconsidered, such as partnering 
incentives, power relationships and decision making styles.  These limitations noted, this work 
categories the PPPs within the TPD across ten functional definitions, as furthered in the fourth 
chapter. 
 
2.3.2 PPPs and international organisations  
While the progression towards partnering was not necessarily linear, it has undoubtedly 
accelerated in recent years, especially considering the role of IGOs played in promoting them.  
Though from their inception IGOs incorporated some acceptance towards engaging with the 
social sector and private business,  it was nearer to the turn of century that they  sought out 
partnerships as “an ideal means through which to reposition [themselves] and sharpen their 
missions” (Reinicke 2000, 54).   
Executive leadership has been a main stimulant for reform (Ruggie 1999; Bull and 
McNeill 2000; O’Brien et al. 2000). Kofi Annan’s leadership role as secretary-general 
beginning in 1996 undoubtedly was another major event in turning the UN towards private 
sector approaches (Tesner with Kell 2000, 31).  Former World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz 
dedicated substantial attention to partnerships during his term, and when Go Harlem 
Brundtland became WHO Director-General in 1998, she began a strong push towards 
engaging with companies, noting that the WHO has to “be more innovative in creating 
influential partnerships’’ (Brundtland 1999; in Buse and Walt 2000, 554).     
                                                                                                                                            
24 Other variations are based upon subject area, such as Buse and Walt’s version that suggests simplicity is more 
necessary and segments global PPPs for health through goal orientation as follows: product based (focused on 
increasing supply in areas of unmet demand for certain drugs), product development (public sector offsets some 
portion of the costs of drug research and development; and system/issue orientation (focused on drawing attention 
to or creating promotion of certain healthy policy issues or resource (2000a, 700).  
25 See also Reinicke and Deng 2000; Nelson 2002; and Börzel and Risse 2005. 
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Though the UN was not created to actively engage with private actors,
26
 and “then as now 
there was no basis covering hybrid forms of international collaboration” (Martens 2007, 11), it 
has fervently embraced partnerships in the past decade. The 2002 World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg was integral in this accord.  Initiated to 
some extent due to the perceived lack of progress on the Earth Summit goals, the WSSD 
launched close to 300 partnerships, known as Type-II agreements to distinguish them from the 
politically negotiated Type I agreements, which were promoted as follows: 
“Specific commitments by various partners intended to contribute to and reinforce the 
implementation of the outcomes of negotiations of the WSSD and to help further 
implementation of Agenda 21 and the MDGs.” 
   Bali Guidelines (UN 2002a) 
 
As Zadek expressed, “The Johannesburg Summit was more than anything about 
partnerships.  Just as Rio was as much about legitimising the role of NGOs in global 
governance as it was about the environment, Johannesburg was about the legitimacy of the 
role of business in development, working with public bodies and civil society organisations” 
(Zadek 2004, 21).  The Johannesburg partnerships were later registered within the UNDP’s 
Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), as discussed in the fifth chapter. 
 Though virtually all agencies engage in multistakeholder partnerships in some way, 
there is a marked variety within UN organisations.
27
  Considering the UNDP’s key role in 
supporting the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), it sponsors numerous partnerships 
programmes including the Public-Private Partnerships for the Urban Environment (PPUE), 
which hosts close to 400 partnerships and the Small Grants Programme, which is one of the 
earliest efforts involving non-state actors within IGOs.  UNICEF claims is has “has the most 
extensive corporate involvement of any single UN body” (UN archives 93; in Buse and Walt 
2000, 554), and reports entering into over 1,000 alliances.  The United Nations Environment 
Program (UNEP) also has extensive involvement in local partnerships and initiatives, such as 
the UNEP Finance Initiative (UNEP FI).  The United Nations Fund for International 
Partnerships (UNFIP) has also supported over 400 projects implemented by 39 UN agencies 
that cover activities in 123 countries between 1998 and 2006 (UNFIP 2007); however, 
projects do not necessarily imply the creation of a new partnership. 
                                                 
26 The initial UN charter incorporated a role for civil society under Article 71 (Tesner with Kell 2000, xxii), but UN 
officials did not formally work with them until the 1990s individual companies did not engage formally with the 
UN until the 2000s.   
27 See See Hoxtell, Preysling and Steets 2010 or Utting and Zammit 2009. 
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At the forefront of such relations given the daunting challenges of the global health 
agenda, the WHO began an earlier reach for corporate resources, expertise and funding.  
Indeed, some of the first and most highly profiled PPPs emerged within the WHO, such as 
Roll Back Malaria
28
 in 1998.  A lagging budget, perceived lack of effectiveness and 
overwhelming burdens led the WHO to feel that corporations were increasingly needed to 
further their work (Buse and Walt 2000a, 552); indeed, as WHO director Dossal notes that the 
involvement with business and civil society may “not just [be] the best chance, it may be the 
only chance to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (Dossal 2005, 2).  
The World Bank exhibited a stronger private sector focus than the UN from the start, and 
it has always “tended to argue the merits of the private sector (Bull and McNeill 2007, 10).  Its 
charter, however, technically not does permit it to enter into PPPs.
29 
 Based upon perceived 
early successes from greater private sector involvement in the late 1980s, the Bank’s efforts in 
these regards began to grow.  In 1998 it launched its Business Partnerships for Development 
website with the goal of developing and promoting partnerships in the areas of natural 
resources, water and sanitation, road safety and youth development.   It is estimated the Bank 
engages in over 125 Global Partnership Programs and 50 Regional (Steets and Thomsen 
2009), and its other main partnering programs are the Private Participation in Infrastructure 
schemes (PPIs)
30
 and the Carbon Fund.
31
  
 
2.4 Debating partnerships 
While they may be uniquely structured and suited to address the new global 
challenges they are increasingly promoted to face, partnerships are far from a proven mode of 
governance. Not only are “cross-sector partnerships by their very nature unnatural 
relationships” (Caplan 2003, 32), but public-private synergies may not always be achieved.  
Given that “the tendency towards multistakeholder partnerships continues to develop 
unhindered in international collaboration” without governments and IOs keeping pace with 
necessary regulations and guidelines (Martens 2007, 19), several issues emerge. 
 
 
                                                 
28 http://www.rbm.who.int/ 
29 The Bank’s charter entails that it cannot lend directly to the private sector with governance guarantees; it can 
however do so through its subsidiary the International Finance Corporation (IFC), as well as engage in many 
private sector transactions through its growing Finance and Private Sector Development Department.  See Miller-
Adams 1999 for more background. 
30 http://ppi.worldbank.org/ 
31 http://www.carbonfund.org/ 
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2.4.1 Shortcomings  
Positive ideological tones and optimistic promises have catapulted PPPs onto the 
global stage, but there are often “misguided assumptions” regarding the efficiency of 
combining the public and private sectors (Buse and Harmer 2007).  The translation of 
complementary resources into a synergistic relationship often fails to materialise, and PPPs 
can lead to partners bearing more risk or cost for the undertaking than without the interaction.  
Rather than a “win-win solution,” partnering may lead to a trade off between the quality of 
government and the efficiency of the market (Hemming 2006, 15).   Further, partnerships are 
not necessarily new, but rather a “relabeling” of existing operations, with no improvements or 
modifications made to current projects (Richter 2003).  Many suggest partnerships only 
duplicate current IO work or new PPPs simply replicate existing ones (Caines and Lush 2004), 
which could further neglect more pressing needs.  For example, it is claimed that the Global 
Fund was created in 2002 motivated by political and ideational aims over functional ones to 
replace the WHO’s Global Programme on Aids, despite lack of evidence a new institution was 
needed (Barnes and Brown 2010). 
In regards to financing, despite the promises of increased financial resources, 
partnerships could actually detract from the provision of public goods if the money pledged 
towards partnerships takes away from other budget areas (Martens 2007).  A study of the CSD 
partnerships finds they “have failed to bring a substantial amount of new, multi-sectoral 
resources to sustainable development activities” (Hale and Mauzerall 2004, 235), and 
similarly, “little evidence that donor funding has been able to leverage additional financial 
support” was noted in a recent review of GHPs (Pearson 2004, 7).  For both GHPs (McCoy et 
al. 2009) and CSD-based partnerships (Hale and Mauzerall 2004; Bäckstrand 2010) private 
sector funding, with the exception of a few foundations, remains limited.   PPPs’ existing 
funding is also often limited to a few sources; for example, some estimate the Gates 
foundation has contributed over 60% of all GHP funding (CIPRIPH 2006, 92).  The seven 
chapter explores these financial issues in more detail.   
Such issues further concerns over potential power imbalances introduced above. 
Mixing TNCs, rich in financial resources and size, with NGOs could allow the operating 
modes of the firms to dominate.  Neglect of local stakeholders is an even more dominant 
concern: many existing health and environment partnerships, which constitute the majority of 
these arrangements, are found to exclude smaller, local partners from key partnerships’ 
proceedings arrangements (Buse and Harmer 2007, 262-263; Rein et al. 2005, 10).  Further, 
when corporations or IOs become involved in rural villages or smaller communities, the local 
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interests may be neglected (Hale 2002), and their involvement may even divert resources to 
issues of lesser national or local priority in an attempt to find quick solutions (WHO 2002).   
Risks are also at stake for the partners themselves: for IOs, the threat is that the 
“proliferation of partnership initiatives can contribute to the weakening of multilateral 
cooperation under the UN system and to the fragmentation of global governance” (Martens 
2007, 61) thus frustrating efforts to tackle global challenges (Buse 2004).  More so, some 
accuse PPPs of only weakening further the power of NGOs or civil society (Richter 2002, 12; 
Rundall 2000, 11), advancing corporate interests (Stott 2003) and causing complex problems 
of international coordination (Martens 2007).   
Though IOs are asked to play a role as “norm entrepreneurs” (Benner 2002), how 
these norms are formed is an issue.  Tesner with Kell (2000) note that the UN has a role to 
play in transmitting global norms, which is facilitated by initiatives such as the Global 
Compact, but many fear such partnerships are only means for corporations to “blue wash”32 
their image without adopting or practicing these global norms.  Furthermore, the Compact is a 
voluntary initiative, which does not “have the mandate or resources, to monitor or measure 
participants’ performance,”33 and is often accused of too easily accepting partners that do not 
uphold the UN’s missions.  In contrast, NGOs have a difficult and complicated procedure to 
gain consultative status with the ESOSOC to prove their activities are compatible (Martens 
2007, 38). Despite acknowledging the need for multilateral support, there is also a growing 
fear that relying on PPPs might lead to a “diminished sense of the ‘public’ nature of global 
health initiatives” (Buse and Harmer 2007, 265).   
 
2.4.2 PPPs fail to address the gaps? 
Partnerships between business, IGOs and civil society are promoted as the most 
efficient and innovative solution to address these pressing deficits of global governance, but it 
is in these roles that PPPs are the most debated.  Emerging criticisms regarding the 
accountability, transparency, representation, and ultimately effectiveness of these partnerships 
are also surfacing.  The diverse nature of the actors involved and the lack of formal systems of 
reporting makes accountability even harder to track and assess.  A paradox emerges that 
though the desire for increased accountability facilitated PPPs promotion and growth, complex 
relationships between partners, the lack of a polity to report to and a possible inequitable 
spread of resources among the partners could actually reduce accountability (McQuaid 2000, 
                                                 
32As per Bruno and Karliner (2000, 3), bluewashing is a term used when companies work with the UN to improve 
their public image.   
33 www.unglobalcompacy.org/aboutTheGc/integrety.html 
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10).  Even more worrisome is the way that PPPs could allow governments and other public 
sector entities to “shift their policy-decisions to the realm of partnerships” and “circumvent 
parliamentary control” (Steets 2005, 5-6).  Likewise, businesses are accused of using PPPs as 
“public opinion shields” (Andonova 2005, 16) gaining positive reputational effects without 
changing practices.   
Thus despite the promise that PPPs can expand accountability in global governance, 
their flexible structures and diverging actor base certainly ensure accountability is made more 
difficult. Partnerships also lack internal accountability procedures: a year after 
implementation, most of the partnerships adopted at the WSSD had “specified very few such 
transparency and accountability mechanisms in their structure” (Andonova and Levy 2003, 
17).  Increasingly reviews criticize PPPs for lacking standards to both internal and external 
accountability mechanisms (Barstch 2008), though it is argued that as PPPs’ challenge 
traditional notions of democratic accountability (Benner, Reinicke and Witte 2005), perhaps 
PPPs should be held to different accountability standards (Steets and Blattner 2010) 
An inherent lack of transparency also persists in these arrangements, as it is argued 
PPPs could forgo either public or private means of promoting transparency.  Such processes 
can be facilitated by the current lack of any comprehensive fiscal accounting or reporting 
standards for PPPs (IMF 2004, 23) which leads to varying reporting strategies being utilised 
(if any) across partnerships.  Partnerships may also allow multilateral organisations to 
“weaken their accountability to member states” (Steets 2005, 6) and businesses may use PPPs 
to gain positive reputational effects without changing any actual practices.  These challenges 
are often levied against GHPs, especially as to lacking transparency in publishing governing 
materials or reports (Buse 2004b). 
In terms of increasing participation, it is also debated whether partnerships do more 
to represent neglected interests, as they could be continuing to promote the dominance of 
special interests.  A continuation of northern dominance over southern interests is evident in 
many transnational partnerships (Richter 2002), and other studies of PPPs in developing 
countries show that the actual involvement of partner governments and civil society is low in 
terms of participation and any actual influence (Hoering 2003).    Further, if  the individual 
partners involved are themselves not representative, then “it is doubtful that close cooperation 
between essentially unrepresentative organisations – International Organisations, 
unaccountable NGOs, and large TNCs – will do much to ensure better protection for, and 
better representation of, the interests of populations affected by global policies” (Ottaway 
2001).  Determining actual influence is more than simply looking at representation.  As this 
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work will argue in later chapters, static partner listings are often inaccurate and say little 
towards the actual workings within the PPPs.   
  
2.4.3 Lacking output and limitations of current research  
 Do partnerships really deliver results-based governance and address the 
implementation gap?  Given they are studied from multiple disciplines and research 
traditions, misunderstandings prevail.  Though recent growth of studies has advanced out 
understanding of the subject area, the theoretical coverage of PPPs is still broadly segmented 
between diverging perspectives, as became clear in the earlier sections outlining explanations 
for their emergence.  One set of studies views PPPs as institutions while the other as arenas 
for goal-achievement and problem solving for individual actors.  Within the former most 
research attempts are limited to case studies, which entails “partnerships and sustainable 
development are more clearly linked discursively than empirically” (Van Huijstee, Francken 
and Leroy 2007, 85).  The latter tends to focus more on partnership success factors, focusing 
on the partnering process rather than outputs.  Thus far, few concrete efforts to bring these 
varied disciplines together have materialised, which hinders efforts towards cumulative 
understanding.   
 Given a lack of comparable criteria, or even agreed upon notions of what a partnership 
entails, PPPs have not been evaluated in a comprehensive, comparative basis. While there is 
an emerging body of existing evaluations and partnership reviews, current attempts at 
evaluating across partnerships are limited at best, and most are based on high-profile case 
studies.  Larger empirical reviews analyzing PPPs are mainly community or regionally 
focused, and though national PPP projects have been given more consideration, these are 
generally only project focused.  IGOs are gradually conducting more evaluations and case 
studies of successful partnerships, but these documents are often generated internally, which 
may bias the analysis and questions comparability across PPPs. Third party agencies and 
public policy groups are beginning to focus more on review (Rein et. al 2005), but most are 
also case specific and only highlight areas of concern.  Outside of attempts within the health 
and environmental subgroups, few comparative studies consider a large enough sample size 
of PPPs to allow for any generalizations to be reached in regards to their overall impacts. 
While the partnerships hosted within the UN CSD have received more attention to 
evaluation, the most commonly cited works (Andonova and Levy 2003; Hale and Mauzerall 
2004) are now rather outdated.  More recently, a team of researchers furthered the evaluation 
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of these CSD-based PPPs with the Global Sustainability Partnership Database (GSPD)
34
 
(Biermann et al. 2007b).  Emerging works from the GSPD are thus far focused on assessing 
sectoral groupings (Pattberg 2010; Biermann et al. 2007a; Szulecki, Pattberg and Biermann 
2010), but are shedding valuable light onto the state of play and legitimacy of these PPPs.  
Further chapters will discuss these in full when comparing these findings with this work.   
Health partnerships have been the most serious in terms of internal evaluation (Lele et 
al. 2004).  Most attempts at external reviews have also occurred within these GPPPs, and 
some of these reviews have even gone past impact assessments to examine broader 
consequences (Utting and Zammit 2006).  While initial findings are broadly positive in terms 
of the potential for GHPs (Caines 2005), later reviews at the country-specific level (McKinsey 
2005) highlighted serious concerns surrounding the costs at which these initial results were 
incurred.  These and similar national or regional focused reviews further highlight the lack of 
attention to internal evaluation and assessment (McKinsey 2005).  The most evaluated, 
especially as a group, are the set of product development partnerships (PDPs) (Grace and 
Druce 2009), and though these PPPs in particular are seen as delivering on many of their 
targets and leading to noted advancements within particular disease areas of focus, many 
recent reviews are still critical regarding their governance (Buse 2004b; Buse and Harmer 
2007; Sorenson 2009) and note overriding shortcomings in legitimacy (Buse and Tanaka 
2011). 
If partnerships are to live up to their promise that they are “greater than the sum of its 
parts and about creating lasting and meaningful impact at all levels of action” (Global 
Knowledge Partnership Secretariat 2008) than evidence which transcends individual 
partnerships is needed.   As these issues will be continually developed throughout this work, 
the above is purposely only a brief snapshot.  The existing bodies of evaluations, assessments 
and large-n studies will be further explored in the remaining chapters that detail this work’s 
approach to evaluation and the empirical findings that result.
35
 
  
 
 
                                                 
34 http://www.glogov.org/ See also http://www.ivm.vu.nl/en/projects/Projects/environmental-policy-
analysis/partnerships-for-sustainable-development-research-project/index.asp for more information.  
 
35 As the concluding chapter will discuss, the resource library within globalppps.org will host a separate area 
related to PPP evaluation, where downloadable reports, evaluation toolkits and critically the full body of sampling 
frame evaluations can be accessed.  While this work conducted a meta-review of existing partnering toolkits, large-
n evaluations and high profile case studies, this could not be included given space limitations but will be made 
available via this online portal.   
55 
 
Conclusion 
Public-private partnerships are increasing gaining a foothold in international 
governance, yet the motivations for these trends, the possible limitations of PPPs, and most 
significantly their actual effects are far from known.  Though PPPs stand to address the global 
governance gap, the actual effects and impacts of PPPs are largely under explored, which is 
intriguing given their increasing attention, popularity, and perceived promises for future 
governance.  Indeed, a striking component of the recent literature on partnerships is that 
researchers specifically say that they are not going to address effectiveness (Kaul 20006; Bull 
and McNeill 2007; Martens 2007), though they all acknowledge the pressing need for it.   
Challenges certainly exist in examining output legitimacy: the diverse nature of 
partnerships challenges the academic literature in its need to incorporate non-state actors 
working with the public sector in joint operations.  These are challenges undertaken by this 
work, and the next chapter details how by conceptualising PPPs as institutions, partnership 
analysis can benefit from substantial gains made within the research bodies analysing the 
variation and effectiveness of environmental regimes. 
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CHAPTER THREE: INSTITUTIONAL VARIATION  
 
 “Every institution has its unique set of irrational and difficult constraints, yet some make a 
leap while others facing the same environmental challenges do not.36” 
 
The troubling array of global problems increasingly manifesting themselves both 
within and across borders further emphasises the interdependence amongst people and nations 
that characterises the current international system.  Sovereign states have long looked to 
international institutions for their potential roles in facilitating action and enhancing 
cooperation to address these collective challenges.  Though not all were firm to grasp 
Ruggie’s (1975) earlier proclamation that “international behaviour is institutionalised,” the 
role of institutions in coordinating international action has long been of focus within 
international relations (IR). 
The pace of globalisation and increasing complexity of global challenges transform 
this system of interdependent nations and placed increasing pressure on states and their 
existing institutions (Reinicke 1998).  As the limitations of purely intergovernmental efforts to 
coordinate effective action become apparent (Hewson and Sinclair 1999), corporations and 
global civil society organisations  began to claim an increasing presence in global affairs, 
leading to profound reconfigurations of global power and authority.  Consequently, where 
these processes of interdependence and globalisation interact (Buse and Walt 2002, 43), public 
and private actors are coordinating to form new governance arrangements.   
The transnational public-private partnerships introduced in the previous chapter 
illustrate the further institutionalisation of such collective action, as they are seen as potential 
institutional vanguards to address these pressing governance needs.  Yet, while these 
institutions certainly face challenging tasks and difficult environments, some partnerships 
have managed to not only persist but succeed while others fail miserably.  Since some 
partnerships arose out of the same international conferences or mandates and/or involve 
similar actors and organisations, this variation is even more striking.  Yet narrow focuses on 
individual partnership performance without taking internal processes, actor involvement and 
design along with external linkages will not contribute to overall concerns regarding PPP 
legitimacy (Bartsch 2011).  Clearly, partnership analysis is in need of “robust analytical 
frameworks,” else “it will be difficult to make useful comparisons or draw practical 
conclusions” (Utting and Zammit 2006, iv).   
                                                 
36 Collins, Jim.  Good to Great and the Social Sectors: Why Business Thinking is not the answer. 2005.  
57 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to place the study of PPPs within a suitable theoretical 
grounding. As PPPs represent a furtherance of the institutionalisation of IR, rather than 
viewing partnerships as a radical departure from the current system (Andonova 2007, 3), 
partnerships could be conceptualised as emerging forms of international institutions.  Doing so 
would allow existing IR theory, especially focusing on evaluating international regimes, to 
maintain considerable value. Yet while institutional-based theories provide an appropriate 
grounding, a framework must consider that governing authority is now being shared by public, 
private and social actors across multiple spheres.  Transnational partnerships operate at three 
distinct levels: the micro, internal partnership; the meso, institutional or regime; and the 
macro, societal level.  To consider how relevant state and non state actors (NSAs) interact 
within partnerships, these theories must also be complemented with approaches that speak to 
internal governance, organisation and functioning.   
The chapter proceeds by placing partnerships within the current conceptions of 
international institutions and regimes.  The next part discusses the diversity these institutions 
exhibit and presents ranging theories explaining this variation.  The following section returns 
to the issue of analysis and evaluation and specifically considers the progress made and 
applicable lessons from existing attempts aimed towards measuring institutional effectiveness.  
The concluding section brings these arguments together in an application to PPPs and outlines 
commonly considered sets of explanatory variables that will assist in building this work’s 
analytical framework, which is designed to assess partnership variation.   
 
3.1 Institutions, regimes and partnerships: Making sense of concepts 
 
3.1.1 Definitions and background  
The post WWII era has witnessed a dramatic surge in the demand for institutions 
(Keohane and Nye 1989) and organisations (Archer 2001) attempting to cope with deepening 
interdependencies between nations.  Traditional approaches that analysed institutionalised 
cooperation focused on the three associated yet distinct concepts of international institutions, 
regimes and organisations.  While international cooperation was largely an intergovernmental 
affair, the advent of globalisation “subjects the intergovernmental regime to new disciplines” 
(Knight 1999), and challenges these existing institutions.  As Kofi Annan aptly summed: 
“While the post-war multilateral system made it possible for the new 
globalisation to emerge and flourish, globalisation in turn has progressively 
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rendered its designs antiquated.  Simply put, our post-war institutions were 
built for an international world, but we now live in a global world” 
(Annan 2000, 11) 
Globalisation has not only blurred traditional boundaries between nations but borders 
between traditional governance mechanisms as well.  PPPs, as networked forms of governance 
can lead to a gradual erosion of traditional constructs that have long formulated IR study.  Yet 
transnational partnerships lack any clear placement within IR and “do not fit comfortably 
within the traditional structure and terminology of international regimes, institutions and 
organisations” (Andonova 2007, 5).  As little consensus prevails on what even constitutes a 
partnership, their study has relied on a mix of approaches (Weihe 2006).  In efforts to 
determine how PPPs fit within and complement the traditional institutional and regime 
literature, it is first necessary to review the ranging notions of these main concepts.   
The proliferation of international institutions within recent decades has 
reinvigorated their study within all major disciplines from economics (Williamson 1985; 
Nelson and Winter 1982), law (Posner 1981), sociology, organisational studies (Dimaggio and 
Powell 1991) and political science (March and Olson 1989).  While this expanded the research 
discipline, it also led to varying and often competing perceptions of what even constitutes an 
institution!  A broad social science conception considers institutions as sets of rules, decision-
making procedures and programmatic activities that serve to define social practices and to 
guide interaction of those participating in these practices (North 1990), or the “persistent and 
connected sets of rules and practices that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity and 
shape expectations” (Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993, 5).  Within sociology, institutions are 
basic building blocks of social and political life (Dimaggio and Powell 1991), while from an 
economic standpoint, institutions serve to minimize market costs and arise because the 
benefits of creating and participating in them outweigh the associated transaction costs 
(Williamson 1985).   
 Initially institutions were largely viewed as state sponsored actions, and as a result, 
“virtually no one predicted that these would triumph over politics” (Martins and Simmons 
1998, 730-731).  Their increasing role in areas long maintained within the ciphers of nations’ 
borders posed an uneasy challenge to the dominant realist agenda, which viewed institutions 
“as epiphenomena that reflect deeper social forces and distribution of power in society” 
(Strange 1983).  While not disregarding power, neoliberal institutionalists focused on the 
constellation of interests or actor preferences that interact to form and shape institutions.  Such 
perspectives, or power-structural approaches, are largely based on a functional logic: states 
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perceived that the benefits or joint gains from agreeing to cooperation within institutions 
outweighed the costs.  A restricted view of states as rational actors has significant limitations 
(Hollis and Smith 1990; Wendt 2004), as it “left open the issue of what kinds of institutions 
will develop, to whose benefit, and how effective they will be” (Keohane 1988, 388).  This led 
to the growing field of cognitive approaches which incorporated a role for ideas and 
knowledge and also viewed institutions as sites of normative discourse and learning.   
A rising demand for new institutions to cope with deepening interdependencies 
coupled with a loss of confidence in “standard institutional tools” (Young 1994, 4-5) led to a 
renaissance in their study associated with new institutionalism (March and Olsen 1989; 
Rutherford 1994).  Scholars saw more of a need to focus on social institutions as governance 
systems within the international order, or the “constellation of rules” that guided behaviour 
(Martin and Simmons 1998, 737) rather than only the institution as an actor or agency.  Thus, 
the formal study of international regimes became increasingly mainstream within IR and the 
narrower fields of international political economy (IPE) and environmental politics (Young 
1997; Hisschemoller and Gupta 1999).   
Mostly following Krasner’s (1983) work there was general working consensus around 
a definition of regimes as “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of IR” (1983, 2), but 
this still left ambiguities regarding how these norms and principles should be defined as well 
as their role in explaining regime variation (Haggard and Simmons 1987).
37
  This vagueness 
led many to apply a leaner definition (Keohane 1989, 4) while others utilise broader 
conceptions including all forms of “patterned behaviour” (Puchala and Hopkins 1983).  
As both are forms of further institutionalisation of international relations, the 
emergence of regimes and PPPs has been conceptualised in similar ways. Considered as 
social institutions (Young 1994) and a major type of international institution (Keohane 1989), 
both regimes and partnerships “are created to respond to the demand for governance” 
(Breitmeier, Young and Zurn 2006, 3; for similar argument for partnerships, see Reinicke and 
Deng 2000).  They also function within similar realms as both “govern the interactions of 
actors in specific issue areas” (Levy, Young and Zurn 1995, 274).  Though topical concerns 
vary between international regimes and partnerships, regime theory provides many tools for 
                                                 
37 Though Krasner later clarified that “Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, rectitude. Norms are standards of 
behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or postscriptions for action. 
Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice” (1983, 2), 
this still left several questions regarding the precise nature and place of regime theory, such as whether to focus “on 
the basis of explicit rules and procedures, or on the basis of observed behaviour, from which rules, norms and 
procedures can be inferred” (Keohane 1993, 26-27).  
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evaluating problem-driven institutions.  Drawing heavily on new institutionalism, these 
research fields also have converging interests around collective action problems, or those 
situations in which undesirable outcomes arise from seemingly rational choices.   
Though partnerships are distinct from regimes, they both function as governance 
engines which provide collective goods or meet these pressing governance gaps.  As they can 
both be conceptualised in this way, the wide and continually developing analytical strands 
within this research discipline offer many potential tools for transnational partnership analysis.  
Early regime works focused on explaining how, why and under what conditions these regimes 
arise.
38
  A second research pillar was more concerned with regime implementation and 
compliance (Chayes and Chayes 1991; Weiss and Jacobson 1998).  Though these works 
produced a fruitful dialogue, they left many questions unanswered, such as why these regimes 
took on the different forms they did. These questions led to a promising field of study 
regarding whether or not regimes mattered (Levy, Young and Zurn 1995; Young 1997), and 
later more attention on how and why they do (Miles et al. 2002).     
Even though its base stems partly from game theory and institutional economics, early 
regime theory still relied heavily on variables of power, interests and knowledge, relating 
closely to realist, neoliberal institutionalist and cognitive schools (Hasenclever, Mayer, and 
Rittberger 1997).  These approaches were heavily criticised for treating regimes as fixed 
entities, and they were later enhanced by those focusing on the role of knowledge, especially 
epistemic communities (Haas 1992).  A close link exists between the roles that these 
communities take within regimes and similar roles of experts within partnerships, especially 
global health partnerships (GHPs), which rely on private practitioners for knowledge and 
information transfer (Buse and Walt 2000a).  Thus while some rational actor perspectives 
persist, regime theory also relies on sociological approaches, and it these closely associated 
with neoinstitutionalism in political science and organisational behaviour (Dimaggio and 
Powell 1991). 
New institutionalism clearly distinguishes between institutions and organisations, 
though regime analysts have always been aware of the close relationship between the two 
(Breitmeier 1997, 88).  Regime theory exists as a subset within broader institutional studies, 
                                                 
38 For works on regime formation, see especially Hasenclever et al 1997; Keohane 1984; Keohane and Nye 1989 
and Young 1989.  Focusing within environmental regimes and cooperation, see especially Haas’s (1990) work on 
epistemic communities, Liftin’s (1994) work on ozone layer regimes and similar studies by Parson (2003) 
regarding scientific assessment. 
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but there is no simple or agreed upon distinction between institutions, regimes and 
organisations (Young 1997). Though IGOs also aid in international cooperation, they are not 
confined to operating within issue-specific areas, as regimes are by definition.  International 
organisations often serve as instruments which aid the creation or support of international 
regimes and institutions, but they also function as actors in their own right.  Further, while 
many regimes exist alongside formal organisations or are headquartered within an IGO 
(Sandford 1994), other organisations are created only after the regime to further aid its 
functioning.   
It is possible to differentiate by noting that institutions are practices composed of 
recognized rules coupled with conventions governing relations among the occupants of these 
roles.  Institutions affect the behaviour of actors but are not always actors in their own right 
(Young 1994, 3).
39
  Organisations, on the other hand, are the physical material entities 
themselves, with headquarters, budgets and secretariats; thus, organisations have higher levels 
of bureaucratisation and structural formality than regimes.  Regimes are the set of rights, rules 
and decision making procedures that “provide the rules of the game,” and actors within 
organisations function “under the terms of these rules” (Breitmeier, Young and Zurn 2006, 3).   
These definitional exercises are not an attempt to accredit higher status to one type of 
institutional form over another but serve as an exploration of the relationship between these 
concepts, especially as to how PPPs fit within the mix.  Though the role IGO’s play as 
“partnership entrepreneurs” was elaborated upon in chapter two, there is a clear distinction 
between PPPs and organisations.  Most PPPs are not formal organisations in their own right 
and often lack headquarters (termed Centre Points (CP) within this work).  They are also 
distinguished by their horizontal, non-hierarchical governance.  In contrast to formal 
organisations, most PPPs operate with flexible structures, often across multiple players and 
layers of governance.  Further, many partnerships are institutionalised within organisations or 
reliant on them as partners for funding and resources.  Perhaps PPPs should be further 
distinguished from IGOs since the promotion of the former in global governance is 
supposedly to address the perceived governance failures and inadequacies of the latter 
(Benner, Reinicke and Witte 2002; Tesner with Kell 2000).   Regime theory as a framework 
show how international cooperation can be achieved without the creation of formal 
organisations, but most PPPs still embody many organisational characteristics.  This implies 
that the management and organisational studies this work incorporates stand to contribute 
valuable analytical tools to compliment analysis.   
                                                 
39 This conception as applied to PPPs is furthered in the next chapter.  
62 
 
While useful for macro-level analysis, regime theory is thus not directly applicable for 
both definitional and theoretical reasons.  Partnerships are divergent institutional forms from 
regimes: as an example, PPPs are generally more flexible and engage more private actors 
within internal collaborative governance modes. Given that participation within PPPs is 
voluntary (Andonova 2007; Kaul 2006), traditional regime theories assessing internal 
compliance become more difficult to apply.  It is also easier to “exit” partnerships than 
formally negotiated regimes, as the only recourse may be “shaming” mechanisms rather than 
sanctions in the former.  Though PPPs also function in target and rule-setting, they rarely have 
the binding nature of international treaties negotiated by regimes (Reinicke and Deng 2000; 
Benner, Reinicke and Witte 2002).  International treaties are also voluntarily entered, but once 
adopted they take the force of law.  PPPs, on the other hand, have few or no formal 
mechanisms of legality.  Further, even though private actors are participating more in 
international regimes, equal decision making status, where corporate actors hold veto power, 
is still rare.   
As a body of research, the field of regime theory remains rather disjointed and lacks a 
coherent theoretical framework, or even one accepted definition of the unit of study,
40
 though 
this same problem plagues partnership studies.  It has been said that few theories have 
dedicated so much work towards establishing the need for their very existence (Rochester 
1986) or concept definition and justification (Underdal 1995).  The concept has been criticized 
for its “imprecision” and “woolliness” (Strange 1983, 343), and the theory deemed “vague” 
and “in need of conceptual defining.”  Other criticisms levied against regime analysis concern 
its failure to fully account for the social nature of regimes as institutions and the perceived 
contradiction between its ontology and overly positivistic empirical tones (Kratochwil and 
Ruggie 1986, 764), though this has arguable advanced within the past decade.   
Efforts at conceptualising the role of private actors in transnational interactions are 
largely grounded within the “global governance debate” or “global governance theory” 
(Pattberg 2004, 10).  Though governance and regime theory have shared roots in the literature 
on globalism and interdependence from the 1970s, the former is distinct.  It moves from IR’s 
strict focus on intergovernmental regimes and incorporates the entire sphere of authority 
operating, and cooperating, beyond the state.  Partnerships are constitutive of global 
governance structures, but they are also products of these wider configurations of changing 
power relations.   
                                                 
40 Though Krasner’s 1983 definition is the so-called “consensus definition,” it is not universally accepted and is 
also accused of having “a discomforting degree of vagueness…which might inhibit the accumulation of knowledge 
about regimes in the long run” (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1997, 11).  
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While the analysis of public-private partnerships challenges the traditional statism of 
IR theory, it also presents an opportunity to engage with existing, complementary literature 
that shows how PPPs operate as governance mechanisms in a world of “governance without 
government,” (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992).  Consider Young’s (1997) distinction between 
international and transnational regimes.  Whereas the former are institutional arrangements 
whose members are states and focus on international society issues (e.g. arms control), the 
latter’s members are non-state actors and operate in issues associated with civil society.  
Though Young admits the reality is a set of mixed and more complex arrangements, he links 
this into a framework of global governance (1997, 283-284).  As PPPs incorporate (perhaps to 
an even greater extent than most regimes) transnational civil society groups, operate with 
global reach and focus upon areas of lower political contestation than most regimes, such as 
public health or educational outreach, conceptualising the macro-level within this framework 
of transnational regimes provides a workable structure for purposes here. 
The intricacies of partnerships also necessitate this merging of constructs and 
approaches.  Transnational PPPs operate at many governance layers (micro, meso, macro), 
and their varying partners share governance roles across these layers.  Understanding these 
dynamics involves sophisticated frameworks that can incorporate “complex processes of 
interaction involved in multi-level institution building” (Conca, Wu and Mei 2006, 282).  
Moving from the micro to the meso level of analysis, or from structure to processes (Schiller 
2007, 11), necessitates drawing in varying approaches.  Bridging these divides entails 
borrowing from the management and organisational disciplines, which integrates models of 
firm and organisational formation, functioning and performance.  Collaboration at the micro 
level is inexplicitly tied to the resultant institutional level, and the dynamics involved at this 
micro level will certainly be heavily influenced by the characteristics of the actors themselves.  
Incorporating frameworks assist in explaining not only if and when partnerships will form but 
also the possible resulting characteristics the institution takes.  This is why this thesis 
integrates the management interviews, detailed in the next chapter, into its methodology, as 
this allows for fuller exploration of partnerships at this level.  
A multi-disciplinary framework also provides a link between the two distinct strands 
of literature on partnerships:
41
 the institution-based partnership research, which closely 
parallels early regime research, and the actor-based perspectives that focus internally on the 
actors involved within partnerships and highlights actor incentives and internal dynamics 
                                                 
41 The distinction between institution-based approaches and actor-based approaches is discussed in chapter two; see 
also Van Huijstee, Francken and Leroy (2007) or Weihe (2006). 
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(Stafford et al. 2000; Rondinelli and London 2003).  Drawing these together provides a 
needed synthesis of existing works, and it further integrates current PPP knowledge garnered 
from existing case-studies into more established research disciplines; thus, established tools of 
IR theory can be readily applied by integrating these complementary foci.  
 
3.1.2 Exploring institutional variation  
As a form of international institutions, PPPs also cover a range of foci and vary in 
breadth and depth of specificity.  Indeed, many of the definitional issues plaguing a coherent 
study of partnerships are strongly related to their marked variety.  Variation is perhaps not 
surprising, as from the onset of institutional research, regardless of discipline, that institutions 
vary is perhaps one of the few points of agreement!  While variety is to be expected, what is 
evidence is that similar attributes differ amongst all forms of institutions.  Haggard and 
Simmons (1987) summarise four main areas of regime variation and change as strength, 
involving the degree of compliance or accordance with regime rules; organisational form, 
including areas such as membership, degree of centralization and dispute settlement 
mechanisms; scope, meaning the issue area(s) the regime covers; and allocation mode, or the 
way in which regime resources are distributed.  
By nature, institutions are varying structures.  At a basic institutional level, firms vary 
by ownership category, geographic location and spread (e.g. domestic versus multinational), 
form of legal incorporation and industry or area of focus.  As organisations, the firms’ internal 
forums for decision making procedures, such as structure of the executive board, are also 
highly variant across firms, and areas receiving more recent focus given heightened attention 
on corporate governance (Zammit 2003; Ikander and Chamlou 2000).  Business and 
organisation studies have long attempted to show correlations between firm variation in 
performance with ranging variables of firm organisation and behaviour.  While this is not the 
place for a focused review of this field of literature, variables that cause firms to vary, alter 
and achieve are linked to external threats emerging from the market, competition and industry 
considerations or geographic location, as well as internal regarding design, the role of 
leadership (Bowers and Seashore 1966; Dunn 2004), the development of managerial skills and 
employee morale.  While too encompassing to discuss here, particularly relevant works within 
these bodies of literature that explore why institutions adopt varying organisational structures, 
employ varying internal processes and management, and critically how these relate to varying 
levels of organisational performance (See Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen 2009 and Bloom, 
Kretshmer and Van Reenen 2010). 
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3.1.3 Explaining variation: IR constructs   
While institutional variation is obvious, the reasons for these divergences are far from 
clear.  Perhaps one of the few consensus is that partnerships are “organisms that change over 
time and can be expected to be dynamic” (Caplan et al. 2001, 5); thus it should not just be 
design features at initial outset of the institution that are incorporated into analysis but also the 
process of change over time.  However, the dynamics involved in understanding these 
processes are even more difficult to account for than design (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).  
Explaining institutional design and change is highly dependent upon the underlying 
epistemological and ontological perspectives taken, which influence the relative significance 
given to actor, societal and institutional variables, among others.  Within regime research, 
differing perspectives and analytical clashes persist (Kratochwill and Ruggie 1986), which 
thwarts cumulative theory building.  While these separate views provide distinct starting 
points for analysis, if they are seen as a complementary body of studies rather than only 
competing perspectives, they can further broaden understanding of institutional variation. 
Though emphasized in divergent ways, ranging variables of power, interests, 
knowledge and culture tie together most early explanatory perspectives.  For realists, as 
institutions are reflections of dominant power in society, their varying forms must be 
representative of the power preferences of the most influential actors in system (Gilpin 1987; 
Krasner 1985).  Early work on institutional variation focused strongly on the role of a 
hegemon in their creation and variation, but institutions exist and later persist, as do many 
partnerships, even without a dominant power player. A more institutionalist perspective, on 
the other hand, explains variation through the constellation of actor preferences and interests.  
Such views consider regime formation as consequential actions taken by rational actors to 
maximise their self-interests; institutions are thus “rational, negotiated responses to the 
problems international actors face” (Koremonos, Snidal and Lipson 2004, 8).   
In these settings institutions can influence the choices actors make, but they cannot 
determine them (North 1990).  Though rational choice accounts
42
 sheds light on ways 
institutions vary, it offers a more narrow view of why they do.  Within this perspective, 
                                                 
42 These theories offer differing accounts of variation based upon structural, game-theoretic or functional 
perspectives.  Structural theory is mostly associated with hegemonic stability theory (Krasner 1985), but these 
interpretations are not fully able to account for regime design and change.   A game-theory view led early works on 
regime formation focuses on explaining cooperation, but is not as able to account for differing forms and change.  
Functionalists and neofunctionalists vary, and as Haggard and Simmons (1987) note that “new functionalism” is 
also not clear on differentiating between institutions and organisations, which affects their ability to clearly explain 
variation in design. 
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Koremonos, Lipson and Snidal’s (2001) consider how the independent variables of 
distribution, enforcement problems, number of actors and uncertainty can account for 
variation in the institutional design features of membership, scope, centralization, rules of 
control, and flexibility of arrangements.  Even though the authors’ findings were largely 
compatible with their conjectures regarding choice and incentives (2001, 296), they 
acknowledge that rational design “is essentially silent on the sources of preferences that 
underlie these incentives” (32), and does not provide a full explanation for elements of design 
choice
43
.   
As discussed in the previous chapter, the majority of theoretical attempts at explaining 
PPPs have relied upon similar functional accounts. Viewing their emergence in this light 
would argue that as states “can no longer do it alone” (Nelson 2002, 15), partnerships arise to 
fill in the gaps left by their inadequacies (Pierre and Peters 2000).  With this logic, 
partnerships should form in areas of greatest governance deficits. Empirical studies show 
limitations to these accounts, however, as an early study of the original WSSD partnerships 
found most functional arguments were clearly lacking: partnerships arose more in areas that 
largely reflected the dominant interests of the main powers involved rather than areas of 
greatest need (Andonova and Levy 2003; Bäckstrand  2005).  Related structural views 
conceptualise PPPs as a “logical response to structural changes in state-market -society 
relations that have occurred since the 1980’s” (Utting and Zammit 2006, 3), further suggesting 
PPPs should emerge with forms that fit these functional requirements.   
Narrower, structural accounts also cannot clearly address why previously unengaged 
actors interact to create international regimes or partnerships or account for the motivations for 
existing actors and institutions to function alongside them.  Though rational accounts 
incorporate actors’ preferences, these are considered previously formed and fixed.  Even 
cognitive perspectives emphasising continual social learning as reinforcing change and driving 
towards more efficient regime solutions (Haas 1990), are still criticized for assuming a 
convergence of interests that may not occur and are still largely agent-centered (Milner 1992).  
Though similar accounts are applied to partnership studies, these are usually focused on the 
actors’ incentives to join partnerships (Ruggie 2002; Dingwerth 2004; Rondinelli and London 
                                                 
43 These arguments are returned to in the concluding chapter, though as discussed in chapter four, many of these 
elements are integrated into this work’s analytical framework.  
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2003) and can examine when and why partnerships arise, but they do less to explain the 
resultant varying forms.
44
  
In a complex system, characterised by multiple levels of governance, when structural 
changes occur, “it is not inevitable that a specific institutional approach such as PPPs should 
emerge as the preferred solution” (Utting and Zammit 2006, 3).  Though rational choice may 
go the farthest in accounting for institutional variation (Martins and Simmons 1987; Koeble 
1995), even many rationalists agree that social and cultural influences matter.  Within the 
theoretical threads of neoinstitutionalism, institutions are placed within a broader societal and 
sociological environment and no longer considered solely as fixed entities (Brint and Karabel 
1991).  Institutional design depends on the larger macro environment and is attached to the 
product of sociological construction and of political, economic or social decisions, or “realms 
of meaning” (Dimaggio and Powell 1991).   
What differentiates this view is that variation cannot be explained ex ante; it is a 
continual process and highly influenced by setting, and actors’ preferences are no longer fixed 
but must be considered within the institutional context.  Now “institutions are more than just 
another variable …. By shaping not just actors’ strategies (as in rational choice) but their goals 
as well, and by mediating their relations of cooperation and conflicts, institutions structure 
political situations and leave their own imprint on political outcomes” (Steimo, Thelen and 
Longstretch 1992, 9).  The connection between individual choices in designing institutions 
and institutions’ ability to shape these interests and ideas is a two-way relationship.  While 
institutions are still a product of human design, it is not necessarily conscious design 
(Dimaggio and Powell 1991, 8).  Such perspectives place further emphasis on the unit of 
study, as the “institutions do not merely reflect the preferences and power of the units 
constituting them; the institutions themselves shape those preferences and that power” 
(Keohane 1988:382; see also Kratochwill and Ruggie 1986), and even more so institutions can 
not only shape but also determine human behaviour (March and Olsen 1989).  As institutions 
incorporate institutional and environmental demands in diverging ways (Powell and Friedkin 
1986; Covaleski and Dirsmith 1988), such perspectives help examine not only why PPPs 
emerge with the actors, forms and functions they do, but also how and why PPPs interact and 
cope within the diverse, and often demanding, environmental contexts that they do.  
  
 
                                                 
44 Works on national PPPs stand to contribute to some of these explanations, see for example Rosenau Vaillancourt 
(2000) and Osborne (2000) for most comprehensive comparisons of national PPPs and their structure, functions 
and effects.   
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3.1.4 Explaining variation: Integrating perspectives  
This brief overview should also reinforce the need for PPP analysts to refrain from 
overly heavy reliance on any one perspective, given the marked variation and unique 
structuring PPPs embody.  Despite the accumulation of research regarding regimes, no strong 
theory of regime variation and change exists, and regime analysis still does more to note 
marked variation rather than explain it.  Perspectives that focus on power, interests or 
knowledge are not only often at odds with each other, but they do not fully account for the 
dynamics involved in regime negotiation.  While constructivist approaches go farther in 
explaining variation, these accounts still consider states as main actors, which is an issue as 
many partnerships form without any state members. Even theories more rooted in sociological 
perspectives are not directly applicable, and they are often also accused of having too little 
explanatory power due to their post-hoc and case-specific avenues of explanation (Gorges 
2001).  
Another area regime theory has not addressed well is how existing institutions vary or 
are impacted by their interactions with these newer forms of governance (Stokke 1997).  This 
is important not only in explaining the varying forms PPPs take but also what factors drive 
relatively unlikely partners to cooperate.  Though the actor-based perspectives approach 
partnerships from this angle, few have advanced beyond basic theoretical outlines, and 
empirically most remain focused on identifying success factors (Van Huijstee, Francken and 
Leroy 2007).   
As a form of institutions, firms vary in deciding whether or not to partner with NGOs 
and IGOs, the extent of interaction and the form of the resultant relationship.  The incentives 
and dynamics that motivate these diverging decisions can be difficult to conceptualise from 
only macro-based IR theories.  Such limitations further highlight the need to integrate micro-
level analysis, which this work does by pulling in relevant management theories.  While there 
is already a noted high synthesis of “business” literature and existing partnership literature on 
possible success factors (Caines et al. 2004), this literature is largely applied to the partnering 
process rather than with an empirical focus on outputs, and there have been few efforts to 
synthesise or combine these. 
Given the extent of corporate engagement within these transnational PPPs, these 
complimentary foci provide insight into not only the incentives to engage in these structures, 
but also the varying forms the emerging institutions take.  If the adage that form follows 
function applies, variation can only be explained by incorporating internal dynamics which 
this related literature provides.  Partnerships are not a new idea for corporations, either, as the 
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“urge to merge” has led to a high number of joint ventures and consolidations amongst 
corporate actors within the past decade.  Lessons from high profile failures, to the numerous, 
struggling cases of these joint ventures highlight the internal issues and noted variation in 
internal culture, ideas and processes just as much, if not more, than overriding structural or 
institutional explanations.    
Before giving up in exasperation, one can note that institutions vary in similar ways; 
these diverging variables can be broadly segmented into focus or scope; internal features 
(elements of design, decision-making procedures and main actors involved) and external or 
exogenous factors, the latter being more socially and environmentally situated or constructed.  
Further, though surely not comforting, one certainty is that all institutions, whether private or 
public, social or economic, vary in their performance or effectiveness.  Understanding how 
and why PPPs as institutions vary is a significant undertaking, and the primary focus of this 
work, but how this variation could possibly explain varying degrees of performance or 
effectiveness obviously the overriding concern. 
 
3.2 Explaining institutional effectiveness  
As partnerships increasingly gain a larger governance role, it becomes more critical to 
determine why some PPPs succeed while other efforts fail.  Evaluating hybrid forms of 
governance is methodologically and analytically challenging, however, as “the nature of the 
evidence to assess effectiveness is less clear” (El Ansair et al. 2001, 215).  Though it is 
acknowledged that “we need to learn much more about the factors that control the 
effectiveness of international institutions” (Young and Demko 1996, 1), the study of regime 
effectiveness has become a major and continually growing field of research (Breitmeir, Young 
and Zurn 2006, 7), leading to an established body of study of lessons learned.
45
   
 
3.2.1 Defining effectiveness 
While some convergence is occurring in regards to operationalising and comparing 
regime effectiveness (Underdal 2004), the field is still limited by a lack of standardisation of 
terms and varying methods of operationalising hypotheses and procedures (Breitmeir, Young 
and Zurn 2006, 10).  Lacking a comparable basis, cumulative understanding is slowed as 
varying definitions utilised ultimately determine the methodology employed.  Effectiveness is 
a highly subjective term which is used synonymously with significance, consequences or 
influence, which only heightens its ambiguity.  Being effective is often taken to mean being 
                                                 
45 Underdal and Young 2004; see also Levy, Young and Zurn 1995 and Miles et al. 2002   
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successful at the tasks set out to achieve, but this leads to fundamental questions regarding the 
nature of the goals and task setter(s) and also necessitates that objectives are clearly defined 
and articulated.  First, a distinction should be made between effects  and consequences. While 
a considerable amount of research targets the former, this often excludes other consequences 
or side-effects of functioning.  For example, Young (1999a) defines regime effectiveness as “a 
matter of the contributions that institutions make to solving the problems that motivate actors 
to invest the time and energy needed to create them” (Young 1999a, 3), but he acknowledges 
this focuses rather narrowly on the subset of consequences the regime produces which are 
related to its specific tasks.  A similar notion considers effective regimes to be those that 
successfully perform some generic function or solves the problem that motivated their 
establishment (Miles et al. 2002), but this also focuses upon internal effects, closely related to 
regime-specific behavioural complexes.  
Analysts also often make the distinction between simple and broad effectiveness.46  
Whereas the former involves the effects of the institution upon institution-specific behavioural 
complexes or issue areas, the latter accounts for all of its impacts on the environment.  
Attempts evaluating simple effectiveness generally compare regime problem focus to the 
perceived solution (Underdal 1992; Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Weiss and Jacobson 1998; 
Miles et al. 2002).  Though the merging of public and private interests may indeed fulfil the 
initial goals of the arrangement, unintended externalities could offset any positive 
contribution.
47
 As broader consequences move outside of internal regime-specific analysis and 
involve cross-regime, domestic and systemic consequences and possible further impacts on 
international society (Young 2004, 8), incorporating these into the analysis is clearly more 
difficult, and thus it is much less developed empirically.  Attributing causality also becomes 
more challenging as one moves towards assessing consequences. 
 Effectiveness also includes the overlapping, and often confused, notions of strength 
and robustness.  As a point of analytics, effectiveness is generally related to problem-solving, 
(Underdal 1992; Young 1994, 142-143), and strength is considered “the extent to which [the 
regime] constrains the freedom of legitimate choice open to the individual member” or the 
degree of compliance with its rules (Underdal 2004, 28; see also Aggarwal 1983 and Haggard 
and Simmons 1987).  Robustness is also associated with the institution’s ‘staying power’ 
(Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1996, 178) and refers to those regimes that “master 
threats to their existence” with their functioning capacity intact” (Hasenclever, Mayer and 
                                                 
46 Another version of this differentiation is between simple and complex; see for instance Young 2002a, 14-15. 
47 This is a commonly cited criticism of the recent proliferation of partnerships, especially in areas of regulation 
(Pallemaert 2003, Hale and Mauzerall 2004), CSR initiatives (Utting 2005) and health (Buse and Harmer 2007). 
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Rittberger 2003, 184).  While the terms are not unrelated, they are conceptually independent, 
and may even be inversely related to each other (Downs, Rocke and Barsoom 1996).  An 
institution’s persistence does not always mean it is still effective or serving any relevant 
interest, nor are all regimes or partnerships intended to endure.
48
  If effectiveness is a self-
reinforcing concept (Brinkerhoff 2007, 72), one assumes that for a partner to remain involved 
in a partnership, the partnership must result in benefits (collective and individual) which 
exceed the financial and opportunity costs of the partner’s involvement (OECD 2006), than 
the pure maintenance of the partnership may then be one proxy of effectiveness.   
Defining effectiveness thus often involves clarifying what it is not.  Effective is not 
necessarily equitable, either in terms of the interests involved or the populations targeted.  A 
key concern regarding PPPs is that they only serve the interests of their most dominant 
members, generally corporations, which could further detract from real development needs 
(Richter 2003; Zammit 2003).  They also may only target a limited geographic area and divert 
resources from being deployed to more needy areas.  Effectiveness is also not always equated 
with efficiency: while a partnership may well fulfil its tasks, it may not do so in the most cost 
effective way.  Costs are often not fully considered in existing partnership evaluations: many 
existing impact assessments focus on partnership financials but neglect to perform calculations 
on whether the partnership is a cost-effective institution (McKinsey 2004).  Though PPPs are 
promoted as a “quest to increase economic and social efficiency,” more recent IMF 
evaluations caution that it “should not be taken for granted that PPPs are more efficient than 
public investment and government supply of services” (IMF 2004, 3-5).  Though truly 
evaluating effectiveness should require a comparison of all relevant costs and benefits, this 
would include incorporating opportunity costs, which are often intangible and thus difficult to 
define and measure.  
Currently, the notion of partnership “success” factors is more prevalent than 
effectiveness, but such criteria are often vague or unspecified, such as making a contribution 
to the global partnership movement (Tennyson 2004, 33-35) or “ensure that we don’t do 
harm” (UNDP Nordic Office 2006, 1).  Many argue that a narrow conception of success is 
relevant as “PPPs are mostly focused on achieving specific goals, and at the end of the day 
both the partners and the PPPs will be evaluated based on the degree to which they reach those 
goals” (Bull and McNeill 2007, 41-43).  However, though the majority of existing work 
focuses solely on these narrower views, this could lead to a “danger that impact assessment 
will become the new mantra in policy circles” (Utting and Zammit 2006, 24).   
                                                 
48 As discussed in the next chapter, many of the CSD-based set time frames of as little as two or three years 
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Thus while the conventional regime definition considers effectiveness the “extent that 
[the partnerships] performs a particular function or solves the problem it was established to 
solve” (Underdal and Young 2004), this is certainly a limited view of effectiveness and “not 
sufficiently precise to be useful as an analytical tool for systemic empirical research” 
(Underdal 2002, 4), nor does it incorporate the noted social, ecological or political concerns. 
One way to address these methodological challenges is to break down partnership 
effectiveness into dimensions or areas of focus. A McKinsey (2002) review of health-focused 
global partnerships notes effectiveness should be tracked along three fitness dimensions: 
outcome performance, activity performance and relationship performance.  Brinkerhoff (2007) 
defines partnership effectiveness along three distinct parts: relations, reduction of transaction 
costs and reinforcement (2007, 72-73).  Young (1994: 142-152) distinguishes amongst six 
dimensions of effectiveness: effectiveness as problem solving, goal attainment, behavioural, 
process, constitutive and evaluative effectiveness, but even he notes there are probably more.  
In later work exploring the causal, behavioural pathways of regimes’ effects, he remarks that 
while most attempts, including his own, link effectiveness to problem solving, it should also 
include legal, economic, normative and political elements.  Even more, these varying 
dimensions may not necessarily co-vary in any predictable fashion (Young 1994, 150).   
The most common practice is to analyse effectiveness via the triad of outputs, 
outcomes and impacts (originally Easton 1965, see also Underdal 2008).  Outputs are the 
regulations, procedures, or research results relating to partnership formation and functioning; 
outcomes are the behavioural changes or effects associated with the partnerships’ efforts; and 
impacts are the environmental consequences or effects on the overall problem or issue area.  
These approaches, as furthered in chapter four, are attractive as they link PPP research to the 
larger body of policy analysis and also place the focus on direct effects that can be considered 
within a causal results chain (Young 2001).  This is not to deny the obvious caveats:  outputs, 
while tangible and traceable, may not actually lead to problem solving.  Behavioural changes 
are difficult to trace and even harder to compare against each other.  While a PPP can 
potentially fulfil its goals in terms of problem solving and be considered a success, this does 
not guarantee effectiveness at the environmental level.  Partnerships will certainly produce 
unintended side effects through their operations, which may even be severe enough to negate 
any positive influence; these are significant issues to which later chapters will return.   
It is doubtless that the concept of partnership effectiveness will continue to evolve, 
and highly likely it will always remain contested.  As fully developed in the next chapter, 
given this work’s purpose it moves past these definitional issues and instead builds a 
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framework that works towards analysing tangible partnership effects.   While it is certainly 
necessary to consider partnerships’ full efforts towards program solving, this work focuses 
narrowly on effects.  The remainder of this section still continues the theoretical, analytical 
and methodological discussion of explaining institutional effectiveness, as these build the 
eventual framework and methods utilised. 
 
3.2.2 Measuring and evaluating effectiveness 
Previous work exploring regime effectiveness notes the importance of “focused 
conceptual definition, ease of operational measurement, comparability across time and issue 
areas and ability for aggregate performance measures….” (Sprinz and Helm 1999, 360).  
Methodologically, building a conceptual framework for such a study must involve addressing 
the following three questions, originally proposed by Underdal (1992, 228-229) (italics in 
original): 
 What precisely constitutes the object to be evaluated? 
 Against which standard is the object to be evaluated 
 How do we operationally go about comparing the object to our standard49  
 
Object 
The first point seems straightforward: obviously the object is the partnership, but in 
practice this is far from clear.  Clarification is needed between the partnership itself and/or the 
tools it utilises, such as its set of rules, norms or procedures.  Whether the assessment 
considers the “sum” of its influence or only the extent of its intended effects must also be 
clear.  Partnerships, as regimes, are political constructs, developed and operated through 
political processes which also generate their own consequences (Underdal 2004), separate 
from the set of rules or standards they actually implement.  The time in its lifespan is also a 
consideration, but institutional effectiveness may also not be a linear process but rather 
curvilinear, increasing initially but diminishing as the PPP ages.   
  
 
Standard  
Actually measuring effects requires defining a standard of evaluation, which involves 
two steps: the first is establishing a standard metric of measurement that can be applied across 
                                                 
49 Originally outlined by Underdal (1992) see also Underdal 1997; Sprinz and Helm 1999;  and Miles et al. 2002 
for further discussion.   
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cases while the second is determining the reference point for comparison.  While evaluating 
hybrid forms of governance obviously presents challenges in both regards, applicable tools 
from regime research for the latter are more developed than the former (Underdal 2004, 35).  
A standard allows comparison of actual performance to a defined benchmark.  A view that 
effectiveness refers to the extent to which a partnership has achieved the objectives it set does 
not necessarily lessen the methodological challenge.  For one, it detracts from the ability to 
apply a common metric of measurement across cases.  Assessing goal attainment also depends 
on the clear articulation of scope, focus and objectives, yet many PPPs lack this specificity and 
clarity.  More fundamentally, determining whether or not the partnership is working towards 
an attainable or feasible goal is beyond the scope of most researchers’ work,50 as it involves 
not only making several subjective judgements but also possessing an intricate knowledge of 
the subject matter at hand. 
 Attempts to establish a standard present two common options: what would have 
occurred in the partnership’s absence (the hypothetical state of affairs that would have existed 
without the partnership), and a second a notion of a good or optimal solution. The former 
looks into whether or not the partnership “matters” by assessing relative effectiveness while 
the latter attempts to answer whether or not the partnership indeed “solved” the problem 
(Underdal 1992).  Sprinz and Helm (1999) specify these as upper and lower bounds and 
combine these with measures of regime performance, falling between a no-regime 
counterfactual and a collective optimum which allows one to arrive at a coefficient of regime 
effectiveness on a 0 – 1 interval.   
This approach offers a method of comparing regimes in absence of common metrics 
by comparing proportional gains or effects – or relative versus absolute effectiveness.  Despite 
its frequent use,
51
 these techniques still leave much to be desired:
52
 there is often a lack of 
transparency in operational terms, generaliseability is difficult and it cannot capture 
simultaneous cross-institutional or multi-level governance attempts.   These values are also not 
mutually independent from each other (Underdal 2004, 36), as determining whether or not a 
partnership improved matters depends on some notion of what an improvement constitutes, 
leading to the latter standard.   
                                                 
50 For attempts to determine the degree or range of problem difficulty within regimes, see Effinger and Zurn 1990; 
Stein 1982; Underdal 2002 and Zurn 1992. 
51 The techniques is frequently applied to international regulation regimes (Sprinz et al 2004; Wettestad 2002) and 
environmental regimes (Helm and Sprinz 2000; Hovi, Sprinz and Underdal 2003a), while numerous reference the 
concept in terms of possibilities of evaluating regime effectiveness.  See also Biermann et al. 2007b for relation to 
partnership evaluation.   
52 For a critique of the approach, see Young 2001 and 2003 as well as the rejoinder by Hovi, Sprinz and Underdal 
2003b. 
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Constructing the no regime counterfactual is difficult, as it requires considering what 
would have happened under the previously existing situation.  Common methods employ 
expert opinion or review teams, where specialists within the issue area conduct thought 
experiments to arrive at a “score” on either an interval or ordinal basis (Miles et al. 2002; 
Helm and Sprinz 2000), but even these experts often disagree with each other (Young 2003, 
99).  Also utilised are simulations (Bueno de Mesquita 1994; ibid et al. 2003), political cost-
benefit analysis (Helm and Sprinz 1999; Pastor and Wise 1994), status quo ante or statistical 
effects separation.  Though they offer a methodological repertoire of applications, whether all 
or any of these can be relevant to partnerships is still far from clear.
53
 
Arriving at the notion of collective optimum is an even more challenging, if not 
impossible task, and few studies attempt it.
54
  Approaches that do usually focus on specifying 
and comparing regime effects to regime goals, attempt to define technical functional optima 
(Miles et al. 2002), emphasise cost minima analysis or define environmental thresholds.  The 
notion of collective optimum is clearly a more unattractive option for PPP research; one 
reason is the empirical difficulty in constructing the measure.  Partnerships are also generally 
narrower problem-focused governance arrangements than environmental regimes.  As such 
effectiveness compared against an ideal-type scenario may be less relevant.  Further, neither 
standard is operationally convenient for PPPs: the “no-partnership” case is often absent (Druce 
and Harmer 2004, 14) and establishing a counterfactual is difficult as there is often “very little 
baseline data” (Holm 2001) from which to establish a comparison.  One exception would be 
considering the “ideal scenario” in a limited application of the term, such as product 
development partnerships (PDPs), with specific aims.  For example, the International 
Partnership for Microbicides (IPM) could consider an ideal type scenario where an effective 
female contraceptive is developed.
55
   
 
Metrics:  
Any effort to measure or compare institutions against a standard also necessitates 
common metrics of measurement, or a defined unit(s) that at least specifies notions of more, 
the same or less.  These are still arguably rare in regime research (Mitchell 2004, 121).
56
  With 
                                                 
53 See Breitmeier, Underdal and Young 2009 for overview of recent advances in quantitative techniques. 
54 As an exception, Helm and Sprinz (1999) and Miles et al. 2002 use both standards in comparative empirical 
research, but these attempts are frequently attacked by critics.  
55 This would still be a limited view if it neglected critical aspects of access, distribution and advocacy, as well as 
eventual elimination of HIV in woman, as the latter would  be, for traditional scholars, the assumed CO and hence 
only if IPM achieved this ambitious goal –and the effects could be attributed solely to IPM- would it be considered 
effective.   
56 Exceptions include Breitmeir, Young and Zurn 2006; Meyer et. al 1997; and Miles et al. 2002.   
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the inclusion of corporations, focus usually turns to financial metrics, such as growth, 
operating margins, net profit and earnings per share, but applying financial indicators to the 
public or not-for-profit sector is difficult as they are not dictated by rational capital markets 
that channel resources to those who deliver the best results (Collins 2005, 19).  Social 
objectives also cannot be priced or easily quantified, so no single economic metric is 
applicable across cases (e.g. profit margin), nor is financial data available for most PPPs,
57
 
even if this was the desired metric.   
While examples of PPP performance metrics are available from case studies, these are 
often more suited to analysing intra-partnership change over time rather than comparative 
assessment.  Some metrics could be benchmarked to other PPPs in similar functional or issue 
areas, but it is fair to say metrics are most developed in partnerships that target tangible 
products or goals.  When comparing across partnerships, common metrics become difficult to 
apply, especially if one wants to speak to partnership performance rather than compare the 
process of partnering.  More metrics and tools are available for the latter including many 
practitioner-based guides,
58
 but these are closer to checklists rather than evaluative 
assessments. 
 Even lacking applicable common metrics, many studies still compare partnerships and 
deem certain PPPs more or less effective than others.  This is possible by comparing relative 
effectiveness, where performance is measured across regimes by comparing proportions of 
gain or relative improvement within the areas.  While only a few attempts have applied a 
interval scale to partnerships,
59
 many have proposed ordinal level rankings of PPPs, both 
within IGOs (OED 2004; Lele et al. 2004), and there has been a more recent attempt 
evaluating a set of 21 transnational partnerships, which will be furthered in subsequent 
chapters.
60
  While few would deny the difficulties of such analysis, the larger issue at stake is 
transparency.  Without transparent metrics and clear specification of methods used, it is 
difficult for such attempts to present convincing conclusions, especially if there is little 
                                                 
57
 As discussed in chapter five and seven, only 27% of operational PPPs publish financial reports.   
58 For example, see Building Partnerships for Development (http://www.bpdws.org) and the Partnering Initiative 
(http://thepartneringinitiative.org). 
59 See Sprinz and Helm 1999 for application to regimes; Biermann et al 2007b propose working towards a scale for 
PPPs registered with the CSD. 
60 The team based at the team Berlin SFB700/D1 has an ongoing research initiative since 2005 on transnational 
partnerships, see http://www.sfb-governance.de/en/teilprojekte/projektbereich_d/index.html for more information 
as well as Liese, Andrea. 2010. Explaining Effectiveness: The Degree of Institutionalization and Beisheim, 
Marianne. 2010. Process Management. In: Marianne Beisheim and Andrea Liese (eds.): Transnational Public 
Private Partnerships for Development – Explaining Effectiveness by Institutional Design.  Forthcoming (To be 
submitted to Palgrave Macmillian, Governance and Limited Statehood Series). 
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guidance on the composition behind these rankings.  More so, it is difficult or impossible for 
another researcher to duplicate the work, and as such contributes less to the research field.   
 
Operational procedures  
Even if one assumes that a standard and metrics are in place to note comparative 
change over time, the remaining challenge is to determine if, how and to what extent these 
changes are different than those that would have occurred without the partnership.  This can 
be done through counterfactual analysis, introduced above, which involves modelling the 
likely course of events that would have occurred in the absence of a regime (Fearon 1996).  
This involves determining 1) what order would have occurred in absence of the partnership? 
and 2) what would have happened under that order?  For the first, one can assume the previous 
order, and while this is not necessarily ideal it is workable.  Answering the second question is 
more challenging, but can be attempted by assuming a linear approach (extrapolation), 
building various change models or relying on existing models for estimates (Underdal 2004).   
While this returns the focus to the institution, it leads to the persisting issue of making 
causal connections between the institution and its supposed consequences.  This has led to 
tendency-finding analysis (Dessler 1992), which focuses upon identifying mechanisms or 
pathways through which the institution could influence behaviour (Haas, Keohane and Levy 
1993; Young 1999a).  This is helpful in actually attributing effects as it allows one to trace 
actual behaviour pathways, but it cannot be used for large samples or in a cross-comparison 
basis.  Rather than identifying relationships between independent and dependent variables, this 
asks “Under what conditions will the regime prove effective?” (Dessler 1992) and probes the 
combination of factors that matter for success in a given regime.  As establishing causality and 
attributing changes in output or behaviour to the partnership’s functioning is analytically 
challenging, Young (1999) argues that only by viewing behavioural changes to explore casual 
connections can the analysis be free from “charges that the relationships reported are little 
more than spurious correlations (1999, 10).”  He proposes an analysis based on a more 
deepened understanding of the regimes, rather than arriving at a score or indexed ranking of 
regimes (See also Haas, Keohane Levy 1993). 
The ability to make sound causal inferences and attribute consequences also leads to a 
more frequent use of contribution analysis (CA) (Mayne 1999) in existing attempts at PPP 
evaluations of impacts (IHP+ 2008; IHP+ Framework 2009).  CA addresses the difficulty of 
the attribution problem and limits of measurement and attempts to move past this to 
demonstrate how a partnership is actually making a difference.  It is a way of using 
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performance measurement information to deal with attribution under uncertainty by 
acknowledging that other factors are also at play.  CA allows one to reach likely association 
regarding evidenced outcomes; it does not attempt to definitively prove contribution, but 
provide enough evidence about the difference the program is making (Mayne 2001).  
While none of these techniques will be satisfactory alone given the inherent 
underlying epistemological concerns, they do offer an agenda regarding how to understand the 
consequences of partnerships as similar complex institutions.  Moving forward, the most 
appropriate methodological options may best be a toolkit which pulls together different yet 
complimentary options (See, for example, Underdal and Young 2004; Young, Lambin et al. 
2006; Delmas and Young 2009).   
 
3.3 Measuring institutional variances 
Assuming that the challenges encountered above are met, the pressing questions then 
relate to explaining resultant variance in effectiveness.  While attempts assessing regime 
performance have advanced, “it is abundantly clear that we do not have a well-developed 
causal model identifying the most potent independent variables and specifying how they work 
and interact under different circumstances” (Underdal and Young 2004, 365), and the field as 
a whole lacks any common model “to serve as a guide to research and as a framework for 
integrating findings” (ibid).  Most recent attempts at partnership evaluation (Biermann, et al. 
2007b) build analytical frameworks that define effectiveness (or some variation of the term, 
e.g. goal attainment and compliance often featured as dependent variable in studies on 
international regimes as the dependent variable and a set of independent variables, as 
explanatory variables or determinants of effectiveness.  The same initial steps are taken to 
reach and build the framework in this work, though it steps apart slightly from these common 
methods.   
Drawing closely on this regime literature, this section begins by returning to broader 
debates in IR theory, specifically focusing on social action models emphasising the role of 
power, interests and knowledge (or state centrism, pluralism and rational institutionalism, 
critical theories and sociological perspectives).  Within these broader contextual theories, three 
sets of more operational variables converge, which fall within the following main camps: 
institutional problem solving capacity; nature of problem; and the impact of environment, 
linkages and broader socioeconomic setting.     
 
3.3.1 International Relations theories and social constructs  
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 The first group concentrates on variables of power, interest and knowledge.  From a 
neorealist perspective, those focusing upon power argue the need for a hegemon or dominant 
power in the operation of a successful regime (Keohane 1986).  Power relationships remain 
paramount in critical global governance studies, which seek to explain the ability of actors to 
constrain or influence policy choices and actions (Cox 1987; Fuchs and Kalfagianni 2010).  
An institutionalist perspective, however, emphasizes actor interests and preferences and how 
these interact or converge (Underdal 1987).
61
   More effective institutions would be those that 
were most successful in reducing transaction costs (North 1990; Cutler, Haufler and Porter 
1999), improving transparency, and producing cooperation in ways that fulfilled the dominant 
interests of the actors involved (Oye 1986).  These more rational attempts at explaining regime 
effectiveness are often lacking, and they struggle to explain why institutions persist.  As 
regimes are clearly more than institutional hangovers left after their creating hegemons’ 
interests or activity has declined (Ward Grundig and Zorick 2004, 152), more is needed to 
explain their variation - just because they are potentially effective does not explain why or 
how this occurs.   
A stronger cognitive stance, however, finds more of a role for information and 
knowledge; these studies rooted in more social or constructivist frameworks highlight the 
importance of linking regimes to information needed to solve the problem, key experts who 
provide this knowledge or proper counselling and the dynamics involved in social learning 
within the institution (Miles et. al 2002).  The presence of an epistemic community within 
environmental regimes is also seen as necessary for successful functioning  (Liftin 1994; Haas 
1992).  Miles et al. (2002) supplements this by also finding that the presence of these informal 
expert networks enhances the abilities of the powerful actors within the regimes (e.g. chairs or 
heads), but that epistemic communities seem to make the most impact directly through 
national policy channels (451-452).  The role of social learning within the regimes also plays a 
large role in adding knowledge during regime functioning and thus increasing effectiveness.  
Still it is possible that including industry experts could actually lead to failure if including 
private actors within rule setting regimes ends up weakening regulations as they are the ones 
who will be forced to comply (Börzel and Risse 2005, 10).  These perspectives have 
interesting implications for partnership analysis, especially considering the intended roles 
partnerships are purported to play in knowledge sharing and learning. 
In contrast to these traditional state-centred approaches, others consider the emergence 
and presence of transnational environmental activist groups as representing a new organizing 
                                                 
61 See also Cashore 2002 and Scharpf 1997. 
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principle in global politics (Wapner 1997; Lipschutz and Mayer 1996).  From this view, there 
is a role for a wider group of actors involved in the institution, and this is not limited to 
“pressure politics” but rather a formal, recognised authority, giving a place for global civil 
society (Scholte 2002).   Rather than viewing partnerships as more effective with dominant 
state actors, some of these perspectives might consider a negative correlation between state 
involvement and partnership success (Wapner 1996). This could be especially relating to 
sustainable development efforts in which partnerships often arise due to perceived state 
failures (Glasbergen and Groenenberg 2001).   
While these more macro-perspectives can account for dynamics related to power, 
interests and their interactions, partnerships are non-traditional governance realms where these 
dynamics may not be emphasised to the same extent.  These traditional modes, even though 
they are now accounting for roles of non-state actors, are also still focused on the issue of 
sovereignty, and as such stand to be complimented with elements from organisational and 
economic theories to work towards identify sets of characteristics that can be assessed across 
partnerships.  Further, the above are more developed theoretically than empirically and are 
also difficult to compare or contrast because observed variance is highly dependent upon the 
perspectives.  Thus while not completely leaving these behind, fulfilling the methodical aims 
of this work involves focus as well on more operational variables, which will be integrated 
into areas of analysis and tracked within this work’s framework.  The remaining subsection 
reviews these existing camps of focus.  
 
3.3.2 Institutional Problem solving capacity  
Focusing on the institutional setting, researchers have found that even more 
challenging problems can be effectively handled if appropriate institutional attributes fit.  
Mitchell’s (2002) work sees convergence around the main variables of institutional design 
(including participation, governance and decision making structure, centralisation and 
flexibility), resources and leadership.  This relates to the institution’s problem solving 
capacity.  Combining the expertise of the public and private sector in a win-win scenario is a 
driving impetus behind partnership promotion.  Thus, including diverse actors should bring 
the “necessary technical, regional, social and political information” to the process of policy 
generation (Brinkerhoff  2002, 1301; see also Witte and Reinicke 2005) and lead to greater 
effectiveness than acting alone.  Participation must be distinguished from membership, 
however, while membership is endogenous to design choice, actors refers more to the group of 
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interested actors and their relative importance to the institution (Koremenos, Lipson and 
Snidal 2001, 769).  
Institutional structure or design is an area of considerable significance for both 
regime analysts and practitioners (Mitchell 1994).   As institutions are increasingly seen as 
being effective global problem solvers, the more attractive focusing on design principles will 
become.  These elements are of practical significance, “since they can, at least in principle, be 
deliberately manipulated and used as instruments” (Underdal 2004, 41).  Another related 
aspect is flexibility, or how well the institutional rules and procedures adapt to or 
accommodate changing settings or circumstances (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2004).  This 
is considered as their “flexibility and voluntarism,” which is argued to make PPPs a more 
“promising governance approach” (Ivanova 2003, 17).  If partnerships are supposed to exist in 
a dynamic environment, then inflexible arrangements or procedures could frustrate 
partnerships’ ability to adapt to needed change (Biermann et al. 2007b, 11).  Mitchell (2002) 
also finds increased flexibility enhances effectiveness in environmental regimes.  Also related 
to the institution, and arguably its effects or performance, are the internal management 
processes and practices, both formal and informal, which guide its functioning (Breitmeir, 
Young and Zurn 2006; Bloom and Van Reenen 2007).   
Despite the increased attention given to Governance and decision making (GDM), 
less is known about why rules and procedures vary so drastically across these institutions.  
These are critical to this work’s purposes which consider variation across input and output 
legitimacy, as elements of representation, accountability and transparency (Bexell, Tallberg 
and Uhlin 2008) are inherently tied within these structures and processes.  For example, 
though it is argued GDM procedures that enhance equitable and balanced representation are 
necessary for global PPPs (Buse 2004a), whether this is evidenced empirically has yet to be 
shown, though noted deficits in governing forum representation are often highlighted 
(Sorens0n 2009).   
 
3.3.3 Problem nature and scope 
Alternative viewpoints consider the problem or issue area to explain variation in 
effectiveness (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1997; Miles et al. 2002).  Institutions will be 
more or less effective depending on how well the problem can or cannot be addressed; thus, 
the more benign the problem, the more effective the regime.  While it seems to make sense 
that some problems are by nature easier to solve than others, how these are differentiated and 
categorized will always be a subjective process (Hasenclever, Meyer and Rittberger 1996).  
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Though none of the studies arrive at the same conceptions of the term, they can be considered 
largely in line with each other in terms of overall problem characteristics (Efinger and Zurn 
1990; Stein 1983; Underdal 2002).    
 Though insights from these studies are useful, partnerships generally focus upon more 
narrowly defined issues or tasks than regimes, lessening some of the direct application of 
existing theories.  It is also worth exploring if partnerships are focusing on relatively neglected 
areas, as functional accounts suggest, or within areas where international regimes or IGOs 
already exist.  This would also have implications for how relatively easy or difficult the issue 
is to solve, as well as addressing a central question regarding PPPs justification: issue 
coverage and value add, as subsequent chapters will address.   
  
3.3.4 Exogenous and environmental factors  
As social institutions, partnerships exist within a wider sociological, political and 
economic environment, and their ability to succeed will inherently be linked to the 
environment – political, social, economic, cultural - of operation.  This also highlights the 
relevance of the economic locus, as it is known that firm performance is highly dependent on 
the nature of the market in which it competes as well as its acceptance in varying domestic 
settings.  Beyond systematic and environmental affects, the more recent heightened focus on 
governance by regime scholars in addition to institutions places more focus on the multilevel, 
multiplayer nature of the interactions across actors.  Partnerships obviously do not exist in 
isolation from each other, and institutional linkages and embedding matter.  While it is clear 
that the international system has seen a growing number of these newer governance 
arrangements, the impact of these linkages between and across institutions is less studied but a 
growing area of research (Silan and VanDeever 2009)   This concept has been applied to other 
arrangements, mainly in Social Network Analysis (Granovetter 2002) and organisational 
studies.   
How much the partnership is fixated within existing institutions or organisations (its 
host) or as its own entity apart from its parent institution is a key issue.  While attempts to 
research structural linkages within regimes are becoming more developed (Stokke 2001;  
Andersen 2002), less is known on the extent and impact of embedding within existing 
institutions for global partnerships, a point returned to in this work’s concluding chapter.   
While Mitchell (1994, 457) highlights the importance of building on existing institutions, 
overriding institutional linkages could be constraining as well.   This is certainly relevant as 
applied to PPPs who started within host organisations and later “broke free” to become fully 
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functioning independent entities, as for example IAVI did when it eventually left the 
Rockefeller Foundation (Rockefeller Foundation and IAVI 2003).  Linkages across PPPs and 
institutional interplay, sharing and exchange are also key issues in this regard, either 
enhancing effectiveness or potentially detracting if it leads to unnecessary duplication or 
competition, issues returned to as well in the empirical chapters.   
 
3.4 Revisiting institutional variation, summary and concluding remarks 
A key lesson that emerges from the above is no easy success framework exists as 
context matters (Rein et al. 2005), and these factors will interact in dynamic and situational 
ways.  Further, certain processes will work better in certain institutional designs or within 
some internal governance structures, and certain problem characteristics are better dealt with 
under some design features than others (Wettestad 1998; Miles et al. 2002).  While it is clear 
that internal elements can go far in explaining partnership variation, there is still little 
consensus in current works as to which elements matter more than others.  Further, there is 
often a contrast between design elements in theory and practice, or what is intended and the 
practices actually manifest.  This is already evidenced in existing PPPs: Partnerships thrive 
without dominant state powers; indeed, some of the studied transnational PPPs do not have a 
formal national government as members.  Even when teams of experts are consulted or 
involved, partnerships still falter, and while some partnerships perform multiple tasks 
exceedingly well, others are incapable of generating actor interest around even narrow 
functions.  Internal partnership dynamics can also not be clearly isolated from the exogenous 
variables, and certainly these variables are tightly linked in explaining variation; isolating 
them as independent variables may be too methodologically challenging.   
In conclusion, transnational partnerships as institutional innovations can lean on the 
cumulative information garnered from existing IR research on international institutions 
complimented with a micro-level focus from managerial and organisational studies.  Bridging 
this macro and micro divide allows the framework to analyse partnership variation more 
closely.  While evaluation will always be an area fraught with methodological, analytical and 
conceptual problems, this broad theoretical framework will be applied to PPPs in order to 
examine the variation in partnership form, functioning and effects, or input, process and 
output variables. While it is perhaps the interplay of these internal and external dynamics that 
lead the most towards explaining variation, this is an element this work cannot address 
empirically.  The next chapter reviews the main methods and modes of this analysis before 
transitioning to the database to present the findings. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
Methods and framework for partnership analysis  
 Despite the promise that PPPs will effectively address global challenges, the 
enthusiasm dedicated to their promotion has not been matched with the same ardent push 
towards evaluation.  Lacking integrated, large scale or evidenced-based analysis, PPPs’ ability 
to influence global policy, drive change and lead to lasting impacts is far from clear.  Despite 
more recent trend towards critical assessments of PPPs, existing academic works are 
inherently tied to the researcher’s theoretical perspective and analytical approach.  This means 
as a set of research and methods, existing PPP evaluation studies still represent a rather 
fragmented and inconclusive body of works.  Thus cumulative, evidence-based reviews of 
transnational partnerships and their variation are lacking.   
 While existing approaches provide a starting point for analysis and note key lessons 
learned (Caines 2005; Schipulle 2003; Vollmer 2009), what is needed is a rigorous and 
systematic review of the broad universe of PPPs.   A more focused study and evaluation 
framework “could indicate whether and to what extent the expectations raised by the 
partnership paradigm are indeed met” (Van Huijstee 2007, 86).  This work makes progress 
towards this needed systematic study, and this chapter now turns to its constructed framework 
utilised to analyse and compare transnational partnerships.  
As expressed in the previous chapter, this work takes a unique approach to partnership 
evaluation, focusing on variation and effects rather than effectiveness.  Even with a narrower 
focus, evaluating PPPs presents several notable challenges and is inherently based upon 
several assumptions.  The result of which is that any evaluation will inevitably be guided by 
the research strategies chosen.  The decisions made regarding strategy and methods certainly 
directed the work and resulting analysis presented in the remainder of this thesis, and therefore 
need presenting and justifying.  In doing so, this chapter first reviews the prevailing 
methodological and analytical challenges of partnership and institutional effectiveness 
evaluation more broadly.  This is followed by introducing the conceptual framework and its 
components, and the next section details the modes and methods of evaluation employed.  The 
chapter concludes with brief summary remarks and reiteration of this work’s limitations and 
remaining issues. 
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4.1: Challenges, definitions and specifications 
Evaluating institutions and attempting to account for institutional effectiveness 
involves precisely defining both the institution of focus and also how that institution’s 
observed (or perceived) performance compares against a standard of effectiveness.  Any 
approach taken towards the goal of evaluation should thus not only recognise the distinctive 
analytical and methodological challenges assessment involves but also devise ways to meet 
these.  This involves clearly articulating overriding definitions, so speaking to this, this section 
walks through the persisting methodological challenges and discusses the strategies employed 
to identify the object(s) of study, the definition of the dependent variables and related 
approaches taken.   
 
4.1.1 Defining unit of study and partnerships of focus 
Partnerships are complex arrangements, and their varying components and at times 
vague degrees of separation between them compound the difficulty of identifying a unit of 
focus.  As introduced in the second chapter, this work begins with the intention of presenting 
transnational PPPs.  This encompassing definition, which creates the universe of transnational 
PPPs, focuses upon claimed partnering initiatives: the extent, involvement and commitment of 
the actual partnering arrangement is – and can only be – assessed through research.  This work 
then narrows this to a sampling frame of (ITPs), as per the definitions reviewed in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: Main partnership definitions employed throughout this work   
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Multiple aspects of partnerships’ functioning necessitate further definitional 
clarifications.  As institutions PPPs can function either as arenas for actors to engage and 
interact or as organisations which are actors themselves (Underdal 2002, 24).  The former 
refers to PPPs as a “framework within which politics takes place” (March and Olsen 1989, 16; 
in Miles et al. 2002, 24).  Within this literature focused on the role of epistemic communities, 
institutions are arenas for interaction among experts, agenda setting and negotiation (Haas 
1964).  The latter occurs when institutions serve as significant actors in their own right.  As 
arenas, institutions focus on regulating access to problems, and as such they specify not only 
the purpose but also the rules, location and timing of interactions.  If functioning as 
organisations, however, partnerships “must have a minimum degree of internal coherence 
(unity), autonomy, resources and external activity” (Underdal 2002, 27).  While this work 
attempts to focus on PPPs as organisations and actors in their own accord, it quickly becomes 
clear that many PPPs function as actors to facilitate interaction and build further partnerships, 
making clear distinction difficult. 
Determining which actors are partners – versus members, funders or participants – 
and which sectoral base they represent is also challenging.  Not only is this often unclear in 
design from partnerships’ own publications, but it will certainly be a more critical issue in 
practice.  As the second chapter traced, many definitions of partnerships imply equal sharing 
of risks and rewards across partners (Nelson 2002, 47), which is often not the case in reality.  
In attempts to avoid entering similar subjective criteria into the notion of partnering, this work 
steps apart from such definitions and maintains a non-normative stance and does not assume 
these criteria into the definitional base. 
The disjointed nature of the partnering also often confuses the line between what the 
partnership itself accomplishes and what the individual partners contributed.  This is 
especially the case when global partnerships function with a small central working staff and 
contract operations on the ground to various NGOs or Contract Service Organisations (CSOs), 
who have varying degrees of ties to the head office.  It is also necessary to distinguish the 
effects of a group of related partnerships from individual PPP operations, or the phenomena of 
institutional interaction or interplay (Young et al. 1999/2005)
62
, which is likely to arise 
especially as more PPPs appear in similar issue areas.  Further, as many global PPPs emerged 
from the same global or regional summits or function in areas heavily populated with similar, 
often competing, organisations such as NGOs or other partnerships, attributing effects to 
                                                 
62 See discussion in previous chapter, as well as Stokke 2001 and Rausutiala and Victor 2004 regarding the role of 
interactions as determinants of effectiveness. 
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particular institutions remains challenging.  Distinguishing partnership effects also requires the 
difficult task of separating the PPPs’ partner-based projects – often carried out by 
partners/actors – from those of the PPP itself.  As this work discusses in chapter seven, this 
distinction is rarely made by the PPPs.   
Ambiguities remain even with a solid notion of the partners and partnership.  For 
instance, while most of this work focuses on the centre point (CP) to allow for more 
comparability, the relationship between CP and individual country operations or units is more 
complex than can be detailed here.  Further, it is also not always clear the CP is the best 
representation of the PPP as a whole, or should be the focal point for examining its effects, 
which is why country-level consequences are increasingly the focus (McKinsey 2005; Biesma
 
et al. 2009).   
Finally, the definitions employed are articulated for clarification; this is not an attempt 
to claim that this should be the accepted notion of a partnership or that PPPs must be 
transnational or have a tri-sectoral actor base to be effective.  This work purposely attempts to 
limit the universe of PPPs studied in order to ensure a reasonable scope of study; thus it does 
not cover national and local PPPs,
63
 and given the sampling frame specifications, several 
notable global PPPs do not fall within the band, such as the majority of those partnerships 
hosted within the UNDP’s CSD, those within USAID’s GDA database or some well-covered 
partnerships such as PEPFAR. 
 
4.1.2 Operationalising effects   
Existing works employ alternative notions of effectiveness such as compliance, 
performance, influence or success, which leads to varying methods of evaluation and ranging 
views of PPP effectiveness.  When comparing evaluations, the definition of effectiveness 
employed and which aspect of the PPP functioning is being evaluated must be considered at 
the onset.  Given the inherent methodological problems involved in assessing effectiveness, 
this work attempts to move past these definitional issues and approaches PPP assessment from 
a more systematic, methodological angle.  As discussed in the first chapter, while the original 
intent was to analyse partnership effectiveness, throughout the process the focus shifted to the 
analysis of partnership variation with an emphasis on effects.  The previous chapters walked 
through progress made in attempts to evaluate regime effectiveness and also highlighted that 
despite progress made, varying and debated approaches still compose the field (Underdal and 
                                                 
63 See Vaillancourt Rosenau 2000 for work on national PPPs. 
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Young 2004; Young 1999b; Miles et al 2002).  Yet this variety in approaches means there is 
an applicable and relevant accumulated body of knowledge and theory. 
The last chapter’s discussion presented the distinction between effectiveness as goal 
attainment and as problem solving (Breitmeier, Young and Zurn 2006, 32).  This widely 
utilised categorisation of effectiveness is applicable to all types of institutionalised forms of 
cooperation.  While these can be complementary, fulfilling the declared goals of the 
partnership does not always correspond to also solving the problem targeted by the efforts 
(Bernauer 1995).  Not only can partnership effects be distinguished into goal attainment and 
problem solving, but the latter is broken down into outputs, outcomes and impacts,
64
 each 
described in turn below (Figure 4.1).65  
 
Figure 4.1: Effectiveness segmentation  
 
 Outputs are directly related to partnership performance and are associated with the 
actual activity of the institution.  These can be noted as the tangible products produced by the 
partnership – the “promulgation of regulations designed to operationalise rules and the 
development of policy instruments intended to guide the behaviour of key actors” (Chayes and 
Chayes 1995; Weiss and Jacobson 1998). These are the procedures or arrangements needed to 
transform a [regime] from a chapter arrangement into a going concern (Mitchell 1994).  At the 
onset of the PPP lifecycle, this can include the establishment of regulations, partnering rules 
and procedures, producing basic partnership documents and other procedures and functions 
that all institutions should undertake.  As outputs relate to the core formation and operations of 
the partnership, such as specifying the goals and tasks of the PPP (Ulbert 2008) evaluating 
                                                 
64 Originally defined by Easton (1965), similar methods are employed by two other existing large-n PPP studies: 
See Biermann et al 2007b and Liese and Beisheim 2011; Beisheim and Kaan 2010 and Beisheim and Liese 
forthcoming.  
65 See Beisheim, Liese and Ulbert (2008) for a similar conception; originally cited in Ulbert 2008. 
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them is a necessary first step.  Determining if the partnership still exists has been an issue for 
early evaluators of the CSD partnerships: Tondreau’s (2005) work found no data for nearly 
one-third of the PPPs supposedly operating in Chile.  Once functioning, outputs become less 
comparable across partnerships and more concerned with the main objectives of the 
partnership, such as producing policy reports, undertaking awareness campaigns, or 
distributing medications: this stipulation presents a need to distinguish between organisational 
and performance-based outputs. 
Occurring at a higher level than outputs, outcomes are actual changes in behaviour 
arising from the operation of the partnership or measurable changes in behaviour (Levy, 
Young and Zurn 1995; Young 1999b).  Examples of possible outcome indicators include 
compliance with and implementation of partnership rules, established awareness of the issue 
approached, change in attitudinal views or other behavioural effects.  Evaluating outcomes 
and establishing causality requires more methods than tracking outputs as outcomes occur at a 
higher level. For example, a program that sources varying partners (inputs) to train community 
leaders (output) may lead to greater social capital (outcome).  Obviously more difficult to 
track and operationalise,
66
 these can often be quantified based upon qualitative information, 
such as expert opinions and results from detailed interviews or surveys.  Thus focusing on 
outcomes is closer to what Young refers to as “behavioural effectiveness,” when a PPP causes 
others to alter patterns of behaviour, “either by doing things they would not otherwise have 
done or by terminating or redirecting prior patterns of behaviour” (Young 1994, 145).   
Impacts are those changes that lead to eventually solving the problem targeted by the 
partnership that can be attributed to the operation of the partnership and are the most difficult 
aspect not only to define but also to measure and assess across PPPs.  Partnership impacts are 
associated with actual improvement in targeted area of focus or those tangible changes in 
economic, social or environmental parameters.  Both outcomes and impacts are easier to 
assess when PPPs clearly articulate their intended value-add (Lele et al. 2004), and further 
there is no straightforward method for inferring outcome or impact from information about 
output (Underdal 2002, 6).  Many PPP studies utilise the OECD/ DAC impact definition as the 
“the positive and negative, primary or secondary long term effects produces by a development 
                                                 
66 For example, the Internal Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank evaluates outcomes by considering: the 
relevance of the intervention's objectives in relation to country needs and institutional priorities; efficacy, i.e. the 
extent to which the developmental objectives have been (or are expected to be) achieved; and efficiency, i.e. the 
extent to which the objectives have been (or are expected to be) achieved without using more resources than 
necessary. 
(http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?theSitePK=1324361&pagePK=64253958&contentMDK=207896
85&menuPK=5039271&piPK=64252979 
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intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended” (OECD 1991).  Though impacts 
can be unintended, these are not necessarily negative side effects, as they can include further 
learning, norm diffusion or transference of skills, as examples.   
While many studies focus on the “partnership working” (Caines 2005) as measured 
against partnership objectives or maintain a focus on outputs, measuring impact is less 
frequently employed.
67
  Even amongst GHPs, there is a lack of empirical or even anecdotal 
evidence and studies on impacts, especially in relation to national health governance systems 
(Brown 2006).  Yet, as individual regimes do not operate in an “institutional vacuum” (Young 
2004, 8), broader consequences should be considered.   
Impacts are obviously more difficult to assess  and rarely considered outside of 
individual case studies, especially given the challenge of conceptualizing a collective 
optimum.  Partnerships would have to focus upon narrowly defined problems or issue-areas in 
order to gauge an appropriate benchmark.  Some larger macro variables could be used, such as 
percentage changes of a population with access to drinking water or overall changes in literacy 
rates or pre-natal deaths, but accurate measurement and causal attribution to the partnership in 
question are obvious caveats.  This leads to the use of contribution analysis and similar 
methods discussed in the previous chapter.  As the empirical chapters will further discuss, 
though, while the significance is acknowledged, few partnerships make strides towards 
measuring their work this way, though especially in the health field consolidated efforts to do 
so are making gains, it is lacking for most.   
 
Distinguishing between Performance and Organisational-based outputs 
Another definitional aspect often muddled is that between what this work terms 
performance and organisational outputs.  This involves clarifying between the effects of the 
partnership itself and the effects of the partnering process.  The distinction is significant as 
the latter can be more readily compared across PPPs, despite varying areas of focus or 
activities performed; this is because process-based outputs are related to basic operations.  The 
former speak more towards whether or not partnerships are effective as problem-solving 
institutions. 
Lack of clarification can create confusion when comparing evaluations, as most reviews 
make no distinction between the two while employing varying notions of performance, 
effectiveness and legitimacy.  Especially when studies attempt to rank or compare 
partnerships, scoring effectiveness based on partnership outputs can be misleading unless 
                                                 
67 For attempts applied to environmental regimes, see Barret 2003 and Miles et al. 2002.    
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there is transparency towards whether the scores are based upon how effective the partnerships 
are as institutions of cooperation or how effective they are as problem solvers.  This work 
addresses this precisely by distinguishing between the two, and while the focus is on analysing 
the latter, as these are comparable across the universe of ITPs, performance is discussed, 
mainly through partnerships’ attempts towards performance tracking, review and evaluation.68  
 
4.1.3 Approach and operational procedures 
From the discussion thus far, it is clear that lacking common standards or benchmarks, 
existing evaluations of operational procedures across PPPs remain rather crude attempts.  This 
work takes a very pragmatic, operational-based approach to analysing partnerships.  Rather 
than presenting another conceptualisation of effectiveness and proceeding in the pursuit of a 
relative ranking, the focus here is on systematic study.   As this work focuses on the narrower 
view of partnership effects rather than effectiveness, it does not attempt to define a standard of 
reference or construct a scale of effectiveness, though the concluding chapter will return to the 
discussion of performance more broadly. 
This work operationalises effectiveness as effects into two components: goal 
attainment and problem solving.  It does not focus on effectiveness purely in relation to PPP’s 
goals set; instead, it analyses how articulated goals, visions, and missions vary across PPPs.  It 
then segments effects into partnerships’ attempts towards output, outcome or impacts.  
Outputs can be performance based or organisational based, but this work focuses the crux of 
the analysis on comparable, organisational outputs, for which standard metrics and indicators 
can be applied.   
 
4.2 Transnational partnerships:  Components of framework 
Though they are hailed as effective and legitimate governance tools capable of  
addressing persisting governance deficits (Reinicke and Deng 2000), there is little systematic 
evidence of PPPs’ actual contributions and effects in these regards (Biermann et al. 2007a, 
240). A relevant useful basis to structure a conceptual framework for this needed evaluation is 
to return to the discussion surrounding PPPs and legitimacy.  While legitimacy itself is a 
rather vague and encompassing term (O’Kane 199469), it provides a useful conceptual 
umbrella under which to analyse partnerships.  The familiar distinction between input and 
output legitimacy (Scharpf 1999) is readily applicable.  “Input” legitimacy, or democratic 
                                                 
68 See chapter seven for discussion. 
69 For an overview of applications of legitimacy to empirical research, see Hurrelmann et al., 2007.  For works 
linking procedural legitimacy to output effectiveness, see Beisheim and Dingwerth 2008. 
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legitimacy (Dingwerth 2007), is said to refer to the accountability, transparency and 
participatory quality of the decision-making processes (Bexell Tallberg and Uhlin 2008; 
Dingweth 2007) whereas output legitimacy refers to problem solving quality or capacity.  
Legitimacy thus concerns both procedural elements and their societal acceptance (See also 
Risse 2006).   Using this conception, this work’s framework builds on the challenge that PPPs 
should be evaluated both as to their efforts to increase the effectiveness (problem-solving 
capacity) and legitimacy (democratic accountability) of global governance (Börzel and Risse 
2005).   
Many argue PPPs’ eventual acceptance and perceived success will be legitimized not 
only by their democratic qualities, such as enhancing participation, but also by their 
substantive results (Omelicheva 2009).  Further, while output legitimacy is related to 
governance effectiveness, it “hinges on perceived effectiveness among stakeholders, which is 
not necessarily the same as resolution of underlying problems” (Biermann and Gupta 2011, 
1858; see also Dingwerth 2005, 2007).  This gives additional credence to the importance of 
organisational outputs, as these speak towards this element of perceived effectiveness, what 
Bäckstrand terms institutional effectiveness (Bäckstrand  2010).  Building on this 
legitimization concept, this work moves towards the systematic study of the relationship 
between aspects of input legitimacy as defined here (i.e. structure, processes) and output 
legitimacy (effects) through this conceptual framework.   
  
4.2.1 Constructing a framework  
As it is often claimed that PPPs face a trade-off between input legitimacy and 
effective performance (Börzel and Risse 2005; Haas 2004), both components should be 
captured within the framework.  From a normative perspective, legitimacy refers to how a 
process should be designed and what results it should have (Omelicheva 2009, 113-117) and 
encompasses the notion of consent of the governed – that is that those affected by a governing 
institution are represented and can hold it to account.  Empirically, however, this is very much 
determined by perspective and depends on whether those subject to rules deem them valid and 
appropriate. Legitimacy can be derived from multiple aspects of the partnership, mainly its 
structure, process and outcomes (Brinkerhoff 2007, 74); these highlight relevant areas of 
focus: structure and form; functioning and management processes; and effects of partnerships.   
Moving from theory to practice, a common framework serves a useful purpose as it 
furthers evidence-informed, comparative study.  Instead of providing one common benchmark 
for evaluation, however, a framework should be seen as a useful means to focus upon the key 
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underlying questions and “provide a menu of possible indicators and not necessarily 
predetermine which indicators should be used and what the targets should be” (Pearson 2007, 
12).  The strengths of guiding frameworks are their ability to allow for cross-case comparisons 
and widen the dialogue on partnership evaluation.   Basic frameworks also provide a common 
language that cuts across researchers, partners, funders, donors and stakeholders. 
There are continued arguments for partnership study to be placed within more 
comparable, robust frameworks (Utting and Zammit 2006), and especially within the health 
sector there are calls and related attempts to develop common frameworks for monitoring and 
evaluation (for example, see Pearson 2007), as conceptual frameworks have been developed 
for analysing system-wide
 
effects (Bennett and Fairbank 2003) and certain national-level 
effects (Brugha 2008).  An attempt of a detailed framework for PDPs by Social Impact 
Advisors noted that a common framework should be “timeless” in that it is relevant both today 
and in the future and thus will continue to provide a common platform adaptable to individual 
organisations (FSG Social Impact Advisors 2007).  That said, though it provides a 
comprehensive framework, this is considered too detailed and overly burdensome for existing 
PDPs (PPP Stakeholder InterviewF), and furthermore the directors of several notable, high 
profile PDPs have remarked this could not be practically implemented.  This is a critical point:  
this work is not attempting towards a radical or novel framework nor as detailed as the FSG or 
similar works.  Instead, it is purposely intuitive, usable across PPPs and even more so is in line 
with OED and World Bank proposals for global programs as well as closely aligning with that 
proposed by the joint work on health systems strengthening and International Health 
Partnerships
70
 (IHP+) common evaluation framework.  As these are proven applicable and 
useful across large sets of partnerships and programs, it is useful to model and build this 
work’s analysis within.71  
Laying the context, the discussion provides the background and also guides later 
consideration of the relationships between inputs, processes and outputs within the framework 
(Figure 4.2).  The remainder of this section lays out these components (e.g. inputs) which are 
broken down into areas (e.g. actors) and dimensions (e.g. sectoral split), which can be 
operationalised and tracked; the terms used are shown in Figure 4.3.  Though the basic 
components are more generic, the variables were defined and operationalised so they related 
                                                 
70 http://www.internationalhealthpartnership.net/en/home 
71 That said, one interesting components of this work is how closely the 25 dimensions of the MM Interviews 
assess many of the same areas proposed within the FSG framework; yet the MM Interviews are done in a 
systematic, comparable way (and conducted within two to three hours).  Thus, as will be returned to in this work’s 
conclusion, there may be considerable value to this approach moving forward practically for partnership evaluation 
as well as theoretically linking to the general constructs on which this work is based.   
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to the theoretical constructs as much as possible and would not only encompass most 
significant aspects of partnership structure and functioning but also allow for the further 
testing of relevant hypotheses.   
 
Figure 4.2: Evaluation framework   
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4.2.2 Framework components 
 While the model of inputs, processes and outputs drives the main framework of 
partnership evaluation, these should not be seen as a stepped sequence, where certain inputs 
necessarily lead to certain outputs: this is what is investigated throughout the work.  The 
framework does aid in the identification of the expected causal links, similar to a “program 
logic” framework,72 commonly applied to partnerships and related programs and initiatives.  
This framework is broken into main components at varying areas and dimensions of analysis.  
For example, within the input component is the area of institutional; within institutional are 
dimensions of legal status, legal structure (e.g. 5013c, Foundation) and level of 
institutionalisation, which can have sub dimensions (such as country of incorporation).  Many 
attributes do not fit neatly into one category, as many suggested attributes are also considered 
within this work’s analysis of organisational outputs.  For example, the launch, design and 
operations of governance and decision making (GDM) systems are a key input, activity and 
translate to a related outputs partnerships should produce.   
                                                 
72 For more on the logframe framework, see World Bank. 2000. The Logframe Handbook, World Bank.  Available 
at  http://www.wau.boku.ac.at/fileadmin/_/H81/H811/Skripten/811332/811332_G3_log-framehandbook.pdf  
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There are inherently trade-offs in designing a conceptually tight framework, which 
incorporates all dimensions noted to be significant, and one that is applicable to large-n 
empirical analysis.  While I argue that this framework is theoretically based, conceptually 
sound and as encompassing as possible – as demonstrated through the discussion below and 
resultant analysis in this work’s remaining chapters – there are limitations that must be 
acknowledged when moving from theory to practice.  As becomes clear, not all of the desired 
elements can be captured with the specific dimensions given the necessity of data availability 
and the desire to have minimal subjective assessments or rankings within the input side of the 
analysis.  These variables and components will obviously not all be relevant in all cases, nor 
should these factors be seen as independent from each other – more appropriate combinations 
may be significant in some cases and not others, especially for certain functional types of 
PPPs.  While full analysis of the interplay of these variables is outside the scope of this work, 
the framework encompasses the building blocks required to move towards this.  
Figure 4.3: Framework breakdown    
 
 
 
 
 
 
INPUTS  
The first aspect of the framework involves the input side of the analysis, and while the 
term itself is perhaps too broad to hold much analytical value, it serves as a useful area 
heading. In general, input indicators measure what goes into an activity, such as design, 
funding and resources, but these indicators do not measure the quality of the service provided 
or outputs produced by the partnership.  This work breaks inputs aspects of: focus; attributes; 
actors; institutional and organisational; governance and decision making; and “input” 
legitimacy.   
Distinguishing these aspects across partnerships presents definitional and 
measurement challenges, however, and lacking clear and straightforward tools, objectivity can 
be difficult.  Especially with these PPPs of focus, inputs are far from static aspects: 
partnerships often change even basic aspects of structure and design.  Capturing these 
attributes is also difficult given the overlap between inputs and process.  While the framework 
notes these separately, many inputs also have multiple potential focal points for analysis.  For 
example, resources, while largely an input, challenge the framework as the ability to attract 
 
Framework Components  
 Within each Component, certain areas considered 
   Within each Area, certain dimensions considered 
Within each Dimension, ranging variables are considered (often within sub categories)  
96 
 
and generate new funding streams could be considered an output and the management of 
funding and resources a PPP process.  This is not a limiting factor, however, as the categories 
are presented only to enable reader to more easily consider what aspects of partnerships are 
tracked within the framework, and the explanatory value of these variables is furthered within 
the analysis.   
 Focus and scope are linked to the nature of the problem and include the area of focus 
(thematic and issue), functional type, geographical scope and stated goals of the partnership.  
Despite being perceived as basic and fundamental aspects of PPPs, these are more subjective 
areas and difficult to clearly define; as such a researcher’s judgement stands to play a role.  
Problem area of focus denotes the thematic or sectoral area the PPP targets, such as health, 
education, energy or infrastructure.  Area of focus involves functional type: the role or aim the 
PPP professes to hold.  Scope is the claimed geographical territory of coverage, which can 
differ from the countries or regions in which the PPPs physically operate, so both are noted.   
The goal(s) of the partnership are captured via the stated mission statement (as this is 
articulated and publicly available) as well as more specific, stated goals. Combined with the 
other elements of focus, this leads to a conception of problem structure (Miles et al. 2002). 
Problem area of focus and the nature of the problem the partnership attempts to tackle are 
analytically significant, as few would dispute that some problems are inherently more difficult 
to solve (or even address) than others.
73
  This work presents the focus, area and goals as 
articulated by the partnership and notes the nature of the problem addressed, but it does not 
attempt to determine relative strength or toughness or incorporate this directly into the 
framework.
74
  It does not set out to express an opinion on the relative difficulty or strength of 
goals, but merely to define them, as the partnership does.  This is a critical and significant 
task, as many argue partnerships are less effective when they have vaguely defined or broad 
goals or target areas (Bäckstrand 2005).   
A strong argument in favour of partnerships is that as they have a narrow focus, this 
parcels governance issues into manageable tasks (Reinicke and Deng 2000), and thus they 
may be even more effective governance arrangements.  Many studies show regimes with more 
narrowly defined problem areas are more effective (Young 1989a, 1995; Sebenius 1993; 
                                                 
73 For related analysis in regards to problem difficulty in regime analysis see Efinger and Zurn 1990; Stein 1982; 
and Underdal 2002. 
74 See Kalfagianni and Pattberg 2011 for a conceptualization of problem structure, which they consider a control 
variable in explaining variation in effectiveness of transnational rule-setting organisations.  The authors consider 
that the nature of problems organisations try to address, the salience of the problems for political actors, the level of 
awareness in society, the establishment of knowledge associated with the causes and consequences of the problem 
at hand, and the prior existence of public regulation.  
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Andersen and Wettestad 995; Miles et al. 2002), but this conflicts with arguments that note 
issue-linkage is what causes regimes to develop, and perhaps succeed (Hisschemoller and 
Gupta 1999).   
Attributes: Linked to a partnership’s problem solving capacity are descriptive 
aspects, mainly related to partnership age, founding and other descriptive characteristics.  Age 
of the PPP, the life cycle stage in which it is being assessed certainly matters.  Older, more 
mature are expected to exhibit a more advanced form and functioning than those more 
recently initiated.  While not necessarily a linear increase in effectiveness over time, there will 
undoubtedly be discrepancies across PPPs at various stages in their life cycles.  Partnerships 
are certainly evolving processes (OECD 2006), and while it is argued that throughout their 
operational lifecycles they transition from being activity based to strategic-focused 
(Binkerhoff 2007, 85-86), the reality is there is no set pattern and PPPs will vary considerably 
in their growth and evolution.  
 Another oft-cited reason for engaging with partnerships is that harnessing both 
private and public sector bodies brings additional resources to the arrangement neither is 
capable of achieving on their own.  Within this dimension this work assesses the following: 
funding levels, main donors and change over time, income streams and geographic sources of 
funding.  Deemed highly significant to institutional functioning (McKinsey 2002; VanDeveer 
2000), not only do the level and stability of these resources vary considerably across 
partnerships, but so do the key donors involved and their respective  level of commitments.  
Also, more than purely finances, which themselves are difficult to assess for partnerships, 
these global PPPs rely on intangible assets as well; this is clear in various issue areas from 
health to development issues, and the source and continuity of these experts and knowledge 
communities are crucial towards lasting partnership effectiveness.   
While it is doubtless that resources are needed for adequate functioning, this could 
also lead to resource dependency.  Partnerships that rely too much on initial donors or funders 
could detract from their sustainability and future effectiveness if they fail to generate their 
own support; indeed, one potential measure of partnership success is its additionality, or the 
degree to which partnerships generate new multi-sector funding for sustainable development 
or their own initiatives (Bäckstrand 2005, 17).   
Though resources certainly deserve a place within partnership inputs in the 
framework, throughout the course of analysis, it became clear they would be treated largely as 
an output, mainly due to issues of data availability on finances, lack of comparability of non-
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financial resources across the universe of PPPs and their applicability to the organisational 
outputs category.
75
 
Actor variables cover the partners, members and participants and the defining 
characteristics of these groups and the individual actors within them.  As the TPD provides a 
breakdown between public, private and social partners, as well as the structuring of the partner 
definitions and layers, this allows a review of the PPPs’ levels of inclusiveness.  The 
distribution of membership amongst the private, public and social sectors may also play a role.  
Early reports indicate that at least in global health partnerships, the private sector is over-
represented (Buse and Harmer 2007), especially when compared to funding contributed.  
Enhanced membership opportunities are argued to not only decreases the participation gaps in 
global governance (Reinicke 1998) but enhance partnerships’ success, so it will be necessary 
to see if this is evidenced empirically.  Current empirical works are limited in cases sampled 
but do show how a wide range of interests contributes to successful partnerships (Khagram 
1999).  Too many members could have the converse affect, especially if this leads to 
coordination problems due to higher transaction costs (Scharpf 1997, 70), frustrates governing 
and decision making or become an institutional constraint (Hemmati 2002). 
The necessity of diverse stakeholder involvement for partnership success is a 
frequently referenced argument, but the ranging involvement these actors contribute is less 
studied and not evidenced empirically as a contributing success factor.  This is certainly 
crucial as many current studies of PPPs in developing countries show that the actual 
involvement of partner governments and civil society was low in terms of participation and 
any actual influence (Hoering 2003).   Adequate representation involves more than being 
included or having a “seat at the table,” as even formal inclusion or engagement may hide 
internal power imbalances.  Despite the popularity of these arguments, whether or not these 
actor variables, especially concerning participation and representation, matter for effectiveness 
is far from clear. While all static and claimed accounts of partnerships are noted, the 
interaction and communication between these partners and how these partners interact within 
the organisational structures are best captured within the management interviews.  
Institutional design and institutionalisation:  Though flexibility is a unique and 
distinguishing characteristic of global PPPs, partnerships vary greatly regarding their structure 
and formalisation.  As their unique institutional design is one of their most promoted features 
                                                 
75 It is acknowledged that this placement and treatment is debatable, and this is not denying the critical nature of 
resources as inputs, especially as to the possible link between resource levels and potential effectiveness and/or 
performance.  Given this work’s goal of assessing variation across inputs, processes and effects rather than analysis 
of PPP effectiveness, this variable is consolidated within outputs to note variation in PPPs’ generating and 
managing funds and resources.   
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(Ivanonova 2003), comparing these varying levels of institutionalisation and which specific 
elements of institutional design may be more likely to contribute to effectiveness in varying 
situations is significant.  Institutional attributes have been a key aspect of regime research 
from an early stage, as more attention was devoted to understanding these variables of 
institutional design and the possible impact on varying levels of effectiveness (Andersen and 
Wettestad 1995).  It is also expected that different types of PPPs will require different types of 
institutional capacity, as what is effective in one environment is not necessarily successfully 
replicated in another (Young 2008).  Even more so, these features are significant as they can, 
at least in theory, be manipulated and developed to work toward lesson building for designing 
more effective PPPs (Underdal and Young 2004).   
Key areas of institutional design include: overriding entity type, institutional and 
organisational design, legal structure and status, host status and location and type of centre 
point (CP), often termed secretariat.  These are related but slightly distinct from 
organisational and structural variables, which are the institutional factors that define or 
make up the PPPs.   These include clarifying the basic type and function of the partnership.  
Also included within this input category are the structural characteristics of staff structure and 
leadership roles, types of post, business operation design and legal status.  Of interest is also 
the “leanness” of the central management team and central or secretariat characteristics.  
Already, analysts within PPP discourses argue that institutional design matters in terms of 
partnership functioning.  Many advocates of PPPs argue that it is their institutional design that 
relies more on legitimacy, self interests, or voluntary norms that lead to their enhanced 
success. Despite its perceived necessity, however, the flexible structures of partnerships 
“bring[s] their own serious risk and side effects” (Martens 2007, 62).  Flexibility may also be 
highly tied to the environmental conditions in which the partnership operates, but internally 
managing flexible structures is also inherently complicated.  
 Guided by the hypothesis that this variable would be of key significance, these 
institutional design considerations and rules are aggregated into level of institutionalisation 
(Table 4.2).
76
  Incorporating the theoretical works discussed in the previous chapter as well as 
the unique features of PPPs, the focus here is on the level of independence of the entity, 
composed of features such as legal status and incorporation, host status, degree of 
independence from host, degree of delegation to partnership units or other actors and related 
elements of design. 
                                                 
76 The level of institutionalisation is also the main explanatory variable in related work which reviews 21 
transnational PPPs.  This research team defines level of institutionalisation based upon degree of obligation, 
precision and delegation (See Beisheim and Liese 2011 and Beisheim and Kaan 2010).       
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Table 4.2 Scale of institutionalisation 
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al form 
 
 
- Institution
al 
structure 
 
 
- Organisati
onal 
structure 
 
 
- Organisati
onal 
characteris
tics 
 
 
- Time limited, ad-
hoc 
- Unlimited time scale - Permanent 
institution 
- No separate legal 
status 
- Legal status 
 
- Own legal status 
with guiding legal 
document 
-May or may not 
have a Centre Point  
- Centre Point 
established 
 
- If hosted, formal and 
separate governance 
or DM than host 
institution 
- CHQ location 
established 
- Centralisation/ 
decentralisation 
planning across 
operating units 
- No formalised or 
separate governing 
body 
- Formalised GDM 
procedures  
- Budget 
 
- Full budget 
authority 
- Formal board 
- Formalised DM 
procedures 
- No membership 
rules or criterion 
- Clearly defined 
members and/or 
partnership 
- May or may not have 
membership rules 
and/or criterion 
- Membership rules 
and/or criterion 
 
 - Centralised decision 
making 
 
- Business plan 
articulated 
- CE strategy/ DE 
operations 
- Few or no full-time 
staff 
 
- Full-time operating 
staff 
- Full-time operating 
staff and articulated 
staff structure 
*Most hosted fit in this 
category, though some 
reach medium levels of 
institutionalisation 
  
 
 
Governance and decision making (GDM) and input legitimacy:  It is often argued 
that “Whether or not PPPs realize their full potential and whether they impact negatively or 
positively on their public and civil society partners is, arguably, largely a function of their 
governing arrangements” (Buse 2004a, 226), yet this has been les empirically tested and thus 
these elements deserve a place within the framework.  GDM variables are generally contained 
within the guiding legal document of the partnership, existence of dispute resolution processes 
and the governing body(ies), the latter  considering its structure, status and member 
composition, decision making rules, internal governance and reporting.  One key factor is 
whether or not PPPs have a governing body or board, as this should not be assumed, 
especially for hosted PPPs.  The composition of and representation on these bodies is also of 
interest, especially for those who argue that inclusion of civil society in governance processes 
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(Wapner 1997; Held 1995), as involving non state actors into the governance arena may 
enhance not only input legitimacy but also problem-solving effectiveness (Reinicke and Deng 
2000). 
Understanding decision-making structure and how the votes are distributed within 
these addresses debates relating to power and influence within PPPs, but truly analysing this 
involves assessing the methods and management structure that allow varying powers and 
actors within the PPP to exercise their authority (Underdal 2002 ) (this draws emphasis to this 
work’s MM interviews, below).  Roles, which consider not only task and role allocation but 
also actual oversight in relation to member selection and handling of internal conflicts are also 
relevant.  A key question is how much it matters for partnership success if (and how) actor 
capabilities fit the role in the ways intended.  How well these roles are clarified is also 
significant, as McKinsey’s (2005) review finds for global health partnerships, as strongly 
defined roles and responsibilities are often crucial for operational success.   
Within these variables the nature of the decision rules, or the conditions that need to 
be met to reach decisions or social choices (Breitmeier et al. 2009, 114; in Kalfagianni and 
Pattberg 2011) are relevant, especially as it is argued that rules more closely related to 
unanimity and inclusiveness will improve compliance (Breitmeier, Young and Zurn 2006), 
which relates to recent findings that enhancing procedural transparency can enhance 
compliance (Beisheim and Dingwerth 2008).   
Input legitimacy:  As argued at the onset, key concerns of PPPs relate to their 
accountability and transparency, especially as to the possible impact of these governance 
variables on effectiveness, or output legitimacy.  The actor and GDM dimensions within the 
framework (such as actor types and sectoral representation) work towards assessing PPPs’ 
input legitimacy.  Tracking variables related to these dimensions also speaks to debates 
surrounding stakeholder democracy within international relations (Held and Konig-Archibugi 
2005; Risse 2006), especially as related to the participatory quality of these institutions or the 
ability for PPPs to contribute to the participation gap in global governance (Ruggie 2002; 
Streck 2004). 
Deemed necessary to maintain the legitimacy of transnational governance institutions 
(Beisheim and Dingwerth 2008), accountability and transparency mechanisms are of 
significant focus within this work’s analysis.  The framework captures “transparency of 
governance,” or policies and institutions designed to empower a polity to observe actions, 
rather than “transparency for governance.”  The former is tightly linked to information 
disclosure while the latter is designed to influence and alter behaviour, such as education-
102 
 
based transparency or exposure. As a note, many PPPs’ function is related to the education-
based transparency, or providing targeted actors with information intended to remedy 
informational deficiencies (see Mitchell 2011, 1882 for this distinction).  When analysing the 
former, as this work does, the focus is on the level of information provision the PPP provides.  
For the universe of PPPs, this involves assessing their publication of a legal document, annual 
report and/ or financial statements and/or reports.  While these specific discussions are 
furthered in chapter seven, it will become apparent throughout that a large part of this study 
and research is in itself an exercise in PPP transparency, as this work struggles to complete 
full PPP profiles for many. 
 
MANAGEMENT AND PROCESSES 
Ranging studies of varying effectiveness of PPPs have attempted to “chip away” at 
noted differences in effectiveness and performance by evaluating similar measures of 
partnership inputs, such as resources or leadership.  While the input elements of structure, 
actors and/or institutionalisation tracked above can go far in explaining the variation in PPP 
effects, these are only part of the story.  Partnering arrangements can consist of similar 
partners, resource levels and issues areas of focus yet exhibit varying levels of perceived or 
actual effectiveness.  Within the private sector, econometricians label this unexplained 
differential between inputs and productivity as fixed effects of “managerial quality” (Mundlak 
1961; Bailey et al. 1992). 
Strong management practices and process management capabilities within PPPs could 
be a key determinant of PPP effectiveness, as after being established, it is these practices 
which “contribute to compliance and the successful implementation of measures taken” 
(Ulbert 2008, 8).  While management practices receive some focus, as these are inherently 
difficult to assess and compare, no work has attempted to do so systematically: most existing 
work is done on an individual partnership basis via case studies, which tend to highlight the 
PPPs with either very strong or very weak management. Given the often subjective nature of 
the study area and qualitative nature of research, the ability to generalize these findings is 
limited.  While studies based in economics and organisational studies have increasingly 
evidenced the strong link between management and the performance of institutions,
77
 lacking 
an accepted tool to measure management, these works were less developed on a comparative 
or large-n basis.  As furthered below, this work utilises a structured interview based on work 
                                                 
77 See, for example,  Black and Lynch 2001; Cappelli and Neumark 2001; Bertrand and Schoar 2003;  and Bloom 
and Van Reenen 2007.  
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pioneered in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), which uses an established methodology for 
defining, measuring and evaluating management and effectiveness to assess and compare 
management practices within a set of the sampling frame PPPs.  
Management concerns the internal management practices and processes functioning 
within the PPPs and speak towards how the process of implementation is managed and 
monitored.   Management practices are more than the attributes of the partnership leaders or 
top managers: while style can influence practice, these management processes are by nature 
part of the organisational structure and behaviour of the PPP.  Management practices for 
partnerships are considered as composed of the following main areas: partnership operations; 
leadership; vision; performance management; target and goal management and people/staff 
management.  
What is significant is that this management assessment allows this work to further 
explore the range of variables thought to matter in explaining PPP variation, but previously 
nearly impossible to asses across PPPs outside of case studies, such as resource management, 
leadership and internal performance tracking.  The main data for process dynamics and 
partnership working evaluation is obtained via a management practices interview, henceforth 
MM Interview, and remaining discussion is reserved for chapter six. 
 
EFFECTS  
After distinguishing effectiveness between goal attainment and problem solving, one 
considers a pathway to explore effects that starts with outputs, leading to outcomes 
(behavioural change), and which can eventually lead to impact (environmental change).  
While one may assume temporal interaction of these elements (Ulbert 2008, 5), sequencing 
does not necessarily always follow in a straightforward, stepped fashion, nor do all PPPs 
attempt to produce all three.  When it comes to problem solving, it should not be assumed that 
a PPP that produces successful outputs and outcomes will contribute towards impact in its 
focus area, nor that PPPs which excel in some areas will necessarily do well in others.  These 
dimensions are also tied to goal attainment, or the specification of how partnerships intend to 
reach stated aims or objects.   
Outputs, first order effects and the main focus of this work, can then be further 
distinguished as organisational and performance.  The former
78
 focus on basic processes, 
procedures and functions that all PPPs should undertake, especially those deemed  necessary 
                                                 
78 Outputs of functioning should not be confused with outputs of partnership working (see for example Atkinson 
2005), the latter assessing the partnerships internal relationships.  The focus here is on the tangible outputs of 
partnerships as institutions.  
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to lead to an efficient and functioning institution.  Examples include structuring and legal 
notice, the creation of business plans, developing timelines and strategic planning and details 
regarding (efficient) resource use, especially related to funding and the production of related 
reports.  These outputs are also significant because they represent the development of policy 
instruments intended to guide the behaviour of key actors (Young 2002a), which leads to an 
assessment of outcomes.  Once PPPs are functioning entities, outputs become less comparable 
across partnerships and more concerned with the main objectives of the partnership, such as 
producing policy reports, undertaking awareness campaigns, or distributing medications.  It is 
these performance outputs which go further towards analysing PPPs effectiveness capabilities, 
as these track and measure outputs of the PPPs specific to their problem solving role.  While 
outcomes and impacts are necessary elements of analysis, this work is not able to fully explore 
these PPPs contributions, but they are addressed in the goal segmentation analysis in chapter 
seven and are also discussed in this work’s conclusion.   
 
4.3 Methods of evaluation 
  Collecting, describing and measuring partnership inputs, processes and outputs, as 
well as attempting to analyse the resultant relationships between them, is a complex task.   
Many challenges and issues arose along the way, and this work sought to address these and 
make needed decisions based upon considerations of available options, feasibility and ultimate 
intended contribution of this work.  It is safe to say the originally planned task was overly 
ambitious: the process of even identifying and describing the partnerships was an enormous 
undertaking, and fully applying the conceptual framework was  not only difficult but one that 
had to be continually revisited.  While further discussion on scope and remaining limitations 
are revisited in the concluding chapter, this subsection speaks directly towards the 
methodology and systematic steps taken. 
 
4.3.1 Methods: Establishing methods and evaluation framework  
The multi-faceted focus of this study and its related framework allow for the analysis 
of multiple levels of partnership functioning and performance.  In doing so, this study 
combines qualitative and quantitative data, information collection techniques and analysis.  
Rather than contradictory, however, these aspects complement each other and allow for more 
in-depth research.  Not only do different methods have different strengths, but there are “no 
fundamental incompatibilities preventing us from combining them in one integrated study” 
(King, Keohane and Verba 1994, 4).   By using multiple methods, the work is able to use the 
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strengths of one method to compensate for the other, for example in terms of data and 
information collection and resultant analysis.  This is especially exemplified in the 
management interviews, which in effect quantify information from qualitative interviews with 
the PPPs, as furthered in chapter six.   
This work’s main focus for PPP information collection, comparison and assessment is 
stored within the constructed Transnational Partnership Database (TPD), its two sub-
databases, TPD-Outputs and TPD-Goals and the Management Matters (management 
practices) database (MM-Database).  The TPD is the first presentation of a micro data set of 
global PPPs
79
 and represents a comprehensive source of information and analysis on the 
global partnering universe.  Its expansive coverage and inclusiveness of variables furthers 
partnership analysis.  The TPD’s two sub-databases, TPD-Outputs and TPD-Goals are rich 
data sources of the sampling frame of ITPs and related to the latter element of the conceptual 
framework, effects.  This study’s other distinctive feature is its source of information 
collection via the MM interview, as this innovative survey tool allows for a comparative 
partnership analysis and in-depth understanding of partnerships at the micro level. 
Any database should be seen as a means to an end rather than the end itself.  
Throughout the process the theoretical underpinnings that underlay this work (as previously 
introduced) drove the variable selection and TPD partnership coding. Though “a research 
design that explains a lot with a lot is not very informative” (King, Keohane and Verba 1994, 
123), it was also deemed necessary from the onset to encompass as many relevant explanatory 
variables within the framework as possible while maintaining a focus on empirical feasibility.  
Decisions as to not only which variables to track but also how to categorise the partnerships 
across these were continually made difficult by the often fragmented state of the field, vague 
definitions and the lack of standardisation of classifications and typologies in both academic 
works and current partnering practice.   
As articulated earlier, this work incorporated the major theoretical issues and research 
questions dominating partnership research, but it is obviously clear that it is impossible to 
include the entire range of variables that may be deemed relevant.  Further, building the final 
framework presented here involved moving from an ideal, theoretical construct into a 
modified one: more operational, feasible, manageable and defensible.  To some extent, 
especially regarding the organisational outputs tracked, the original framework altered 
throughout, as some variables were determined missing for the majority of the universe of 
                                                 
79 As previously noted, the other main academic database is the Global Sustainability Partnership Database 
(Biermann et al. 2007b) developed by the Institute for Environmental Studies at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, but 
at time of writing this includes only CSD partnerships. 
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PPPs and others were added during the course of the process as it became apparent they would 
be meaningful to the analysis.
80
   
To manage this process, this work took the stance that all variables and codes 
analysed in the TPD and its sub-databases were ones that could be replicated by other 
researchers, and if subjective assessments were required then decisions made would be clearly 
defensible.  Thus, while moving from an ideal set of variables to those feasibly tracked across 
close to 800 partnerships involved losing some detail and specificity for scope, readers and 
users of the TPD should appreciate its encompassing nature, focus on clarity and precise data 
tracking.  The sampling frame of ITPs allowed for the full exploration of the variables across 
the framework components and the ability to collect and analyse data more closely, though 
these criteria of defensibility and replicability were maintained.  This work’s management 
interviews, provided an additional, richer dataset, and (available for a subset of PPPs) further 
drawing out micro-based insights presented.  Finally, throughout the course of this work many 
interviews and meetings were held with relevant PPP stakeholders, but none of this qualitative 
information fed directly into the TPD coding.   
 
4.3.2 Methods of analysis: Collecting and describing units of study  
Key throughout the process was to preserve utmost transparency and attention to 
detail to allow others to understand the reasoning behind definitions and analysis and also 
ensure their ability to replicate this study.  Explicitly, this involved ensuring the variables were 
clearly defined, articulated and tracked as objectively as possible (or to the extent the subject 
area allows).  This work also fully records the process by which this information was gathered 
and the reasoning behind the resultant partnership and components coding. 
 Defining the universe of global public-private partnerships was the first ambitious 
aspect of the data collection and a more controversial task than originally anticipated, given 
the vagueness of the definitions of PPPs and the contested nature of the term itself.  The TPD 
first lists and describes all claimed global public-private partnering initiatives, but it does not 
take the normative stance that all listed potential partnerships include all aspects of a “true 
partnership” or that roles are shared as claimed.  The process of universe definition occurred 
in early 2008 and continually updated, but was revisited in 2011 so all information is accurate 
                                                 
80 Furthermore, once the decision was taken to transfer the TPD from an independent research project to a full 
accessible, online project – the Global PPP Platform (globalppps.org) –it was deemed useful to create as complete 
profiles of all PPPs as possible.  In doing so, the analytical potential of the inputs presented in chapter five 
expanded considerably, but much of this could not be discussed in the present work given length limitations. 
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as of 30 June 2011.  Before detailing the data sources utilised, it is helpful to understand the 
universe definition and partnership coding. 
  Establish universe:  After defining the unit of study, several steps were taken to build 
the universe and sampling frame.  First sources of all existing claimed public-private 
partnering initiatives were compiled.  Existing aggregated sources, of which there were three 
major listings, were utilised first.  As mentioned, Kaul’s (2006) work is the largest 
compilation.  Her 2005/2006 attempt to pull together the overall collection of global PPPs and 
examine their descriptive and structural characteristics resulted in 405 identified 
partnerships,
81
  but this online database is no longer available.  The WHO’s International 
Initiative on Public Private Partnerships for Health
82
 (IPPPH), while no longer operational or 
accessible once represented the most consolidated source of GHPs.  Originally managed by 
Roy Widdus, the IPPPH is in now within the Global Forum for Health Research, but no longer 
maintained.  Perhaps the most studied segment of global PPPs in terms of a large-n foci are 
the post WSSD Type II Partnerships for now hosted within the UN’s Commission on 
Sustainable Development (CSD)’s consolidated database, though it is based on self-reporting 
by the PPPs.  Across all, these databases were mostly listings of partnerships rather than full 
databases of information, however, so it was often rather cumbersome to obtain actual 
information on the partnerships.  Once these partnerships had been identified, the databases 
were merged to eliminate overlaps, or PPPs that appeared in multiple.   
The second wave of data collection involved investigating other potential sources, 
mainly major program websites from the World Bank, USAID, UNDP and UNFIP, among 
others.  Since 2001, the USAID, through the GDA model, has cultivated more than 1,065 
public-private alliances with over 3,025 individual partners (USAID 2011), but the majority of 
these are shorter-term projects, locality specific and not tri-sectoral; thus, the individual 
alliances are not included within the TPD.  In the end, the PPPs noted from the UN focal 
points were also listed but not added into the TPD in full due to lack of information and the 
novelty of the PPPs, as no information could be found on the vast majority outside of their 
initiation article within the newsletter.  This was followed by reviewing other academic 
research work on global PPPs, following through with leads from corporate websites and then 
investigating relevant secondary sources, a similar process Kaul (2006) originally took.  Of 
note, outside of these three main sources additional PPPs were not added to the TPD if it was 
clear they would fall outside of the sampling frame (i.e. only a national scope or no private 
                                                 
81 http://www.thenewpublicfinance.org/p-universe.php 
82 Information and related publications from the initiative can be found at http://www.globalforumhealth.org/ 
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partners involved).  Thus, while acknowledging there may be more this process resulted in 
757 identified global partnerships, 53 of which did not come from the three databases.  
Define and describe:  Once identified, the universe of PPPs was characterised across 
several dimensions to clarify the object of study and create individual PPP profiles.  To do so, 
this work developed a coding/ definition system and applied this consistently across a few 
main variables.  This not only describes the universe of PPPs but also eventually reaches the 
narrower sampling frame of ITPs.  AppendixA provides a full list of all TPD variables, but the 
coding process for the main variables is described briefly below.   
 Partnership type: Outside of source, the key code is the PPP type.  This relates to the 
filtering process of moving from claimed global public-private partnering initiatives to the 
sampling frame and essentially describes the PPP in one snapshot.  This involved coding 
partnerships that were no longer operational, existed “in name only” (occurs when a formal 
announcement was proclaimed for the PPP but no follow up or evidence of operation could be 
found) or were projects rather than institutionalised partnerships.  The next step in the process 
identifies partners (actors, members) and scope (global, regional, etc), and those without a tri-
sectoral actor based and transnational reach are classified within this type and not placed 
within the sampling frame.  To reiterate, the focus remains on claimed partners, scope and 
geographic reach, among others, as it was acknowledged from the onset that listed information 
may not represent the reality within each PPP.  Slightly more than 20% of the PPPs changed 
their type during the process, mainly either because status changed (partners involved, scope, 
operational), additional information was obtained or an interview revealed the different nature 
of partnering or partners involved than originally identified.   
 The TPD coding system in effect served as a funnelling technique, where each code 
type essentially noted the reason the PPP is not in the sampling frame.  This can be thought of 
as the statement, “Not in the sampling frame (X) because this PPP does not meet this criterion 
(e.g. S for scope, P for partners, etc).  This funnel works the universe to the sampling frame of 
PPPs, discussed in chapter five (See AppendixB).  
Besides type, the other classification perhaps subject to the most criticism is assigning 
a functional type to the partnerships.  As the second chapter discussed, PPPs perform a myriad 
of functions (Reinicke and Deng 2000: 12-23; Bull and McNeill 2007; Kaul 2006).  While 
some works consider two broad categories of policy implementation and policy formulation 
(Schäferhoff,, Campe and Kaan 2009, 457), even among these two categorisations many PPPs 
blur the line between the two.  Though most existing works attempt a categorisation or 
typology segmentation, few clearly lay out the methods for establishing these types.  It is often 
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unclear whether this should be determined by what the PPP claims to do, what it actually does 
or what activities the funders earmark the most money for, and it is even more unclear how to 
determine all three for each partnership given the lacking information.  This work defines ten 
functional categories and assigns all PPPs accordingly as per the methods below (Table 4.3.). 
Table 4.3: Functional Descriptions  
 
Main 
Category Definition 
Advocacy A PPP dedicated to advocacy’s main operations revolve around vocally and/or visibly supporting a 
position or action.  Raising awareness, affecting popular opinion, influencing policy-makers and 
social outreach are ways of illuminating the position of the PPP’s message and further bring 
attention to its core agenda.   
Information 
production/ 
research 
A PPP involved in information and knowledge production generally engages in forms of joint-
research amongst its main actor base.  The partnership may share resources or capital (physical, 
human or technological) towards producing new knowledge; at times this results in a network to 
create a “virtual library” or “virtual laboratory.”  Most global health partnerships devoted to product 
and vaccine development fit within this category; other PPPs encourage partners to conduct field 
work that contributes to new knowledge. 
Information 
dissemination 
& transfer 
A PPP within this category is committed to facilitating dialogue and the exchange of information 
and experience between actors.  Often, such partnerships establish formal institutions or informal 
networks, such as clearing houses or periodic conferences, that encourage target actors to congress 
in order to explore ideas for policy or joint-action in a given issue field.  Other partnerships may 
institute an accessible database constructed through combined input for the purpose of sharing 
information and learning.  Such a partnership is created to encourage consultation towards extending 
and deepening networks of relations and/or to facilitate discussion and discourse on the topics 
deemed significant. 
Policy and/ or 
(its) 
development 
This type of PPP is involved assisting in the development of policies that will further the 
partnership’s agenda/interests.  Unlike a pure advocacy partnership, this type of PPP goes beyond 
simply raising awareness, and aims to create pressure in favour of a certain position, push towards 
policy change or develop/create new policy standards.  Policy development PPPs focus on applying 
the pooled expertise and experience of the PPP to assist policy-makers in updating the policy 
environment and designing new effective policy where a need has been identified by the 
partnership.   
Setting 
standards 
This type of PPP is involved in encouraging the adoption of particular standards and practices, often 
geared towards an industry.  These partnerships often pool the expertise and experience of its 
partners to inform and assist enterprises in improving the monitoring and implementation of 
particularly defined supply-chain practices, or to encourage the standards of products and services 
across an industry to be harmonized. 
Coordination 
(of resources, 
expertise) 
A PPP that specializes in coordination uses its pooled expertise, experience, knowledge and 
resources to manage the planning and preparation of activities that will provide public goods for 
beneficiaries.  The strength and utility of the partnership is often derived from the ability of partners 
to apply their comparative advantage to the goal of coordinating action.  For example, some partners 
may be adept at fund-raising, other partners may have experience in planning humanitarian 
activities, and some (usually UN bodies) have large networks of relations to rely on for gathering 
expertise.  The PPP brings partners’ expertise and assets under one umbrella, mobilizes these and 
attempts to coordinates them in a more coherent manner. 
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Facilitation This type of PPP aims to bring about increased engagement and networking between relevant actors 
with a view to strengthening their cooperation, often to encourage the provision of public goods or 
services in a given issue area.  Often, this type of PPP considers itself a “broker,” “clearing house” 
or  “network” between like-minded actors; facilitation PPPs tend not to engage in the actual 
implementation or coordination of initiatives; rather, they seek to recruit and match other 
organizations towards such ends. 
Capital 
provision 
This type of PPP coordinates the mobilization of resources and channels these towards a targeted 
population.  The partnership often involves a grant-awarding public body or a fund engaged in 
socially responsible investment that makes available a sum of money to vetted candidates that 
engage in the coordination or implementation of a public good or service.  
Operational An operational PPP would have a direct presence on the ground, and retain some stake, oversight, or 
management over the activities that the PPP supports.  An operational PPP goes beyond finalizing a 
framework for future action and actually conducts action itself; for example, operational areas could 
include sale of goods/services or the distribution of aid and/or humanitarian relief. 
Capacity 
building 
A capacity-building partnership is distinct from simple coordination in that its efforts are geared 
towards developing the autonomous capabilities of local stakeholders and/or beneficiaries.  It is also 
distinct from operational PPPs; even though capacity-building is a direct (up-front) way of engaging 
stakeholders and beneficiaries, the public service that is produced is developing competencies and 
skills, rather than consumables or other forms of humanitarian support.   
 
This work makes the functional types purposely broad and notes secondary functions 
where appropriate.  To reach these functions, this work combines three main elements in the 
following order of prominence: partnership mission statement, partnership key activities or 
business/ strategic plan and partnership dedication of time and resources, where the latter were 
available.  The methodological process is focused first on the partnership’s claimed primary 
function, but it is difficult to make a satisfactory judgment unless there is an explicit 
delineation of the partnership’s key focus.  While useful mission statements will include 
mention of not just the intended impact of the partnership, but the activities the partnership 
engages in to achieve this, often such statements do not suffice in explicitly delineating 
primary activities.  The function variable can be considered more activity-based; if the 
activities involve mobilizing resources towards an initiative, the function would be coded as 
coordination, whereas if primary activities were to involve joint research, the function would 
be coded as information exchange and/or research.   
 
Creating Profiles: Partnership attributes and addressing input legitimacy 
 Using the information collection processes described below, a full PPP profile is 
created for every PPP in the universe.  This consists of variables within the following 
categories: Focus (scope, sector); Partners (including actual names of all partners involved, 
partner counts and partner sectoral split); Legal (legal structure and status); Operations (years 
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founded, ended and total years operational); Institutional (hosted status structure, design and 
status); GDM variables (type of body, sectoral split of decision making, layers of governing 
bodies); Funding and resources; and Contact details.  See AppendixD for full list of variables 
tracked. 
Besides more detailed descriptors on PPPs operations and structure, these variables 
speak towards the main debates regarding PPPs input legitimacy: their ability to bridge the 
participation gaps (Reinicke and Deng 2000), participatory quality of decision making 
processes (Scharpf 1999; Wolf 2006) and transparency (Bäckstrand 2006; Buse 2004a; Buse 
and Harmer 2004).  Considering these aspects involved tracking and assessing the existence of 
an annual report, financial data and/or guiding legal documents.  That said, it could be argued 
much of the TPD is an exercise assessing PPP’s transparency and accountability, as simply 
collecting basic information, especially funding sources or governing arrangements, is 
challenging.     
 
 
4.3.3 Methods: Collecting and describing partnership effects  
For those within the sampling frame, additional information on both partnership 
inputs and outputs was collected utilising the same methods of data collection.  This involved 
more detailed descriptives of partnership inputs, such as type of centre point, number and 
status of full time staff and level of institutionalisation.  The remainder of these variables and 
the resultant findings are discussed in the next chapter, which presents the TPD and chapter 
seven which discusses the sampling frame and effects. 
 While some data collection was done simultaneously with that above (including final 
verifications), the partnership output empirical work was conducted solely during November 
2009 - May 2011, with the latter serving for final verification purposes, and the comparative 
basis utilised 2008-2009 as the last fiscal year for financial data.  As functioning and 
legitimisation variables do not entail making as subjective of judgements (though there will 
always be an element of this, the definitions are noted for every variable, e.g. scale of 
institutionalisation), these two areas made sense to track together.  The process to describe and 
measuring partnership effects was conducted through: 1) PPP goal definition and 
segmentation (outputs, outcome or impact minded) and 2) comparable outputs of partnering. 
 PPP goals set and defined:  Global partnerships are varying institutions, composed of 
actors with ranging aims and incentives; yet these individual goals which lead to their 
involvement in the PPP and may or may not be the same as the intended goals of the 
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partnership itself (Zadek et al. 2001).  The stated goals of a partnership are obviously a key 
reference for evaluation, and the first step towards analysis of goal attainment, but goal 
articulation is itself worth evaluating, especially as this was found to vary so greatly across the 
PPPs.  This work produces the first TPD- Goals database, which tracks the missions and 
visions for sampling frame PPPs.  It also breaks down all stated partnership goals into whether 
or not they are output, outcome or impact focused, and PPPs can obviously set goals within 
one or all of these. 
Publicly available documents and readings that pertain to the PPP’s mission and vision 
are the obvious starting point.  Often, the websites of active (and even some ceased) 
partnerships are instructive enough in having a separate and visible link to a mission and/or 
vision statement.   Publicized declarations of mission and/or vision statements commonly are 
broken down into objectives; more often than not, these are expressed at the outcome-level, 
outlining the steps that lead to the achievement of the impact-level goal.  Information on 
outputs is usually found on a paragraph or a webpage separate from the mission and/or vision 
statements, and often outputs can be gauged from the partnership’s description of its activities.  
This overall method is thus top-down, beginning by studying objectives set at the 
environmental/ impact-level or the behavioural/ outcome-level, and only thereafter 
determining activities that contribute to the output-level.  This method proves useful in 
establishing an overall context and then shows how output-oriented activities are geared 
towards the achievement of higher-level goals.   
 Simply defining and segmenting goals, while a useful and enlightening exercise, only 
goes so far in the analysis of partnerships effectiveness.  Analytically, the next step is ideally 
to track progress of the PPP towards these goals, but this will only be possible for PPPs with 
well defined goals and strategies, measurable (at least to an extent) goals and aims and clearly 
defined and published indicators and metrics.  While this process forms a part of many 
existing effectiveness studies, issues regarding lack of standardisation and difficulties of 
comparison exist.  This is not to deny the importance of assessing goal attainment, but it is 
difficult methodologically to confidently evaluate or rank PPPs based on perceived progress 
towards their varying set goals.  This is especially the case as the goal definition process 
across all PPPs was in itself ambitious, and while tracing goal attainment for all ITPs is clearly 
outside of the scope of this work, this work goes as far as possible by detailing PPPs’ internal 
performance tracking, internal review systems and whether or not they have been subject to 
external evaluation, among others, as detailed in chapter seven.   
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 Organisational outputs: Related to the functioning of partnerships, comparable outputs 
of functioning represent the key outputs that all partnerships should produce, regardless of 
function.  From an assessment standpoint, partnership output variables are more easily 
accessible and observable and can also be judged on a more quantitative scale than outcomes, 
and are thus more easily tracked.   These outputs tracked in TPD-Outputs can also be 
considered first order means or steps deemed necessary to reach eventual performance.  These 
are critical as outputs must also be in place to speak accurately of partnership efficiency and 
productivity, since either involves accurate measures of both inputs and outputs, which these 
speak towards.  The outputs were selected based on a meta-analysis of existing partnership 
and institutional frameworks of outputs, existing literature, interviews with partnership 
practitioners
83
 and examples from high performing partnerships’ reporting systems.  To an 
extent, however, information availability and feasibility of information tracked were also 
taken into account. 
A point worth considering evident throughout the work and thus also often 
rearticulated is many aspects flow across inputs, processes and outputs, and as such cannot be 
slotted firmly within one category in practice, but for analytical clarity this work must make 
certain segmentations.  Further, as many existing evaluations have ranging foci for their study, 
there is no clear categorisation of where all of these legitimisation variables fall.  For example, 
while rule design and the dispute settlement or resolution system are partnership inputs, 
utilising and applying these are part of partnerships’ processes, but the publication of these 
rules and/or the results of disputes are tracked as organisational outputs of the partnership.  
While it is crucial not to confuse these aspects of legitimacy with the dependent variable of 
effects in analysis, given availability of information and categorisations utilised, this remains a 
challenge throughout.  
 
4.3.4 Methods: Data sources and methodological processes  
This led to a development of a profile for each PPP. Primary sources included all 
publicly available PPP information, including websites, annual reports and other publications, 
relevant partner websites or publications, program documents and related materials.  Existing 
PPP evaluations were utilised to complete the databases, but all documents were noted as to 
their source and whether internal, independent or external.  After assessing the primary 
resources available, this work focuses primarily on annual reports and financial statements, 
strategic plans, and if available, evaluations.  Internal evaluations, newsletters and partner 
                                                 
83 See list of Stakeholder interviews in AppendixK. 
114 
 
statements were also used for database information, as often these were the only source of 
information, but this was done only if the sources could be verified as to time period, source of 
publication and author.  
The UN CSD database was another source of information (for 169 PPPs it was the 
only source) as well as global health organisations, the World Bank's Global and Regional 
partnership program, the Centre for Global Development, the UK Department for International 
Development Health Resource Centre, Partnerships
 
for Health Reform and the Global Forum 
for Health Research, among others.  Additional publications were obtained through
 
reference 
lists of identified papers and by contacting key informants
 
in the field, but as a methodological 
point all information in the TPD comes from a verifiable source, publication or webpage.  If 
information could only be obtained by contacting the PPP directly (via email or phone contact, 
if available), this is clearly noted as to lack of public availability and source.  Thus TPD 
information did not come solely from conversation or interviews, though interview 
information was used to verify TPD information or make corrections (e.g. adjust a partner 
count, number of staff), but this mostly applied to TPD-Outputs information.  This is also the 
case for documents sent by the partnership but not publically accessible without request 
permission; specifically, a set of PPPs only made these documents available to partners or 
members, but were happy to send to this author. 
This work’s process dictated that information from MM interviews or direct contacts 
was used to verify inputs and organisational outputs but not those related to PPP transparency.  
Specifically this implies that while staff counts, number of locations and total number of 
partners/ funders and (external) evaluations conducted would be adjusted post-interview, 
variables that involved a transparency component (e.g. publishing performance metrics) were 
not – even if the interview revealed the PPP had metrics.  To adjust for this and not, the MM 
Interview-based set of organisational and institutional aspects tracked during the interviews 
(AppendixG) are collected in a separate database and subject to full, separate analysis (though 
only an aspect of this will be presented within this work given space).   
With this multiplicity of sources, there was a need for selection criterion for reports 
and information utilised in creating partnership profiles. The key consideration was whether 
the databases should be as accurate as possible or as replicable as possible.  While both were 
goals from the onset, in the end accuracy was chosen with the caveat towards transparency 
variables detailed above.  In essence, however, major discrepancies were few and are spoken 
to below, though minor discrepancies (e.g. partner count, staff count) were frequent.  One 
additional consideration was whether or not to include secondary material or ‘grey’ literature 
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(such as briefs, media or journal ‘comments’), and in the end these were used to verify or 
backup key information, mainly because for many PPPs these were the only sources.
84
    Thus, 
these data collection processes utilised a degree of methodological triangulation and the most 
up-to-date and verifiable information was used as the final data point, and all conflicts noted.
85
 
 Further, especially at the onset of this research work and during its course, key PPP 
stakeholders were also interviewed via a semi-structured conversation covering the main 
aspect’s of this work’s framework and detailed probing into the particular area for which that 
interviewee was specialised.  In addition, managers and directors at four PDPs were 
interviewed in 2010 following the MM interview portion of this study.
86
  Given the empirical, 
large-n nature of this work and the direction taken, this analysis and insights are not included 
here, but when applicable relevant discussion from these additional interviews is mentioned.   
 
4.3.5 Methods: Measuring partnership management practices 
To investigate the issue of partnership management, this work conducts a structured 
Management Matters interview with a set of the ITPs.  The management matters survey is 
based on methodology pioneered in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and developed as joint 
collaboration between LSE and McKinsey & Company, a consultancy.  This tool is based on 
interviewing managers to collect management practices data, originally across private sector 
firms, and then evaluates and scores on these practices.  Further development of the 
methodology has applied this same survey tool and scoring grid to the public sector 
(government tax agencies, schools, hospitals and aged care homes) and charitable 
organisations; among others.  Thus, it has shown clearly its relevant application across 
countries, sectors and types of institutions.  Not only is it applicable as a survey tool, but the 
resultant findings from these structure interviews continue to  find stronger management 
practices to correlate with higher performance levels (Dohrmann and Pinshaw 2009).   
This methodology allows this work to utilise and benchmark a rigorous comparison of 
global PPPs within a proven framework and structured scoring grid, especially as this tool 
provides a conceptually sound, operationally manageable measure of process management.   
These works have shown clear relationships between stronger (and higher scored) internal 
                                                 
84 This judgment is also made given the goal of this work, in assessing  PPP variation, rather than an attempting to 
evaluate or analyse PPPs’ effects more specifically.   
85 More detailed information and guidance to the compilation of the TPD and the dating track process will be made 
available at globalppps.org; the concluding chapter returns to this. 
86 This allowed for particular probing into certain areas that varied the most across this set of rather similar 
partnerships and detailed investigation and related analysis into elements such as institutional design choice, 
partner management and performance tracking, as examples, which will feed into further work as the conclusion 
discusses.   
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institutional management practices and external indicators of institutional performance and 
productivity (Bloom and Van Reenen 2010).  Applying this management measure and the 
process undertaken to conduct the interview involves understanding the processes involved in 
scoring management practices; collecting accurate responses; and obtaining interviews with 
the partnership directors, all described in full in chapter six.  
 
4.4 Considerations and conclusions  
 Any large scale study of such a fragmented universe of institutional structures 
presents many challenges, especially for the scope of a single work or researcher.  While this 
work presents an evaluative framework for transnational partnerships focusing upon 
partnership inputs, processes and effects, a few limitations and caveats should be noted. The 
first is that this work should be seen as an applicable and useful common framework for 
transnational partnerships, but this is not an attempt to establish one accepted definition of 
partnerships or effectiveness.  This work also takes a more narrow focus on partnership effects 
rather than effectiveness, and by applying the study to partnership effects, the work is able to 
maintain a more feasible scope while avoiding the more subjective nature of ranking 
partnership effectiveness based upon my own conceptualisations, crude scale or standard.  As 
this works utmost methodological goal is to maintain applicability, transparency and 
systematic procedures, this was the best course to take.  Repeated calls from established 
researchers of international regimes note difficulties with subjective judgement of individual 
analyst when explaining and evaluating the effectiveness of various regimes.
87
 As the 
importance of convergence regarding these issue areas across researchers rather than 
additional attempts at conceptualisations are often made (Underdal 2004), this was the course 
taken. 
  To conclude this chapter, this work moves in the direction of systematic, comparative 
research on the impact of varying components of partnership inputs and management 
practices on partnership effects.  It provides a foundation for more quantitative study of 
partnerships and further attempts to sharpen the concepts involved in partnership research. 
Combined, the methodological processes build upon the partnership conceptual framework to 
examine the degree to which transnational partnerships vary and takes steps towards 
explaining how ranging variation in partnerships can be explained by varying foci, structural 
                                                 
87 See Young, King, and Schroeder 2008 where similar arguments are made as well as Young 2003 for specific 
cases. 
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inputs and management processes.  These three aspects are discussed in the subsequent 
chapters, which present the empirical findings.   
 
118 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: 
Transnational partnerships in global governance: Variation in form and effects 
 
In the complex, collaborative and at times contradictory continuum of current global 
affairs, transnational partnerships have increasingly gained prominence.  While their potential 
is intriguing, we know little regarding the cumulative impact of the practice of transnational 
partnering.  With a grasp of the background and methodology, this chapter presents the first 
comprehensive view of the universe of claimed global partnering initiatives.  Doing so, it 
highlights not only the defining features of the global partnerships operating within the 
multilateral domain but also touches upon the persisting debates these raise.   
   Though organised by main partnership characteristics given the substantial depth of 
information to cover, this chapter stays closely with the overriding concerns regarding 
partnerships’ efforts to address persisting governance deficits.  As it summarises the key 
findings of this work’s Transnational Partnership Database (TPD), this chapter presents 
the information systematically, as per the framework relating to partnerships inputs.  This 
involves considering attributes that fall within the following: characteristics (operations, age, 
and location), focus (scope, function and sectoral coverage) and actors (partners and funders 
involved).  The next section considers structural features of institutional design and level of 
institutionalisation followed by governance and decision making (GDM) variable
88
s.   The 
final section returns to these overriding debates, possible implications and summary remarks. 
 
 5.1: Partnership universe: Operations, locations and coverage 
From the onset, attempts to describe or define the universe of PPPs are challenged by 
the often vague and varying and notions of what embodies or typifies a PPP.  As the term 
partnership is rather value-laden, overused and frequently applied to a range of institutional 
endeavours, the expression itself is difficult to grasp.  The definitional uncertainties of the 
term are worth reiterating as these will continually challenge analytical work and always leave 
a degree of ambiguity relating to any claimed, final figures. 
 
 
 
                                                 
88 The analysis of sampling frame ITPs are also presented, as insights emerge regarding how this set of PPPs 
compares to the universe as a whole and this work tracked additional, detailed variables on this subset. 
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5.1.1 Transnational partnerships: Numbers and where to find them  
It is undoubtedly impossible to define the complete universe of transnational PPPs, so 
from the onset this work acknowledges this is likely still an incomplete picture.  As previously 
detailed, the approach taken starts with the main existing, available listings of PPPs, combines 
these and eliminates overlaps (PPPs that appear in multiple listings).  The majority of PPPs 
were found to be listed within the UN’s Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD)89 
(352 PPPs) or the New Public Finance
90
 (NPF) initiative (304 PPPs), with the latter also 
encapsulating 66 of those within the Initiative on PPPs for Health (IPPPH) and 50 of those 
listed within the CSD.
9192
  After merging these, the next process added in partnerships from 
additional sources, including IGO’s main program and partnership pages, other academic 
research institutions and public policy networks for think tanks with a dedicated PPP or non-
state actors research team.  It then investigates other potential PPPs not included in these 
consolidated sources that were operational by 2010 to create this work’s TPD.  Thus while 
acknowledging there may be more this work identified 757 identified global partnerships, 53 
of which did not come from the three databases (Table 5.1).  
 
Table 5.1 Sources utilised for the Transnational Partnership Database (TPD) 
Source PPPs Percentage
CSD only 296 39%
New Public Finance only 187 25%
IPPPH only 4 1%
New Detailed only 75 10%
New Public Finance and CSD 50 7%
New Public Finance and IPPH 66 9%
New Detailed and CSD 5 1%
New Detailed and IPPH 20 3%
All three databases 1 0%
Other sources 53 7%
Total 757 100%
CSD all 352 46%
New Public Finance all 379 50%
IPPH all 71 9%  
Source: TPD, 2011 
 
                                                 
89 http://webapps01.un.org/dsd/partnerships/public/browse.do  
90 http://www.undp.org/thenewpublicfinance/partnerships.html 
91 Kaul (2006) mentions that her work is not inclusive of all CSD partnerships. 
92 Netmark Plus was the only PPP to be listed in all three:http://www.netmarkafrica.org/index.html 
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Most existing attempts at cross-PPP or cumulative evaluative works have been done 
on the partnerships for sustainable development registered with the UN’s CSD; as of June 
2011 there were 348
93
 registered PPPs within this database.  The NPF database, based on the 
work of Inge Kaul (Kaul 2006; Broadwater and Kaul 2005), was taken out of operational 
status in 2009 and is no longer accessible.  Outside of the author’s own work, no additional 
analysis was conducted following initial publication; indeed, most PPPs listed were not aware 
of the NPF or their placement within it.  The IPPPH, originally within the WHO, was no 
longer updated after 2004, and though it was transferred to the Global Forum for Health 
Research
94
 as in initiative there has been little furtherance.   
As mentioned in the last chapter, most other existing online databases were mainly 
project-based, regional or agency specific and thus would fall outside of the global scope this 
work originally sought to include.   Thus the TPD is the first to merge across sources and 
attempt to verify updated operations across all PPPs.  While seemingly straightforward, this 
process was continually complicated by missing information, lack of maintenance of 
partnership listings and absence of clarity of publically available listings.  For instance, many 
institutions are claimed partnerships, but do not appear to be engaging in any form of 
collaboration; others may be defined in one location as a partnership, yet when contacted these 
institutions were quick to distance themselves from this category; thus, the verification process 
of partnership entities was a challenging and consuming endeavour.   
 
Narrowing: 
The TPD collected information on all 757 partnerships in the universe and describes 
the partnerships by creating detailed partnership profiles.  This serves as a narrowing process, 
which allows the work to funnel this large universe of partnerships to a specific form of 
institutionalised transnational partnerships (ITPs).
95
  The 147 partnerships which embody the 
characteristics of an ITP constitute the subset of more institutionalised initiatives which 
undergo detailed analysis (Figure 5.1).96 
 
                                                 
93 As mentioned in the second chapter, the CSD website currently lists 348 partnerships [accessed 20 August 2011]; 
however, it originally included four additional partnerships that have been removed but are still within the TPD.   
94 http://www.globalforumhealth.org/ 
95 ITPs are voluntary, horizontally structured and collaborative institutionalised interaction between multi-sector 
parties (based in the public, private and social sector) organised with a purpose or task of global reach; see chapter 
two for definitional background. 
96 As noted, upon the final TPD update process (June 2011), an additional 98 PPPs were identified as possible 
sampling frame PPPs (and 21 PPPs changed type, mainly through partner restriction, to eliminate them from the 
sampling frame); but analysis remains limited to the 147 numerated as of December 2010.   
121 
 
 Figure 5.1:  Narrowing process from Universe to Sampling Frame   
 
Of the claimed partnerships pulled together by this work, 317 were no longer 
operational or no information could be found to verify their operational status.  At over 42% 
of the universe, this is an astonishing number of partnerships, especially given the rampant 
and continual promotion these initiatives receive.  A further 60 were not actually partnerships, 
but only programs or projects within existing institutions, and these were designated within a 
separate category.  A portion (13) of these were Social Responsibility Initiatives (SRIs) where 
a public and private institution agreed to work together on a certain project/ initiative, but 
there was often no established, formal or long-lasting relationship.  The majority of these 
SRIs
97
 also had little information regarding their work outside of the initial press release.  
British Petroleum, Shell and Statoil all have named SRI’s that share basic characteristics such 
as private sector institutional hosting, operational-geared functions and claimed global scope, 
but these are not stand-alone initiatives, and hence it is difficult to distinguish these from 
projects undertaken by BP or Shell as an entity.   On the other hand, partnerships such as 
Community Watersheds Partnership Program Global Development Alliance (Formerly the 
Coca-Cola/USAID Water and Development Alliance), while not an institution in its own right, 
represents a formal partnership between the institutions.  It also has a defined mandate, 
traceable activities and operations which can be distinguished from Coca Cola’s broader CSR 
                                                 
97 All SRIs were sourced from the NPF database.   
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initiatives.  While this is obviously a difficult distinction, it is one this work deemed necessary 
so it made all efforts to distinguish projects from institutions in the narrowing process, though 
complete precision cannot be reached.  
 Another 43 partnerships are for-profit entities and not included in the sampling frame; 
further, a large segment of the PPPs (243) were not be included within the sampling frame as 
they have a narrowly defined scope, i.e. country or regional specific, or they do not include 
partners from the three sectors.  This is not to say these PPPs should be less studied or that 
they may be more or less effective, but rather it is this work’s goal to focus detailed analysis 
on this more institutionalised subset. 
 
5.1.2 Operational status and partnerships no longer functioning  
Partnerships are either deemed fully operational with a partnership-specific website or 
fully operational with verifiable information available on its host, main partners’ websites or 
related sources.  This work defines a PPP as having operational status if there is any existing 
and relevant information confirming status as ongoing, even if no tangible output can be 
distinguished
98
 (Figure 5.2).  
 
Source: TPD, 2011 
 
 
                                                 
98 December 2008 served as the cut off period.   
Figure  5. 2: Operational status, All PPPs   
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Digging deeper reveals that at least 26 partnerships, but probably more, have ceased 
operations due to a completed mandate.  An example of this is the Lapdap Antimalarial 
Product Development, a partnership between GlaxoSmithKline, the WHO the UK’s 
Department for International Development (DFID) which completed its objective of 
submitting Lapdap (a fixed ratio tablet of an antimalarial drug combination) for registration 
within a period of 5 years
99
 (Lang and Greenwood 2003).  A larger number of these expired 
when the funding cycle terminated or initially planned timeline ceased; however, it is often 
difficult to distinguish these partnerships from the formerly referenced category, as to be 
coded as complete mandate, this work would have to source a verifiable report, publication or 
even press release noting successful completion.   
Another 13 partnerships fit into the category “exist in announcement only.”  These 
partnerships have published information noting partnership initiation or intent to partner, often 
with a specified timeframe and mandate, yet beyond this initial publication no additional 
information can be found to verify the partnership was ever established or made it off the 
ground.
100
  An issue in determining the status of “no longer in operation” versus “completed 
mandate” is the source of the announcement, as a few of these may have been assumed into 
either an existing or new institution or a similar, pre-existing partnership.  An example is the 
WHO/Novartis Coartem® which while eventually successful,
101
 never existed as a separate 
entity.  Most times, however, the original source did not provide enough leads, nor did any 
follow-up or attempts to contact the partnership allow for full verification of status.  A related 
issue is that of the 169 PPPs for which their CSD database entry was the only information 
available.  After efforts to contact the PPP and extensive searching, no operational existence 
could be confirmed for these, thus these were deemed no longer operational.  Of these, 62% 
(105) were initiated with a set timeframe, so while it is still discouraging that no information 
regarding the PPP could be found, this limited lifespan was planned. For the remaining 64 that 
were open-ended, however, this is a different story.
102
  While these also “exist in information 
only,” these PPPs are kept with a unique code to distinguish them as CSD-based, but are 
classified as no confirmation of operating.   
                                                 
99 Not only was this done on time but at a relatively low cost, and after which a public health group was formed 
which investigated relevant pricing and distribution issues. 
100 This work attempted to verify information directly via email, phone and fax confirmation but was unable to 
confirm these partnerships ever began operating. This number does not include any UN-CSD partnerships.   
101 Novartis and the Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV), a PDP, jointly launched Coartem in 2009. 
102 As a proxy, these were deemed no longer operational as of 2008 - this work’s cut off year for having evidence 
of operations.   
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Unfortunately also within the not operational category is a rather large set of 
partnerships which seem to have initiated or started operations but for which no current 
information past 2008 could be obtained on operational activities.  This work distinguishes 
between these types to separate partnerships that were once operational and have some 
evidence of activity from those which were only announced.   This is critical, as research 
questions should not only consider which factors are associated with partnership success (or 
mere continuance), but also if certain characteristics or types of PPPs are more likely to lead to 
a limited timeframe.   
That a large number of PPPs fail should perhaps not be surprising.  Especially in 
terms of institutional structuring, growth phases, staff levels and motivation and many other 
characteristics, PPPs could rightly be compared to private sector commercial start-ups.  As 
such, it is interesting to note that recent research across a broad range of industries, time 
periods and countries shows that nearly half of all start-ups cease operating within four years 
(Sull 2009, 56).    Exploring the types of PPPs that have ceased operations may unearth 
possible explanations for continuance or lack thereof.  Yet what is critical is to not only 
understand why this occurs – and there are certainly transferable lessons - but also ensure PPP 
stakeholders have current information on this operational status, or transparency of operations, 
across the universe of PPPs.   
What does this suggest regarding the state of the PPP universe?  Without question 
consolidated or up-to-date information on global PPPs is lacking.
103
  While others have noted 
the lack of information or evidence of operational activity in global partnerships, usually in 
relation to their reporting and monitoring of activities (OECD 2006), this work is the first 
attempt to assess the totality of the partnership universe AND to attempt to verify operational 
status of the CSD partnerships beyond their self-reported entries.  This raises pressing 
questions regarding PPPs’ roles as effective modes of governance given that many institutions 
lack verifiable or accessible information on their activity or operations.  While one must 
acknowledge that these sources are slightly outdated, and there would be a natural progression 
or evolution of the partnerships, the high numbers of those without any tangible evidence of 
operations is still alarming.   
Of difficulty is that partnerships are moving targets - constantly changing and 
adapting institutions: attempting to define and categorise them is complicated by their 
continually evolving nature.  During their development, partnerships will obviously undergo 
                                                 
103 The lack of evidenced activity echoes arguments regarding CSD registered partnerships from Andonova and 
Levy 2003 and  recently Szulecki, Pattberg and Biermann et al. 2010, who find 156 (47 percent) of CSD registered 
PPPs are inactive.    
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internal change and also be impacted by external factors.  Many PPPs also either become 
subsumed into existing organisations or continue under a different name or head partner; thus, 
it becomes increasingly difficult to trace their activities.  Those hosted within IGOs are often 
staffed only on a part time basis, and when the key “champion” of that initiative leaves, the 
PPP leaves with it (World Economic Forum 2005), a finding echoed strongly in this work’s 
interviews.  While a supposed inherent strength of partnerships is their flexible nature, as this 
should allow them to withstand and adapt to changes (Caplan et al. 2001; Kjaer and Tennyson 
2003) and be innovative problem solvers, lacking solid institutional structuring or strong 
backing, these institutions often have limited tenures or become too tied to a certain actor’s 
interest. 
At issue is the continued promotion of these initiatives despite the fact that large 
numbers do not survive past the initial years of operation, the main partner’s initial funding 
cycle or even the announcement of the PPP!  Recall the second chapter’s discussion of how 
once the partnering trend became caught up in a discourse or promises, allowing these to 
become established entities despite evidenced effects, or even operations.  While often applied 
to GHPs (Buse and Harmer 2004) or CSD partnerships (Bäckstrand 2010), the TPD show this 
is made manifest across the universe.  Not only is this worrisome given the massive amount of 
attention and tangible funding going into these initiatives - e.g. at the launch of the WSSD 
over 250 million USD had been committed to all partnerships, and this figure has increased 
substantially since then (Biermann et al. 2007a) - it also raises a few pressing questions to 
explore: Are certain types of PPPs more likely to be operational than others? Are certain 
characteristics or types of actors involved or type of partnering, associated with more stable 
operation?  Do certain issues or problem areas that give rise to multiple partnerships more 
frequently lack sustainability?   Yet, perhaps another pressing question, rarely asked, is as long 
as there is transparency, should high failure rates be accepted?  This work will continue to 
explore these issues. 
 
5.1.3 Geography and scope  
Given that partnerships should bring actors together across wide-ranging geographical 
terrains (Brinkerhoff 2007) that would not have cooperated previously and are supposedly 
expanding the scope of global problem solving, a key area of consideration is partnerships’ 
geographical coverage.  If PPPs are truly addressing governance deficits, one expects not only 
global coverage of their operations but, more significantly, a focus on areas not covered by 
existing governance programs.  Further, one of the main promises of the CSD partnerships 
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was their supposed ability to bridge balance between local problems and global agreements 
(Hale and Mauzerall 2004, 221).  Therefore, partnerships could be expected to claim a wider 
geographical scope while being more directly focused on local implementation, especially in 
more neglected areas not well covered by global agreements.   
The TPD presents the breakdown between transnational, regional and country 
coverage by assessing PPP claimed scope, headquarter location and targeted population, if the 
latter is specified.  Efforts were made to ascertain whether PPPs actually covered the territory 
claimed, but the data and numbers remain based on the claimed scope, as verifying this for 
each individual PPP basis was impossible.  While the information is far from conclusive, the 
TPD reveals that PPPs may not only leave many areas uncovered but also provide little to 
verify their efforts to translate global concerns into local implementation. 
Though clearly specifying scope is a commonly cited success factor a key element of 
vision setting or institutional strategy (Druce and Harmer 2004), data from the TPD reveals 
the lack here, which further confuses the picture of these claimed global initiatives.  
Concerning overall scope (Figures 5.3), the majority of PPPs claim a transnational/ global104 
scope, but this claimed coverage is not necessarily associated with global operations.  Within 
this category, a large number do not break down scope specifically but profess to aspire to a 
broader global agenda; others propose a global reach as their initiatives are fitting with global 
dialogues.   A claimed global focus is perhaps to be expected, especially as partnerships 
emerged in great part from the persisting mantra that global problems required global 
solutions (Ruggie 2002).  Further, given the large number of these PPPs that emerged from the 
WSSD context, broadly linked to reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and 
given the heavy involvement of international organisations within these initiatives, it might be 
presupposed that most would claim either a global focus or one which covers multiple 
geographical terrains.  Moreover, PPPs are supposedly rooted in global processes, connected 
to international networks (of expertise, funding) but focusing on specific, often local, projects.  
It is therefore believed that they “could operate at the right scale to address widespread local 
issues while helping to mobilise the global community to take action” (Hale and Mauzerall 
2004, 222).    
 
 
 
                                                 
104 The term transnational is utilized within this work to imply operations across more than one country or region, 
as the term global gives a skewed representation of PPPs’ scope; the reality though is the terms are used 
interchangeably both within the related literature and by the PPPs themselves.   
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Figure 5.3: Geographical coverage, All PPPs 
           
Source: TPD, 2011 
 
What is more critical, however, is to consider only those PPPs that are still in 
operation (Figure 5.4), which reveals claimed scope roughly in line with the overall universe; 
however, the number of PPPs with a claimed global scope is higher in operational PPPs at 
79%.  
 
 
Source: TPD, 2011 
 
Of those claimed regional-based PPPs, the largest numbers operate in Africa, at nearly 
50%.  Other regions, including Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia, Europe, and Oceania, 
are represented between 10 and 15% (Figure 5.5a), and the regional coverage of operational 
Figure 5.4: Geographical coverage, Operational PPPs   
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PPPs is broadly similar (Figure 5.5b).  The geographical coverage of the 59 country-specific 
PPPs is more evenly distributed, with Asia and Africa as the highest regions at at 31% and 
25% respectively.  
Figure 5.5.a and 5.5.b: Regional Coverage, All PPPs and Operational PPPs 
         
Source: TPD, 2011 
 
This work utilises the term claimed scope since this is the closest information 
available to reach a determination on coverage.  Though claimed scope is often considered 
synonymous with country of implementation, this may not accurately capture the true nature 
of the partnering arrangement.  Many PPPs profess a global span given their overriding goal 
or aim but actually have a narrower focus, so viewing areas of operation or country of 
implementation is a more reliable variable.  However, as this information is not expressed in 
similar ways across PPPs, and is often not available, a PPP-wide comparison of this metric is 
not possible.  Claimed scope can also not be directly associated with targeted population.  
Existing work on CSD partnerships utilise that information source to show that OECD 
countries were the main countries of implementation, followed by Asia and Africa (Biermann 
et al. 2007a), yet from this work’s probe of CSD information, it was not possible to replicate 
this analysis without relying on CSD entries, which this work does not take as verifiable 
information sources given the overriding inaccuracies. 
Another way to address geographic reach is to consider the location of the centralised, 
head base.  This work uses the conception of a centre point (CP), which can be either merely a 
centralised contact, which the majority of PPPs have, and/or a more specific Central Head 
Quarters (CHQ),
105
 the latter being a centralised operational base.  The majority of operating 
                                                 
105 The terms CP is used to avoid applying the term secretariat to these partnerships, as not only does the term have 
varying connotations, but many will function with only a dedicated contact and others will be highly 
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PPPs have established headquarters in developed, high income countries, and only 4% of 
PPPs are headquartered in low income countries (Table 5.2).  This is often justified on 
grounds of ease of access, enhanced staff hiring and retention, availability of necessary 
technology and infrastructure, among other relevant reasons.  While it could be argued that 
partnerships can be just as, if not more, effective in addressing developing countries’ concerns 
if they are headquartered in a developed country, TPD findings still raise questions regarding 
reach and touch of the PPPs, especially those that do not have operational staff in neglected 
areas or those they are supposedly targeting.    
A similar picture emerges for the sampling frame.  By definition, these have a global 
scope, but over 90% have a CP based in a high income country, and almost half of the ITPs 
(48%) are located in just three cities: Geneva (22%), Washington, DC (18%) and London 
(8%).  While the necessity of having a headquarters in a developing country in order to have 
developing country impact is highly debated, it is still perhaps shocking that half are located in 
just a handful of cities.  The majority of these PPPs do have more than one operating site or 
location, with the average being three sites of operation, and more than half of those with 
more than one sites have at least one branch in a developing country.  For example, many 
health-focused PPPs, such as Lily MDR-TB, DNDI and IPM have at least one, if not many, 
locations in either Africa or Asia, though they are headquartered in either Washington DC or 
Geneva.  On average, independent PPPs have four operating sites with the most being 57; for 
hosted the average is three with a maximum of 80, and the minimum number of sites for both 
is obviously one. 
 Source: TPD, 2011  
 
                                                                                                                                            
institutionalized and not consider the central office to be only a secretariat.  When this work utilizes the term 
secretariat, it is because the partnership claims this role for its CP.  
Table  5.2 :  Cent r e   Point locations  , All PPPs    
Country Location   Number   Percentage   
Europe 
  269   36%   
North America 
  248   33%   
Information Not Available 
  129   17%   
Asia 
  51   7%   
Africa 
  35   5%   
Central and South America 
  20   3%   
Australia 
  5   1%   
Total 
  757   100%   
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 What this brief snapshot suggests is the need to probe more deeply into partnership 
scope and reach.  Given their location bases, if PPPs are targeting areas not reached by 
existing governance channels, there should be a greater demand for partnerships to show 
tangible evidence of on-the-ground impact in these areas.  Yet many studies note such 
evidence is persistently lacking (OECD 2006; Tondreau 2005).  Certain notable PPPs have 
begun more targeted assessments of global reach and local, targeted implementations, but 
across the majority of PPPs such evidence is lacking, leaving little evidence that partnerships 
truly have a global reach and not just global focus.
106
  That said, if viewing those with 
professed regional scope, the picture is not as pessimistic, which begs for more research into 
areas of implementation for these PPPs.  
 
5.1.4 Age and operations   
  Similar to the entire universe of PPPs, the majority of the sampling frames were 
launched between 2000 and 2004, though a significant number of the ITPs were initiated 
before the WSSD in 2002, as compared to the universe as a whole where only 41% were 
launched prior to 2002 (20% of all PPPs were launched between 2002 and 2004).  
Interestingly, the average PPP has been in operation for 13 years, and of those that have 
ceased operating, the average lifespan was 10 years.  The average lifespan of the sampling 
frame is 16 years, but the median age of 11 is perhaps more useful. 
Figure 5.6:  Date launched, All PPPs 
  
Source: TPD, 2011 
 
                                                 
106 See Biesma et al. 2009 for a review of global health partnerships and country-based evidence of activity, effects 
and impacts. 
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Figure 5.7  Date Launched, Sampling Frame ITPs 
   
Source: TPD, 2011 
 
       
5.2 Coverage, focus and functions 
 As they work across multiple levels - transnational to local – partnerships are also 
promoted in large part for their ability to address areas and specific problems not touched by 
global agreements (Rein et al. 2005) and this work towards addressing persisting 
implementation gaps in global governance (Reinicke and Deng 2000; Börzel and Risse 2005; 
Benner, Streck and Witte 2003).  To understand if and how partnerships work towards these 
ambitious goals, this work details the sectoral and functional areas targeted by the PPPs - 
variables that also lead towards determining the partnerships’ problem area of focus.  
Significantly, the TPD is thus able to discuss coverage area across the PPP universe and begin 
the first comprehensive mapping of global partnership coverage.   
 
5.2.1 Sectoral focus  
A large proportion of PPPs, especially the Type II partnerships that arose from the 
WSSD summit, are focused broadly on sustainable development goals or so-called WEHAB 
areas (Water, Energy, Health, Agriculture and Biodiversity and Ecosystem management),
107
 
yet the universe of global PPPs supposedly targets a broader agenda in attempts towards 
global governance or to provide collective goods.  Given their promises to bring pressing or 
previously neglected issues to the table and provide directed focus to these areas, one expects 
either broad coverage across sectoral areas and/or for partnerships to be most focused on those 
                                                 
107 See http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/documents/wehab_papers.html for background and WEHAB 
Framework Papers.  Accessed 1 September 2010. 
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areas not currently being addressed by existing governing operations.  Using 23 classifications 
based on UNDP guidelines,
108
 this work assesses sectoral areas of partnership coverage and 
finds partnerships may be far from fulfilling these expectations and instead cluster in only a 
few areas.  
 The majority of these PPPs focus on health, environment, sustainable development, 
energy and business and finance, of which 30 of the latter are not-for-profit initiatives (Figure 
5.8).
 109
  Interestingly, comparing operational to no longer operating partnerships presents a 
similar trend, as no sectoral area exhibited huge discrepancy, though it was more likely for 
PPPs focused on water/ sanitation or sustainable development to no longer be operational.   
However, both the uneven distribution of partnerships across these main areas and how few 
PPPs are focused outside of these few sectors is striking.  Many areas are rarely covered; for 
example, less than 5% of PPPs focus upon areas of human rights, marine conservation, 
biodiversity or disaster management.   
Figure 5.8:  Sectoral coverage, All PPPs 
 
Source: TPD, 2011 
 
Viewing only the sampling frame (Figure 5.9) presents a similar picture: the majority 
of PPPs are centered on health, sustainable development, environmental concerns, water or 
                                                 
108 Sector list is noted within AppendixA. 
109As a note, 6% of the operational PPPs have multiple sectors of focus. 
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energy.  As these are the set of transnational, tri-sectoral, global focused PPPs, and these 
initiatives are generally associated with the highest level of operations, this clustering is rather 
troubling.    
Considering the timeframe of emergence highlights a few trends: while 32% of the 
health PPPs started after 2002, of those focused on sustainable development approximately 
63% were initiated following 2002.   This is similar for those focused on energy or 
environmental issues: 66% were founded after 2002.  As expected, this certainly reinforces 
that timeliness of global agreements or topical trends in global discourse may influence 
partnership initiation. 
Figure 5.9:  Sectoral coverage, sampling frame 
 
Source: TPD, 2011 
 
 
Despite the claim that PPPs focus on either the most pressing or neglected needs, 
these TPD findings lend additional credence to recent arguments that (especially) 
environmental PPPs tend to “respond selectively to governance gaps” and to be driven by 
political interests rather than structural gaps in global governance (Andonova 2006).  Existing 
studies on CSD-based partnerships suggest partnerships may promulgate in areas where either 
a number of current governance agreements already exist or the interests of key actors are 
most concerned (Andonova 2007; Andonova 2005; Biermann et al. 2007a).    Andonova’s 
work on sectoral areas covered by CSD-based partnerships shows that these partnerships are 
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more inclined to focus on certain areas while leaving others neglected, even areas where there 
are obvious governance gaps, such as gender issues, which “reveal(s) the political rather than 
narrowly functional nature of [Public-Private Institutionalisation] PPI” (2005, 30).  Hale and 
Mauzerall further suggest that the private, flexible and voluntary nature of PPPs means they 
“do not share the CSD’s macro perspective” meaning that “some key issues have not received 
the attention they deserve” (2004, 233), thus leading towards partnerships lack of focus on 
areas claimed to need the most attention.  
 As this work incorporates partnerships outside of the CSD, it encompasses a wider 
perspective on partnership coverage.  Of the approximately 461 partnerships not covered 
within the CSD, 56 are focused primarily on health.  This is to be expected given the data 
sources as well as continued push to address overriding health issues with partnerships 
(Widdus 2005; Buse and Walt 2000a), but it does leave a large number of less studied PPPs.   
These global health partnerships (GHPs) are more globally focused (80%), and half of these 
GHPs are hosted by a UN body, mainly the WHO.  The few existing studies that attempt to 
map or plot GHPS (Carlson 2004), though now outdated, also suggest coverage disparities, as 
the majority of PPPs cluster in certain disease and topical areas with relative neglect of others 
(Widdus 2005).  To move beyond these two sets of macro based studies, this work also breaks 
down sectors of non CSD and GHPs.  Of these, partnerships are still largely focused on health, 
energy and the environment, though there is a set with business and finance themes
110
.  
Certain areas, notably biodiversity, human rights, cultural concerns or forest or marine 
management are covered by less than 25 partnerships in total. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
110 This latter point is to be expected given the number of NPF PPPs remaining.  
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Figure 5.10:  Sectoral coverage of Non CSD or IPPH PPPs 
 
Source: TPD, 2011 
 
PPPs also seem to promulgate in sectoral or thematic areas that receive greater 
amounts of current intergovernmental and international attention.  Significantly, areas with the 
highest density of PPPs are also thematic issues that also receive the greatest amount of 
Official Development Assistance (ODA), (See Deutscher and OECD 2009), which reinforces 
findings by Andonova and Levy (2003) that the original CSD –based partnerships tended to be 
driven by supply of rich countries and donors rather than demand of issue areas.  Existing 
work based solely on CSD registered partnerships also suggest areas where most CSD 
partnerships are concentrated are those most densely regulated at the international and national 
levels (Andonova 2006; Biermann et al. 2007a).  Such sector concentration questions the 
functional logic that PPPs emerge to address persisting governance deficits, as even with the 
macro picture the TPD provides on the state of global partnering, these same trends are 
reinforced.   
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5.2.2 Functional division of PPPs 
In order to develop a deeper understanding of the coverage of PPPs, differentiating 
amongst functional types is also necessary.
111
  This work defines ten functional categories, 
which were furthered in the previous chapter.  Using these categories, across both the universe 
and ITPs, the majority of PPPs engage in the coordination of resources followed by the 
functional goal of information exchange and research (Figures 5.11 and 5.12).  That so few 
partnerships engage in direct operational activities is striking given their promotion as 
development engines - easily mobilised institutions supposedly leading to more efficient 
operations and direct implementation on the ground (Kaul 2006).  While the CSD partnerships 
in particular were supposed to accelerate the implementation of sustainable development 
goals, across the universe of PPPs it seems few target any sort of actual implementation.  This 
raises an intriguing question: are global PPPs reinforcing the claim that partnerships are 
“prototypes for tomorrow’s governance arrangement and pragmatic delivery vehicles” (Zadek 
2006) if so very few actually even strive for direct delivery or results? 
Figure 5.11: Functional breakdown, All PPPs 
 
Source: TPD, 2011 
 
 
                                                 
111 See discussion in chapter four regarding functional definitions employed. 
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Figure 5.12 Functional breakdown, Sampling Frame PPPs 
 
Source: TPD, 2011 
 
Though the official texts of the WSSD summit defined the Type II partnerships as 
“specific commitments by various partners intended to contribute to and reinforce the 
implementation of the outcomes of the intergovernmental negotiations of the WSSD and to 
help the further implementation of Agenda 21 and the MDGs (Kara and Quarless 2002), the 
majority of these partnerships rather seem more engaged in further institution building 
(Biermann et al. 2007a, 256).  The large percentage focused on coordination of resources is 
perhaps related to the fact that this category is rather broad, but it is still worth probing.  Of 
these, the majority have a global scope (65) and the main sector foci are health (35%), energy 
(10%), water (9%) or sustainable development (8%).  What is also interesting is that over 70% 
of coordinating PPPs have a UN agency as partner (versus 54% for the universe); this is also 
worth further questioning, as it seems puzzling for such a large number of PPPs to engage in 
coordinating resources, money or expertise when this is already within the role of many of the 
UN agencies.    
Lack of focus on direct implementation has been an emerging criticism of 
partnerships, as recent works note PPPs will fail to address the implementation deficit if only 
working towards goals that lack either concreteness or tangibility.  One study finds that over 
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165 of the 321 PPPs listed with the UN cite only vague objectives, such as “supplying 
information for decision making” (Biermann et al. 2007a).  Another work on OECD 
partnerships notes that of the 32 that responded to the survey, only three or four could 
demonstrate evidence of direct benefits though 28% expressed ambitions towards proving 
impact (OECD 2006).  The predominance of PPPs functioning in areas such as coordination 
may also partly explain why there are so few empirical evaluations of large sets of 
partnerships’ effects, though the literature on partnership formation and functioning is large.   
What is notable is that within functional categories, unlike sectors, there is a marked 
difference across PPPs that have no evidence of operations.  While the average of PPPs no 
longer operating is 42%, close to 65% of PPPs attempting towards capacity building are no 
longer operational, as are 55% of those originally with a primary function of policy and/or its 
development (Figure 5.13), which may reinforce the claim that there is a tendency for PPPs to 
function in areas where there are “quick wins” (Martens 2007) or easier evidence of activity, 
which means governance gaps persist. While merely being operational does not imply the PPP 
is achieving its goals or leading towards problem solving, that so many PPPs attempting 
operational or direct goals (perhaps with more difficult targets or ones that can only be 
exemplified over time) are no longer in existence is concerning.   
 
Figure 5.13: Percent of PPPs without operational evidence, by functional type 
 
Source: TPD, 2011 
 
139 
 
5.2.3 Implications: Problem area of focus  
These findings raise pressing questions regarding whether partnerships have truly led 
to a broader, and more focused, coverage of global issues, and also call into question the claim 
that PPPs operate in areas where government or intergovernmental actions are either 
inadequate or fail.  Are partnerships only going for the “low hanging fruit” (Hale and 
Mauzerall 2004) as has been suggested, focusing on more manageable geographic or issue-
focused areas, or are they truly enhancing the global governance problem solving arsenal with 
their targeted reach?   
Such a clustering of PPPs also leads to concerns over competition, especially 
regarding resources and functioning.  While some themes or areas may be more conducive to 
partnering (World Economic Forum 2003, 7), PPPs are heavily concentrated in a few areas.  
Partnerships are undoubtedly conditioned by the environment in which they operate, but that 
so many exist in areas where the supporting legal and regulatory frameworks are already in 
place (Caplan et al 2001, 5; Nelson and Zadek 2000) raises further concerns regarding their 
relevance.   Of course this may not be negative if partnerships are implementing regulations, 
working in direct operations or furthering agreements or policies that necessitate direct 
involvement, but the TPD shows that the majority of partnerships function in less tangible 
roles, mainly the coordination of resources rather than direct implementation.  A counter 
would be that PPPs are furthering work of their partners to undertake these tasks, but as this 
work will discuss in the seventh chapter, few make efforts to establish and report on their 
value add in this regard. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly the areas most PPPs address are also associated with trends in 
global agreements and, more specifically, higher levels of either governmental or current 
donor attention is perhaps not surprising, but it is debatable whether this model is sustainable 
over time, especially as both topical trends and funding dollars tend to shift with time 
(Deutscher and OECD 2009); a fact that the global economic turmoil of 2008-2010 and its 
subsequent effects attests.   
If partnerships will continue to be promoted as the logical answer to the demands 
resulting from a changing economic and political environment and as a means to enhance 
effectiveness in global policy making (Reinicke 1999/2000), than their current coverage area 
must be understood and encompassing of this global agenda.  This work purposely presents 
both sectoral focus and functional target separately to draw out these relationships, but it also 
performs several mapping exercises to further speak to partnership coverage.  When mapping 
function and sector type (Table 5.3), the TPD reveals that the top ten combinations of function 
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and sector represent close to 30% of the total universe of PPPs; however, that the top two 
combinations (health focus and functioning in either coordination or information exchange/ 
research) is perhaps not surprising given the existing consolidated databases from the TPD 
pulls its information.  That said, outside of these combinations, no other reaches 5% of the 
universe of PPPs.   
 
Table 5.3:  Results of mapping:  Top 10 categorisations (PPP universe) 
Sector All PPPs % All 
Operational 
PPPs 
% 
Operational 
Health, Information production 47 6% 32 7% 
Health, Coordination 40 5% 28 6% 
Business and Finance, Capital 
provision 34 4% 21 5% 
Sustainable Development, Capacity 
Building 15 2% 2 0% 
Sustainable Development, Information 
dissemination 13 2% 3 1% 
Environment, Information 
Dissemination 12 2% 7 2% 
Environment, Capital Provision 11 1% 10 2% 
Energy, Information Dissemination 9 1% 5 1% 
Environment, Capacity Building 10 1% 3 1% 
Environment, Coordination 10 1% 8 2% 
Sustainable Development, 
Coordination 10 1% 5 1% 
 
 
Source: TPD, 2011 
 
Table 5.4:  Results of mapping: Top 10 categorisations (sampling frame) 
Sector & Function SF % SF 
Health, Coordination 21 14% 
Health, Info Exchange 16 11% 
Environment, Coordination 8 5% 
Health, Advocacy 7 5% 
Environment, Setting Standards 5 3% 
Agriculture, Info Exchange 5 3% 
Water & Sanitation, Coordination 4 3% 
Environment, Advocacy 3 2% 
Agriculture, Coordination 3 2% 
Sustainable Development, Coordination 3 2% 
Energy, Advocacy 3 2% 
 
 
Source: TPD, 2011 
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5.3: Addressing actors and participation 
At the very core of multi- stakeholder partnerships is their ability to bring together 
actors from diverse backgrounds, as actors have “different competencies, aspirations and 
styles of behaviour” that can be combined to achieve a common vision (Tennyson 2004, 5).  
Global partnerships gained heightened prominence in an international system complicated by 
various forces: an increasingly difficult agenda of persisting and cross-cutting issues, the 
rising presence of non-state actors
112
 in traditional governance roles or arenas, and heightened 
attention given to the perceived benefits of increased participation in global governance (Haas 
2004).  Global PPPs further reinforced these trends and institutionalised these relationships 
between actors.  
 
5.3.1 Actors, governance gaps and challenges of partner analysis  
The strength of partnerships should be in their ability to leverage the skills, resources 
and expertise of these actors to create synergies that lead to a unique problem-solving ability.   
If met, partnerships should be not only enhancing implementation in global governance, but 
by including this diverse actor base, they should also be addressing the persisting deficits of 
representation and participation in existing governance arrangements (Witte, Streck and 
Benner 2003).  Do global partnerships fulfil, or even set out to fulfil, these promoted 
promises?   
Existing works on partner involvement suggest that optimistic notions of enhanced 
participation and representation may be far from the reality.  Critics attest global PPPs, rather 
than being global, are instead heavily dominated by the North (Utting and Zammit 2009), lack 
a true multi-stakeholder nature, and within their processes tend to marginalise or exclude some 
social groups, often women, even when they are the targets of the partnerships activity 
(Geddes 2000).  CSD-based partnerships are said to have a heavy dominance of Northern 
governments and limited involvement by developing countries (Bäckstrand 2005, Biermann et 
al. 2007a; Andonova 2006).  Related works on GHPs suggest that especially when it comes to 
PPP decision making, the targeted populations, notably in developing counties, are not 
represented equitably to Northern governments (Buse and Harmer 2007).  Many also question 
the merits of increased participation by the corporate sector  (Martens 2007) or the incentives 
for increased engagement from civil society in regards to the related impact this may have on 
global governance (Ottaway 2001). Further criticisms note that this over representation and 
                                                 
112 See chapter two for furtherance of these discussions regarding global challenges and enhanced private and social 
sector participation in global governance. 
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power of private sector interests is associated with the privatisation of global governance or 
corporate globalisation (Utting and Zammit 2009; Richter 2003), leading to a fear of 
institutional or regulatory capture, especially in relation to global public health and (Beigbeder 
2004). 
It has been more frequently argued in terms of health PPPs that there is both 
dominance by a few developed countries, mainly the US, UK, Netherlands and Canada (Buse 
2004b) and continued underrepresentation of the South (Bartsch 2008).  Despite an initial 
push of Southern involvement in CSD partnerships, early reviews showed that the majority 
were led by Northern-based governments (Andonova and Levy 2003, 23).  More recent work 
suggests little has changed since the PPPs were first initiated in 2003.  Specifically, one study 
(based on the CSD database as an information source) notes that as of 2006 not only were the 
majority of CSD-based PPPs led by a Northern based government but in more than a quarter 
of the partnerships, governments from industrialised countries were the only government 
actors (Biermann et al. 2007a).   
One should interpret with caution reviews analysing the partners involved, as static 
listings of partners are often outdated, inaccurate or simply not representative, and even 
correct partner listings say little towards actual participation.   While most studies of CSD-
based PPPs utilise the CSD database for information, these listings were often several years 
out of date at the time of this study, and as detailed below, this work also found many of the 
CSD database’s listings as well as the actual PPP websites or information sources to be 
inaccurate.   
Notions also differ greatly regarding definitions of partners, which complicates the 
analysis.  While some PPPs clearly articulate what classifies a partner, the majority struggle 
and many do not attempt to deal with these ambiguous issues.  Confusion also surrounds the 
notion of partners, members, funders and stakeholders, yet most PPP leaders are happy 
leaving this issue unaddressed, perhaps due to the tensions involved.  This is not only an issue 
of publishing information: during this work’s management interviews, when asked many 
partnership leaders were unable to define the term “partner” in their institution.  The majority 
were also unable to articulate the number of partners involved, and these were the Directors!  
Those that had a firmer grasp on partners noted the difficult and often political tension caused 
in listing partners on websites or reports, which led them to take either an overly exclusive 
process or a minimal reporting.   As one noted, “We call them stakeholders and others 
contractors, yet both consider themselves partners, so we must tackle this every year when we 
publish our annual report or every time we attempt to update our website” (MM Interview18).  
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This discussion is to reinforce that only tentative claims can be made across large sets 
of PPPs.  This work reviews the actors involved through the following: representation of 
different sectors within the PPPs,
113
 distribution of partners from North and South, dominant 
partners and IGO participation, number of partners and partners versus funders.  Finally, 
though this work speaks to claimed partners across the universe of PPPs and presents initial 
insights, it is difficult to draw conclusions simply because certain actors are involved as a 
partner in name, especially as some have over a hundred claimed partners. 
 
5.3.2 Actors involved: Division and main partners  
Though they are promoted as multi stakeholder initiatives, less than half of the 
universes of PPPs (45% or 337 PPPs) are tri-sectoral, involving an actor from the public, 
private and social sector.  Outside of trisectoral, the next highest split falls to those PPPs with 
partners from the public and social sector but not private (25%), 10% have only claimed 
public partners.  Comparing to those partnerships still operational reveals a similar picture in 
terms of split; however, while slightly over half are tri-sectoral (52%), only 4% have private 
and social partners only.   While these figures represent involvement by at least one partner 
from these sectors, one can also consider how this involvement breaks down, or the actor-base 
split.  Across the universe, on average 29% of the partners come from the private sector, 19% 
from the public and 30% from the social (for operational PPPs, these figures are 30%, 14% 
and 32%, respectively) (Table 5.5).  
Table 5.5: Partner sectoral split, All and operational PPPs 
Partner split % All 
% 
Operational 
Public only 10% 8% 
Public and social (not private) 25% 18% 
Tri-sectoral 45% 52% 
Social only  3% 3% 
Private only 4% 4% 
Private and social (not public) 4% 4% 
Private and public (not social) 7% 6% 
No information 3% 5% 
Total 100% 100% 
 
 
                                                 
113 As a note, this work does not analyse the lead partners involved, as this is only information available within the 
CSD database of PPPs and given that claims made within this were often inaccurate; applying this piece of analysis 
even to these (and certainly for all PPPs) was deemed infeasible. 
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By definition, the sampling frame are trisectoral, but within each individual 
partnership, it is interesting that this is also relatively well balanced, as on average 27% of the 
partners come from the private sector, 32% from the public sector and 41% from the social, 
though this varies slightly from the sampling frame as a whole to independent and hosted 
PPPs (Figure 5.14).   
Figure 5.14: Average balance of partners in sampling frame 
 
 Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011 
Despite their promoted ability to function best in areas where governments are 
inefficient or lacking, it seems governments and governmental agencies continue to dominate 
these initiatives – or at least partner in the majority of them. Almost three-quarters (70%) of 
the PPPs (68% operational) have a government partner, while 86% of all PPPs (84% 
operational) have at least one partner from the public sector broadly.  Thus only 14% (16% of 
operational) have no public sector partner.   Those who take a state-centric view would say 
that this government involvement is necessary, as PPP would have negligible effects without 
strong, state presence.  Others, however, note that a key role for PPP’s is closing participatory 
gaps through the increased engagement of nongovernmental actors (Keck and Sikkink 1999; 
Reinicke and Deng 2000), so the continued presence of public sector actors is interesting.    
Close to 13% (11% operational) have a government partner yet no IGO involved, 
which is roughly equivalent to those which involve the UN or an IGO but have no government 
body involvement.  Merely having a government body as a partner should be treated with 
caution, as it is debatable how much role the governments take, as these actors may often play 
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a more hands off role and may not be involved in partnership operations or decision making
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(Moran 2005).   
Across all PPPs, social sector representation is higher than private: 76% of all PPPs 
(77% operational) have at least one partner from the social sector, while 59% (66% 
operational) have at least one private sector partner.  Specifically, a corporate actor is active in 
over half of the operational partnerships, and interestingly 19% (20% operational) involve at 
least one business or industry association.  While an NGO is involved in approximately half of 
the PPPs (all and operational), around 40% also consist of at least one academic or research 
institution, and close to 20% of the PPPs partner with other PPPs. Academics are not 
concentrated only in information exchange/research functional -type partnerships: while 
approximately one-third are involved in PPPs that perform this function, 20% are in 
coordination and 16% engaged in capacity building (Table 5.6)  
Table 5.6:  Partner types involved, All and operational PPPs 
Sector Partner Type All Operational 
Public 
UN 55% 53% 
IGO 48% 49% 
Government 70% 68% 
Private 
Corporate 52% 59% 
Industry Associations 19% 20% 
Social 
Philanthropic Foundations 25% 27% 
NGOs 51% 50% 
Other PPPs 20% 21% 
Academic/Research Institutes 41% 40% 
Other Social 19% 18% 
 
 
Source: TPD, 2011 
 
Beyond sectoral representation, an additional concern is the balance of partners across 
geographical and population areas, as there is a persisting debate regarding whether or not 
PPPs reach previously neglected populations and broaden participation in global governance 
(Kjaer and Caplan 2003, 59).  Does either of these arguments hold against the evidence?  
While again based on claimed partner information, TPD shows that while still not a significant 
percentage of South-based actors, numbers are much higher than existing studies would attest.  
While 29% (30% operational) have government partners from only the North, 26% (25%) 
have actors from both and 13% (9%) from the South only. 
 
                                                 
114 This was reinforced in several of the MM interviews discussed in chapter six.  
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Table 5.7 North-South Government Participation 
 
 Government Participants All PPPS Operational PPPs 
North Only 29% 30% 
South Only 13% 9% 
Both North and South 26% 25% 
No government 32% 35% 
 
 
Source: TPD, 2011 
 
For CSD-based PPPs, (using TPD information), 27% (31% operational) have 
government partners from the North only, 18% (12%) from the South only and 40% (41%) 
from both, and 15 (16%) have no government partner.  When eliminating both those CSD-
based PPPs for which only the CSD entry information was available as well as those that are 
no longer operating, the numbers are as follows: 31% have government partners from the 
North only, 12% from the South only and 41% from both, 16% have no government as a main 
partner  
However, viewing individual country level participation shows this may be slightly 
skewed, as a few governments are involved in multiple partnerships.  The top 15 countries in 
terms of involvement are mainly high income, OECD countries, with South Africa (the host of 
the WSSD) and India being the only non upper-income country governments amongst the top 
ten. This is not to say Southern governments are not involved as partners, but these pale in 
terms of the Northern-based actors, especially when official government aid agencies are 
included in the analysis.   
From another perspective, despite their perceived reputation of speaking for the 
people as a whole, it is also debated whether enhanced social-sector involvement actually 
increase the “Southern voice,” as some assert these actors, mostly civil society groups, often 
represent the North and their cultural values just as much, if not more, than private or 
government-based actors (Boli and Thomas 1999). 
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Table 5.8:  Main Countries involved in PPPs 
Country All Operational 
United States 25% 29% 
United Kingdom 15% 18% 
France 13% 12% 
Netherlands 12% 14% 
Japan 11% 11% 
South Africa 9% 8% 
Canada 9% 9% 
Australia 8% 8% 
Germany 7% 9% 
India 7% 8% 
Sweden 7% 9% 
China 6% 7% 
Indonesia 6% 4% 
Thailand 5% 4% 
Brazil 5% 6% 
 
 
Source: TPD, 2011 
 
5.3.3 Number of actors and main partners  
Diverging opinions persist regarding the significance of the number of actors involved 
in PPPs.  Some suggest either that larger partnerships may be “more powerful’ and thus 
perform better (Szulecki, Pattberg and Biermann 2010, 6).  Alternatively, over inclusive, 
larger partnerships may only be a negative factor (Wapner 1996), as the more actors that are 
involved means the PPP has to accommodate for more diverging interests and cultures, which 
could hinder decision making.  This could actually lead to diminished or lessened performance 
or impact, what Underdal refers to as the law of the least ambitious programme (2002, in 
Miles et al. 2002).  This is especially at issue if it could further lead towards the lowest 
common denominator of action (or regulation) (Schäferhoff, Campe and Kaan 2009).  
Accurately speaking to these debates, however, requires verifiable information on not only the 
partners involved but more significantly the extent of this actual involvement.  
Though the presentation of number of partners is muddled given its base on claimed 
information, the TPD shows that the average number of partners across all PPPs is 63, which 
is higher than CSD partnerships (based on TPD data) with an average of 44.  The maximum 
number of separately reported partners is 303 and the minimum is two.
115
  When considering 
                                                 
115 Another work showed that the average number of partners in CSD database is 29 (Szulecki et al 2010, 6).  
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only the sampling frame, there is an average of 172 partners involved within the ITPs (median 
is 40), which is much higher than the universe at whole with an average of 63.
116
   
Addressing actor-based arguments also involves determining whether certain 
institutions or agencies are more frequent partners than others.   As Figure 5.15 shows, over 
half (54%) of operational PPPs involve a UN body as a partner, with 17% of operational PPPs 
partnering with either the UNDP or UNICEF.  There is a similar high level of presence from 
the World Bank (22% of operational) and the WHO (17% of operational).  Others worth 
mentioning are: The Gates Foundation (6% of all PPPs, 10% of operational), USAID (6% of 
all, 8% of operational), and The German Development Corporation GIZ (3% of all, but 5% of 
operational).  
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) is involved in approximately 10% of 
the operational PPPs, more than the highest percentage for a government agency (USAID, 
8%).  As a note, this universe is not inclusive of all internal agency PPPs, so these numbers 
will not reflect all USAID and DFID projects.  While the BMGF’s support to GHPs is well-
documented (McCoy and McGoey 2011), and it  has made great strides in both supporting 
these institutions and also pushing for greater levels of monitoring and evaluation and 
streamlining (Grace and Druce 2009), it still means a large proportion of the health 
partnerships are highly dependent on Gates.  This could be worrying if the support, either 
financial or otherwise, of the BMGF is ever lessened.  Even more so, there may be 
consequences for PPPs in leaning so much on one foundation, especially if this implies one 
actor has undue say or influence within partnership decision making, points returned to in this 
work’s concluding chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
116  On a methodological point, it is quite possible this higher number is because in general ITPs have more 
publically available information, thus they would cite or list more partners than others who have limited 
publications.  The other discrepancy may come from the partner versus member distinction and general layers or 
tiers of partners.  In general ITPs were more likely to have established multiple levels of partners, which would 
result in a higher total.  
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Figure 5.15: Highest actor involvement partners, All and operational PPPs 
 
Source: TPD, 2011 
 
 
The predominance of IGOs within these institutions is significant, but not surprising 
given the continued and rather fervent partnering push IGOs have engaged in (Andonova 
2005; Held 1995; Utting and Zammit 2006).  Over the previous decade, increased attention 
has certainly been given to the UN and other IGOs’ need for greater resources and expertise 
(Bull, Boas and McNeill 2004; Buse and Walt 2002), as “Partnering with business and civil 
society has turned into a necessity for the UN in order to get the job done” (Witte and 
Reinicke 2005, ix).  This heavy level of involvement does raise the question if there has been 
too much urge to partner, especially if PPPs are supposed to complement IGOs.  One view is 
that this partnering push may have been a reactive, rather than a proactive measure on the part 
of the IGOs (Andonova 2006): as global partnerships increasingly gained presence in areas 
classically associated with IGO’s work, IGOs may have felt PPPs were “stepping into their 
mandate and their resources [especially] as donors prefer to support global PPPs” (Kaul 2006, 
244).  This could lead to an “if we can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em reaction,” where IGOs become 
heavily involved in PPPs to prevent or thwart either perceived or actual competition from 
these PPPs.   
Another view is that IGOs are using PPPs to either “reinvent their missions” 
(Bäckstrand 2005, 19); increase their democratic accountability (Wapner 1997); or, regarding 
the UN system, restore their legitimacy (Bull and McNeill 2007); thus, they are recognising 
the need to work with/ within these initiatives.  This is not to say IGO involvement in PPPs is 
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necessarily negative, but it does call into question the “newness” of these partnerships as well 
as their persisting role and relevance.  Also certainly of concern is the role of the IGO within 
the PPP – that is, are these truly new initiatives or rather projects within the IGO, treated, 
staffed and operated in the same way and “partnership” in name only?   
Considering which actors are partnering within the sampling frame, (Figure 5.16), 
two-thirds (65%) have a UN body as partner with the WHO is represented within 24%.  In 
regards to IGOs, 39% are also partnering with the World Bank, which is the highest IGO 
representation, and 6% partner with the Asian Development Bank and 6% with the African 
Development Bank.  Governments themselves have significant representation, with 13%  
partnering with USAID and 12% with DFID.  From the philanthropic side, the Gates 
foundation is the most represented, as it partners with 31 of the ITPs (21%), followed by 
Rockefeller (17), Wellcome Trust (six) and the Ford Foundation (five).   
 
Figure 5.16:  Main partners involved, Sampling Frame 
 
Source: TPD, 2011 
 
Enhancing the involvement of traditionally margainlised groups, trade unions, 
women, migrants and farmers, for example, is considered necessary for sustainable 
development (Elliot 2004), so it is worth exploring whether there is participation of 
traditionally marginalised groups in the PPPs, as, many attest these are often  of a say in 
global governance.  Despite being an overriding promise and perceived benefit of 
partnerships, especially those emerging from the WSSD, this has been found lacking across 
CSD-based PPPs (Hale and Mauzerall 2004; Biermann et al. 2007a) as well as GHPs 
151 
 
(Sorenson 2009).  Static listings may not present a complete picture, however, as many PPPs 
may work or contract with NGOs on the ground, who may be involved or responsible for the 
majority of the implementation.  As an example, many of the product development 
partnerships, which work directly with local based NGOs, are not considered formal partners, 
and while they may be highly active in daily/operational decisions have little to say in 
strategic oversight.   Thus there is certainly more engagement with PPPs than listings would 
suggest, but the essence of these as partnerships is harder to determine.   
One trend that also prevails across both CSD and all PPPs is that more 
institutionalised groups are more heavily involved, as only a handful of partnerships formally 
partner with local groups, and even locally based NGOs have limited claimed or cited 
involvement.  While individual partnerships highlight their inclination or desire to partner 
with these local organisations, such as the Lily TB-MDR partnership which notably partners 
with the women’s association in China and many locally-based nursing associations, overall 
involvement is minimal, and significantly less in terms of representation within decision.   
 
CSD versus TPD partner comparison:  
 The universe of PPPs is perhaps slightly more diverse than only CSD-based 
partnerships, and slightly over a quarter of the sampling frame are CSD-based partnerships.  A 
recent review noted that 16% have no government body as a partner and together over 60% of 
partnerships are led by the public sector, either government or IGO.  The same study also 
found that 19% of total partners are from NGOs and 9% from the social or technical 
community (Biermann et al. 2007a).
117
  While these are interesting areas to probe in further 
works, a brief snapshot is presented here comparing all PPPs versus just CSD (Table 5.9) 
 
Table 5.9:  CSD and TPD, main partner comparisons 
Partner Type CSD PPPs All PPPs 
Government 87% 70% 
NGOs 61% 51% 
Private sector 36% 59% 
Academic/research 51% 41% 
Foundation 25% 18% 
Actor split  
Tri-sectoral 41% 45% 
 
 
                                                 
117 Andonova (2006, 2007) and Biermann et al. 2007a do not always distinguish between operational and ceased 
PPPs in their analysis – thus readers should interpret their conclusions with caution.     
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Finally, the appropriate balance of partners and optimal level of participation or 
inclusion will no doubt vary given the partnership type, function and scope, but the TPD 
findings highlight that while global PPPs are promised “to bridge multilateral norms and local 
action by drawing on a diverse number of actors in civil society, government and business” 
(Bäckstrand 2005, 2), the reality is a mixed and complicated picture. The TPD certainly shows 
a higher level of participation from civil society and business groups than existing CSD 
accounts, but if one eliminates PPPs associated with CSR initiatives and/or those hosted 
within a private sector institution, business/ private involvement falls considerably.  Further, 
outside of the BMGF, no social actor has near the dominance of Northern governments or 
IGOs in terms of overall involvement, and perhaps most critically, little shows that PPPs are 
drawing on these marginalised groups.   
While some works assume that partners with more resources to put on the table should 
be associated with holding greater power within the PPP (Utting and Zammit 2006), and that 
partnerships are forums where “unequal power balances” prevail (Ritcher 2003), this work 
does not make such assumptions, as it notes this can only be explored with more detailed 
probing.  Moving forward, a more thorough understanding of the power sharing and 
leadership within PPPs will certainly go far in determining how representation and 
participation are manifest in PPP functioning.   
 
5.4: Institutional design of global PPPs  
From their earliest days, partnerships were said to represent “the beginnings of a shift 
from the stiff formal waltz of diplomacy to the jazzier dance of improvisional solution 
oriented partnerships” (World Resource Institute 2002).  Promoted for their flexible nature and 
lack of engrained bureaucracy, these features should allow for faster speeds of decision 
making, operations and ultimately results.  Key defining characteristic of partnerships’ design 
lies in their looser structures and supposed adaptability, which should enhance not only 
effectiveness but also their learning capability, as the “evolutionary character and flexible 
structure allows for more openness” (Witte, Streck and Benner 2003, 65).  Considered highly 
linked to PPP’s functioning, accountability (Rein et al. 2005; Bäckstrand 2006), transparency, 
performance and ultimately effectiveness (Witte and Reinicke 2005), institutional design of 
partnerships is thus a key focus.  
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5.4.1 Partnerships and institutional design: What do we know?  
Partnership formation and institutionalisation have increasingly become prominent 
fixtures in PPP research (Kjaer and Tennyson 2003; Beisheim and Kaan 2010).  To understand 
partnerships, many works suggest classifications or typologies by level of institutionalisation.  
Martens (2007) notes that partnerships can be classified in low, medium and high levels of 
institutionalisation, where low levels are associated with more time limited and ad-hoc 
initiatives, medium levels would have a clearly defined membership but no separate legal 
status and high levels will be permanent multi stakeholder institutions with formal 
membership and a firmly established governing body (2007).  McKinsey’s (2002) review of 
global health alliances suggests appropriate structural form is necessary to drive success, and 
this should fit the overriding goal of the partnership of focus.  Establishing and maintaining a 
secretariat is obviously indicative of a more institutionalised alliance, and many have become 
fully separate legal entities.  While the latter is the most separate from its parent institution, it 
is also the most costly and time consuming to create and maintain.   
Reviews of partnerships also give increasing credence to the role of structural factors 
and choosing appropriate fit or structure (Buse and Harmer 2004; McKinsey 2002), the 
relative degree of independence from one’s host institution, the flexible or networked nature 
of the partnership as well as the significance of institutional culture (Ulbert 2008).  Emerging 
works continue to explore additional ways institutional design and levels of institutionalisation 
vary across PPPs.  More recent work (Leise 2010) operationalises institutionalisation based on 
the legalisation literature (Abbott et al. 2000) and explores a set of 21 PPPs with the 
hypothesis that degree of institutionalisation (based on rules, obligatory status, their relative 
precision and the delegation of their interpretation and application to a third party) is a major 
determinant in explaining relative PPP effectiveness.  While the authors find a high level of 
institutionalisation is relevant for achieving high levels of compliance, this analysis is far from 
concrete, however, as it attempts to apply a theoretical case rather than grounded empirics, and 
it is difficult to scale across a larger set of PPPs, and the authors do recognise the need to 
broaden their analysis and take more dynamics into account (2010, 139).  That said, it still 
represents inroads into exploring the relationship between institutional design and partnership 
effectiveness. 
 
5.4.2 Entity type, legality and status 
Utilising this conceptual background, this work analyses transnational PPPs’ 
institutional design across a few main dimensions.  One of the main features of interest is the 
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entity-type - or overriding institutional form - of the partnerships.  This is especially related to 
whether it is hosted, an informal network or initiative without a centralised location, a fully 
independent institution or a variation of these entity-type forms.  Across the universe of PPPs, 
one striking finding is that 72% are hosted by another institution (66% for operational).  A UN 
body or agency is host to 19% of the hosted PPPs while another IGO hosts 10% and a private 
sector host 10% as well.  Of only the CSD-based partnerships, however, closer to 75% are 
hosted, and of these 20% (71 PPPs) are within a UN agency or another IGO.  Regarding 
overall entity-type for the sampling frame, 79 of the 147 are hosted (54%), the majority within 
a UN agency (38% of those hosted), though 12% are hosted within an IGO. 
Regarding legality or legal status, over 23% of PPPs declare themselves as not-for-
profit initiatives as regards their official legal status and 65% have a non-profit host.  By 
definition the sampling frame of PPPs are not for profit. Interestingly 5% are formed as not-
for-profit PPPs while housed as initiatives within for-profit firms; this is significant as it 
means these initiatives have taken a separate form from their host, and are thus more 
institutionalised than those partnerships which are housed as projects within a parent 
institution.  Though it is a rare form, some hosted PPPs maintain a separate legal identity 
within their host, as the Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI) post-2010 when it legally 
separated from the Clinton Foundation AIDS Initiative. 
Publication or existence of a guiding legal document also lead to an assessment of 
institutionalisation, as well as being a matter of PPPs’ efforts towards transparency. That said, 
only 14% of partnerships have an accessible note to their guiding legal principles.  While this 
already seems quite low, when considering only the independent (non-hosted) and operational 
partnerships, where one expects institutional status to be more fixed, this figure only 
marginally improves to 23% of the PPPs.  This certainly reinforces the relatively informal 
nature of the majority of these initiatives, especially as even those still functioning with 
evidence of activity are not doing so under an established legal, documented framework!  
Amongst the sampling frame, however, this figure is considerably higher at 38%. This number 
should be considered with the caveat that these legal documents could be as minimally 
binding as standards or statements of intent or Charters, so that so few had one is startling.   
Those that are not hosted, however, are not necessarily free-standing or independent 
bodies, as many function as loose networks without an established centralised location.   
While entity-type and legal status and form are distinguishing features and helpful in 
providing general perspective of how PPPs institutionalise, these both need to be considered 
within the partnership’s overriding institutional context and strategy.  Partnerships can 
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function with varying spectrums of centralisation, ranging from having centralised 
management and operational system to working with decentralised networks and multiple sites 
where different partners, or different PPP bases, undertake aspects of management and/or 
operations.   
The role and function of the modal or central point is of even more interest when 
considering the PPPs’ centralisation strategy, especially for those decentralised with multiple 
operating centres.  Specifically of concern is where the strategic, administrative and 
operational decisions take place and how this varies across types of partnerships and locations.  
Clearly the element of centralisation stands to impact partnership functioning as this will 
determine where and how decisions are undertaken and carried out, as well as the 
communication, reporting, conflict resolution, monitoring and evaluation systems, among 
others (Tennyson 2004, 14-17).  As this element is too difficult to audit across the universe of 
PPPs, it is only viewed for the sampling frame at this point.  
 
5.4.3 Centre points, institutional structure and design  
Beyond hosted versus independent status - and perhaps an even more basic element of 
institutionalisation -  is whether or not there is a centre point (CP) and/or centralised 
headquarters (CHQ), as these are not necessarily given.  This work defines the CP as the main 
contact or point place, which could be purely an administrative base with no management or 
coordinating roles.  The presence of an actual centralised operating site, while fairly common 
across the PPPs, varies considerably across PPPs.  For some, it is the institutionalised centre 
while in others it is the nodal, central point for the partnership and can be thought of more as a 
hub than a CHQ, as a private sector organisation would utilise the term CHQ.    
Across all PPPs, 19% (4% operational) do not have a verified contact for the 
initiative.  This is a startling finding, especially as this is only a contact point for the initiative 
that can be verified.  That is, this information does not speak directly to the existence of a 
central point for operations, as many of these contact points are representatives from a main 
partner involved in the initiative rather than a base or central point for the PPP.  Amongst 
those with information available, approximately 82% of the total PPPs identified have an 
established operating site with a physical location (this could still be within a hosted 
institution but represents a centralised operating site), and even amongst the sampling frame, 
almost 10% of the partnerships have not established such a central point. 
Since the existence of a central location, even within a host, may be seen as a 
necessary ingredient for PPPs, as it provides an element of structure and establishment for the 
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initiative, it is remarkable that so many lack this.  Many will proclaim that the flexible, non 
structured form PPPs often take allows for even wider ranges of participation and eventually 
facilitates implementation.  However, this work shows there is certainly a tendency for the 
partnership to cease existence earlier as no tangible entity was ever associated with it.  It is 
perhaps not surprising that the majority of the non-operational PPPs never made this step to 
establish a centralised location point.  It is also perhaps unsurprising that of those that have 
established a contact point, the majority are in high income countries, with only a few located 
in middle or lower-income countries. 
 
Central Point, Position and Role 
The structure and design of these contact points as well as the role that this central 
point takes varies across the ITPs.  These contact points also undertake varied positions: this 
work distinguishes between five common forms from lowest to highest in terms of 
institutionalisation as follows: dedicated contact, staff, host,  executive team, secretariat
118
 and  
CHQ. 
Table 5.10: Types of Centre Points (CP) for Sampling Frame 
Type of Centre Point (CP) Percentage of ITPs 
Host (that maintains separate office or 
established contact) 38% 
Secretariat 22% 
Executive Central team 15% 
Staff/ Team 11% 
Central Head Quarters (CHQ) 9% 
Other (Dedicated contact) 1% 
 
 
While acknowledging this systematic study of institutional form should be applied to 
all PPPs, at this point only the sampling frame is assessed.  Of the ITPS, 38% function with a 
base inside a hosted institution while another 22% have a secretariat, either independent or 
hosted.  Fifteen percent have an executive staff; 10% an executive team and 8.8% function as 
a full CHQ position.  While knowing structure is useful, the terms utilised such as team, staff, 
etc, are synonymous and employed in varying ways by the partnerships. 
To speak to organisational characteristics, one also considers the role that this central 
point undertakes, and this work distinguishes between the following: administration, 
communication (of partnership activities), coordination, management, implementation, 
operations and other support.  Many CPs will hold more than one of these, and the most 
                                                 
118 This work only utilises the term Secretariat if the PPP itself does.  
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institutionalised partnerships will not necessarily have a CP which holds all of these functions, 
as many may be delegated through the decentralisation strategy/plan.  At least half perform 
management roles, and less than 10% any direct operations (Figure 5.17).   Interestingly most 
hosted PPPs have CPs that function in a management role, while for independent this is more 
varied.  While it initially appears fewer than expected of the CPs are responsible for 
implementation, this may speak to the often desired role of CPs as central points in the 
network rather than implementers themselves. 
 
Figure 5.17:  Role of Centre Points, Sampling Frame 
 
Source: TPD, 2011 
 
 
Within the institution itself, choices made regarding design and organisational 
structure vary considerably, which is significant as these will influence relationships between 
executive team, staff and/or operational team, governance bodies and boards, and partnership 
stakeholders as a whole.  A few avenues to probe include organisational rules, HQ 
characteristics, nature and features of centralised staff and internal decision making structures 
as these may build a greater perspective on institutional character and culture. Given 
availability of information, this work cannot detail HQ characteristics or internal structuring 
across all partnerships, but it does assess many of these variables for the sampling frame of 
ITPs as furthered in the next two empirical chapters.   
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Centre Point activity and organisation: 
Across the PPPs, the variation in form and functioning of these CPs is striking, which 
is critical given the often-cited significance of the CP’s characteristics and staff to partnership 
functioning and effects. The TPD shows a higher degree of functionality for the sampling 
frame than partnerships overall, as over 90% of (operational) ITPs having staff in place.  Over 
80% also have an established staff structure, generally in the form of an executive team or 
executive staff organised along basic functional areas.  The more institutionalised, and to an 
extent the larger the PPP, the more this staff structure formalises.  As PPPs begin to grow in 
scale and often scope, they expand from a small team of executives to functional or 
geographical based structures with multiple staff units.  Partnerships grapple with this as they 
grow, attempting to manage growth while preventing what is referred to as the tendency to 
become siloed organisations, which may take the partnerships away from the flexible and 
perceived faster moving organisations they were created to be.   
One increasing criticism of PPPs is their tendency to overcompensate on lean 
operating systems and employ excessively minimal central staff and working centres 
(McKinsey 2002), and indeed the TPD shows these staffs are generally quite minimal, 
especially those employed at the CP.  Though it may be cost saving, such minimization tends 
to weaken the performance of the PPPs overall (Druce and Harmer 2004; FSG Social Impact 
Advisors 2007).  Still, why partnerships exhibit this is rather obvious: many PPP directors 
note the continued pressure to drive down operational and administrative costs, especially as 
donors are often reluctant to fund these aspects of the PPPs
119
 (Stakeholder interviewI); thus 
many PPPs strive to keep this line item as low as possible.  Administrative costs are also 
linked to the level and variation of staff salary, and a desire to keep these costs low leads to a 
tendency to rely on low numbers, or none at all, of  fulltime staff, employ interns and also 
offer staff less incentives and pay, all of which can significantly impact PPP functioning and 
performance.   
 
5.4.4 Institutional structure, design and variation 
PPPs also make decisions regarding their formal legal/ institutional structure.   As 
mentioned the largest block of PPPs, or 72% of the total, are hosted by another institution.  A 
small number of PPPs (six PPPs) are hosted by another institution but have a separate 
                                                 
 
 
159 
 
institutional structure, mainly as a charity.  Of the independent PPPs, the most common 
structure is a charity or non profit foundation (17% of operational PPPs) or a 501c3  
corporation in the US (which is a registered US-based charity), which 10% of operational 
PPPs are.  A smaller number (7% of PPPs) are officially incorporated in various countries, 
mainly the UK and Switzerland.  Such details are critical for partnership analysis as legal 
structure will make official the PPP as an institution and will also highly influence a PPP’s 
reporting and financing requirements across countries.  A further 3% of PPPs’ legal structure 
could not be verified, though their entity type was hosted.  While the ITPs are on average 
more institutionalised than the PPP universe, the overriding institutional structures are similar, 
as outside of hosted (which 53.1% are), the majority are 5013cs (19%), charity’s or non profits 
(11.6%), foundations (6.1%) or incorporated (9.5%).  
Scale: Institutionalisation is analysed more deeply for the sampling frame by 
incorporating these aforementioned elements along with organisational structure, institutional 
design and partnership rules, and guiding legal and institutional principles.  Together all of 
these aspects of design, status, structure and organisational characteristics are conceptualised 
into a scale (Table 5.11) which utilises distinctions between high, medium and low levels.  
This incorporates multiple aspects of institutional design, and the scale considers the degree to 
which the PPP as an institution has been structured and formalised, with the corresponding 
rules and characteristics that occur with these higher levels of institutionalisation.  Of the 
ITPs, 26% are distinguished as high, 39% medium and 34.5% low. 
Once a partnership has a formal institutional structure established, internal 
organisational design and dynamics begins to matter, especially as these impact the 
communication and decision making channels across the PPPs.  Partnerships with more than 
minimum levels of institutionalisation organise internally in a few main ways: the most 
common form resembles an international organisation’s tri-partite structure of an 
administrative/management secretariat at the CP, an executive or governing body and at times 
a general assembly, though the latter is much more common in CSD partnerships than across 
the universe of PPPs.   
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Table 5.11:  Conceptualisation of scale of institutionalisation 
Elements of 
institution-
alisation Low* Medium High 
- Entity 
status 
 
 
- Legality  
 
 
- Legal/ 
institution
al form 
 
 
- Institutio
nal 
structure 
 
 
- Organisat
ional 
structure 
 
 
- Organisat
ional 
characteri
stics 
 
 
- Time limited, ad-
hoc 
- Unlimited time scale - Permanent 
institution 
- No separate legal 
status 
- Legal status 
 
- Own legal status 
with guiding legal 
document 
-May or may not 
have a Centre 
Point  
- Centre Point 
established 
 
- If hosted, formal and 
separate governance 
or DM than host 
institution 
- CHQ location 
established 
- Centralisation/ 
decentralisation 
planning across 
operating units 
- No formalised or 
separate governing 
body 
- Formalised GDM 
procedures  
- Budget 
 
- Full budget 
authority 
- Formal board 
- Formalised DM 
procedures 
- No membership 
rules or criterion 
- Clearly defined 
members and/or 
partnership 
- May or may not have 
membership rules 
and/or criterion 
- Membership rules 
and/or criterion 
 
 - Centralised decision 
making 
 
- Business plan 
articulated 
- CE strategy/ DE 
operations 
- Few or no full-time 
staff 
 
- Full-time operating 
staff 
- Full-time operating 
staff and 
articulated staff 
structure 
*Most hosted fit in this 
category, though some reach 
medium levels of 
institutionalisation 
  
 
 
Figure 5.18:  Level of Institutionalisation, Sampling Frame 
 
Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011 
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5.5: Governance and decision making  
While PPPs may stand to increase participation, representation and involvement in 
global politics (Bexell, Tallberg and Uhlin 2010), others argue that partnerships not only fail 
to live up to these promises but may even exacerbate current inequalities (Utting and Zammit 
2006).  The critique of global PPPs develops along multiple lines, mainly that 1) partnerships 
are themselves not democratic, and 2) as governments and other global actors continue to 
promote working with (and partnering within) PPPs, this further weakens democratic 
principles of global governance (Meadowcraft 2007).   
Clearly analysis of partnerships’ democratic potential lies in examining their internal 
governance and decision making, yet despite continued attention to the issue and often heated 
debates, a comprehensive audit of global partnerships’ governance is lacking. To address these 
issues, the TPD probes into governance and decision making structures and styles across the 
universe of PPPs
120
.  Though detail is often missing for many hosted institutions, for most 
some information could be garnered on decision making type, which in some ways is a 
positive finding; thus, this work creates one of the first datasets of partnership governance 
forums.
121
   
 
5.5.1 Governance forums  
One overriding finding, as already highlighted, is that approximately half of the 
partnerships are hosted by another institution; thus, one assumes a majority of governance and 
decision making will be influenced, if not directly controlled, by the host institution
122
  (See 
Buse 2004a for a related argument). Beyond hosted, approximately 14% (22% operational) of 
all PPPs are governed by a formal board and around 3% (2%) by a steering committee.  
Outside of these main forums of decision making, a small proportion of PPPs function under a 
council (2%), team (2%) or other group (2%), the latter generally an assembly.  Less than 10 
PPPs in the universe claim to be officially governed by this general assembly, but this does 
not include hosted that may also have an assembly.   
Given that the majority are hosted, a more thorough understanding of the GDM within 
these is of interest; however, as many merely function as initiatives , or even projects, they 
                                                 
120 As additional details on sampling frame PPPs are collected regard GDM variables, discussion of these is 
reserved for chapter seven. 
121 Of those that are hosted and there is no other information outside of hosted status, these are assumed to be 
governed only by the host institution.  
122 As a note on methodological process, if the PPP is hosted by another institution, the main governance forum is 
noted as host and the subtype is tracked separately.  As it is impossible to discern the relative influence between the 
subtype governing forum (e.g. Board or committee) and the host itself, this approach was taken as a proxy to speak 
to both. 
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lack descriptive governance information.  Of the hosted PPPs for which information is 
available, slightly over 20% are governed by either a group or assembly (22%) or an 
appointed / dedicated Team (22%), 17% by a Board and 16% by a formal steering committee.  
The remainder have decentralised governing structures or note the CP (mainly secretariat) is 
the only governing entity (Figure 5.19).   
Beyond the structure of governance, to speak to the PPPs’ democratic nature, member 
representation within decision making bodies matters.  The TPD analysed the board/member 
composition across all partnerships’ main governance forum, and the governance split is rather 
startling.  Only around 16% of the partnerships have true multi stakeholder 
representation on their governing boards with at least one representative from the public, 
private and social sectors, though this number is slightly over 20% for those with confirmed 
operations (Figures 5.20 and 5.21).  This is striking considering the rampant promotion of 
these initiatives as multistakeholder endeavours, supposedly bringing new voice and decision 
making powers to global governance.   
 
Figure 5.19:  Types of Governance, All PPPs 
 
Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011 
 
Even further, over one-quarter (28%) of the PPPs are governed only by members 
representing the public sector, which should even more bring this governance issue to the 
forefront, especially as these aspects are perhaps more telling than actor involvement alone 
regarding relative say within these institutions).  Further, perhaps contrary to criticisms that 
TNCs and private interests dominate decision making within global PPPs (Zammit 2003; 
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Bruhl 2007), across the universe at large the social sector is more highly represented than 
private actors, with around 25% of PPPs functioning with at least one member from the public 
sector and one member from the social sector on the board or committee but no representation 
from the private sector.  Another interesting finding is between operational and non 
operational partnerships: the main difference is in trisectoral representation (21% in 
operational vs 16% in all) as well as that only 20% of operational PPPs as compared to 26% 
for all have public/ social only.  Among hosted PPPs, there is verifiable trisectoral governance 
split for only 8%.  Public representation only dominates: 24% of the hosted PPPs are governed 
only by public sector members with 21% from the public and social sector only.   
Figure 5.20:  Sectoral Split on main governing forums All 
 
Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011 
Figure 5.21:  Sectoral split of main governing forums Operational 
 
Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011 
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Many partnerships make explicit their efforts to be truly multi-stakeholder in terms of 
decision making, such as the Accelerating Access Initiative to HIV Care, which notes that its 
purpose is to provide a forum for exchanging ‘information and views, for consultation and to 
articulate needs and expectations, especially those emanating from governments, and to 
provide advice and guidance... (UNAIDS 2002), in order to encourage the involvement of all 
stakeholders.  Alternatively, many PPPs, especially in technical areas, adamantly defend their 
decision making structures, noting that expertise and know-how should be criteria for 
inclusion rather than sectoral base, as this leads to the more effective partnerships.  This is an 
argument made most strongly in terms of GHPs, which are often criticised for lacking public 
and social sector representation in favour of private sector interests (Buse 2004a; 2004b; Buse 
and Harmer 2007).  Partnership directors and those on the opposing view counter these claims 
by noting that membership should be based on merit, not “token political representation” 
(Kettler and Towse 2001).  
In addition to the public/private interest base, and in some ways more a criticism of 
PPPs, is the lack of representation from the Global South on governing boards (Reinicke and 
Deng 2000; Caines 2005), but at this time the TPD only presents information regarding 
sectoral splits across all PPPs.  This discussion is furthered in the seventh chapter which 
presents the sampling frame in more detail.   
 
5.5.2 Donors and dollars  
It is often assumed that especially within finance-starved PPPs, donors may wield 
considerable influence.  Specifically, it is claimed these are often powerful Western donors, 
especially TNCs and other private interests, who thus have undue influence within PPPs.  
While one cannot say much about the relationship between funders, donors and board 
members and their relative weight or say without more detailed PPP-specific information, this 
work does examine all documented evidence to assess funding sources across all PPPs.   
A critical finding is that the sectoral base of funders is not available for close to 5% of 
the independent partnerships, and while this information was rarely specified in detail for 
hosted PPPs, it is assumed that the host is the main funder unless other information is 
specified.  First, this is not specifics on donors or figures, which is even rarer, only noting 
where and from whom it receives funding.  As a note, at times these “funders” were rather 
vague, as the PPP would note it was funded by private sector investors, governments, etc 
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without listing specifics.  Thus while this work compiled all available information, it is still 
only a picture as far as sources allow. 
Of the partnerships with available information (PPPs with no information are 
eliminated from percentage totals), it is perhaps surprising that more than one-third of the 
PPPs are funded only by public sources.  This would perhaps run contrary to many arguments 
that governments rely on the private sector for the financial arm of PPPs, especially as around 
12% are funded only by private donors, compared to less than 7% of partnerships that only 
have social sector-based donors.  Only 14% of the global partnership universe has a diverse, 
multi stakeholder funding base, compared with the 21% of operational who have a tri-sectoral 
governance body (Figure 5.22) 
 
Figure 5.22:  Sectoral split of funding base, All PPPs 
 
Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011 
 
 Finally, governance encapsulates more than form and design but also the dynamics 
within these structures, the transparency of the governance processes and the clarity of 
specified roles, rules and responsibilities for those involved.  To further speak towards input 
legitimacy, this work also assessed elements of transparency and accountability across the 
universe of PPPs, though detailed discussion is reserved for chapter seven.   
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5.6 Implications and Conclusion 
 This chapter reveals for the first time the nature and status of the universe of 
transnational public private partnerships, and this work’s TPD shows that while over 750 PPPs 
are claimed, only around 440 of these show evidence of current operations.  Beyond pure 
operational status, the functioning of these institutions and whether or not they are indeed 
addressing unmet needs is of concern.  While some areas have a wide coverage of these global 
institutions, such as health, many issue areas, such as women’s rights, are rarely addressed.  In 
terms of the actual work of partnerships, the TPD shows that most of these PPPs function in 
areas of coordination of resources or expertise rather than more tangible or direct operational 
areas.  While global PPPs are heralded for their ability to close noted global governance gaps, 
this chapter shows that global partnerships may fail to meet these promises.  For one, there is 
still heavy dominance of Northern governments and significant representation of IGOs as the 
main actors involved within the PPPs.  This is especially in regards to UN bodies, which host 
or partner with a significant proportion of the universe of global PPPs  
Regarding institutional design, this work provides a unique perspective on variations 
in PPP legal and organisational form while showing how PPPs organise along this range of 
institutionalisation.  These PPPs are often relatively flexible, many lack any institutionalised 
structure or even an established centralised point of operations, or more fundamentally a 
contact.  Perhaps one of the most striking findings, however, is the large majority that are 
hosted by another institution, and often little information regarding governance, funding  or 
most fundamentally performance, is available in these hosted partnerships.  Finally, while the 
universe and main partnerships “inputs” focused around partnership type, scope, actor-based 
variables and institution-based variables as discussed above, this work recognises that while 
not static concepts, these descriptive features of partnerships still represent rules or a structural 
base and may differ from reality.  
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CHAPTER 6:  
Management Practices in Global Partnerships 
 The inherent differences that emerge when combining these varied institutions and 
their respective cultures are certain to lead to organisational challenges; thus, it is often 
suggested that strong management and governance processes within PPPs will be significant.  
Despite this common assumption, and the frequent reference to the critical nature of 
management, it is a lagging area of PPP research, especially in terms of linking management 
variation to variation in performance. 
 Regardless of measurement used, performance varies greatly across public-private 
partnerships.  This is not surprising: performance and productivity vary greatly across 
organisations in the private and public sectors, even within narrowly defined industries 
(Foster, Hiwanger, and Syverson 2008).  Much of this work, and others, explore how these 
various partnership characteristics, inputs or institutional explanatory variables may explain 
what drives these differences.  While PPP evaluation brings considerable challenges, not least 
due to lack of standardisation of concepts and metrics, even within sectors with more 
comparable data, there remains a gap between institutional outputs and conventionally 
measured inputs.   
Recent works have made substantial gains in getting into what may drive these 
differences across institutions.  Beyond measured inputs, such as institutional design or actors 
involved, another approach looks to the role of management.  This involves analysis of the 
institutional practices and processes that may be significant in explaining performance 
variation.  While economists, academics and practitioners have long acknowledged the 
importance of management in determining these differences, little has been done to 
systematically address this, mainly given a lack of comparable data and applicable 
measurement tools.  An ongoing research agenda,
123
 originally pioneered in Bloom and Van 
Reenen (2007) has attempted to quantify and evaluate management across the private, public 
and not-for-profit sectors. 
This chapter moves the analysis to the micro partnership level and assesses the 
management practices within a set of the sampling frame ITPs.  The first section addresses the 
significance of management and related PPP literature which addresses it.  The next details the 
methodology used.  The subsequent section presents the main findings and describes the 
evidenced management practices within and across PPPs while the following section explores 
                                                 
123 For background on the management methodology, see 
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/research/productivity/management.asp and  www.worldmanagementsurvey.org  
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the drivers of these management differences.  An additional section discusses the links with 
governance and organisational autonomy, and this chapter concludes by returning to the 
significance of management.  
 
6.1 Partnerships processes:  Background and missing management link 
While the notion that management matters for organisational performance is perhaps 
not surprising, what is startling is just how much the managerial decisions do matter.  
Established study across sectors shows a significant relationship between organisational 
management and organisational performance (Figure 6.1). Management may be even more 
important than other factors commonly associated with institutional performance, such as 
industry sector, regulatory environment or country of operation; thus management practices 
may command significant explanatory value, even over business lines, government policy or 
geography (Dorgan et al. 2006).  Might management play just as much of a role in 
partnerships?  Before moving into the findings of this work, this section lays the background 
by reviewing related theories and notions of management and providing a link to existing 
literature on international institutions and PPPs that consider the role of management.  
Figure 6.1: Established relationship between management and performance  
 
World Management Survey research shows that in over 6,000 industrial firms globally, 
management and performance are tightly linked  
 
 Source: Bloom et al. 2010a 
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While management is not a neglected area of partnership focus – it is increasingly 
mentioned in regards to partnership “must haves” – systematic study of management across 
partnerships is lacking.  Beyond this fundamental gap, there is little consideration given to 
management practices as a key factor in explaining partnership functioning and performance.  
While the lack of a tool or established system of measuring management is one reason, there 
are a few other factors that help to explain this lag.  A management-focused view resides in a 
missing gap in PPP research as while it is cited and discussed it is fair to say it has not been 
truly studied, especially given the current varying approaches taken to partnership analysis.   
Before moving into partnerships specifically, it is worth noting that the significance of 
procedures and processes has been a growing tenant within international regime research and 
new institutionalist studies.  Even though earlier research focused on the constructs of power, 
interests and knowledge, the critical role for programmatic activities in determining regime 
effectiveness has always been of focus (Young 1999b).  The more recent findings from the 
International Regime Database (IRD)
124
 project also noted the significance of procedural 
elements in influencing regime effectiveness (Breitmeier, Young and Zurn 2006) and the 
dominance of the managerial approach over that of compliance (Chayes and Chayes 1995). 
The management approach argues that more rule targets are involved in the process of 
rulemaking, the greater the degree of compliance will be with these rules.  Critically, the 
researchers find less support for approaches to compliance associated with management and 
enforcement than expected, as legalisation and legitimacy variables account for a sizable 
proportion of conformance on the part of regime members (Breitmeier, Young and Zurn 2006, 
232).  As the dimensions within the management measure utilised in this work encompass 
dimensions tightly linked to these latter elements, and evaluates how well PPP directors and 
managers implement or execute these, these findings reinforce the applicability of this MM 
tool.    
Using this regime literature as a base, Beisheim and Kaan (2010)
125
 takes a similar 
view and utilize the “managerial approach to compliance” (Raustiala and Slaughter 2002) as 
applied to transnational partnerships.  Their use of process management refers to the 
secretariat structure and the internal workings of the PPPs, though they also acknowledge the 
                                                 
124 The International Regimes Database (IRD)  presents quantitative analysis of 23 international environmental 
regimes in terms of problem solving capacity and problem structure, focusing on varying factors that account for 
regime effectiveness and compliance.  The authors also consider aspects of regime design, actors, decision making 
models and other variables in constructing the database; management features as one element of a constructed 
model.  (See Mitchell ongoing)        
125 See also Liese and Beisheim 2011and Beisheim and Liese (forthcoming) as well as the SFB 700/D1 workshop 
papers Beisheim 2010 and Liese 2010. 
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importance of resources, conflict resolution and timeframe limitations.  While their work notes 
the importance of management, it often confuses structural and process dimensions; that is, it 
does not distinguish between the PPP’s organisational characteristics, such as the presence of 
a secretariat, as separate from the management within the CP.  The work is also based upon 
interviews not conducted with the same methodology across all PPPs of focus; thus, while it 
attempts a quantitative “score” for the partnerships, it falls more towards comparative case 
studies than systematic comparison.   
Long-established partnership reviews consider management and decision making, but 
these are often written more for partnership practitioners and dedicated as PPP toolkits, 
learning guides or best practice resources (Caplan et al. 2007; Stott et al. 2006; UN Global 
Compact 2007).  Many commissioned evaluations include a focus on management (OED 
2004), but this is generally more qualitative and maintains an emphasis on best practices 
learned from highly successful partnerships.  Though numerous reviews consider 
organisational and process issues (World Economic Forum 2005), this is not done 
systematically across more than a set of partnerships, nor are they generally considered as 
drivers to performance.  With a few noted exceptions, systematic attention to management is 
clearly lacking.  Even those that focus on management often stop at individual PPP case 
studies or discussing best practices, relying on discussions surrounding SMART management 
frameworks and success strategies rather than evaluation or comparison of the implementation 
of these practices.  
This echoes earlier studies, such as the 2004 DFID review of over 20 Global Health 
Partnerships (GHPs), which discussed the critical aspects of management styles and structures.  
Many of the points the authors target from their commissioned “business” and “partnership” 
literature review, such as the necessity of well-articulated goals, strong and shared vision and 
transparency between partners, are aspects which the MM interview tool utilised here 
assesses.  Also relevant is the work’s mention of the 7 C’s of partnership working (DETR 
1999; in Druce and Harmer 2004):
126
 clarity of leadership, understanding, purpose, role, 
commitment, management and measurement.  While all useful practices, however, their 
uptake within PPPs is rarely evaluated in a comparative perspective.  This relates to the 
growing body of PPP evaluations, which offer value in that they can probe deeply into PPP’s 
operations and the status of the management (Grace and Druce 2009), but tend to focus on the 
actors within the roles and decision making styles.  Fewer studies consider how deficiencies or 
                                                 
126 For more on partnership working, see Geddes 1997; Harding 1998; and Skelcher and Lowndes 1998.  
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strengths in management may lead to a difference in PPP operations, though almost all 
individual evaluations point to lacks in these regards (Buse and Tanaka 2011).   
Case studies, especially of high-profile partnerships, give increased attention to 
management.  For example, recent reviews of the Global Fund (Macro International 2007), 
International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI) (Druce et al. 2003) and the Medicines for 
Malaria Venture (Faster Cures 2009) note the importance of centre point management - often 
the need to strengthen it - yet management is rarely measured nor considered outside of the 
internal partnership context.   
In sum, the current state of play suggests management practices are a missing link 
from partnership research.  Absent is the evaluation of management, the ability to compare 
across organisations, outside of noted success factors, and, significantly, on management 
towards both strategy and implementation or execution.  While best practices may be 
published, and efforts made to disseminate across PPPs, there is little study of whether they 
have been diffused and taken up within PPPs, points returned to as the findings are 
highlighted.   
 
6.2 Measuring management practices  
This work measured management practices by conducting interviews with PPP 
directors and/or chief operating officers (COOs) or equivalent positions
127
 across a subset of 
the sampling frame.  The interviews cover practices across six areas (Figure 6.2.), and each of 
these broad areas is broken into dimensions while the interviews are scored on a one-to-five 
basis across these 25 dimensions of practice.  Conceptions of good, average and poor practices 
are defined in advance for each of the dimensions, and the tool assigns scores from one 
(“worst practice”) to five (“best practice”) across the dimensions.128  Partnerships that track 
performance well, for example, continually monitor key performance measures and 
communicate information about them, both formally and informally, to partnership staff and 
the partners themselves.  On the other hand, partnerships who struggle with performance 
management may rarely or infrequently monitor metrics and communicate them, perhaps only 
sporadically, to funders or donors.   
                                                 
127 While the same equivalent position was interviewed in each PPP, many titles/ positions are used across the PPP.  
Throughout this chapter, the title Director is used, though the interviewee may have held the title CEO, president 
and/or manager.    
128 See AppendixI for complete PPP management interview, questions and assessment guide.  
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The overall management practice measure is an average of these 25 scores (Figure 
6.3), but one can also compare across areas and dimensions.129  Applying this management 
measure and the process undertaken to conduct the interview involves understanding at least 
three factors: scoring management practices; collecting accurate responses; and obtaining 
interviews with the partnership directors.  
 Scoring: To measure management requires codifying the concept of good and bad 
management into a measure applicable to different partnerships.  Benchmarked on the original 
survey interview grid which has been adapted to apply towards private, public, charitable and 
government sectors, it can serve as a robust tool for assessing hybrid forms of these 
institutional structures.
130
    The interview-based, evaluation tool defines and scores from one 
(worst practice) to five (best practice) across areas of management practices which appear to 
matter to PPPs.  Each of these areas is broken into dimensions of management (the questions), 
all scored between a one and five, with the higher score indicating better performance.   
A funnel technique is utilised to further the scoring process and ensure accurate 
responses.  Each dimension begins with an open question (“Can you describe the PPP’s 
method of obtaining new partners”) rather than closed questions (e.g. “Do you utilise funding 
as a basis of partnership selection”). These questions target actual practices and examples, 
with the discussion continuing until the interviewer can make an accurate assessment of the 
organisation’s typical practices. For each dimension of practice, the set of sub-questions 
begins with a broad, open question and is followed with more detailed questions to narrow and 
fine tune the scoring ability of the analyst.   
                                                 
129 More details on the general methodology can be found in Bloom and Van Reenen 2010 and Bloom et al. 2007.   
130 Approximately 14 dimensions of management practices hold consistent across all sectors, furthering the 
significance of assessing management as a key driver of practice.   
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Figure 6.2: Management practice areas assessed 
 
Figure 6.3: PPP interview dimension scoring   
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Obtaining accurate responses:  Key to the applicability and relevance of this data is 
obtaining unbiased responses from the interviewees; that is, ensuring partnership directors 
provide accurate responses and their answers regarding institutional practices reflect what 
actually happens in reality.  As is well known from research on survey methodology (Bertrand 
and Mullainathan 2001), interviewees tend to be biased in their responses towards what they 
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perceive the interviewer is looking for as the correct answer.  Thus measures should be taken 
to ensure interviewers are scoring based on partnership practices rather than the interviewee’s 
impressions. In addition interviewers may themselves have pre-conceptions about the 
performance of the institution they are interviewing and bias their scores based on their ex-
ante perceptions. More generally, a range of background characteristics, potentially correlated 
with the PPP directors or head managers, may generate some kinds of systematic bias in the 
survey data; for example if these directors have a background in public relations or lend 
themselves more easily to interviewing style. 
 This approach tackles these issues by utilising this double blind survey methodology; 
this refers to the fact that the interview is conducted via the telephone for all directors and 
while they were fully prepared for the conversation and topics covered, they were not aware 
that they were being scored nor of the criteria.  As interviewers themselves can be biased in 
conducting interviews or evaluations in general based on pre-conceptions of the PPP’s relative 
effectiveness, the second aspect of the double blind methodology is that the interviewer is not 
only external to the PPP operations but also is unfamiliar with the PPP performance 
information in advance of the interview.  The interviews were conducted by this thesis’s 
author and one highly-trained interviewer analyst, who had also conducted over 100 
interviews in both the public and private sector institutions using the methodology.
131
  Over 
85% interviews were scored by two people which furthered the reliability of the information 
assessed and scores given. 
Furthermore, each interview also collected valuable information relating to the PPP 
itself (AppendixG).  This includes details on the PPPs’ internal structure and organisation, 
partnership selection process, legal and ownership status, number of sites and operating units.  
Whenever these same indicators could be found from external sources or datasets (many were 
also collected with the output variable/ PPP structural variable aspects), we cross checked 
these responses.    
The targeted contacts within the partnerships were the equivalent of the chief 
executive or the chief operating officer within the PPP, while across a certain subset of PPPs 
multiple managers were spoken to in order to further test the rigour of the assessment tool.  
The PPP managers were also those who worked and functioned within the PPP themselves 
rather than partner organisations.  While this narrowed the frame of partnerships spoken to in 
that there had to be a central point of contact for the PPP, it enabled further comparability 
across those surveyed.  It must be noted that a minimum degree of institutionalisation is 
                                                 
131 The interviewer was also fully trained on the background relating to transnational PPPs. 
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needed before one can assess management, so partnerships for which there is no designated 
contact point or location self-eliminate from the management survey.
132
  Another concern may 
be that these managers were too removed from the PPP management processes to accurately 
answer the questions; however, this was dealt with through several measures, including 
consistent points of contact across partnerships, interviewing a second, more operational-
minded contact in a set of PPPs and designing the nature of the questions to tease out possible 
ambiguities in response.
133
   
What distinguishes this tool, besides its measurement and comparative use, is its focus 
on implementation and deployment of practices.  More than looking at structure or design, this 
work gets to the crux of the practices themselves, a task few other researchers have attempted, 
especially on a comparative basis.  This methodological tool has been benchmarked, and 
proven robust, across close to 20,000 institutions in the public, private and charitable sectors.  
That it has proven applicable and relevant in measuring management in these varied 
institutional structures provides solid grounds for its use here.   
What is significant is that the same practices around monitoring, target management 
and people management are consistently associated with better performance across all the 
sectors studied.  This is significant as one can now benchmark partnerships consistently with 
these practices known to make a difference.  What is interesting is how frequently these same 
practices, that were already built into this grid and proven relevant cross sectors, are 
referenced in partnership evaluations and toolkits.
134
  That said, this tool is adapted 
specifically for global partnerships to capture additional dimensions of practice, as it expands 
from the original 18 question set and alters all operational-based management dimensions.   
Obtaining interviews was done through a stepped procedure with careful attention to 
methodology.  Sampling frame PPPs with functional types of information exchange/research, 
policy and/or its development, and setting standards were initially targeted. This was done 
after determining these three would lend themselves best to comparisons and represented 
slightly over one-third of the sampling frame.  The process involved emailing the set of 83 
PPPs which had these functional types as either primary or secondary functions an 
introduction letter reviewing the study and an invitation to hold a structured conversation.  
                                                 
132 This only excludes less than five partnerships from the survey, as the majority of the sampling frame had at least 
a contact specified for the CP.  Of the 22 no response emails (an additional four failed), 17 were sent to a basic (e.g. 
info@) email rather than named contact. 
133 The validity of this survey tool was also ensured by collecting variables regarding the process of the interview.  
This includes variables relating to the following: interviewer fixed effect, time of day and day of week of the 
interview, duration, speciality and background of the manager, position of the interviewee and tenure in post.   
134 See FSG Social Impact Advisors 2007; Buse and Tanaka 2011; Hurrell et al. 2006; as well as the evaluation 
resource library at globalppps.org.    
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Forty-three successful interviews were held with fifty-one different managers, and during a 
small set of interviews multiple directors participated in the same interview.  Thus there were 
thirty three unique PPPs,
135
 five interviews were deemed incomplete in that the manager/ 
director did not have enough time for the full interview (these were dropped from the final 
analysis), and an additional six the manager expressed interest but a conducive time could not 
be set within the determined interview timeframe.  In addition, seven partnerships responded 
that they were no longer operational, and for four PPPs all attempts at contact failed.  An 
additional four responded to the interview request but were determined to not constitute an 
ITP, as per the definitions of this work.
136
   
This work also considered whether or not there was potentially sample bias in the 
received responses.  After review, however, the partnership interviews were found to represent 
both well known, well funded partnerships and small hosted initiatives with less than one 
fulltime staff member.  The variation across sectoral focus, geography and timeframe of the 
partnership was also fairly representative of the sample at large.   
Table 6.1: PPP interview statistics  
 
Management Interview (MM) statistics 
 Total PPPs emailed  83 
Total individuals interviewed:  51 
Total interview sessions held (i.e. same PPP, different persons):  43 
Total  unique PPPs approached and finished interviewing:  33 
Average call duration: ~2 hours 
 
 
6.3 Describing management across and within PPPs
137
 
6.3.1 Patterns of management practices 
Management varies drastically across the PPPs of focus, with some partnerships 
exhibiting strong practices while others falter towards the bottom.  When plotting the 
distribution of management scores (Figure 6.4), the spread across the scale is evident with 
                                                 
135 As multiple partnerships had interviews with more than one manager, in the analysis which follows only one 
interview per PPP is included to prevent over biasing the sample towards any type of PPP.   Rather than averaging 
the scores, the interview is kept in entirety with scores from the director/manager in the most comparable position 
to the entire set of PPPs interviewed.  
136 This includes the Global Forum for Health Research, the Bicycle Refurbishing Initiative, the International 
Council for the Control of Iodine Deficiency Disorder, and Building Partnerships for Sustainable Development, 
most of which were determined to be XPPs as per the TPD coding; See AppendixB for coding.   
137 Throughout the remainder of this chapter, PPP managers are named when they consented to full disclosure and 
“PPP Director” is utilized when they asked for full confidentiality.  The full list of PPPs’ interviewed is available in 
AppendixJ with confidentiality taken into account.   
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several partnerships clumping at the tail end.   This is particularly striking when considering 
that a score of “one” indicates worst practice and “five” best practice; therefore, partnerships 
scoring a two or less on performance management, for example, will not articulate goals or 
targets for the partnership nor consider setting metrics to track progress.  While this is perhaps 
not surprising, given the many known variations across partnerships, this distribution persists 
even amongst similarly focused PPPs or those with the same participating actors.       
PPPs also are better and worse managed in certain areas of practice, which may go far 
in explaining differences in performance.  The areas of management mentioned above are 
broken into either four broader categories for simplicity (partner operations, performance 
management, people (staff) management and vision/leadership) or six, more specific 
categories.  When considering all partnerships, there is not a significant difference across 
areas; however, PPPs tended to perform higher on Vision and Rationale while struggling most 
in operational areas.  While the majority could articulate their organisation’s vision, mission 
and rationale, and how this is managed, most largely failed to maintain the operations deemed 
necessary to effectively run the organisation.  This is a significant finding, as it shows that 
despite best intentions and purpose, PPPs may either dedicate too much time to this former 
aspect of work or not sufficiently engage in the necessary management practices and 
infrastructure to execute the vision.   
Regardless of categorisation, PPPs scored worst on two particular dimensions of the 
25: 1) Operations management: Adopting best practices and 2) Performance management: 
Holding performance dialogues.  It is striking that the average worst scoring question related 
to the ability to adopt partnership best practices, the dimension which tests whether a 
partnership regularly reaches out to others, find ideas to improve performance (from other 
PPPs, IGOs, their partners, etc) and incorporates these into its practice.  While many admitted 
they knew it was significant, the majority of PPPs had no processes in place to do so.  These 
findings perhaps draw questions related to PPPs’ roles as social learning institutions and 
knowledge sharers given that so few place enough, if any, emphasis on this.   
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Figure 6.4: Management varies across PPPs 
 
 
6.3.2 Management across PPPs 
Partnerships are varied organisations, which makes clear categorizations for 
comparison difficult.  In related works, organisations are often compared across countries
138
 
within the same sector or industry or across similar industries; however, geography is less of a 
base for PPPs, as so many are located in the same country and indeed city.   Two general 
categories which represent key distinguishing PPP features are utilised: 1) hosted vs 
independent status and 2) functional categories.  Throughout this chapter, the use of categories 
or types of PPPs refers to those sampled in this study rather than all PPPs, though as is argued 
in this work’s concluding chapter, much of these findings can be generalized to a greater 
extent.  Further, numbers per functional category are per the set of PPPs interviewed rather 
than the TPD sampling frame as a whole; see chapter five of this work for a functional 
breakdown of the universe and sampling frame of PPPs  
Independent PPPs are much better managed than those that are hosted (Figure 6.5), 
and this is especially significant when considering only those hosted within a public 
(government; IGO) organisation.
139
  Besides the raw management scores, another way to see 
                                                 
138 Good management is not dictated by geography; however, related work on management practices in industrials 
highlighted the way superior management techniques transcend language, culture, and regulation (Bloom and Van 
Reenen 2007). 
139 The Eli Lilly MDR TB Partnership is the only PPP hosted within a private organisation interviewed, so 
henceforth all scores for hosted drop the Eli Lilly scores to draw out all comparisons.   
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the striking difference is by comparing the distribution of hosted versus independent 
management scores (Figure 6.6), as the former has a noticeable “tail” of underperforming 
partnerships with average scores of less than 2.5.  Strikingly, there are no top performing 
hosted partnerships, with the best managed scoring only a 2.8.   
Figure 6.5: Management practice score, independent versus hosted  
  
 
Figure 6.6: Distribution of management scores, independent versus hosted  
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Using the assessed management score to consider how management differs across the 
functional-types (Figure 6.7), it emerges that information exchange/ research partnerships 
outperform the others with standard setting and advocacy partnerships lagging in terms of 
management practices.
140
  As hosted status is spread fairly evenly throughout the functional 
areas, scores are not being driven by the PPPs’ independence, or lack thereof.  Despite these 
differences, when bracketing into categories the sample size becomes relatively small, so this 
work does not make more than initial insights here, though it is certainly an interesting area 
for further work.  The distribution of scores across functional areas (Figure 6.8) shows that 
despite having the most PPPs sampled, information exchange/ research PPPs have a relatively 
low spread, which signifies less dispersion of management scores, while advocacy PPPs have  
the highest dispersion of scores.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Management score by function
  
 
 
 
                                                 
140 Of those PPPS interviewed, the functional breakdown is as follows: Advocacy (4); Coordination (5); 
Information exchange (13); Policy (5) and Setting standards (4).  
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Figure 6.8: Distribution of managment score by function 
 
 
6.3.3 Management: Strengths and weaknesses  
While there is a significant management gap between hosted and independent 
partnerships, management still varies considerably within these.  This work is unique in its 
ability to measure the relative quality of management practices (benchmarked against a best 
practice guideline), and it is quickly evident that the thoroughness of partnerships in adopting 
these practices differs widely.  Turning the focus to the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
partnerships allows one to draw out more of the differences between types of partnerships as 
well as highlight areas where all struggle. 
The biggest weakness for hosted PPPs, especially compared to their independent 
counterparts, is the area of target and goal management, as there is almost a full point 
difference in average scores (Figure 6.9).  Interestingly, while there is a significant gap 
between hosted and independent PPPs in terms of people management, it is not the biggest 
driver of the difference between the two.  In related work, it is this aspect of management that 
drives most of the difference between public and private organisations in terms of 
management (Bloom et al. 2010a). 
Across functional areas, while coordination PPPs outscore all other functional types in 
regards to operational management, they struggle the most in performance management – the 
182 
 
setting and tracking of partnership performance.  As this type of PPP functions to bring 
together expertise, knowledge and resources across partners, that they do well in managing 
their partners and resources is a reassuring finding.  Their weakness in performance 
management and tracking is a concern, however, especially if one assumes that these 
operational processes are needed to drive the desired results.  What also stands out is that 
advocacy partnerships exemplify strong leadership, which signifies – at least for those in this 
sample – that they are led by engaged leaders with clearly defined roles and responsibilities 
who still understand the broader set of challenges the PPP faces.  However, these partnerships 
also have the weakest people management systems in place; in fact, it is the only functional 
type to score higher on leadership than people management.  These partnerships did little to 
incentivise or reward staff and had less in place to engage staff longer term (e.g. through 
professional development, incentives, rewards) with the partnership.  This does not bode well 
moving forward if these PPPs lose their current (often founding) leaders or there is a 
continued lack of succession planning and/or leadership turnover.   
 
 
 
Figure 6.9 Management score by entity type 
 
 
To further pull together these insights systematically, this work walks through the main areas 
of management drawing in examples from specific partnerships.   
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Operations management: 
While overall operational management is the weakest area for PPPs, these average 
differences across management areas are slight when grouping all PPPs together.  By breaking 
this into dimensions, however, interesting findings emerge.  PPPs, even high scoring ones, 
struggled on a few areas (Table 6.2).   
 
Table 6.2 PPP management scores across operations management 
Management dimension All Independent Hosted 
Partnership selection strategy 3 3.2 2.3 
Clearly defined partnership roles 2.9 3.1 2.6 
Organization principles 3.2 3.3 2.89 
Scoping resources and resource management 3 3.2 2.4 
Good use of partner resources and internal   collaboration 2.7 2.9 2.2 
Adopting partnership best-practices 2.6 2.8 2.1 
Continuous improvement and process documentation 3.1 3.2 2.8 
 
 
One aspect many partnership leaders struggled with was their partner selection 
strategy: the majority of PPPs were unable to articulate what defined a partner in their 
organisation.  Whereas strong performing partnerships clearly spoke through the process of 
new partners joining and the necessary steps taken on both ends, other PPPs allowed open 
membership to any who paid a fee or even expressed interest.  The worst performing 
partnerships were unable to define partners and relied on reactive, often ad hoc means of 
partners joining.  A disconnect is often noted between core partners, involved with main PPP 
work (often founding partners) and other partners.  This is especially the case for research-
based PPPs, such as the product development partnerships (PDP), who had detailed criteria 
and arrangements for all “partners” engaged in research or development but much looser 
definitions for advocacy or communication partners.
141
   
Interestingly, partner selection is particularly weak for hosted partnerships.  This does 
not generally stem from command/ control of the host organisation, which is generally 
relatively unengaged with this aspect for the PPPs interviewed, but rather from the fact that 
most of these lack a proactive process, as the majority noted potential partners “came to 
them.”  Most of the hosted PPPs surveyed also tended towards more relaxed, open partnering 
                                                 
141 Another difficulty with these PDPs was how to handle contract service organisations (CSOs), which considered 
themselves partners but which the PDP managers would consider a contracted relationship.    
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requirements, often engaging with partners who “expressed interest” or signed on to the PPPs’ 
goals or missions.  While this is also found for a few independent PPPs, the majority of these 
worked more to control numbers and comparatively more attempted at least some form of due 
diligence.  The discrepancy across PPPs for this dimension was great, with weak performers 
noting they “responded to requests of interest” and “used to have a form online;” to others 
who noted an MOU is considered a minimum only, but in reality no true partnerships is 
formed, and no risk or financial sharing occurs,  without a more formal agreement.  For the 
top performers, the key piece on the selection strategy is the link with the partnerships’ goals – 
that is, partners have something of critical value to “bring to the table.”   
While health advocacy partnerships were notably weak here, advocacy and policy-
based PPPs in other areas, such as the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) or the World Energy 
Council (WEC) were some of the top performers.  The WEC, for example goes through a 
process at the board level, which is also part of the bylaws of the organisation, where 
companies are identified that meet a list of criteria.  The WEC also works to control partner 
numbers and sets a cap to ensure active engagement of all of the partners.  On the other hand, 
the Global Vaccine Alliance (GVA) began with what its director acknowledges was “a broad 
tent or umbrella strategy” to partnerships.  Its self-acknowledged leas faire criterion, in which 
potential partners only had to note an interest in global health, meant all were welcomed.  The 
Alliance now considers over 600 organisations “partners,” and it acknowledges they will not 
be able to provide services of value to all of them moving forward.  Thus, this is an area the 
PPP is actively looking to manage. 
All partnerships performed worst (or equivalently) on the dimension “Ability to 
clearly define partnership roles” versus the dimension “Partnership selection strategy,” many 
to a significant extent.  That is, even those that clearly articulated the process for a partner 
joining, performed due diligence on potentials and had clear partnership strategies, struggled 
to define the roles and requirements this membership entailed.  Other PPPs believe it is 
necessary to keep roles loosely defined, as the Online Access to Research in the Environment 
(O.A.R.E) director noted: “Partners join us because they want the flexibility: we keep partner 
responsibilities as loose as possible to accommodate this and see no need to be firmer” (MM 
Interview43).   
What quickly became evident is that for many PPPs, the actual active engagement 
between partners is quite limited!  On a more macro picture, this will be critical in eventually 
addressing the argument that a major role PPPs fulfil is that of learning institutions.  The 
“partnering” within many transnational PPPs more often occurs with engagement between the 
185 
 
PPP centre and individual partners rather than continual partner-to-partner engagement.  The 
ability of the PPP to coordinate its partners and encourage and facilitate engagement and 
learning remained weak for most, but many directors noted this was a critical area that needed 
work.  To distinguish, while many partners hold annual partner meetings and issue 
newsletters, these are information distribution dialogues – CP to partners – rather than forums 
for information-sharing and lesson- learning across partners.   
Some PPPs are making strides towards this, instituting membership surveys or 
roundtables to bring partners together and share practices; however, almost no PPPs made any 
effort to actually capture this knowledge or ensure partners went away with lasting lessons.  
Some are moving towards having a members’ area on their websites, such as the Collaborative 
Labeling and Appliance Standards Program (CLASP) or the Global Health Council (GHC), 
that are both looking towards newly revamped websites to facilitate this engagement.  A few 
stand out in this regard, such as IPM which has an accessible partnership database for 
continued online collaboration and learning processes.  Another example is IAVI’s 
encouraging its research managers to collaborate across projects.  Many directors 
acknowledged the weaknesses here, but often they felt they were overly time/ resource 
constrained to do more.  In terms of partner workings, many of the directors noted that when it 
came to fulfilling partner operations, it generally came down to relying on “the usual suspects” 
or those that have contributed in the past.  
It is worth briefly returning to the dimension PPP best practices, as even the best 
management struggled and a notable number of PPPs admitted they fell behind on this.  
According to one Director: “That is a great question, and I admit we could do much better 
here, but the staff and time resources always reign paramount” (MM Interview15).  This 
constraint is often expressed, as PPP directors prefer to be active, in many respects in efforts 
to satisfy donor requests, so PPP learning and improvement fall behind.  As the WRI’s 
director summated: “We made the decision a long time ago to be a “Do” tank rather than a 
“Think” tank, so admittedly some of these other pieces fall behind (MM Interview37).  
Despite the repeated mantra that PPPs believe they distinguish themselves from the 
private sector as they embody “collaboration not competition,” actual collaboration amongst 
PPPs is notably lagging.  Even those that regularly engage with other PPPs or similar, 
sectoral-based organisations do little to capture and disseminate learning within the 
organisation.  If it is done, it is generally at the onset of the partnership; for example when 
IPM began, its CEO Zeda Rosenburg went to the other PDPs and “literally sat at their feet, 
begging for the lessons of what worked, and more importantly what failed” (MM 
186 
 
Interview19).  Many other PPPs expressed similar motivations for the partnership onset, but 
once it came to the operations, sentiments were more diverging.   
This is an area, however, that many donors and funders are constantly pushing – and 
often facilitating (FSG Social Impact Advisors 2007; Grace and Druce 2009).   The Gates 
Foundation hosts initiatives promoting “matrix collaboration” across PDPs, where 
VPs/Directors of various functional areas are set to engage in timely conference calls or 
meetings.  Many PPPs feel this is too much and ends up being a distraction from the main 
partnership work; quite a few expressed that the constant push to collaborate and share has 
reached an extent beyond that deemed desirable.  Especially amongst PDPs, much of this was 
already going on in an informal basis, so many expressed that it did not need to be mandated 
by another body.  However, while sharing may have been ongoing, what is admittedly not 
occurring is any capturing or documenting of these lessons and practices.  The majority of 
PPP directors across all fields admitted the risk in this; they know that key lessons will leave 
with the current staff, but given the multitude of pressures and constraints, they do not want –
or feel they cannot - prioritise now.   
 
Target and performance management: 
A major focus of studies and evaluations, the area of Targets and Performance is 
separated into two distinct pieces: Target and goal setting for the PPP itself and performance 
tracking and review of the PPP operations.  While it is perhaps not surprising that independent 
partnerships are better managed than hosted ones, what is striking is hosted PPPs struggle 
most in target management, especially as the need to better articulate goals and track progress 
is constantly stressed in IGO and other funded reviews and evaluations (OED 2004; Caines et 
al. 2004).  Drawing this out, it is not the performance metrics and tracking which are the 
biggest issue, many hosted PPPs do fairly well here, rather it is the target and goal setting 
process itself (Figure 6.10).   
Hosted PPPs, especially those in government or UN organisations, tend to lack long 
term planning or tracking.  This is even the case for PPPs that have been in existence for 
several years, while others which are younger consider themselves too much in the “early 
initiative” stage, so they feel it is still difficult to explicitly say what success will look like.  
There is a clear disconnect between PPPs that are forced to articulate this in business plans by 
donors or hosts versus those that are not, but mandated targets by donors are often just as 
much of a hindrance for PPP directors, especially those who feel these conflict with each 
other.   
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Figure 6.10: Management scores across target dimensions 
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The divergence across PPPs is striking.  One government-hosted PPP director frankly 
commented in response to setting goals: “This is very hard – you mean against which we 
could measure progress? This isn’t very realistic” (MM Interview33).  The contrast is 
particularly stark compared to the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative (DNDI), where one 
of its directors Rob Don referred to the “Bible” on his desk, which includes a well-articulated 
3-5 year strategic plan, annual business plan and shorter-term project based targets, all with 
well articulated metrics that cascade and feed into each other (MM Interview1).  The majority 
of PPPs operate with one to two year business plans and three to five year strategic plans.  The 
latter while rarer are also more qualitative and can have little to no governing body or donor 
influence; this also means that partnerships can exhibit  disconnects between operating goals 
and strategic objectives.  This is expressed by the e8 as a desire to keep things flexible, given 
the constant changes (MM Interview41), a sentiment articulated by many.  There is an 
exhibited range in terms of focus and difficulty of the goals.  Over half of those interviewed 
expressed the overriding goals as bringing in more funding, adding new members or 
publishing a new business or operating plan.  Indeed, for these PPPs, the majority of staff time 
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and resource is spent dedicated to these operational goals, regardless of the longer term or 
strategic-minded focuses.   
Also revealing is the lack of push or “target stretch,” especially within hosted 
partnerships.  Of course these dimensions are highly correlated with each other, as 
partnerships which fail to clearly articulate goals and targets will obviously not consider goals 
demanding.  However, that so many partnerships, even those deemed fairly effective by 
external evaluations, do not believe their targets to be demanding is surprising.  What also 
emerges is the confusion between being busy versus being pushed and/or stretched.  While 
PPP directors, staff and partners on the ground can be functioning and operating, and a few 
expressed the quite hurried nature of the work, they often could not link any of their current 
work towards longer term partnership goals.  The farther down the organisation one goes, the 
more this became evident.  As one PPP manager expressed, “I am sure the partners on the 
ground are busy every day, but I doubt they would consider their work demanding, nor are 
they really understanding how what they are doing links into the PPP’s goals overall” (PPP 
Stakeholder InterviewQ).   
The other set of dimensions relates to performance management, the setting, 
tracking, reviewing and follow up of partnership performance targets.  One overriding finding 
is that contrary to the often-expressed scepticism, PPP directors rarely felt being pushed by the 
private-based partners as to what goals or targets to set.  Most influence in this respect came 
from the board, depending on how activist the governing body was.  Donors and funders 
tended to have more influence regarding what indicators or metrics should be tracked, 
especially as more funding becomes tied to projects (specified activities/work) rather than core 
(general funding the PPP can allocate as it wishes).  While donors often think they are helping 
by providing metrics, it can become a heavy burden when PPPs have to report on many 
diverging indicators to satisfy varying needs.   
Holding and managing performance dialogues, or discussing performance, is the 
uniformly lowest scoring dimension across PPPs.  This can be considered the third step of 
performance management: 1) tracking of goals, 2) reviewing performance and 3) discussing 
the results.  Most partnerships failed to hold constructive reviews, and even the better 
managed partnerships, which had clear goals, articulated metrics and a process of collecting 
timely updates, fell behind here.  PPP directors often noted they did the review themselves and 
there were not scheduled review times or systems to go over the partner or project-based 
metrics sent to the CP, outside of annual or biannual board meetings which most PPPs had.  
As Lilly’s MDR-TB director Patricia Carlevaro; noted, “We can be out there doing or we can 
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be in here documenting and discussing.  We prefer to be out there” (MM Interview13).  This is 
an area worth considering, as so much emphasis is placed on the need for better and timelier 
metrics by donors, evaluators and practitioners, but these will not add value if constructive 
dialogues and reviews, involving all relevant staff, are not held within the PPP.  As 
performance management is an iterative process (Figure 6.11), weaknesses in the dialogue 
and review mean PPPs rarely adequately follow through appropriately when metrics are not 
met; thus consequence management is notably weak in many PPPs. 
Figure 6.11: Performance management system 
 
People management: 
 When it comes to their people, PPPs are relatively well managed, especially compared 
to government organisations, but probing deeper reveals some underlying issues.  The biggest 
divergence between hosted and independent PPPs relates to staff evaluation and review 
systems, as these were often absent in the hosted partnerships where there were little or no 
performance-based reviews or rewards.  A few PPPs that relied on the host’s systems did well 
here, but usually for these PPPs staff was not fully dedicated to the PPP (their roles were split 
between the PPP and other roles within the host organisation).  It is easy to see how this leads 
to a lack of commitment and perhaps accountability as well as possibly less incentive to drive 
the PPP’s work forward. 
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 A few of the independent PPPs have employee systems in place that would rival those 
of the best performing private sector organisations, including staff/manager goal and target 
setting, individual targets and accountability, and annual (or more frequent) reviews in place.  
Interestingly, this is a system that evolved and grew over time in these PPPs, and one that 
many PPPs are currently developing.  IPM, for instance, recently hired a new Vice President 
of Human Resources (HR) whose role is not to function as an administrative HR, but rather to 
develop these staff and talent management systems.  The GHC and the Global Vaccine 
Enterprise, among others, are also working towards developing new systems for this.  The 
GHC’s director, however, noted that this ran against the standard mentality of the organisation 
and there will be some staff who do not want to see this (MM Interview3).  PPPs that did a 
form of staff survey or study (even informally) all expressed that staff expressed their desire to 
have a more involved individual management system.
142
  The lack of attention here stems 
from many factors.  One is a claimed lack of resources in staff time; however, while this 
reason is often expressed, better managed partnerships prioritised this, as they understood the 
significance of developing and incentivising their staff. 
   
Perception versus reality  
Given how significant partnership management is, and that many best practice 
guidelines are available, why have more partnership managers not committed to improving 
management?  There are many possible explanations and cited constraints, espeically the lack 
of physical and personnel resources.  There is another overriding factor, though, which is a 
prevailing disconnect in most of these institutions.  Many directors have a relatively poor 
perception of the actual management functioning in their organisations.  At the end of the 
interview, partnership managers were asked to self-assess the management of their own 
institution on a scale of one to ten,
143
 and to avoid false modesty, they were asked to exclude 
their personal performance from the calculation.  As shown in Figure 6.12, the average PPP 
manager considers his or her own partnership to be above average.  The responses indicate 
that PPP managers are particularly overoptimistic about their management practices.  This 
resonates with other work that shows no correlation between manager perception and 
organisational performance (Bloom and Homkes 2008).  By this measure, PPPs assess 
themselves at an average score of 3.75; this is not only well above the average but also 
                                                 
142 Instilling these talent management systems resonates with best practice across public and private sector 
organisations.  For work on talent/people management see Ichinowski, Prennushi and Shaw (1997) and Black and 
Lynch (2001).  For an overview of incentives employees desire the most see Bury et al. (2008). 
143 Managers were asked, “Excluding yourself, how well managed do you think the rest of the partnership is on a 
scale of one to ten; where ten is best practice and five is average?” 
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uncorrelated with their management score.  Not only does this suggest that the managers are 
not well informed regarding their own management but it also calls into question the multitude 
of reviews and studies which rely on manager self-response and perceptions. 
Figure 6.12: Self-assessed versus assessed management practice score 
 
 
6.4: Explaining differences in management practices 
What drives these differences in management across partnerships?  This work 
identifies a few main factors which seem to drive the majority of these differences: hosted 
status, level of institutionalisation, partnership size, age and resources.  To further probe into 
the results, this work also ran some simple OLS regressions with the dependent variable of the 
partnership management score, which examined several variables thought to be important in 
determining management performance.  While the regression results should be interpreted as 
partial correlations and not as structurally causal, since this work has no mechanism here by 
which to claim causality, the exhibited relationships between PPP management and these other 
drivers are certainly worth exploring.   Interestingly, many of the same factors found to matter 
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for management in both the public and private sectors
144
 also seem to be at play within PPPs.  
The unique structuring of partnerships, however, also draws out additional features which also 
seem to impact the management processes.   
 
6.4.1 Institutional status and structure: 
 Institutional structure or lack thereof is one of the strongest factors affecting 
partnership management.  This resonates strongly with this work’s findings relating to 
institutionalisation and outputs, discussed in the next chapter, and also relates to recent work 
assessing CSD energy-focused partnerships which shows that partnerships will have to be 
institutionalised to some extent before management matters (Szulecki, Pattberg and Biermann 
2010).  Since hosted partnerships significantly underperform independent partnerships across 
all areas of management, this raises the question of whether other factors of institutional 
design also matter.  As mentioned earlier, during the latter half of the interview directors were 
asked about organisational aspects of the partnership.  Pulling in this information as well as 
that independently collected on the PPP’s from the TPD, this section explores factors relating 
to the Centre Point (CP) status and the level of institutionalisation. While legal structure, legal 
status and guiding legal and business documents are also considered, as these are aggregated 
into the level of institutionalisation measure their individual impact was not distinguished.     
The CP of the PPPs can take many varied roles, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
but given the smaller sample size here and for ease of comparison, these are grouped under 
four headings.  While partnerships with a fully functional CHQ outperform all other types 
(Figure 6.13), what also stands out is that partnerships where the CP is independent yet based 
around a staff/ team rather than a full CHQ or secretariat are the worst managed of those 
interviewed, and it is the target/performance management which is the weakest for these PPPs. 
While one should interpret these findings with caution given the small sample size, 
what resonates in this type of PPP is generally a lack of concreteness in goals beyond 
organisational measures (e.g. increase in members or to create a report) or that the goals are 
driven primarily by one main funding body.  On the former, this is frequently heard in 
independent and membership-based PPPs that rely on dues as well as activities of members - 
often acting without coordination - to fulfil their work.  On the latter point, this generally 
means that there is little balance across measures and reporting is only done via informal 
                                                 
144 These coincide with overriding findings the Management practices project identify, mainly institutional 
ownership, the impact of competition, MNC status and presence, organisation size and the skill levels of managers 
and employees as key drivers (Bloom and Van Reenen 2010).   
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reports to the main funder.  What also resonates is that despite the mantra of partnering, 
without an institutionalised – and to an extent independent – CP, coordination across partners 
is minimal.  When it does occur it is not captured or shared across the organisation.  The 
independent, non-CHQ partnerships often also suffer from either a lack of permanence, a 
constant search for funds and the need to please the main funder, OR a continual drive to 
increase membership, as this is a tangible measure of activity. 
 
Figure 6.13: Management score by PPP Centre Point type  
 
These institutional-based factors are aggregated into a level of institutionalisation 
and show that of those interviewed, 48% were scaled as high, 29% medium and 23%.
145
  It is 
perhaps unsurprising that those scaled higher are better managed, and this holds across both 
hosted and independent (Figure 6.14).  The biggest divergence regards target management, 
which is expected given that hosted PPPs make up much of the lower levels.  For partnerships 
with the lowest level of institutionalisation, however, a lack of leadership and the articulation 
of leaders’ roles was the biggest weakness.  What resonates is that in many of these 
partnerships, the lack of strong leadership can be associated with a lack of firm commitment to 
the partnership, and thus management, and often performance, lags.  The leaders in these PPPs 
were often either the sole or one of two or three fulltime committed staff to the PPP, and 
sometimes even the director was less than 100% time allocated!  Often this translated into the 
PPP becoming more of a project that was part of his or her “real” job rather than a career 
(passion) in itself. All of the better managed PPPs that were hosted or scaled as lower levels of 
                                                 
145 This scaling level is introduced in the fourth chapter; see chapter five for the variation across PPPs.   
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institutionalisation were driven by a leader (or in two instances a small team of leaders) with a 
strong vision and a commitment to both strategy and operations.   
Figure 6.14: Management score by PPP level of institutionalisation  
 
There are risks to a PPP being too driven by one leader however, even if this leader 
inspires and propels the PPPs movement.  An interview with the Micronutrient Initiative (MI) 
surmised this sentiment well: “the irrepressible enthusiast and champion… he lives, sleeps, 
breathes it.  His commitment is total, and infectious..” (MM Interview11).  The manager 
admitted the risk of adopting what Charles Handy refers to as “Zeus-type management” 
(Handy 1978), so MI is actively working now to avoid this.  While the leader’s style certainly 
drives part of the organisational culture, less institutionalised partnerships can become solely 
driven by the unique style and expertise and/or preferences of the leader, even if this may 
mean some decisions are not in the best interest of the PPP.  For example, the Global Health 
Council has two operating sites, one in Washington, DC where the majority of its work takes 
place and another in Burlington, VT, as the original director was from there and did not want 
to officially relocate (MM Interview3).  As the PPP grew, the structure, styles and staff 
between these two centers became more difficult to coordinate, something the new director is 
currently grappling with.  Another issue relates to sector-specific leaders who are passionate 
about the partnerships’ work but not engaged in, or completely removed from, the operations.  
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As noted in interviews with both the GVA and IDRI, the director was very science-oriented 
and completely “hands off” from the management and operations of the PPP.  In the case of 
GVA, this meant that the initial structuring and operating of the PPP was a slow process with 
many ad-hoc decisions made as the director was unfamiliar with the operational-based tasks.  
Another overriding risk with these less institutionalised partnerships is that regardless of the 
current leaders’ strength, the PPP can be seen too much as an individual project or passion, 
which means that when the leader leaves the organisation (or loses interest), the partnership 
will end.  As a manager noted regarding succession planning at the Lily MDR TB Partnership, 
“MDR TB will end when Patricia [the director] ends her tenure at Lilly...not the other way 
around” (Stakeholder Interview).  
While the trade off between flexibility and becoming more institutionalised is often 
expressed (Andonova 2006), it seems clear that PPPs with a structured and fully functional 
CP, rather than just a dedicated team or office, are better managed, and this translates across 
all areas of management and performance.  It is worth returning to the distinction between 
hosted and independent, as what is significant is how much of the management gap is 
explained by the lack of institutionalisation and how much by the hosted status itself.  That is, 
do partnerships need independence to implement strong management practices or can hosted, 
more institutionalised PPPs outperform others?   While it is difficult to clearly separate these 
factors, some aspects of being less institutionalised seem to matter regardless of hosted status 
– such as role and possible lack of leadership or an over-reliance on one main funder or body.  
For hosted partnerships, the perceived sense of stability within the host (regardless of 
performance) can translate into little or no long term planning and concrete goal setting.  
Related is the possibility of disconnect, not necessarily between the host’s and partnership’s 
goals (this is not frequently expressed), but in the timeframe or significance of the partnership.  
Being so intertwined with the host can also lead to a lessened sense of accountability.  This 
relates to the other dimension where hosted partnerships performed much worse than the 
independent: consequence management.  That is, hosted partnerships did worse in following 
through on action plans, instilling processes for identifiable consequences should targets or 
goals not be met, and dealing with repeated failures. 
 
6.4.2 Partnership factors and management: Size, staff and age  
Partnership factors also explain some of the differences in management, as interesting 
insights relating to partnership size and structure, staff characteristics and partnership age 
emerge.  It is recognised, however, that many of these relate to the overriding institutional 
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structure.  It is also difficult to fully separate these factors, as one hesitates to include multiple 
explanatory variables in the same regression given the sample size included in this analysis.  
The relationships discussed below are therefore the result of basic correlations only, as this 
work does not attempt to perform multivariable regression or implement multiple controls. 
Size clearly matters.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, larger partnerships, as measured in 
terms of full time working staff, are better managed than those with fewer employees (Figure 
6.15).   This finding resonates with CSD partnership studies, which find larger partnerships 
tend to produce more outputs (Szulecki, Pattberg and Biermann 2010).  The main reason for 
this is that there are certainly fixed costs of instilling good practices, so those larger PPPs 
benefit from economies of scale.  Another explanation often exhibited in the private sector is 
that well managed organisations will grow larger as they become more successful, that is 
management conditions size rather than size conditioning management.  In order to fully test 
this relationship for PPPs, one would have to find the same effect even for PPPs who had no 
ability or incentive to grow, which is difficult to build into this analysis given the sample size 
and variation in partnerships’ mandates.  However, it is assumed that the former effect is more 
at play as it is not clear how many (or which) PPPs have the incentive to grow larger. 
Figure 6.15: PPP size and management 
0-10 years 
old
11-20 years 
old
20+ years 
old
 
 
While this is somewhat related to the fact that hosted partnerships also tend to be 
smaller, the relationship between size and management holds even when considering only 
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independent PPPs.  Larger, independent partnerships are also much better managed than their 
smaller counterparts, and the majority of this difference is driven by larger PPPs 
outperforming in people management.  This pulls in an interesting perspective, as people 
management is the biggest driver between larger and smaller hosted partnerships, though it is 
not the main differentiator between independent and hosted partnerships.  Larger partnerships 
tend to have more capacity to reward and incentivise employees and more actively engage 
staff in promotions and career development prospects, aspects notably lacking in many smaller 
partnerships.  
Another way to consider partnership size is by looking at the number of physical 
branch sites.
146
  Of the PPPs interviewed, approximately 35% had only one branch, 45% had 
between two and ten branches and 20% had more than 10 branches; hosted and independent 
partnerships were split rather equitably across these categories.  What emerges is that the mid-
size PPPs (between two to ten branches) are the best managed, and this holds across both 
independent and hosted PPPs.  
 
Staff and skills: 
While staff size is considered in this analysis, it is a fuzzier concept, as many PPPs 
struggle to numerate their staff.  Varying relationships with branch sites, contractors and other 
relationships inherent to partnerships complicate this even further.  In related management 
studies, the number of skilled managers and workers clearly mattered for organisations across 
sectors to be better managed (Homkes 2011).  Here skills were difficult to assess as the staff 
levels at most PPPs were so low that percentages of staff with degrees would not be 
comparable across PPPs, and the majority of managers in all PPPs’ CP held a degree.  Thus 
the brief remarks below are based on qualitative responses from the interviews rather than 
statistical analysis. 
A minimum capacity of dedicated workers, for whom the partnership is their fulltime 
job, is necessary for management processes to be in place.  This is not always the case, as 
many hosted partnerships have only a few staff members, and often many of these only 
dedicate a percentage of their time to the PPP.  Partnerships with more staff are able to 
functionally divide work and also implement practices not possible in partnerships with few or 
no staff.  The relationship is not straightforward, however, as there are inherent management 
complexities and challenges that growing partnerships face.   
                                                 
146 Branch sites are defined as core operating sites of the PPP, as defined by the PPP director and would not include 
the number of contacts or offices where no operations or PPP core activities took place.   
198 
 
A noted clash of cultures is occurring in many of these PPPs, but this is not 
necessarily between public versus private backgrounds,
147
 which is less frequently mentioned 
as a challenge within PPPs than many believe but rather between the old and the new guard.  
As partnerships grow, new staff members join; a current trend is for many PPPs to hire more 
from the private sector, which is due to factors such as the state of the private-sector job 
market, a growing desire to “do good” by those serving in these institutions and an overall 
trend towards partnering.  These new staff members often come with a “mode of operating” 
that does not always synch with the founders, many of whom cherished the flexible nature of 
the original initiative.  As partnerships evolve from “start up” phase into maturing 
organisations, the roles and responsibilities of staff change, the partnership often begins 
formalising previously ad-hoc processes and new processes are put in place.  How the new 
and growing staff work to implement these changes is a timely and difficult challenge almost 
all of the PPPs interviewed face. 
  
Partnership lifecycle: 
When examining partnership age and management, it is found that while older 
partnerships tend to outperform their younger counterparts, this effect essentially balances and 
then diminishes for partnerships over twenty years old.
148
  This difference in management 
score is not statistically significant, which is unsurprising given the complex nature of 
partnership age and maturing and the many compounding factors at play.  Across all PPPs, the 
area of partner/ operational management is the weakest for youngest partnerships.  Many of 
these are still struggling to articulate roles and responsibilities for partners, have few systems 
in place for partners to work together and share resources, and have weak, or no, practices 
ensuring continuous improvement.  Interestingly it is the older hosted PPPs who are better 
managed, but any noticeable disparity in management disappears when examining only 
independent partnerships. 
The midsize partnerships, while slightly better managed than the others, exhibit very 
divergent management scores, as is to be expected given the difficulties of a maturity 
transformation.  As partnerships grow, they can expand their original goals or targets, such as 
                                                 
147 From the interviews, what emerges is that this public or private bias, while less mentioned in terms of partners 
and power, is frequently mentioned regarding staff mentality; however, partnership directors were diverging on 
their related commentary, as they span the gamut from noting there is no difference between public and private 
sectors to several directors commenting very frankly they only look to hire from the private sector given the 
different perspectives on working mentality. 
148 For PPPs interviewed, approximately 45.2% were less than ten years old; 29% were between ten and twenty 
years old and 25.8% were more than 20 years old. 
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the Lily MDR-TB partnership expanding from manufacturing and distributing medicines to 
actually training the nurses on the ground, or IAVI which broadened its focus beyond research 
and development of a vaccine to the entire value chain, from research, development (including 
clinical trials), to advocacy, knowledge and education.  The original PPP leader also changes, 
such as occurred for the GHC and MMV within the interview period time.   
During this growing phase, as PPP goals and targets expand, and staff and leaders 
adjust, the operations are obviously affected – all of which can lead to changes in 
organisational design.  As many PPPs in this mid-phase change from horizontal to hierarchical 
structures or re-distribute functional responsibilities, the ability to deal with these “growing 
pains” is managed differently across institutions.  Dealing with these is not unique to PPPs, 
other organisations face similar hurdles.  Undergoing organisational change, regardless of size 
and sector, is difficult, and research shows that only one-third of all performance 
transformations ultimately succeed (Isern and Pung 2007).  Given the state of rapid 
organisational change PPPs are currently undergoing (over two-thirds of those interviewed 
referenced being in the midst of such processes), it is quite possible that many of the factors 
exhibited will have now adjusted.  
 
6.4.3 Competition and Constraints  
 If effective management and good performance are tightly linked, how do so many 
badly managed partnerships survive? If PPPs could easily improve their performance, one 
would assume they would have done so already, especially if these lessons were so readily 
available and PPPs were able to pull in resources and lessons from their partners and 
networks.  Partnerships certainly face unusual challenges and diverging operating 
environments, but one critical element is the perceived lack of competition.
149
  Economic 
theory suggests that competition ensures the survival of only the best-managed firms 
(organisations) and the elimination of the weak ones: competition thus will spur managers to 
work more effectively and outlast rivals.  Decades of research have also shown that business 
protected by government regulation or private-based firms that do not face competition are 
almost always less productive (Lewis 2004).   
This effect cannot be adequately tested, as most PPPs do not perceive they face any 
real competition.  Directors tend to express that PPPs embody collaboration and not 
competition, but for many this sentiment goes further: many directors noted that not only is 
                                                 
149 Competition is one of the biggest drivers associated with better management in both the private and public 
organisations, based upon related work from which this management methodology is based, but this is difficult to 
assess across PPPs (Bloom and Van Reenen 2007; Homkes 2011).   
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there little or no competition, an unsettling majority articulated that they are the “only ones 
who do what [we] do.”  This is significant as despite these expressed notions, the mapping 
from the TPD, the interviews for this chapter and related work (Widdus 2005; Carlson 2004) 
all suggest otherwise.  There are many PPPs in the same space, in similar functions, 
geographies and fields – often with identical funders and board members. 
 
Management constraints: 
Directors were also asked what aspects were most impacting the management of their 
partnerships;
150
 it emerged that country-level systems and geographic constraints are just as 
much of a constraint for PPP directors as funding (Figure 6.16).  It is interesting that almost 
half of PPP managers expressed that dealing with demanding, unclear or burdensome country 
level systems was a major constraint complicating the management of their partnership and 
slightly over a third expressed that political systems specifically were a major constraint.  
Numerous studies have assessed PPP’s country-specific performance recently (McKinsey 
2005; Biesma et al. 2009), often in a negative light - an issue this work has returned to in most 
chapters given the critical significance of system-wide effects.  The degree to which PPP 
managers were aware of the particulars of their partnerships’ operations and eventual reach 
and country systems must be noted.  However, they often lack the capacity, resources, 
knowledge and often expertise in dealing with these country-level systems.  Ultimately it is 
the uncertainty surrounding developing countries’ changing policies and guidelines that 
managers feel impact them the most, as this translates into delayed projects, which can lead to 
delayed planning, timeframe adjustment and inability to meet shorter-term donor targets.  
It is also striking, but perhaps refreshing, that no PPP identified the technological 
environment and/or access to scientific knowledge as a major constraint, even those PPPs 
focused on narrowly defined science and technology, research or development.  Regarding the 
ability to find and hire staff with the right skills, it is interesting that hosted and independent 
partnerships expressed almost identical sentiments: around 32% expressed that this was a 
major constraint and 46% a minor constraint.  These overriding percentages may mask some 
fundamental underlying differences.  One possible explanation, based upon manager 
responses is characteristics of the job market, as following the global recession of 2008-2009 
there were many more seekers than jobs especially in the US, Europe and UK, and this 
provided PPPs with a high quality talent pool.   
                                                 
150 Questions on constraints asked at the end to prevent biasing previous responses. 
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Beyond manager perceptions of constraints, this work also performed regressions of 
the responses from the constraints questions against the PPP’s managerial score.151  While the 
relationship is not statistically significant, there is a slight effect where in partnerships that feel 
constrained are better managed than those that feel no or only minor constraints.
152
  There are 
a few possible explanations for this.  Well- managed PPPs may be more likely to strive for 
improvement so felt more constrained on average.  As the overall results were rather weak, 
this is not probed further. 
A rather robust finding, however, is that those PPPs that identified economic 
constraints (as distinguished from funding and donors specifically) have significantly better 
scores (Figure 6.17), and this holds across both hosted and independent partnerships.  While 
these results cannot imply causality, there are certainly a few plausible factors at play.  
Partnership managers not under economic pressure may not be incentivised or pushed to 
implement more efficient and effective management processes.  Another hypothesis is that 
managers more in tune with the overriding economic environment, and how this will impact 
their partnerships’ operations and performance, have made the necessary improvements in 
their own management infrastructure.  This is certainly an area worth probing in future 
work.
153
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
151 A major obstacle is categorized as “2”, a minor as a “1” and no obstacle as a zero.  This is arbitrary, but similar 
results were obtained using more sophisticated techniques. 
152 This is not a trivial result, as recent work on manufacturing firms shows that well-managed firms are less likely 
to be constrained (Homkes 2011). 
153 Examining these other constraints against partnership-specific management showed interesting coefficients, 
these did not prove robust to changing the regression specification. 
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Figure 6.16 Perception of constraints impacting management 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.17 Management performance score by severity of economic constraints
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Funding and physical resources: 
It is often said, and even more commonly assumed, that partnerships with more 
resources will be better performers,
 154
 yet while a sufficient funding and resource base is 
necessary for PPPs to survive, more resourced partnerships are not always better managed.  
Many hosted PPPs actually had a fairly consistent funding stream, and while this provides a 
sense of security for current or near-term PPP operations, it also translates into factors that 
may negatively impact management.  One overriding finding is how dedicated host funding 
can impact target management, as it can lead to lessened goal setting beyond the current 
funding cycle.  This mentality also leads to a lack of long term evaluations or impact studies.  
Dedicated or consistent funding can also generally mean relying on a sole donor or core 
funder (often, but not always, the host organisation), which means PPP mangers are often 
conflicted between managing the partnership as an institution and managing the partnership as 
a project fulfilling more host-specific aims.   
 One can also examine whether it is the perception of funding constraint (rather than 
overall level of resources) which impacts management.  This is considered using information 
from the manager constraints questions.  While regressing average partnership management 
score against perceived funding constraints shows no correlation, a significant finding 
emerges when considering status of PPPs.  At least among hosted PPPs, funding constraints 
seem correlated with better overall management.  Further, certain areas of management were 
more or less affected by this perceived constraint. Excluding Eli Lilly, it also appears that 
funding constraints correlate with significantly higher operational scores for hosted PPPs. 
While the same relationship holds for independent PPPs, the coefficient is smaller and not 
significant.    
For hosted PPPs there is also a positive correlation between target management and 
perceived funding constraints, but this is slightly less significant than that for operations.  
There is no correlation between target management and funding constraints for independent 
PPPs.    Hosted PPPs that perceive funding to be a major constraint are better managed than 
those that perceive no constraints on funding.  This echoes our earlier discussion: partnerships 
that are not incentivized to show performance, attract donors or funders or plan beyond 
funding cycles are not as well managed as others.  That the link with operations management 
is even stronger is also interesting, as it means that these more constrained partnerships do 
                                                 
154 It must be noted this is an issue given that this management survey occurred in the midst and immediately 
following the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009, which impacted donors and funders from both sectors during 
this timeframe.  While this will be reflected in resource levels (from outputs) the ability to manage a resource 
strategy is the aspect discussed in this chapter.    
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much better at aspects of partner management, partner collaboration and continuous 
improvement.   
 
6.5: Governance, autonomy and other findings 
 Organisational aspects, mainly related to governance and decision making, PPP 
characteristics and the nature of the executive and management bodies are also considered.  
This information is combined with that in TPD-Outputs to study the possible relationships 
between partnership governance, autonomy and decision making on the one hand with 
partnership management on the other. 
 
6.5.1 Partnership autonomy 
This work assessed the relative autonomy of the PPP and PPP managers across two 
levels: a) autonomy from host or funders and b) within the PPP entity, i.e. where within the 
partnership decision making took place.  A set of eight questions grouped in four areas were 
asked: strategic changes, operational changes, staffing decision and budget decisions.  These 
were then aggregated into an overall autonomy score for the partnerships (see AppendixH), 
whereas the higher the number on a one to five scale, the more autonomous the partnership.   
 As expected, independent partnerships are much more autonomous than those that are 
hosted across all four dimensions considered (Table 6.3).  For independent partnerships, the 
PPP entity makes the majority of all decisions relating to operations and staffing, but the main 
partners/funders have more of a say in strategic elements.  Internally, these independent PPPs 
are relatively autonomous when it comes to operational decisions and staffing, but there is a 
greater extent of board involvement in strategic elements and budgeting.  For hosted PPPs, 
while the entity retains most of the decision making ability regarding staffing, they rely almost 
completely on the host for all strategic and budgeting/funding decisions.  Across both types of 
partnerships, the higher the level of institutionalisation, the greater the degree of autonomy the 
PPP entity and PPP operations team both have.   Older partnerships also tend to be much more 
autonomous than their younger counterparts. 
 What is of greater interest is if there is a relationship between PPP/ manager 
autonomy and PPP-specific management, especially as in related works, organisations that 
gave their managers more autonomy are much better managed and also better performers.
155
  
While more autonomous partnerships are much better managed, the difficulty with 
                                                 
155 For more on organisational design, autonomy and management practices, especially as this relates to 
performance, see Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen 2009.   
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partnership-specific analysis is that the disparity between independent and hosted autonomy is 
so great, that it is difficult to tease out specific factors related only to autonomy. 
 
Table 6.3 Partnership autonomy specifications and scores 
 
  
All 
PPPs 
Independ
-ent PPPs 
Hosted 
PPPs 
How would the decision to institute a strategic 
change / shift take place?    4.46 4.71 3.71 
To the extent that the PPP entity decides over the 
above, who within the PPP makes that decision? 2.67 3 1.71 
How would the decision to change / expand 
current operations or programs?   4.53 5 3.28 
To the extent that the PPP entity decides over the 
above, who within the PPP makes that decision? 3.72 4.1 2.5 
How would decisions about key staffing 
decisions take place?   4.4 5 2.5 
To the extent that the PPP entity decides over the 
above, who within the PPP makes that decision? 3.83 4.15 2.25 
How would decisions regarding funding and 
budget decisions take place?   4.27 5 1.83 
To the extent that the PPP entity decides over the 
above, who within the PPP makes that decision? 3.1 3.17 2.5 
 
 
 
 
6.5.2 Governance and decision making structures 
Types of governance forums were grouped into broader categories of Board, 
Committee, Council or Other, and while overall those with a board of directors are still better 
managed, when implementing a control for hosted/independent this relationship largely 
disappears.  One resounding finding is that those PPPs governed by a board of directors 
(rather than any other governing forums) have higher total management scores; this holds 
across both hosted and independent PPPs (Figure 6.18).   
PPPs with a board of directors also have much higher autonomy scores than others, 
and this holds across both independent and hosted PPPs.  This relationship of type of main 
governance forum to autonomy remains strong even with the second specification, but here 
there is a more nuanced finding.  The main story emerging is that while governance forum 
does not relate too strongly to autonomy for independent PPPs, hosted PPPs that have a Board 
of Directors will be significantly more autonomous than those that rely on committees, 
councils or more informal governance forums. 
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Governing bodies: 
This work also considers the number of governing bodies in place.  For example, 
many research-based partnerships will have a board of governors (focused on strategic issues) 
and a technical advisory committee (focused solely science, research or technological aspects).  
Other PPPs may have a board and an executive council or specifically-focused advisory 
committee.  Across the PPPs interviewed, 71% of the hosted PPPs had only one body, 14% 
two, and only one (CGIAR), had more than three bodies with four total.  Of the independent, 
32% had one layer, 53% had two, and 16% had three bodies.   
 
Figre 6.18: Management performance score by government forum 
 
 
What emerges from this basic analysis is that the number of governing bodies is 
significantly correlated to overall management score.
156
  Regressing PPP average management 
score on number of bodies show a highly significant and strong correlation.
157
  While this 
relationship holds across both hosted and independent PPPs, it is difficult to go much farther 
as the majority of the hosted PPPs had only one main governance body.   
 
Decision making split 
Regarding sectoral split, a slight majority (51.62%) of the interviewed PPPs had tri-
sectoral decision making.
158
  Though for hosted PPPs only one-third had a tri-sectoral split on 
the main forum while approximately 60% of the independent PPPs did.  Regressing decision 
making split against management, PPPs that have tri-sectoral decision making are much better 
                                                 
156 CGIAR is excluded from this analysis given it was an outlier with four layers.   
157 The regression coefficient is .46 and significant at the 5% level.  
158 By definition all sampling frame PPPs have a tri-sectoral partner base. 
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managed than those that are not.  While this does not imply causality, the relationship 
represents an interesting finding, though as a note, other categories had too few PPPs to 
regress separately.  A few further regressions are run to test if this relationship is simply the 
result of correlation between tri-sector decision making and hosted status.  Further tests 
showed that while hosted PPPs are less likely to have tri-sectoral decision making, this is not 
significant.  Another regression looked at management against both tri- sectoral decision 
making and being hosted, and while the tri-sector decision-making coefficient is less 
significant, it still had the appropriate sign (the lower significance is likely due to the loss of 
degrees of freedom and small sample size).  These results further suggest that tri-sectoral split 
is correlated to better management, independent of host status.  While decision-making split is 
strongly correlated with greater levels of autonomy for hosted PPPs, the sectoral split of the 
governing decision makers does not seem to have a significant effect on the autonomy scores 
for independent PPPs.   
 
6.5.3 Other findings  
The nature and depth of these interviews allowed for many additional factors of 
partnership-based variation to be considered.  While these proved interesting, however, either 
the sample size of PPPs was too low or the correlations were not significant enough to draw 
anything more than initial insights.  
While it may be assumed that partnerships that have been subject to evaluation may 
be better managed, this is not clearly demonstrated here.  While PPPs with at least one 
evaluation in the past three years were better managed, there is no significant relationship 
between evaluation and management.  However, if one considers only independent PPPs, 
there is a more evident relationship between number of evaluations and management score.  
This is likely due to the smaller sample of hosted PPPs and the fact that half of these PPPs had 
been evaluated at least once.  No hosted PPPs reported having more than one evaluation.
159
   
From a qualitative perspective, one overriding factor resonating from the PPPs was 
the varied degree of significance afforded to the results of these evaluations within the 
partnership.  Those that had actionable, non conflicting and clear recommendations were more 
likely to be taken up than others, and some directors even went as far as to not publish results 
                                                 
159 The information on evaluations is taken from the interviews rather than TPD-Outputs, as some PPPs had 
undergone an evaluation that was not publically available, no longer posted on the website or never publically 
released.  To be considered within this, however, the PPP manager had to report an official, independent 
evaluation.  No PPP manager reported an evaluation they were not willing to send, with the exception of DNDI 
who commissioned an evaluation yet determined not to release it and two other partnerships who noted the 
evaluation findings were available only to members. 
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if they felt it did not resonate with the partnership.   CGIAR is an example of a PPP which has 
been under numerous evaluations and commissioned reviews, but these were often considered 
by some to be “fragmented, conflicting and confusing” (MM Interview39); thus, little change 
occurred.  Only in 2010 did a leader within it note he felt that there would be actual, value-
added changes made, as for the first time the process was streamlined, centers were actively 
involved and recommendations were clear to all involved.   
 Finally, at the end of the interview, partnership directors were also asked in 
summation whether they felt that trends promoting global partnerships to solve global 
problems was getting easier, more difficult or staying around the same.  As shown in Figure 
6.19, the majority of PPP directors were optimistic about the future of the partnering 
environment.  Hosted PPP directors were much more optimistic, as all noted it was getting 
better or at least staying the same.  A disconnect emerged however tied to sector areas rather 
than institutional variables.  Partnerships focused on energy, renewable energy and/or 
resources, felt the environment was improving given the heightened attention, significance and 
resultant donor dollars going into these fields.  Similar sentiments were expressed by the 
directors of sustainability and climate-related PPPs, one who noted that “there is increasing 
global unhappiness with current climate and a look towards solutions such as ours,” as “all the 
relevant parties (public, private and social) need to be at the table or progress will never be 
made” (MM Interview23).  As another director summarised, “While the environment is more 
pushing and dialogue tougher; there are more roads to Rome now: partnerships are the 
continued way forward (MM Interview47)." 
On the other hand, though many of the PDPs have been evaluated as relatively 
effective (Moran et al. 2005), it was these directors who were more sceptical about the future 
of global partnering.  As Zeda Rosenberg, CEO of IPM noted, “This is driven by economic 
factors, though.... the PPPs themselves are doing their job, doing it really well... We’ve got 
drugs in the pipeline that would otherwise never have been there...But how do you maintain 
funding if ministries of development are in such a tough climate – we cannot get the needed 
political support (MM Interview19).”  Another frequently expressed sentiment related to the 
economic conditions of 2008-2010, as this was affecting the amount of donor funds available 
and even the private sector partners’ interest in partnering (MM Interview16). The majority of 
the independent partnerships, however, felt that while the partnering environment was getting 
more favourable, PPPs were no longer considered a new idea or passing fad.  Almost all 
acknowledged the ever-growing pressure to deliver.  
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Figure 6.19: PPP directors assessment of global partnering situation  
 
 
 
6.6 Key findings, implications and conclusions  
This chapter has explored the management practices of the global partnerships and 
made significant inroads into measuring and comparing management within and across global 
PPPs.  While many studies have examined PPPs on an individual basis, or suggested guides 
and toolkits for best practice, few works are guided by a systematic methodology, especially 
one applicable across partnerships.  Moving forward, the management methodology presented 
here stands to contribute as it allows for a comprehensive assessment, replicable across types 
of PPPs as well as within PPPs across time, regardless of sector, function or host. 
While there is variation across the PPPs, trends still emerge.  Independent partnerships 
are much better managed than hosted, and most of this difference is due to the hosted PPPs’ 
weakness in target management.  There is also an evidenced disconnect between goals, 
timeframes and accountability, all issues that could be impacting partnerships performance.   
From a global perspective, several key drivers of management quality have been 
demonstrated to matter across organisations, and many of these are evident in the PPP data.  
Although one should be careful of over-interpreting these correlations, these findings suggest 
that levels of institutionalisation, independence, timeframe, governance and partnership 
leadership all clearly matter in explaining some of the differences in management practices 
across PPPs.  When considering these institutional variables, those that are more 
institutionalised, regardless of hosted or independent status, are better managed, perform 
better across all dimensions, plan clearly for the future with concrete goals and set milestones, 
and hence can better motivate their staff to further innovate and improve.   Better managed 
partnerships also employed more full time staff who had higher levels of engagement with the 
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partnership work – both strategically and operationally.  Governance and decision making 
structures, and the representative voices represented on these bodies, also seem to play a role.   
What also emerges from this work is the lack of partner engagement within these 
institutions: despite the continued emphasis on partnerships and partnering, the majority of the 
actual workings of these institutions came from the coordination and direction of the staff.  
These are significant issues, which obviously affect not only our normative understanding of 
partnerships but empirical approaches to assessing them; concerns which will be returned to in 
this work’s concluding chapter.   
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CHAPTER 7: 
Partnership performance and effects: Analysing partnership outputs 
 
While the partnership rhetoric may be firmly recognized within the global problem-
solving dialogue, a consensus that public-private partnerships are effective at meeting and 
addressing these challenging global issues is far from established.  Considerable attention is 
increasingly turning to the external effects of partnerships, especially in the areas of 
sustainable development (Hale and Mauzerall 2004; Andonova and Levy 2003) and health 
(Caines 2005).  Yet, despite this growing focus on partnership effects (Van Tulder and 
Fortanier 2009), less effort has focused on explaining and quantifying the effects of global 
partnerships at large.  Yet if partnerships are to live up to their promise that they are “greater 
than the sum of its parts and about creating lasting and meaningful impact at all levels of 
action” (Global Knowledge Partnership Secretariat 2008) than evidence which transcends 
individual partnerships is needed.    
This work makes substantial inroads in tackling this challenge directly, and the focus 
in this chapter turns to presenting and analysing these tracked effects.  Combined this work’s 
Transnational Partnership Database (TPD) and two sub databases: TPD-Goals and TPD-
Outputs (these latter two are more detailed than the TPD but limited to the sampling frame 
of approximately 150 ITPs) represent the first and only works which collect, track and 
analyse mission and goals set (Goals) and comparable organisational outputs (Outputs) 
across global PPPs.  Information and data comes primarily from this work’s comprehensive 
databases, but the findings and analysis of the study are complemented with discussion based 
on this work’s fifty PPP management interviews (MM).160   
 This chapter first briefly reintroduces the evaluation framework and the sampling 
frame of ITPs
161
 that undergo detailed analysis.  The subsequent section reviews the goals 
and targets set by these transnational PPPs, especially as to how they are defined along the 
lines of outputs, outcomes and impacts.  The following sections explore PPPs roles towards 
problem solving by reviewing and analysing findings from the output analysis.  The next 
section returns to the question of evaluation by detailing the existing attempts of PPPs 
towards both internal and external performance review and evaluation while the final section 
provides summary remarks. 
                                                 
160 These interviews were a valuable source of information, providing additional perspectives on these findings, but 
this work takes care to limit any discussion based on this information to chapter subparts in so the quantitative, 
effect-focused results are presented  first without muddling the two.  
161 For the remainder of this chapter, all analysis and percentages are given so for the sampling frame, unless 
otherwise stated.   
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7.1  Evaluation Framework and Partnerships of Focus  
As explained, this work introduces and utilises a framework to guide the systematic 
comparison and evaluation of global PPPs.  Frameworks are useful tools to guide the 
analytical process itself, and they also enhance the understanding of the findings for a larger 
stakeholder community.   While consensus on the level of detail or even the necessity of 
applying a common framework will not be reached, this work applies a developed framework 
that is purposely simultaneously broad enough to be relevant across the universe of global 
PPPs while still capturing the relevant components to guide meaningful analysis.    
 
7.1.1 Framework components  
 Given the subjective nature of many aspects of partnership analysis, the often lacking 
and rather disjointed nature of the information available, and varying perspectives on where 
certain aspects of partnership characteristics and activities fall within the framework’s 
categories,
162
 the relationship between inputs, processes and effects will often be blurred. As 
mentioned when the framework was introduced, though these aspects are presented in this 
sequenced order, the flow from inputs to processes to effects should not be seen as a stepped 
succession but rather a relationship – a continual process of feedback loops, which continually 
reinforce and work with (or against) the other aspects (Figure 7.1).   
Figure 7.1 Evaluation Framework Overview 
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162 As examples, resources, governance and decision making could arguably fall into either inputs or outputs, as 
could the activities associated with them.  Throughout this chapter, attempts are made to clarify when aspects cut 
across components.   
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The focus of this chapter is the latter elements, effects.   This work analyses the notion 
of partnership effects, which can be operationalised, rather than the more subjective notion of 
effectiveness and further segments this component into partnership effects of goal attainment 
and problem solving (Figure 7.2).  The first aspect involves the goals PPPs have set out for 
themselves, and this work produces the TPD- Goals database, which tracks mission, visions 
and goals set as well as their segmentation (output, outcome or impact focused).  The second 
component considers effectiveness as problem solving, which this work operationalises into 
effects segmented into outputs, outcomes and impacts.  For reasons articulated in previous 
chapters, the majority of the focus is limited to outputs.  Outputs are further distinguished into 
organisational outputs and performance outputs, the former of which are tracked in this work’s 
TPD-Outputs.  Organisational outputs are those tangible effects partnerships produce as 
institutions – regardless of the functional or sectoral focus of the PPP.   
Figure 7.2: Effectiveness segmentation  
 
 
7.1.2 Sampling frame PPPs  
 While much of the attributes of the universe of PPPs are presented in the fifth chapter, 
the focus turns to the sampling frame of Institutionalised, Transnational Partnerships (ITPs)
163
 
and an analysis of partnership effects.  What is a critical, and a distinguishing feature of this 
work, is that the sampling frame is not chosen due to its sectoral focus, main function or key 
actor(s) involved.  As instantly becomes clear, it is also not selected due to ease of availability 
of information or public awareness of the initiative.  Instead, these ITPs are all initiatives 
within the defined universe of PPPs with a tri-sectoral actor base, transnational scope and 
                                                 
163 Tri- sectoral transnational partnerships are defined as being 1) tri-sectoral, in that they engage at least one actor 
from the public, private and social sector, 2) transnational, in that their operations span more than one country and 
the actors involved join across several countries or regions, and 3) focused on a global public policy goal.    
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global policy goal.  Of the universe of approximately 750 defined global PPPs, this sampling 
frame includes 220 PPPs,
164
 148 of which are operational as of December 2010.
165
  Purposely 
narrowing the sampling frame, this allows a deep probe into multiple areas of PPPs that share 
these global-based characteristics.  Before considering PPP effects, it is useful to understand 
what comprises this group (See Table 7.1 for summary statistics).   As per the framework, this 
involves considering focus (scope, function and sectoral coverage), attributes (age, location, 
organisational) and institutional design and level of institutionalisation.  As introduced in 
chapter five, the functional breakdown of the ITPs of focus roughly mirrors that of the 
universe overall, as per Figure 7.3 below.  
Figure 7.3 Functional breakdown, Sampling Frame   
 
Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011 
 
 The final descriptive area is governance and decision making (GDM) variables.  
These challenge the framework to some extent, as the related variables fall across it: inputs as 
the characteristics of the structures and systems; processes as to the practices and activities 
that take place within the PPP and outputs in that the partnership produces a structured, 
transparent, accountable and effective governance system.   
                                                 
164 During the final TPD updating process, as PPPs changed status and codes and more information was uncovered, 
it was discovered that 177 (operational) PPPs should fall within the sampling frame; however, the analysis here is 
limited to the original 147 PPPs as of 31 March 2011. 
165 For purposes of the discussion on outputs, only the operational PPPs are analysed as not enough information is 
available on those not operating to lead any meaningful discussion. 
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Table 7.1: Characteristics of Sampling Frame  
Area  Characteristics of Sampling Frame  
Scope Global by definition 
Function See Figure 7.3 
 
Launch date/ age Majority launched between 2000-2004 
Organisational Average 3 operational sites; approx 70% 
have staff in place at the CP, average 
being 26 FTEs 
Location  90% based in OECD country 
Sectoral base Tri-sectoral by definition 
Status 55% are hosted, mainly within the UN 
Scale of 
institutionalisation 
26.5% are scaled high; 39.5% medium 
and 34% low  
 
Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011 
 
7.2: Partnership goals: Analysing PPPs’ objectives  
A challenging, ambitious and perhaps daunting global array of problems faces these 
global PPPs; however, with their flexible natures and unique ability to bring together various 
actors and expertise, this is an agenda that many claim global partnerships are most ready to 
tackle.  Still, not only does the nature and focus of these aims vary greatly across partnerships, 
but so does their level of ambition.  The PPPs included within the TPD all aim for the 
provision of collective goods, many in areas of limited statehood (Risse and Lehmkuhl 2006), 
but there is marked diversity across these partnerships, especially as to clarity, focus, scale and 
intensity of the aims.   
The ability to achieve goals and meet objectives continues to be a pressing topic of 
concern in partnership evaluations and the wider partnership dialogue. While obviously a 
critical focus of PPP evaluation – and even more so a focus of funders– to assess progress 
made towards these goals requires first understanding what the PPPs set out to achieve.  
Despite the repeated mantra that global partnerships address problems individual actors cannot 
tackle alone (Reinicke and Deng 2000), few works specifically address this fundamental piece 
on a partnership-by-partnership basis. 
Further, while the majority of reviews speak towards the necessity of assessing and 
considering outputs, outcomes and impacts (OED 2002; Lele et al. 2004), PPPs are not always 
strong in articulating how their goals vary along these lines.  Some donors or agencies require 
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that PPPs do so; for example, all that employ Operations Evaluation Department (OED)
166
 
criteria articulate across the three, yet reviews admit that these are still relatively new ideas for 
many PPPs (OED 2004), and most non OED-based evaluations also do not analyse goals 
across these segmentations.  More fundamentally, few works take the necessary first step of 
assessing what objectives are set.  The emerging body of World Bank evaluations based in its 
Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), health partnership reviews and case studies (Vollmer 
2009)
167
 are exceptions, but these are limited to specific sets of partnerships (see, for example, 
Liese and Beisheim 2011)  
Thus while no work attempts to systematically understand how goals set and articulated 
vary across PPPs, partnership research and evaluation is missing a critical link.  Such analysis 
is needed to understand how the missions, goals and objectives set relate to the issues at hand.  
It also moves dialogue forward from an established rhetoric that PPPs strive towards global 
goods provision (Benner, Reinicke and Witte 2002; Haas 2004) and are results-oriented 
(Malena 2004) to assessing what PPPs are actually setting out to do.  Establishing, or even 
speaking towards, global partnerships’ ability to meet objectives set obviously depends on the 
sound understanding of what these goals are and how they vary.  By exploring how PPPs 
articulate their objectives, this work carries out systematic study of PPPs’ visions, mission and 
goals, which involves analysing both the articulated visions and missions and also detailing 
goals set and their segmentation into outputs, outcomes and/or impacts.  While there is often 
no clear distinction, for most partnerships a focus can be distinguished, and many attempt 
towards all three.   
 
7.2.1 Vision and Mission statements: Aims of global PPPs 
Forward-looking, meaningful, inspiring – all of these characteristics are said to 
encapsulate effective vision statements, in both the private and public sector.  In general, the 
vision should communicate what the partnership is attempting to achieve, its purpose or 
reason for being.  Especially considering global partnerships are supposedly created to meet 
identified yet currently unmet needs, it is expected that the majority of PPPs will have vision 
statements.   
Ideally, well-articulated visions should not only communicate what aims the 
partnership is trying to meet, but also what makes it unique, that is, how it as a PPP -given its 
                                                 
166 The OED is an independent unit within the World Bank, and it reports directly to the Bank's Board of Executive 
Directors. 
167 See, among others, the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group at http://go.worldbank.org/3AS9R002M0 
or the Global Health Case Study Initiative at http://www.casestudiesforglobalhealth.org/.      
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values, partners and benefits - stand apart.  This latter aspect of a vision statement is much 
harder to discern from PPPs’ published information and is rarely articulated.  This is 
surprising, as it should be seen as a critical piece of information PPPs wish to communicate – 
the reason for aiming towards this vision as a partnership rather than actors alone.  What is 
also less well communicated is what strengths the PPPs encompass on a comparative basis or 
what the PPP provides as unique added value.  That is, to solve the problem at hand, the joint 
collaboration of the private, public and social sectors is not only needed but may be the only 
way to solve the problem.  Global PPPs are to be continually promoted, then not only should 
they have an effective means of governance (regardless of the definition of effectiveness 
used), but they may also be called upon to show that they were superior to existing institutions 
and actors.  If this is not even expressed at the onset, it seems even more difficult to find this 
exemplified in practice.
168
    
While vision statements should communicate key information to the institutions’ 
stakeholders and broader community, their significance can be overstated, especially if PPPs 
spend time setting out an inspiring vision that could probably never actually be achieved.   
This could either lock partnerships’ into commitments they cannot fulfil or eventually be de-
motivating if no progress is seen.  Visions should provide direction and be challenging though 
attainable; in essence, the vision can be seen as a statement of what the PPP would consider 
ultimate success or how it envisions the ideal-type future.  Often the partnership’s vision will 
closely mirror its intended impact, despite the fact that achieving these in full is most likely 
considered impossible by the majority.   
Mission statements are similar to visions in that they should provide direction, 
communicate purpose of being and focus the PPPs’ partners, staff and stakeholders.  Missions 
are generally more specific, aim or goal oriented; for example, if the vision is the horizon (e.g. 
a malaria-free world) then the mission is how the PPP aims to take us there (e.g. research, 
bring a drug to market and/or access).  A strong vision statement will not change abruptly with 
leadership change, funder change or changing circumstances; visions are ideal-world scenarios 
whereas missions are the guiding aims and principles.  As such, missions are generally more 
mid to long term in nature; thus, the mission can – and does – change more frequently than a 
vision.  (See Table 7.2 exemplifications of visions and missions). 
PPP’s mission should clearly communicate its objectives and also provide a sense of 
the path it will take to get there.  There are ranging views on whether or not partnerships need 
                                                 
168 Many PPP directors expressed these sentiments during the MM interviews, but this is much less articulated/ 
documented across the universe. 
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consensus regarding the desired aims and path set to get there – that is, is there a necessity for 
PPP-wide buy-in regarding both the process as a means to the end and/ or the desired end 
results themselves?  For instance, Zadek (2001) argues that as long as the mandates and 
mechanisms are in place to deliver on the partners’ individual aims then the respective 
partners do not need to share common interests or goals.  It is also argued that strong mission 
statements should be inclusive, collaborative exercises; the setting of which should be seen as 
a process in itself.  This can be seen as needed to ensure the PPP belongs to all its 
stakeholders, not just the leadership team, or even worse the funders and/or donors.   
What also emerges is while there is often an overriding vision or mission for the PPP, 
the partners’ individual missions for involvement could vary.  For example partners may be 
united around the vision and ultimate desired impact but be personally motivated by varying 
aims, such as research, publication or a positive public image for themselves.  This may be the 
case in terms of many research-focused PPPs, especially in the health field, where varying 
motivations regarding drug development, intellectual property (IP) and eventual distribution 
may guide the varying partners to work together (Nwaka and Ridley 2003; Widdus 2005).  
Another perspective is that though “overarching mission of the partnership needs to be agreed 
partners will rarely share a common vision though of how to get there” (Caplan et al. 2007, 6), 
which is to say that while partners share a common aim for the PPP they may also have 
varying perspectives on the right path to take to reach this.  This could influence the workings 
of the PPP if the partners set out to work together to achieve the PPPs’ goals yet have varying 
ideas of the way to do this.  These issues matter, especially as many argue the partnering 
collaboration itself should be considered an outcome for the partners involved (El Ansari et al. 
2001). 
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Table 7.2: PPP mission and vision examples  
PPP Name Vision Mission 
Global Water Partnerships  The Global Water Partnership's 
vision is for a water secure world 
The Global Water Partnership aims 
to support the sustainable 
development and management of 
water resources at all levels 
 
Youth Business International Youth Business International’s 
vision is that youth enterprise is 
recognised as a vital part of efforts 
to create employment and stimulate 
economic growth throughout the 
world 
Youth Business International aims 
to champion youth enterprise by 
growing a global network which 
provides young people with the 
opportunity to start their own 
business 
 
Roll Back Malaria (RBM)  RBM's vision is of a world free from 
the burden of malaria 
The RBM Partnership aims to 
implement coordinated action 
against malaria. It mobilizes for 
action and resources and forges 
consensus among partners 
 
 
Source: TPD: GOALS, 2011  
 
7.2.2 Key findings 
 Findings from TPD-Goals show while PPPs overwhelmingly made their missions clear 
less did so while also articulating a vision statement (See AppendixE for full set of ITPs 
missions and visions).  Slightly over one-third of the PPPs (36%) have identifiable visions 
while all articulated a mission statement.  Interestingly, just under half of independent PPPs 
articulated visions while less than one-third of hosted PPPs did so.  It was less frequent to 
articulate a vision for capacity building, operational or policy focused PPPs, while the 
majority of PPPs with functions related to standard setting and information exchange/transfer 
could clearly articulate the institution’s vision.  Interestingly, PPPs that were hosted by the 
World Bank all tended to articulate both visions and missions while less than one-third of 
PPPs registered with the CSD did.   
 At first this is somewhat surprising given that a broad global agenda and overarching 
aims motivate many PPPs, but there are a few likely explanations.  It could speak to the more 
focused, operational or task-oriented mission of many PPPs, yet as this work discusses below 
there is less done regarding tracking progress towards performance-based, operational tasks.  
Alternatively this simply stem from lack of clear communication and articulation.  Probing 
more, a few PPPs noted a vision by project but not for the PPP overall, such as the 
Agricultural Risk Management Team or the World Institute for Sustainable Humanity 
(AWISH).  The role of these forward looking visions was remarkably similar across the 
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universe as they were generally a statement of an ideal-type future.  Almost two-thirds of 
partnerships expressed the word “world” in their vision statements; for example “A world free 
from malaria” (Malaria Vaccine Initiative), “A world free of hidden hunger” (Micronutrient 
Initiative), “A world free from blinding trachoma” (International Trachoma Initiative (ITI)) or 
"Our vision is a world where everyone will have equitable access to high quality diagnosis" 
(Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics (FIND)).    
 For the majority (over 95%) the mission statement referred specifically to what the PPP 
aims to do.  While missions should also ideally note what makes the PPP, or its approach, 
unique, this was rarely articulated.  What does emerge, however, is that less than 20% of the 
PPPs articulate the partnering, partnership or collaborative aspect as part of their mission.  As 
an example of ones that do, the ITI aims to eliminate blinding trachoma by 2020 through 
managing the Zithromax donation and “collaborating with partners for the implementation of 
the full SAFE strategy
169" and the Micronutrient Initiative, which “aims to develop, implement 
and monitor innovative, cost-effective and sustainable solutions for hidden hunger, in 
partnership with others.” For another subset, rather than one vision that unified the entire PPP, 
the different agencies or partner groups involved had different missions.  The common vision 
was in a sense rather short-sighted, in that it was an idea to produce mutual gains; thus it could 
be considered that these have a less of a vision and more of a rationale.  
On a methodological note, while it is assumed that more PPPs would articulate their 
visions if explicitly asked, the main sources of annual report, main documents and website, did 
not communicate a clear vision for half of these PPPs.  This analysis is slightly complicated, 
though, as many PPPs note a statement that may alter slightly from the definitions and 
discussion noted above.  In all cases this work defers to what the PPP claims, so if a PPP 
states a “vision” or “mission,” it is tracked as such, even if the language would be more fitting 
with an ideal vision or mission.  In the process of this work, it is found that when only one 
statement is articulated it was in all cases more fitting as a mission and noted as such.   
While published statements build the TPD-Goals database, the MM interviews with 
PPPs on management also garner valuable information that can supplement these.  Drawing 
briefly on these perspectives, it emerged that while visions could generally be quickly “rattled 
off” or cited, only in a few instances were these seen as critical, motivational or more than a 
standard/set statement.  Certain PPP directors referred this interviewer to the website or 
document, saying they were “sure it was on there somewhere” (MMInterview45) while on the 
other hand, for others, it truly resonated that the common vision drove not only the staff’s 
                                                 
169 http://www.trachoma.org/ 
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main motivations – on a daily basis – but also every decision the PPP made.  For many, the 
director noted vision equals the mission for this PPP.  Further, while visions and missions 
should ideally transcend the current individual leader, many global PPPs are tied so tightly to 
their current director or leader, that the individual versus institutional vision cannot be easily 
separated.  For example, Brian Castelli, Executive Vice President of the Alliance to Save 
Energy notes “The president is very involved in the direction we go… the rest of us 
implement…” (MM Interview22).  Finally, there is divergence in how visions are articulated 
across PPPs, even those in similar areas.  For example, while some are broadly aiming or 
reaching, such as the Global Vaccine Alliance, a few are very specific, as Pamela Norick from 
IPM noted: “We’re a one-trick pony: HIV prevention for women” (MM Interview18). 
 
7.2.3 Goal segmentation: Summary of findings  
 While the critical goal setting process PPPs undergo cannot be analysed across all PPPs, 
the end products – the goals - can.  The results of this process should be a set of clearly 
articulated – and ideally measurable – goals, which should provide tangible benchmarks for 
the PPP as well as guidance for its stakeholders.  While it is obviously a relational category of 
assessing partnerships, as whether or not PPPs achieve the goals set will be inherently tied to 
the nature of the difficulties they set out for themselves, goal attainment is considered by some 
to be critical evidence, albeit lacking, needed to prove PPPs matter.  Assessing or tracking this 
will be hampered from the start, though, if goals and objectives are not clearly accessible and 
understood across PPPs.  TPD: Goals speaks to this, though it is certain more detail on an 
individual PPP basis may be available if all individual partnerships were interviewed and 
internal documents scoured.   
On a micro-level, overall goals are often unclear and in general not highly measurable.  
There is a great deal of heterogeneity and ambiguity across all the partnerships regarding the 
articulation, specificity and clarity of their goals in their published and web-based materials.  
While many do articulate specific and targeted goals at a project level, they do so much less 
frequently for the entire partnership.    
 
Segmentation: 
More than reviewing overall goals set, analysis of these goals is done next by 
segmenting them into output, outcome and impact components.  This work finds that 44% of 
the PPPs articulate their objectives across all three, but this varies greatly by type of PPP 
(Table 7.3).  While only slightly over one-third of hosted PPPs communicate all three, this 
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figure is much higher for independent partnerships, where over half do so.  PPPs that 
articulated all three are exemplified in Table 7.4.  
 
Table 7.3: PPP goal segmentation 
 Output Outcome Impact All 
All PPPs in Sample 78% 76% 72% 44% 
Hosted  74% 76% 68% 35% 
Independent 83% 80% 77% 55% 
Source: TPD: Goals, 2011 
 
 
Table 7.4: PPP goal articulation, Examples 
 
 
Source: TPD-Goals, 2011 
 
 
Outputs 
Outputs are the most clearly defined, shorter term or immediate effects of the 
partnership, and this work utilises a broader, basic notion that outputs are shorter term, 
PP P Name   Output   Outcomes   Impacts    
Medicines for  
Malaria  
Venture   
(MMV)   
Stages of drugs in the  
development pipeline; number  
of initiatives in discovery,  
number of products in  
development, state of projects  
in early phases, among others.    
MMV’s outcomes relate   to  
its efforts to help facilitate  
the uptake of the  
medicines to ensure that  
they make the biggest  
impact in the population at  
risk of malaria   
MMV aims for  
eventual impact of a  
“world in which  
innovative medicines  
will cure and protect  
the millions at ris k of  
malaria and help to  
ultimately eradicate  
this terrible disease”    
Vision 2020   Facilitate the planning,  
development and  
implementation of national  
VISION 2020 programs in all  
countries   
Increase awareness, within  
key audiences, of the  
causes of avoidabl e  
blindness and the solutions  
to the problem   
Eliminate avoidable  
blindness by the year  
2020.   
  
FIND   Outputs relate to FIND’s  
efforts to develop and  
implement diagnostic tools that  
are affordable, accurate and  
suitable for the particular needs  
of patients i n high endemic  
countries    
  
  
A twin - focus on creating  
more effective  
technologies that respond  
to patients needs at all  
levels of the health system,  
while strengthening the  
laboratories in low -income  
countries becomes a key  
component of ensuring  
appropriate   use of the new  
tools   
A world where  
everyone will have  
equitable access to  
high quality diagnosis   
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tangible, often physical outputs of the partnerships.  As a point of clarification, when 
reviewing goals breakdown, this work began with an assumption that these would be 
performance outputs rather than organisational outputs, but as this chapter addresses, the 
relative focus between these two elements varied considerably.  Naturally it is assumed that 
most, if not all, PPPs will, by nature have organisational-based output goals, as these are some 
of the basic activities and outputs PPPs should have in place to be accountable, transparent 
and eventually effective as institutions.  As will be returned to, what emerged from the 
analysis, however, is that for many PPPs these were the only expressed goals, despite these far 
-reaching visions or missions. 
The majority of the ITPs articulated output-based goals, with almost 80% of PPPs 
communicating these.  Hosted PPPs were less likely to have output goals than independent 
partnerships (75% versus 82% for independent).  This could be an issue either of not 
communicating the intended outputs, or it could also be a function of being hosted in that 
perhaps basic output activities were being provided by the host institution itself.  Only 3% of 
the PPPs only articulated only outputs, which may seem lower than expected until one 
considers that many more PPPs articulated tangible outputs along with very ambiguous and 
immeasurable impacts (15% had outputs and impacts only).   
Partnerships that focused on certain functions
170
 tended to articulate outputs more 
frequently, especially those involved in Information exchange/and or research and Information 
dissemination and transfer.  Partnerships that have pure operational goals were also less likely 
to articulate outcomes and impacts, as only around half of these PPPs expressed more than 
output goals.  Another set of partnerships had very outcome and impact-focused goals, 
however.  For example, BioVentures for Global Health
171
  has outcome orientation towards 
accelerating the development of novel biotechnology-based drugs, vaccines, and diagnostics 
and eventually wants to produce impact by saving lives.  Or the World Economic Forum 
Disaster Resource Network
172
, which articulates an intended outcomes to increase the global 
impact of private sector engagement and humanitarian relief. 
PPPs focused solely on capital provision would be anticipated to be more focused 
solely on outputs, but as most of this functional-type is not included within the sampling frame 
this cannot be adequately spoken to.  The MAC AIDS fund is an example with clearly 
articulated outputs of providing funding alongside the more ambitious impact goal of 
preventing the spread of HIV among people ages 15-24.  The same output oriented nature may 
                                                 
170 Percentages refer to sampling frame functional breakdowns, see Figure 7.3. 
171 http://www.bvgh.org/Who-We-Are.aspx 
172 www.weforum.org/issues/humanitarian-assistance 
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be expected of CSR initiatives, but these were not in the sampling frame given the partner or 
scope requirement.  Finally, while it is largely the case for PPPs that there is an articulation of 
impact-related objectives, it becomes clear from this work’s analysis and interviews that the 
majority, if not all, of the activities are centred on outputs.   
 
Outcome 
Outcomes are the medium-term effects of the partnership and are associated with 
whether or not the PPP led to an intended affect on its intended participants.  These are goals 
which are focused on creating knowledge, attitudinal or behavioural-based change and can be 
tracked through the external use, adopting or influence of the PPP and/or its work.  The 
explicit articulation of outcomes as part of goals was less frequent than outputs or impacts; 
that is, most partnerships are not clear about the behavioural change required to achieve an 
outcome or anticipated to occur.  Overall, 78% of ITPs had outcome-oriented goals, though a 
small number (5%) expressed only outcomes, mainly those involved in advocacy or 
coordination roles.  While there is little difference between hosted and independent in terms of 
the rate at which outcomes are outlined, there are patterns across functional types.  Policy 
focused PPPs have higher rates of outcomes in addition to impacts, as most of these made 
clear the uptake and behavioural change they wished their advanced policy to produce.   
 
Impact 
 Impacts, the long term, eventual effects of the partnerships are aimed towards overall 
problem solving, which implies attaining system-wide or environmental effects.  While just 
over 70% of the ITPs did articulate an eventual impact-related objective, a much smaller 
number could clearly identify a specific, measurable impact that their partnership would like 
to achieve. Hosted partnerships were also less likely to have defined an impact than 
independent PPPs.   
  Certain types of PPPs had a greater propensity to report impacts: while capacity 
building (90%), coordination (84%) and advocacy (72%) functional type PPPs were more 
likely to communicate impacts, this was less the case for those PPPs involved in policy, 
facilitation or setting standards.  As expected, most of these impacts were wide reaching, and 
in general the majority of the impact focus was in line or identical to the PPPs’ vision 
statement.  For example, the impact focused goal of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative
173
 
                                                 
173 http://www.polioeradication.org/ 
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is “to ensure that no child will ever again know the crippling effects of polio” while Safe 
Injection Global Network has impact goals defined as to “strengthen health systems.”  
Many of these impacts related to eventual cures or eliminations of the problem of focus 
for the PPP.  Both the focus of the PPP as well as the articulation of the objectives influences 
how measureable this will be.  For example, the Global Alliance for the Elimination of 
Lymphatic Filariasis aims to eventually eliminate Lymphatic Filariasis, the Network for 
Sustained Elimination of Iodine Deficiency (Iodine Network) aims to eradicate iodine 
deficiency and the Global Polio Eradication Initiative aims towards the eventual eradication of 
polio.  PPPs with wider focus may express similar but far from measurable impacts, such as 
the Novartis Institute for Tropical Diseases (NITD)
174’s aim to cure tropical and infectious 
disease   A more ambiguous and certainly immeasurable impact-perspective, the Global 
Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI)
175
 proposes it works towards “Saving 
children’s lives and protecting people’s health” while the Global Alliance for Improved 
Nutrition
176
 (GAIN)’s eventual impact aims towards a world without malnutrition. 
While the possibility of eventual eradication of these diseases may be argued, it is also 
debatable whether or not PPPs will be considered successful even if the set targets are 
reached.  One issue is ease of operation or measurement, as impact goals are not easily 
quantified.  While the specificity of goals is expected to lessen to an extent the further in this 
results chain, even if impact is achieved, as one progresses from outputs to impacts, it also 
becomes exceedingly difficult to measure and properly attribute these effects: even for PPPs 
that reach intended targets related to eventual cures and or elimination, this cannot be 
unambiguously credited to PPPs’ work. 
A more fundamental question at stake is whether PPPs should have eventual 
elimination as a goal; eradication campaigns themselves are highly debated (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention 1999), as continued issues surround the lack of reliable tests, 
definitions of elimination and political contestations.  Reviewing the ITPs no longer in 
operation presents an interesting case in the Global Alliance for the Elimination of Leprosy 
(GAEL), which was created in 1999 to “inject new energy into the elimination campaign” 
(Rinaldi 2005, 1224).  Seen as a way to promote part of the WHO’s Final Push Strategy 
(2000-2005) towards elimination, GAEL was later extended.  Though technically the global 
target of eliminating leprosy was reached in 2000 with world prevalence of less than 600,000 
cases (Britton 2004, 4) when averaging all prevalence rates worldwide, with prevalence at less 
                                                 
174 http://www.novartis.com/innovation/research-development/diseases-of-developing-world/index.shtml 
175 http://www.gavialliance.org/ 
176 http://www.gainhealth.org/ 
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than 1/10,000 people, the PPP itself is not regarded by all as a success.  Much of this is due a 
continued strife between the main partners involved.  One of the initial partners, the 
International Federation of Anti-Leprosy Associations (ILEP), took issue with elimination as a 
strategy as well as the WHO’s definition of prevalence (as the WHO utilized number of 
patients on MDT registers as a measure, which is accused of ignoring patients not yet 
diagnosed as well as ex-patients).  ILEP, among others, argued this implied that even if the 
WHO reached its target, it would not mean elimination of leprosy had occurred; in addition, 
more stakeholders were concerned about the continued social stigma and political issues.  The 
disagreements actually led to it being expelled from the partnership in 2001. 
 A few years later, a 2003 WHO-sponsored evaluation suggested moving from an 
elimination strategy to one focused on avoidance and rehabilitation, which eventually led to a 
new alliance among the WHO, ILEP, The Nippon Foundation and Novartis, but the report also 
explicitly noted that “collaborators will have to work more openly, collegially, and 
inclusively”( Skolniket al. 2003).  Moving forward, the period 2006-2010 was more focused 
on leprosy control activities, and in which the WHO took a stronger leadership role. Thus, 
GAEL ceased to exist in its form, but several additional organisations were created instead.  
The “Final Push Strategy” realised it needed to shift focus to the high levels of stigma attached 
to the disease which led to the Social Mobilization for the Elimination of Leprosy (SMEL) 
amongst continued calls for a post-elimination strategy to ensure “the disease does not go 
underground” (Porter 2004). Thus, even though the elimination campaign was seen as largely 
successful, the partnership created to promote it was less highly regarded and had to be 
disbanded (in two separate forms); yet the movement forward  called for another new, 
reinforced partnership (Rinaldi 2005).   
 
7.2.4 Takeaways 
What are the key takeaways and remaining questions?  One pertains to the necessity for 
PPPs to articulate all three effects.  PPPs which aim only towards output may be considered to 
have a relatively easier path to achieving effectiveness.  For those who argue PPPs are 
pragmatic governance solutions whose key role is their ability to achieve tangible, short-term 
objectives, however, this may be the most fitting role for a partnership.  Critics of global PPPs, 
however, argue that PPPs are too narrow and short-term focused, which leads to a lack of 
country or system-wide considerations (Buse and Tanaka 2011).  This could ultimately lessen 
their effectiveness, and may even make them overall a negative force (McKinsey 2005).  Also 
worth considering is if PPPs only articulate outputs as goals (assuming the related activities 
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match) without articulating the behavioural change anticipated or intended uptake of the 
outputs could also lead to lessened impact.  This also raises the issue of possible overlap 
across PPPs or initiatives which focus on different types of effects (or change) but within a 
narrow issue area.  Without coordination, recipients of the PPPs outputs, such as drugs 
distribution or training courses, can be confused as to the options.  This at best will result in 
inefficient and less effective programs, but at worst means PPPs are essentially competing 
with each other (Widdus 2005). 
As PPPs are not static, objectives will certainly change over time.  Many PPPs have 
also pushed to expand their objectives and goals; for example, health PPPs are being pushed to 
articulate access as well as research (or distribution), as it is argued to be truly effective, there 
is a need to ensure integration of the PPPs’ work and operations within the local and/or 
country health system in which it was providing the drugs or treatments.  It is argued that as 
this continuum was not taken into account, the work was not fully integrated into the system 
(Widdus 2005) leading to this unintended and eventually negative effect.  In one case in 
Uganda, when workers withdrew after the programs work was completed, there was actually a 
resurgence of trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness).  
The set of product development partnerships (PDPs) also exemplify how missions and 
goals change over time.  PDPs that once focused solely on drug research and development 
slowly evolved into organisations that aimed to discover, develop and bring a needed drug to 
market – as well as deliver it.  As such, PDPs had to evolve their focus from pure research to 
being involved in access and outreach.  More recently, they have been turning to also focusing 
on advocacy aims.  Partly spurred by necessity, as PPP leaders realised they needed to have 
the capability to ensure ultimate effect, this change was also largely spurred by the donor 
community, who wanted to have their funding dollars involved in ultimate delivery and 
advocacy.  While all acknowledge this is critical, some PPP leaders become frustrated with the 
seemingly forced transition of their aims and altered focus, as they note this is moving away 
from the innovative model that PDPs were created to fit and not necessarily a space (in 
advocacy in particular) PDPs, by their nature, are best to fit (PPP Stakeholder InterviewM) 
 
7.3: Analysing comparable organisational outputs  
That PPPs are working towards actually solving these global problem at large is 
obviously of key interest to stakeholders, especially those concerned with global partnerships’ 
broader effect on the global governance system (Khagram and Ali 2008; Andonova 2010).  
This draws emphasis to problem solving.  While this focuses on analysing outputs, it is 
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acknowledged outputs are merely first-order effects and may or may not lead to outcomes and 
eventual impacts.  The distinction between organisational and performance outputs is also 
made: the former are the effects the partnership produces as an institution or governance entity 
while the latter are those effects associated with the partnership reaching its performance 
targets.  In an exemplified results chain these latter outputs should lead to eventual problem 
solving through their effect on outcomes and impacts.  While this segmentation could be 
countered by noting that many organisational outputs can be considered as activities rather 
than effects, this work purposely focuses on tangible end products and discernable results.   
Though performance outputs are inherently more tightly tied to problem solving, 
organisational outputs are significant as they are tied to institutional effectiveness;
177
 this 
speaks to whether the appropriate institutional elements and resources are established to 
address the problem at hand (Bäckstrand  2010, 149).  What is more, to assess partnerships, 
one needs a better understanding of all their aspects, including structure, resources, processes 
and practices.  Indeed, for those concerned with assessing the partnership relationship 
(Brinkerhoff 2007) and partnering process, these organisational outputs themselves are the 
focus of evaluation.  Organisational outputs are also integral forces in ensuring these inputs 
and processes will be appropriately assessed, measured and quantified, a concern for those 
assessing partnership productivity and efficiency.  As stated at the onset, another overriding 
reason to focus on organisational outputs is their applicability to comparison across PPPs.  See 
AppendixD for set of organisational outputs tracked. 
 
7.3.1 Operational, actor and institutional outputs 
 While it may be seen as a rather low threshold to begin a discussion regarding effects, 
the first dimension tracked relates to operational status.  As noted previously, evidence of 
operational activity is considered an output, as for global PPPs – especially many associated 
with the UN’s CSD - this is far from an established certainty.  Of those 199 partnerships that 
would be included within the sampling frame for definitional criterion, only 147 have 
evidence of recent operating activity.  While this work utilised multiple sources, the majority 
of PPPs operations were verified from a recent (dated at least December 2008) press release, 
news item, partnership publication or factsheet and/or annual report.   
 Beyond merely having verifiable operations, another organisational output is the 
production and existence of an operating, PPP specific, website.  Of the sampling frame, 85% 
                                                 
177 See Young 1999a for this distinction and Bäckstrand 2010 for application to CSD partnerships; these arguments 
were furthered in chapter four. 
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have this, while for the remaining 15% updated information can still be found online, usually 
on the main host’s website.  Half of these PPPs who do not have a unique website have a 
hosted page within the World Bank, WHO or USAID.  It can be debated whether or not a 
functioning website should be considered integral to PPP effectiveness, but what is certain is 
that lacking one, researchers must perform a rather arduous search for information.  This is 
especially as few PPPs without websites had contact details that extended beyond a generic 
email account.  These issues matter as they provide further credence to persisting arguments 
that PPPs lack transparency and accountability.  
Another organisational output is the articulation of a business plan.  While it is often 
assumed that global PPPs, especially those involving significant sums of money, private 
corporations and public governments, would clearly lay out their intents and purposes at the 
onset of the partnership, the reality is that for many, the arrangements grow and evolve over 
time.  Often this implies that formal mechanisms, seemingly basic to private entities, are never 
laid out in full, which has led many reviews to claim partnerships would stand to benefit from 
adopting more “business-like approaches” (Druce and Harmer 2004).  A 2004 review of GHPs 
argued “GHPs should develop and regularly review strategic, operational and business plans, 
delineating clearly defined roles and responsibilities for all major partners. To improve 
transparency, each GHP should make a minimum of defined key information on GHP 
processes, performance and decisions publicly available on its website” (Caines et al. 2004, 
10).  Yet this work finds that slightly less than half (48.35%) published such a document or 
principles.  This is another finding that this work’s MM interviews support; indeed, for a set of 
PPPs, establishing a business and operating plan was one of – if not the only – goal over the 
next year!  
Though overriding questions of participation and representation are critical, the focus 
in this subsection is the actor-related, specific organisational outputs.  Key amongst these are 
the rules and guidance applied to the partners involved within the PPP, especially as it is 
assumed partnership effectiveness will inherently be tied to the abilities, resources, activities 
and energy of the committed partners.  While this work cannot speak to the nature and quality 
of this participation, the elements it does assess, its published structures and rules, can provide 
a framework for assessing this participation. 
Forty percent of the ITPs had multiple levels or layers of partners established, with the 
most being four.  For example, the Collaborative Labelling and Appliance Standards Program 
(CLASP) distinguishes these into Sponsoring, Country, Implementing partners and Affiliates 
while the Alliance to Save Energy has layers of Founder-level Associates, Patron Associates, 
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Ally and Member.  One key, assumed basic component to a PPP is the clear articulation of 
what defines a partner in the organisation, but as this work has already noted, this is lacking 
for many.  While there is generally a notion of what a partner is, or a set of characteristics, 
resources or ideals a partner should profess, few PPPs made explicit what truly defines a 
partner.  Many even purposely avoid using the word “partner” given the term’s current use in 
popular jargon and the value-laden notions it often elicits. Indeed, during the MM interviews, 
most PPP directors confirmed these published members/ partners are just snapshots, the reality 
is this is an aspect in a constant state of flux.  Perhaps disconcertingly, more than two-thirds of 
the PPP directors interviewed in the management interviews either cited a different figure of 
current partners than available resources noted, or, more commonly, could not numerate this. 
Though varied, the established criterion for joining and due diligence process the PPP 
takes before accepting new members, though varied was overall rather lacking.  While the 
management interviews discussed weaknesses for many PPPs regarding the process of new 
partners joining, these findings highlighted how few PPPs have this documented, as less than 
one-third had established criteria for a new partner joining (Table 7.5).  This low number 
should also be considered with the fact that much of this criterion was rather lose, such as 
partners signing and agreeing to a stated partnership principles document.  A number of 
partnerships have a partner form to request permission to join, and for a few, this could 
actually result in automatic membership!  Interestingly, 15% of the PPPs also charged a 
membership fee, often fees that varied by type (e.g., private versus academic) or layer of 
partnering.   
Table 7.5 ITPs:  Existence of Partnership criterion and membership 
Partner Type Type of Entry Rules #PPPs % 
 Junior Partners 
Criteria Established 22 14.8% 
Approval Body 21 14.1% 
Criteria Document 20 30.2% 
Info / published 21 14.1% 
Senior Partners 
Criteria Established 45 30.2% 
Approval Body 45 30.2% 
Criteria Document 45 30.2% 
Info / published 45 30.2% 
Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011 
 
To address issues of limited representation, many argue that PPPs can include 
southern actors, NGOs and other “traditionally marginalised groups” within governance by 
holding regular stakeholder meetings, and of the ITPs, a fair number (43%) hold a regular 
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stakeholder meeting, which is generally annual or biannual, and the average number of 
members on these assemblies is 264.   
 Many elements of institutional design and structure are also relevant in comparing 
partnerships’ organisational effects.  While the majority of the sampling frame PPPs have 
worked to establish a centre point, 4.1% have not, but the majority of those lacking one are 
hosted.
178
   What about the activity at these centre points?  While 94% have an operational 
team in place, this team can be as low as one person within the host, and for nine PPPs no 
working staff or operational team could be verified.  Information regarding fulltime working 
equivalents (FTEs) in place could not be verified for 18 of the PPP, but for the remaining the 
average number of FTEs at the CP is 26 and 59 FTEs for the PPP in total (spanning across 
operational sites); however, if one drops the top five PPPs from this (those that have over 100 
FTEs) the average drops to sixteen.  Across all, the median number of staff is eleven.  The 
majority of those with verifiable staff counts (88%) had less than 25 full time equivalents at 
the centre, with many PPPs – especially those that are hosted – relying only on part time staff 
and interns. 
       
7.3.2 Governance and decision making 
Of considerable interest to PPPs functioning – and many argue their performance – are 
the governance and decision making systems and procedures (GDM) in place (Buse 2004b), 
especially guided by findings that there is a relationship between good governance and 
favourable development outcomes (Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 1999; 2002).   Many 
reviews criticise PPPs for lack of internal governance legitimacy and accountability (Benner 
and Witte 2004; Utting and Zammit 2009; Sorenson 2009), not to mention the growing debate 
that PPPs overall are not adhering to good governance (Richter 2003).  As many multilateral 
agencies, notably the World Bank’s IEG and the OECD’s DCA continue to develop 
qualitative and quantitative metrics to assess governance, more PPPs and their related 
evaluators are placing emphasis on governance.
179
 
Assessing and comparing GDM outputs across PPPs is complicated by the great 
variety in structure, complexity and functional intentions of the governance processes, even 
for those with the same main partner, such as the World Bank (Lele et al. 2004, 38).  Despite 
this difficulty, this work compiled a wealth of information on these PPPs’ governing 
                                                 
178 On average, the partnerships have three operating cites or locations, and the average is three for hosted and four 
for independent partnerships.   
179 As has been noted by Lele et al. 2004 for World Bank programs; Buse 2004a, 2004b for global health 
partnerships and more recently Grace and Druce 2009 and Buse and Tanaka 2011 for PDPs, as well as PPP-specific 
evaluations such as Faster Cures 2010 for MMV and HLSP 2008 for IPM. 
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arrangements and the related outputs.  However, while this work speaks to structure, design 
and established processes and procedures, TPD-Outputs can only present declared 
information.  The actual functioning within these structures, the interaction between members 
of the governing bodies and the adherence to the bodies’ decision making can only be assessed 
with individual partner analysis.   
While unfortunately the notion of sheer feasibility had to guide part of the process of 
which variables to collect and assess (See chapter four), this work also incorporated the four 
inter-related corporate governance principles developed by the OECD’s Business Sector 
Advisory Group in determining variables.  As these are applied across diverse types of 
governance (both “shareholder” and “stakeholder” type models) and deemed applicable to 
both public governance entities and private firms (OECD 1999), they are useful guiding points 
(Figure 7.4): 
 
Figure 7.4 OECD Principles on Corporate Governance  
OECD Principles on Corporate Governance 
 Clear roles and responsibilities – for the officers and bodies that govern and manage 
the program and of the mechanisms to modify and amend the governance and 
management of the program in a dynamic context 
 Transparency – the program provides both shareholders and stakeholders with the 
information they need in an open and transparent manner (such as decision-making 
responsibilities, accountabilities and processes, accounting, audit, and material 
nonfinancial issues) 
 Fairness – the program does not favor some immediate clients over others (such as 
Bank staff, participating agencies or program secretariats, specific countries or their 
agencies, municipal agencies, local authorities, private service providers, NGOs, and 
community organizations) 
 Clear accountability – of the program for the exercise of power over resources to the 
program’s stakeholders, including international organizations, donors, developing 
countries, the private sector, and NGOs 
1 In 2004, the OECD expanded these principles greatly to include a focus on the following elements: Promoting 
transparent and efficient markets, which are consistent with the rule of law and which clearly articulate the division 
of responsibilities among supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities; Protecting and facilitating the 
exercise of shareholders’ rights; Ensuring the equitable treatment of all shareholders, who should also have the 
opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights; Recognising the rights of stakeholders 
established by law or through mutual agreements and encouraging active co-operation between corporations and 
stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises; Ensuring that timely 
and accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including its financial situation, 
performance, ownership and governance; and Ensuring the strategic guidance of the company, the effective 
monitoring of management by the board and the board’s accountability to the company and the shareholders 
(OECD 2004, 2008).  For the purposes of this work, the focus on the first four principles is preserved.  
Source: OECD 1999; 
See ttp://www.oecd.org/document/49/0,3746,en_2649_34813_31530865_1_1_1_1,00.html 
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Governance outputs tracked fall roughly into dimensions of establishment, structure, 
representation and rules.  One of the most basic GDM outputs is whether or not the PPP has 
established a governance system.  While 80% of the PPPs have established this, for 24 even 
this could not be verified.
180
  For the remaining hosted PPPs it must be assumed that all 
governing takes place within the host, but no information could be found to confirm this, nor 
that another governing entity had been established.  As noted by Buse (2004a) “The 
‘governing’ bodies of hosted PPPs raise questions concerning the nature and meaning of their 
‘public-private’ nature and of the extent to which they are ‘partnerships’” (2004a, 233-234). 
Even for the remaining hosted PPPs for which there is a governing body, especially if they are 
hosted within the WHO (which thirteen are), may be especially problematic as fiduciary 
responsibilities is still with the host.   
 
Structure 
This work found seven main types in addition to those whose main type is hosted: 
approximately half are governed by a board and for the remaining independent PPPs, 
governance comes from a steering committee (6.2%), Committee (2.8%) or advisory 
committee (1%) (Table 7.6).  Most of those who are hosted within the UN (10% of the 
sample) or the World Bank or another IGO (4.1%) still profess a governing body.  Of the 82 
hosted PPPs, 59 have a declared sub-governance type or body, but for 15% of the hosted 
PPPs, even this cannot be verified!    For those with a sub body, it is also worth distinguishing 
between advisory committees or groups versus formal governing bodies, for example, a Board 
of Governors (40%).  Table 7.7 shows the sub-type of governing bodies within hosted PPPs, 
but it must be noted these do not necessarily have authority over the Host, as hosted boards 
generally do not have legal standing. On average PPPs have 1.8 layers of governance on the 
main bodies - roughly the same between hosted and independent.   
Besides formalising a structure and type of governing body, of critical interest is what 
occurs if there is a conflict or dispute within the PPP.  While establishing clear conflict of 
interest procedures is seen as necessary to the legitimacy of the institution, only around 10% 
of the PPPs publish or communicate their dispute resolution system in place. 
                                                 
180 Only one of these was independent: AED – Satellife 
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Table 7.6: ITPs: Type of main governing body 
Governing type % PPPs 
Board 40.8% 
HostUN 22.4% 
HostFP 20.6% 
HostNFP 8.4% 
HostIGO 7.5% 
Other 7.4% 
Council 1.8% 
Committee 1.4% 
Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011 
 
Table 7.7  Hosted ITPs:  Subtype of governance 
Governing 
 Sub-type  
% 
PPPs 
Board 32.1% 
Steering/ Advisory 24.7% 
Group/ Team/ Other 19.8% 
Committee/ Council 12.3% 
Information not available 11.1% 
Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011 
 
Representation 
While structure is of interest, it is the sectoral representation which drives most of the 
governance-related debates, especially as this is a reflection of internal power dynamics and 
distribution, which are significant as this will relate to the perception of ownership and 
accountability of the partnership.  PPPs are also purported to face tradeoffs between efficiency 
and equity in determining composition.  On one hand, they could have larger bodies, which 
would be more in tune with stakeholder models of governance; however, a widening 
participation in governance could be seen as slowing or even hampering decision making 
(Scharpf 1997).  Despite these articulated models of governance, this work’s set of interviews 
also finds that in practice these governance structures are more so evolutions over time, which 
change as the PPP grows, its focus evolves and/or in response to evaluations.  For example, 
GAVI, IPM and IAVI have all made changes to their governance structures or members 
following independent evaluations.  
This work provides the first view across all global PPPs, and what emerges is that for 
the 148 PPPs with trisectoral partner base, only 40% have tri-sectoral representation on 
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their decision making bodies. Half the independent PPPs have tri-sectoral decision making on 
their main governing bodies, but this is only the case for 36% of the hosted.  Besides 
trisectoral, the next largest sectoral split is Private-Social only at 14% while only public-based 
members sit on the board of 9% of the PPPs (Figure 7.5).
181
  Recall from the previous chapter, 
that across all PPPs only 16% have tri-sectoral decision making while this is 20% for 
operational.   
Figure 7.5: Average sectoral representation split on governance bodies within ITPs 
 
 
Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011 
 
What is interesting is that within the PPPs, the average breakdown of these members 
is 26% from the public sector, 31% from the private sector, 34% from the social sector and 8% 
independent, retired or ex officio members (who declare sectoral neutrality).  For hosted PPPs, 
this split is 38%, 19%, 34% and 6% respectively, while for independent PPPs, this varies quite 
dramatically, as on average only 16% of the governing members are public, 41% private, 34% 
social and 10% retired or ex officio members (who declare sectoral neutrality) (Table 7.8). 
 
 
                                                 
181 Not all PPPs publish their governing body members (available for 74%); thus for the remaining sampling frame 
the split is deemed host if it is hosted with no other information available. 
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Table 7.8 Sectoral balance within main governing forums, Sampling Frame (ITPs) 
 
Regarding minimum representation from the sectors, and TPD-Outputs finds at least 
51% have at least one representative from the public, 61% one from private, 62% one from 
social and 36% independent.  From another perspective, governance split should be assessed 
not by sector but rather by country representation, which this work tracks via World Bank 
definitions of high, upper middle, lower middle and low income countries.
182
  Of the ITPs 
50% had at least on representative on the governing body from the both segments with almost 
half had at least one member representing low or lower middle income countries.  All of the 
PPPs with verifiable information had at least one member from an upper middle or high 
income county on their governing board.  Within the PPPs, on average 20% of the members 
were from a low or lower/ middle income country; this was only 17% for independent 
partnerships compared to 23% in hosted.    While these numbers appear low from the onset, 
that at least half have a developing country member presents a slightly different picture than 
many critical reviews of PPPs attest.     
 
7.3.3 Accountability and Transparency  
For many stakeholders, to acknowledge PPPs are legitimate governance entities 
means they must exemplify standards of accountability and transparency, often accused to be 
sorely lacking.
 
  If improving accountability could lead to enhanced performance (Zadek and 
Radovich 2006), then PPPs are expected to establish both internal (to their members) and 
                                                 
182 World Bank list of economies (18 July 2011).  Available at 
siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/.../CLASS.XLS  See http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-
classifications for background  
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external (to wider stakeholders and those impacted by the PPPs’ activities) accountability 
elements (Grant and Keohane 2005).    
Internal accountability involves internal governance and decision making structures, 
internal reporting and clear mechanisms for internal review and possible sanctions, which 
should also be open to scrutiny (Zurn 2000).  External accountability involves the perceived 
need for greater transparency, which involves the publication, in a timely and accessible 
manner, of relevant information regarding the PPP’s processes, activities, governance and 
funding. External considerations involve the interests of groups outside the respective 
organisations – those affected by the latter’s activities without being able to yield influence 
over them – and how these can be taken into account.  This involves creating a form of 
accountability “in which the voices of those most affected by an organisation’s activities are 
not overshadowed by the interests of the most powerful stakeholders” (Blagescu et al. 2005, 
20).  Though more difficult to establish, elements of external accountability are more readily 
assessed across all PPPs, especially as published reports on internal accountability are rare.  
Transparency necessitates information that is timely, relevant, accessible and useful.  
Timely implies information is published within an acceptable timeframe, which is when the 
relevant decisions and information could influence others and/or are still topical.  That for 
many PPPs, the last website update occurred two or three years ago would thus be at issue.  
Accessibility implies not only availability online, which this work tracks, but also how PPPs 
distribute information to non web-enabled stakeholders.  While the former is notably lacking 
,the latter for many is nonexistent.  In terms of usefulness, highlights and performance reports 
are helpful; however, in many cases, this was the only updated information beyond the 
partnership establishment, which can lead to accusations that the PPPs only present a positive 
story of the partnerships or present only successful projects.  On the other hand, too much 
information can also be considered less useful if one cannot distinguish between the 
significance of various reports and publications (Bartsch 2008, 12).   
While both dimensions of legitimacy are critical, while this work set out to assess the 
former, it became evident throughout the course of the analysis that not only do dimensions of 
legitimacy cut across both input and output legitimacy, but they also highly influence each 
other.
183
  While debates regarding accountability and transparency serve as the sole focus of 
numerous works (Steets 2010), this work only narrowly considers a set of the accountability 
and transparency elements argued necessary for PPPs (Figure 7.6).   
 
                                                 
183 See also Risse 2004 and Goodin 2007 for similar arguments.  
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Figure 7.6  Accountability and transparency outputs tracked  
 
 
Findings  
Reports and plans: This work’s overriding findings regarding ITP transparency are 
not encouraging (Figures 7.7-7.9), as only half published annual performance reports online 
(56.5%).  Strategic and annual plans - those that are forward looking rather than only means of 
reporting - were even less frequent at only 38.1%.  While it is startling that PPP stakeholders 
cannot review any form of annual report on PPP’s activities or performance, this is especially 
striking as the sampling frame of PPPs are in general more institutionalised (and also have a 
tri-sectoral actor base).  This number is even lower across the entire PPP universe, as only 
17% of PPPs have a published annual report within the past three years.  A contrary view 
would say as flexibility is a strength of partnerships, and as they are not formal institutions 
themselves, all of the their energy/ resources can and should be devoted to solving the 
problems at hand – direct action – rather than burdensome reporting and guidelines.  However, 
to substantiate this argument, evidence as to the PPP’s results and work towards these 
achievements are seemingly needed.  As less than half of the ITPs have published these, this is 
a tough argument to defend.  
While certain types of PPPs are more likely to publish annual reports than others, the 
tightest relationship is between institutional structure and transparency.  One-third of hosted 
PPPs publish strategic or annual plans while closer to half of independent ones do.  While this 
may be because hosted PPPs strategic aims are assumed within the main organisation’s 
reporting, this percentage figure includes those PPPs that publish a report or detailed update 
within separate or distinct sections of the host’s documents.  Annual reports present a more 
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shocking disparity, as 68% of independent PPPs publish one while only 35% of hosted PPPs 
do.  Levels of institutionalisation are also strongly correlated to annual performance reporting, 
as over 90% of those with high levels have annual reports and only 18% of those with low 
levels of institutionalisation do.    
A more informal summary is more readily available, as 84% of PPPs publish at least 
statements of performance, results or highlights; however, this could be as limited as recent 
snapshots or press releases noting activity.  Since this work’s criterion to reach this standard 
was only reporting action or activity and not necessarily success or results, that for almost 
20% of PPPs this cannot be found should be alarming!  Seventy two percent of PPPs have 
regular newsletters or updates, but these may be rather informal.   It is also tracked whether or 
not keen stakeholders could receive regular updates on the PPPs’ activities and performance, 
as this also implies the PPP could also have a system of tracking (or at least collecting) 
information on its interested stakeholders.  Only 40% of the ITPs had an email letter or 
newsletter that stakeholders (non partners) could subscribe to and receive. 
Similar relationships hold when comparing across PPPs: whereas 59% of hosted PPPs 
have regular newsletters or results, this is 84% for independent PPPs.  Half of the independent 
have newsletters that also offer a (free) subscription, but this is less than a quarter (23%) for 
hosted.  The higher the level of institutionalisation, the more likely the PPP is to report 
performance, as this ranges from all those PPPs with high levels to only 69% for the low.  
Almost all within the high segment also produce regular newsletters or updates, and half of 
these also allow subscriptions or provide targeted updates, but this is less than half for those 
with low levels (47%, and 22% have an option to subscribe).   
Financial: Only 35% publish financial statements or results on their own accord, 
either as separate statements or part of their annual report.  As expected, this is much higher 
for independent PPPs.  One could argue that for hosted PPPs this is to be expected, as the 
finances would be part of the host organisation, but still only 9% of hosted PPPs publish an 
annual budget.  This figure is 18% for independent PPPs, and 13% for all PPPs.  If hosted 
PPPs were run to budget rather than solely responsible for their own financial aspects and 
returns, stakeholders would perhaps expect more detailed information in this regard (Financial 
aspects are discussed below). 
Governance: A key aspect regarding legitimacy is that information regarding 
decisions is made public and available.  Regardless of who sits at the table, it can be argued 
that as long as the wider stakeholder body has timely and feasible access to these deliberations 
and decisions, the PPP can enhance accountability.  In this regard, the findings from TPD-
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Outputs are relatively pessimistic, as governance documents were less publically available 
than performance.  Only 32% of the ITPs published Board meeting agendas and/or 
background chapters and 37% summaries of the meetings or related press released.  Slightly 
less than a quarter presented meeting action points or specific decisions by the board.  What is 
interesting, is that while publishing performance results was much more prevalent in 
independent PPPs, for governance and decision-making, transparency across hosted and 
independent partnerships was relatively equal, with no noticeable difference regarding the 
publication of governance agendas (32% for both), press releases or summaries (37% for both) 
or action points following the meetings (24% for hosted and 22% for independent).   
Partnerships vary slightly regarding levels of institutionalisation and governance 
transparency, with the most noticeable being the low recorded figures for those with only low 
levels of institutionalisation, as less than 20% published any of the tracked governance 
documents.  Of course many of these transparency variables were highly correlated with each 
other: PPPs that published governance documents were likely to publish performance-related 
notifications as well.  This is significant, as it suggests PPPs are not necessarily compensating 
by including information within other sources.  For example, of the PPPs who do not publish 
at least one governance document, 40% also do not have a regular newsletter or update (only 
27% of ITPs do not have a newsletter). 
These findings could be considered rather startling, though perhaps not surprising to 
many of PPPs’ critics.  In some instances, these are not purposeful actions but merely a 
function of lack of resources.  Many PPPs operate with incredibly lean CPs, with only a few 
staff and perhaps no dedicated web technician, meaning many documents – while existing - 
are simply never transferred online. As this work noted from the MM interviews, there is often 
a large backlog of these administrative tasks that PPPs plan on completing or publishing, but 
purportedly lack the staff time to do so.   An extreme argument on this end would be that 
donors and funders require reports and forms, which take considerable staff time and 
resources, but they do not award or punish for transparency or lack thereof, thus leading to 
less incentive for PPPs to publish certain documents.  Transparency has physical costs as well, 
such as printing, translations and updating (Steets 2005, 13), and this would draw from PPPs’ 
already limited resources.  As many PPPs have a goal to continually reduce the amount of 
money spent on overhead, often due to pressure from funders, it is not surprising that these 
activities become lessened, especially if donors/funders are still receiving their required 
update reports.    
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  It is acknowledged that many PPPs may need to keep certain documents and reports 
confidential, especially those involved in research and development as well as highly sensitive 
or even classified issues.  One example is the Pharmaceutical Security Institute (PSI), which is 
fairly lacking in transparency and has almost nothing published online or accessible, but it 
maintains that most of this is necessary given the sensitivity of the issue area.  While this is 
certainly applicable to many PPPs that deal with sensitive issues, the main aspects assessed 
here could rightly be deemed necessary, especially for those PPPs which receive public money 
(which almost all do) or are said to operate in the public’s interest. 
 Finally, while the overall transparency component appears quite low for the sampling 
frame, consider that across the universe of PPPs, which the TPD tracks, less than half of 
operational PPPs publish an annual report or statement and finances were available for 17% 
and 27% of operational PPPs.  That less than one-third of operational PPPs published 
financials, either on their own or via an external source, is a troubling finding, and one this 
work returns to in the conclusion.   
 
Figure 7.7 Transparency among Sampling Frame PPPs: Performance and planning 
reports  
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Figure 7.8 Transparency among Sampling Frame PPPs: Governance documents  
  
Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011 
 
Figure 7.9 Accountability and transparency:  All PPPs 
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7.3.4 Finances and Resources 
When assessing private sector institutions, financial returns and key financial ratios, 
are primary indicators of effectiveness.  For partnerships, however, finances and resources are 
often seen as a critical input and less assessed as an output – mainly due to lack of 
comparability and standards regarding financial reporting.  Partnerships’ financial affairs are 
more than returns generated, though, as they also relate to partnerships’ financial 
accountability, debates about PPPs’ representation and process effectiveness.  Evaluations of 
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PPPs do not always cover PPPs’ financials, but those that do note persistent gaps in funding, 
PPPs’ inability to project funding streams over a longer terms horizon and a lack of clarity 
regarding their funding needs (Druce and Harmer 2000).  
 Especially as many PPPs are created in order to be efficient and effective means of 
governance, it seems necessary to view their finances through a critical lens.  Even more so, 
lacking a steady funding stream is often cited as a key constraint to PPPs’ functioning 
(McKinsey 2002), which raises additional questions such as which PPPs have secure access to 
funding?  Which PPPs generate more finances over time?  Where do these finances arise, for 
example from funders, donors or self-generated incomes?  These main questions are addressed 
through the following: financial actors and governance, transparency and accountability and 
financial returns.   
 Before discussing the finances themselves, one related and often rather contentious issue 
is the relationship of funders to the PPP.  One issue is whether or not funders are considered 
partners.  This is also often a rather difficult issue internally to many PPPs as funders may 
consider themselves partners and key actors, while the PPP leadership and managers do not 
always readily make the distinction.  Of course, nature and background of the relationship 
cannot be determined across the PPPs, nor can relative power dynamics. 
 TPD-Outputs only obtained this information for around 40% of the PPPs, and finds 19% 
of the sampling frame have at least one funder that is also a partner, which is unsurprisingly 
the majority (80%) of   those that provide the information.  Of those that do, the average is 11 
within each partnership.  The TPD-Outputs also analysed timeframe across all PPPs dependent 
on financial information available, and it finds that approximately one-third of the ITPs had 
funders that donated more than one year, with the average being 22 that were repeat 
funders/donors.  The related organisational output would be if the processes were in place, 
even if it is informal, to manage the relationship.  Though this work attempted to track this, it 
could not be assessed for enough PPPs to lead to useful analysis.   
   
Variation in financial transparency 
 As the significance of financial transparency is well noted, it remains surprising how 
few PPPs make financial statements available.  Around half (48%) publish their financial 
information through annual reports, financial statements, donor resources or independent 
sources, though only 35% do this within their own publications/ websites.  The tendency to 
make financial information publicly available varies depending on the characteristics of the 
partnerships and is tightly linked to legal and institutional status.  PPPs’ legal structure, 
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country of incorporation and level of institutionalisation affect not only processes in place but 
also the legal and regulatory requirements regarding financials.  In addition, funders and main 
partners involved may also have varying demands regarding the extent of financial 
transparency.    
Most PPPs’ still maintain the internal decision of whether or not to publish the 
financials themselves, mainly through the PPP website or annual reports.  Of the partnerships 
with available financials, 25% of the material was published by GuideStar, which is a 
501(c)(3) non-profit organisation based in the US which accumulates, analyses and publishes 
financial information on US-based nonprofits,
184
 and the remaining 75% published 
themselves, mostly within annual reports, though 10% published separate financial statements.   
Partnerships that are independent make their financial information public more than those that 
are hosted, as only 23% of the latter have their financial information available (18% self 
published) where as 61% of independent partnerships do.  Either to enhance credibility or to 
satisfy legal requirements, slightly over half (52%) of the partnerships that shared their 
financial information used external auditors.  This is less likely amongst hosted partnerships 
with only about 31% of them turning to external auditors, but for larger, independent PPPs 
this is considered the norm. 
Partnerships with high levels of institutionalisation are more likely to make their 
information publicly available than those with low levels: 92% with high levels have 
accessible financials compared to 52% of those with a medium level and 2% of those with a 
low level.  This is expected as legal status determines reporting requirements, especially in the 
US.  Over 70% of charity, non-profits and incorporated PPPs publish their financials 
(particularly those in the US and the UK), and all registered as a 501c3 did.   
Sectoral focus exhibited some relationship, but these are correlations and do not 
necessarily imply causation.  PPPs engaging in work in the areas of Science & Technology, 
Agriculture, and Water & Sanitation published their finances more frequently than PPPs 
working in other sectors: 100% of PPPs in Science & Technology, 90% of PPPs in 
Agriculture and 63% of PPPs in Water & Sanitation made their finances publicly available.  
Just over half of the PPPs engaging in the health sector and the energy sector did the same. 
The tendency was much less amongst PPPs working in the field of education (33%), 
environment (26%) or sustainable development (23%). Partnerships with different functions 
publish their financials to varying degrees, as those that engage in information exchange 
                                                 
184 http://www2.guidestar.org/rxg/about-us/index.aspx ; there is an equivalent body in the UK: 
http://www.guidestar.org.uk/ 
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and/or research or information dissemination and transfer have a greater propensity to publish 
their financials. Others that engage in advocacy or capacity building are less likely to make 
their financials public.  
Partnerships that publish financial information also tend to be more mature. On 
average, partnerships with publicly available financials have been established for 19 years 
whereas those that do not have been established, on average, for 14 years. Partnerships that 
make their finances publicly available tend to have fewer partners, with an average of 152 
partners compared to partnerships that do not make their finances available which have on 
average 211 partners.   Interestingly, PPPs that share their finances with the public have an 
average of 15 partners that are also funders where as those that do not have an average of five. 
As the definition of a partner and the obligations required varies across partnerships, this is 
another potential area to probe further.  Who the partners involved are also seems to matter to 
an extent, as of the 67 partnerships that make their financial information public, 16 partner 
with the UN, six the World Bank and four the WHO.   
Governance also seems to play a role in determining if partnerships share their 
financial information with the public. Partnerships with established system of governance are 
more likely to make their finances publicly available: 54% of those with governance systems 
shared their financials with the public while only 4% without did.  Finally, the division of 
funding across public, private, and social sources seems to be only slightly related to financial 
transparency, as no real relationship can be discerned.  A partnership that makes their finances 
public will receive, on average, 10% of funding from the private sector, 15% from the social 
sector, and 65% from the public sector. A partnership that does not make their finances public 
will receive, on average, 16% of their funding from the private sector, 11% from the social 
sector, and 73% from the public sector.  
 
Grants and donations: 
Before turning the discussion to the financials themselves, it is worth reiterating resources 
could in many ways be considered a partnership input, as without sufficient resources 
partnership effects could be limited.  On the other hand, PPPs that are overly reliant on initial 
donors or funders could detract from their sustainability and future effectiveness if they fail to 
generate their own support; indeed, one potential measure of partnership success is its 
additionality, or the degree to which partnerships generate new multi-sector funding for 
sustainable development or their own initiatives (Bäckstrand 2005, 17).  That said, given the 
focus and framework of this work, finances are assessed as outputs, especially as the ability 
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for PPPs to generate additional funding, attract a broad donor source and manage resources 
effectiveness can be compared across PPPs as organisational effects.   
Grants and donations comprise a significant portion, if not all, of global public partnership 
incomes.
185
  The total amount of grants and donations in 2008 was $7.02 billion, 
186
 which 
shows more than a 19% increase from 2007, which totaled $5.87 billion.
187
  Nearly all this 
total amount of grants and donations was in the hands of a few prominent partnerships, 
though. The three with the highest amounts in donations and grants in 2008 account for 72% 
of the total $7.02 billion; these are The Global Fund to Fight Aids, Malaria and TB (GFATM), 
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative and The Global Environment Initiative.  The five 
partnerships with the highest amounts of grants and donations account for almost 84% of the 
total in 2008. In addition, the donations of partnerships that counted the UN, the WHO, or the 
World Bank amongst their partners, accounted for 37% of total partnership donations. 
On average, each partnership brought in about $113 million in 2008. This is 
approximately a 12% increase from the 2007 average of $101 million.  Not including the 
GFATM, each partnership brought in an average of $51 million in 2008 in grants and 
donations, which is approximately a 6% increase from the 2007 average of $48 million.  
Across all, there was an increase in the median amount of grants in donations for a 
partnership: in 2007 the median was $6.9 million which increased to $7.6 million in 2008.  
Hosted partnerships on average brought in 50% less in 2008 than the average independent 
partnership in grants and donations.  Age also matters: PPPs who have been established for 
longer are more successful at generating grants and donations than younger PPPs. Those 
established before 1995 raised an average of $105 million per partnership in 2008; PPPs 
established between 1995 and 2002 had an average of $142 million in grants and donations 
(average of $29 million when excluding the GFATM), and those established after 2003 had an 
average of $16 million. 
As expected, legal status and institutionalisation exhibit strong relationships with 
financials, but here unlike other aspects of outputs there are a few unexpected findings for 
hosted PPPs.  In 2008, foundations received the higher average ($580 million) in grants and 
donations than partnerships with other forms of legal structure. Yet interestingly in the same 
year, PPPs hosted by inter-governmental organisations had the second highest amount of 
                                                 
185 The remaining discussion in this section assumes percentages based on PPPs that made finances public (71) 
rather than all PPPs (147).  65 of these PPPs provided figures for grants and donations.   
186 All financials that were not published in USD have been converted for standardisation.  
187 This figure does not include the Institute for OneWorld Health, the 4C Association, the Joint United Nations 
Program on HIV/AIDS and the Global Village Energy Partnership as they do not have publicly available financials 
for both 2007 and 2008. 
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average donations at $474 million per partnership. Partnerships registered as 501c3 
organisations, non-profits, or charities received, on average, less than $21 million each.  
Highly institutionalised partnerships received an average of $138 million ($26 million 
excluding the GFATM) in donations in 2008, which is approximately 50% more than 
partnerships with a medium level. Partnerships with a low level of institutionalisation each 
received even less, on average $12 million.  
Amongst public donors, 54% of the PPPs cited the UN, 23% the World Bank, 21% 
USAID, 15% the European Union, 14% DFID and 7% the WHO as donors.  In the social 
sectors, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) donated to 27% and the Rockefeller 
Foundation 15% of the ITPs.  Private companies were represented to a less extent and more 
focused on specific issue areas; for example, 5% cited either Merck Shell, Pfizer or Microsoft 
as a donor and 4% the Coca-Cola Company.  The average amount given to PPPs in grants and 
donations also varies considerably by the sector they operate in, with some sectors drawing far 
greater amounts than others. PPPs engaging in the health sector drew the most with an average 
of 235 million per partnership ($85 million excluding the GFATM) in 2008 in income. This 
was more than double the average amount of the second highest sector, environment, which 
drew an average of $82 million per year per partnership in 2008. Partnerships engaging in 
sustainable development and science & technology brought in considerably less in the same 
year at $187, 000 and $164,000 on average per partnership. 
 
Income 
 The majority of income generated by partnerships comes in the form of grants and 
donations and subscription revenue.  All PPPs with financials except the Global Polio 
Eradication Initiative, International Electrotechnical Commission and the International Water 
and Sanitation Center reported grants and donations as one source of revenue and income as 
another. Income includes sources of revenue that are generated from interest, currency 
fluctuations, investments, and other income generated from sales of products or services.   On 
average, the total income declared by partnerships appears to be growing annually, as the total 
income generated by partnerships in 2008 together reached $7.35 billion ($3.4 billion 
excluding the Global Fund), up from $7.14 billion ($2.9 billion excluding the Global Fund) in 
2007
188.
 The median amount of income for a partnership was $7.6 million in 2008.  What is 
perhaps surprising is that hosted partnerships brought in an average of $175 million each in 
                                                 
188 These figures do not include the Institute for OneWorld Health, the 4C Association, the Joint United Nations 
Program on HIV/AIDS and the Global Village Energy Partnership as they do not have publicly available financials 
for both 2007 and 2008. 
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2008, surpassing the average of independent partnerships which averaged $105 million in 
income. 
 PPPs that have been established for longer have a higher reported income than younger 
ones. PPPs established before 1995 generated an average of $73 million per partnership in 
2008. PPPs established between 1995 and 2002
189
 had an average of $60 million in income 
and those established after 2003 had an average of $19 million.  Regarding partners, PPPs 
with the World Bank as a partner had an average income of $139 million in 2008. This is a 
higher income than those who partnered with the United Nations or the WHO which had 
average incomes of $62 million and $24 million, respectively. 
 The institutional and legal characteristics show similar trends.  In 2008, foundations 
generated a higher average ($714 million) in income than partnerships with other forms of 
legal structure. In the same year, PPPs hosted by inter-governmental organisations had the 
second highest amount of average income at $450 million per partnership. Partnerships 
registered as 501c3 organisations, non-profits, or charities generated, on average, less than $17 
million each.  Partnerships with a high level of institutionalisation, on average, each generated  
$155 million in 2008, more than twice the average of those with medium institutionalisation 
($70 million) and more than five time more than the average of partnerships with low 
institutionalisation ($28 million).  
 
Table 7.9  ITPs Finances Summary 
Funding Sampling Frame Hosted Independent 
Average Grants & Donations $106.4 $180.1 $88.3 
Average Income $109.8 $163.5 $100.9 
Average Expenditure $105.3 $188.4 $88.3 
Average Assets $338.7 $782.9 $273.9 
Average Liabilities $163.5 $403.3 $132.8 
Figures in missions USD 
Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011 
 
 
 
Expenditures 
Partnership expenditures (reported for 43%) include the costs of managing day-to-day 
operations, fundraising activities, and communications amongst other expenses. Many PPPs’ 
strive to keep this as low as possible, especially as to the management of the day to day 
                                                 
189 GFATM is excluded as an outlier. 
Figures in millions USD 
Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011 
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operations, yet it has been on the rise. The partnerships that made their finances publicly 
available spent a combined amount of $7.32 billion in 2008 ($4.7 billion excluding the 
GFATM), which is an increase from 2007 level of $6.94 billion ($4.2 billion excluding the 
Global Fund).
190
  However, the average expenditure in 2008 only increased slightly: average 
expenditure in 2007 was $92 million versus $85 million in 2008.  Interestingly, although the 
average increased, the median amount of expenditure decreased from $9 million in 2007 to 
$8.3 million in 2008.  
Surprisingly, hosted partnerships spent more than twice the amount of independent 
partnerships. In 2008, the average hosted partnership had an expenditure of $191 million 
where as independent partnerships, on average, spent $89 million.  As this may diverge from 
common expectations, this is an area worth further analysis but it requires detailed financials 
from the host institutions as well, which proved too difficult to include here.  That said, further 
quantitative investigation should be made into the variation in cost structures to better 
understand operational efficiency in the public partnership landscape. 
PPPs that have been established for longer spend more than younger PPPs. PPPs 
founded before 1995 spent an average of $119 million per partnership in 2008, which was $69 
million for 1995 and 2002
191
 and $14 million for those established after 2003.  Partnerships 
that include major international organisations as their partners experienced higher expenditure 
levels, on average. Those who partnered with the UN had an average annual expenditure of 
$118 million. Those who partnered with the World Bank and the World Health Organisation 
had an average annual expenditure of $144 million and $224 million per partnership 
respectively. Partnerships in health and environment outspent partnerships working in other 
sectors. The average expenditure in 2008 was $234 million for a health partnership and $162 
million for an environmental partnership. Other sectors such as sustainable development, 
culture or labour all had average expenditures of less than $3 million per year.  
Partnerships with a high level of institutionalisation spent an average of $125 million 
per partnership, a greater average amount than institutions with a medium or low level, though 
when excluding the GFATM, this drops to an average of $54 million per partnership. 
Partnerships with a medium level of institutionalisation had an average expenditure of $94 and 
those with a low level had notably less with an average of $16 million in 2008.  Considering 
across legal structures, in 2008 PPPs hosted by IGOs and PPPs that were registered as 
                                                 
190 These figures do not include the Institute for OneWorld Health, the 4C Association, the Joint United Nations 
Program on HIV/AIDS and the Global Village Energy as they do not have publicly available financials for both 
2007 and 2008. 
191 GFATM is excluded as an outlier.  
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foundations spent the most on average, $554 million and $544 million respectively. PPPs 
registered as 501c3 organisations spent an average of $29 million per partnership and charities 
and non-profits spent $11 million.  
Other Financial Information 
As with any organisation, partnerships have acquired assets and liabilities through 
investments that they have made, but the nature and extent of these assets and liabilities varies 
considerably depending on the type of partnership.  Both total assets and liabilities increased 
from 2007 to 2008, and the combined total assets of all the partnerships was $18.63 billion in 
2008 and $17.3 billion in 2007, and their liabilities combined to a total of $8.6 billion in 2008, 
an increase from $7.94 billion in 2007.
192
    
On an individual level, partnerships are also accumulating more assets and more 
liabilities. On average, each partnership had assets of $351 million and liabilities of $170 
million in 2008; this represents a 7% increase in average assets and a 4% increase in liabilities 
from 2007.  When considering median amounts of assets and liabilities, it is clear that 
although averages are high, most partnerships are making investments on a smaller scale. The 
median liability is $3.2 million in 2007 and $3.3 million in 2008, and the median asset level is 
$14.8 million 2007 and $11.7 million in 2008. It was surprising to find that hosted 
partnerships carry both much larger assets and liabilities than independent partnerships, but to 
really probe this area, a full accounting audit of the hosts’ financials would be needed to 
determine where and how these were being held.   
Those who are partners with the World Bank had on average assets of $786 million 
and liabilities of $335 million in 2008 compared to those in partnership with the UN who had 
assets of $481 million and liabilities of $223 million.  Those with the WHO as key partner had 
much lower average assets of $14.2 million and liabilities of $5.1 million.  Assets and 
liabilities accumulated showed some relationship with function of the partnership. 
Partnerships engaging in coordination, on average, each had assets of $1.3 billion and 
liabilities of $660 million in 2008. Other partnerships, engaging in functions such as capacity 
building and advocacy have the lowest levels of assets and liabilities. Information exchange 
and information dissemination have the greatest amount of liabilities as a percentage of assets. 
Older PPPs have accumulated more assets than younger PPPs but not necessarily 
more liabilities. PPPs established before 1995 had an average of $308 million in assets and 
$111 in liabilities per partnership. PPPs established after 1995 but before 2003 had an average 
                                                 
192 These figures do not include the Institute for OneWorld Health, the 4C Association, the Joint United Nations 
Program on HIV/AIDS and the Global Village Energy Partnership as they do not have publicly available financials 
for both 2007 and 2008. 
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of $244 million in assets and $141 million in liabilities. The PPPs established after 2003 had 
less assets and liabilities with an average of $30 million in assets and $12 million in liabilities. 
 Partnerships with a higher institutionalisation tend to accumulate more assets and 
liabilities than those with lower levels. In 2008, partnerships that had a high level of 
institutionalisation had an average of $417 million in assets and $199 million in liabilities.  In 
the same year, partnerships with a medium level had an average of $270 million in assets and 
$130 million in liabilities, and those with a low level had $40 million in assets and $33 million 
in liabilities, with liabilities representing a much greater percentage of assets.  The amount of 
liabilities that partnerships have also varies when you compare their legal status. In 2008, 
foundations and partnerships hosted within intergovernmental organisations had the highest 
amount of average assets (over $790 million). On the other hand partnerships with other legal 
structures had much lower amounts of assets on average such as charities and non profits ($13 
million) and registered 501c3 organisations ($10 million).   
 Partnerships working in the environmental field held more assets and more liabilities on 
average in 2008 than partnerships working in other sectors. Partnerships engaging in 
environmental work had an average of $1.5 billion in assets and $656 million in liabilities, 
while the health sector had the second largest average with an average of $701 million in 
assets and $360 million in liabilities per partnership. The amount of assets was significantly 
lower in labour and cultural sectors with average annual assets of $772 thousand and $396 
thousand per partnership, respectively.  As expected, the types of liabilities and assets 
accumulated by partnerships also vary considerably by sector.   
Whether or not to make these investments – and carry the liabilities –are significant 
decisions partnership managers make, and though there are general trends, discrepancies still 
persist even across PPPs in similar areas.  For example, PDPs make varying decisions 
regarding whether or not to rent, lease or buy research labs and facilities, as exemplified by 
the different paths to this taken by MMV, DNDI, IPM and IDRI.  These are also decisions that 
change over time and fluctuate with the needs and resources of the PPP, as IAVI has varied 
throughout the years in how it approaches these decisions.  IPM’s CEO Zeda Rosenberg, for 
instance, commented that every decision is made regarding “whatever will bring a product to 
market fastest, be it whether or not to buy, lease or steal….” (MM Interview19). 
Financial considerations: 
 Overall, there is a significant variety in the financial results shared by the partnerships 
with level of institutionalisation, function, independence, governance structure and main 
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partners all playing a role in their financial outcomes.  Both hosted and independent 
partnerships engaging in the health or environment sectors spent more, attracted more grants, 
generated more income and accumulated more assets and liabilities than those in other sectors 
such as cultural or sustainable development. The differences suggest that the capital intensity 
of a partnership differs across sectors.  As with all outputs tracked, while much of the 
variation shown here across PPPs may be only exhibited relationships and correlations rather 
than causal effects, when it comes to legal structure some aspects may be all or partly 
determined legally.  The discrepancies across PPPs of different legal structures are thus 
expected, but the sharp differences across level of institutionalisation are rather striking, and 
this fits closely in line with this work’s main hypothesis on the significance of these factors.   
 Truly addressing the questions regarding how much money is flowing to PPPs on an 
annual basis over the years tracked depends on how one counts income, grants and donations, 
which is currently handled differently across PPPs.  Thus, while finances are an organisational 
output that in theory can be tracked and compared across PPPs, varying standards regarding 
financial transparency, ranging methods of reporting and the variety of functions in which 
PPPs engage means assessing these dimensions is far from clear cut.  The emerging findings, 
especially regarding differences between hosted and independent partnerships and the 
differing ways in which similar resources are handled signify further qualitative and 
quantitative investigation should be done. 
  
7.4: Performance tracking, indicators and evaluation  
 What the above organisational outputs do not do is analyse performance; instead, these 
outputs assess effects PPPs produce as institutions.  This is certainly necessary but not 
sufficient partnership analysis.  This raises the question of how one can move towards 
comparing performance across PPPs regardless of sectoral focus or functional type within 
these caveats.  One step, and the focus of this section, is to analyse PPPs’ organisational 
outputs that address performance. Specifically, this entails assessing how PPPs track, review 
and evaluate their own performance as well as whether or not PPPs have been subject to 
external and/or independent review. 
Evaluation, tracking performance and reviewing partnerships is the subject of multiple 
works, as discussed throughout this work.  There is a multitude of reviews and studies 
suggesting the PPPs need better systems of performance tracking, PPPs need to consider or 
apply common performance metrics or indicators, further that in general PPPs are lacking in 
most of these regards (OECD 2006).  Yet with few exceptions, mainly case studies and in the 
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health and energy sectors, little is known regarding what tracking systems are set and utilised 
across PPPs at large.  Outside of case studies, few works attempt to compare across PPPs and 
no work has gone outside of a small set of partnerships to assess the macro picture.  While not 
attempting to compare performance across PPPs, this work tracks and compares aspects of 
organisational outputs related to performance and effects through specifically assessing the 
following elements: 
 Internal performance review 
 Establishment of performance indicators 
 Evaluation 
o Internal,  and  
o External, Independent 
Before moving into the outputs tracked, it is useful to consider the most common, 
established standards regarding program or partnership monitoring, evaluation and metrics.  
Many PPPs and all that are hosted within the World Bank and or count the Bank as one its 
main partners are reviewed based upon OED criterion.  The OED (1995, 23–24) assess 
monitoring and evaluation according to the following: 
 Clear and coherent program objectives and strategies that give focus and direction to 
the program and provide a basis for evaluating the performance of the program 
  Use of a results-based management framework193 with a structured set of (quantitative 
or qualitative) output, outcome, and impact indicators  
 Systematic and regular processes for data collection and management  
 Independence of program- level evaluations  
 Effective feedback mechanisms to reflect evaluation findings on strategic focus, 
organisation, management, and financing of the program 
 
These dimensions are similar to those used to assess aid effectiveness (Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness 2005 and Accra Agenda for Action 2008), and related dimensions and 
frameworks are more recently applied to large-scale evaluation attempts, such as the 
International Health Partnerships (IHP+ 2008).  As these standards also mirror similar 
                                                 
193Another overriding trend in global governance, especially from the World Bank and WHO is a focus on results-
based management, whereas the management strategy itself should focus on the achievement of outputs, outcomes 
and impacts.  This draws focus to developing indicators based upon outcomes, not just outputs and adopting more 
business-like approaches (OED 2004).       
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standards and criteria utilised by DFID, USAID and others, they provide a useful base for 
considering these performance-related organisational outputs across global PPPs.   
Distinguishing between performance monitoring and tracking, performance reporting and 
evaluation is also needed at the onset,
194
 as partnerships’ efforts towards each regard vary to 
quite an extent.  Performance tracking or monitoring involves tracking, collecting and 
communicating basic performance indicators.  A strong performance tracking system will 
compare these indicators or metrics to an established base as well as those accepted and/or 
targeted results.  Reporting these indicators involves the timely, relevant and useful 
communication of performance to stakeholders, which can be defined as the PPP’s staff, 
partners, donors, funders and/ or the wider stakeholder community.  Evaluation, on the other 
hand, is the systematic review of performance based upon established criterion and involves 
the collection of information on activities, characteristics, outcomes and impact used to 
determine the value of a specific program or intervention.  As noted by the OECD, 
partnership-specific evaluations should articulate the objectives of the evaluation, scope of 
issues to be considered and participants involved in the actual evaluation (OECD 2006, 22).  
Evaluation implies subjecting the PPPs’ work to a criterion or review that goes beyond 
documenting what happened but also reporting on performance and impacts, ideally in a way 
which provides value and/or guides future work.  
Performance tracking is monitoring and noting what occurs while evaluation is assessing 
what occurred against a standard or criterion.  These are still broad and encompassing terms.  
For example, evaluations can be program or project-based, thematic or institutional based or 
done so at a point in time or at the end of a partnership or project.   Yet distinguishing between 
distinct elements of organisational effects is critical, as most PPPs lag on the latter elements of 
evaluation.  Many confuse the two, assuming that as they regularly perform routine 
monitoring they are also evaluating their work.
195
 
 
7.4.1 PPPs and Performance tracking  
PPPs’ strengths – or lack thereof – in performance tracking to a large extent follow 
from the clarity and consensus that has or has not been established and articulated regarding 
                                                 
194 Within these elements of performance management are areas of performance review and constructive 
performance dialogues, but as these are management and process-based measures and difficult to assess across 
PPPs based on reported information. 
195 For more on monitoring and evaluation, see the DAC Principles for the Evaluation of Development Assistance, 
OECD (1991), available at: http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,3746,en_2649_34435_46032442_1_1_1_1,00.htm 
as well as Glossary of Terms Used in Evaluation, in 'Methods and Procedures in Aid Evaluation', OECD (1986), 
and the Glossary of Evaluation and Results Based Management (RBM) Terms, OECD (2000).  See also Charles 
and McNulty 1999 for useful guide applied to global programs. 
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goals and objectives.  Performance tracking involves the internal monitoring of both activities 
and performance, though the distinction between the two is not commonly made.  Monitoring 
is considered a basic component of all programs to assess whether or not resources are being 
spent and whether or not the program is delivering expected outputs (UNAIDS 2000; Wilson 
2004) and a subject matter long at the centre of global programs, partnerships and alliances.  
Multilateral institutions, global bodies and national and local agencies and donors provide 
considerable guidance for global partnerships regarding performance tracking.  For example, 
USAID identifies three criteria for performance tracking as follows: validity— the extent to 
which a measure actually represents what it is intended to measure; reliability—the stability 
of a measurement process; and timeliness—frequency and currency (Charles and McNulty 
1999, 4).  These same principles are readily applicable for performance reporting as well. 
Strong systems to track, measure, monitor and provide feedback are obviously needed 
to gauge the effectiveness of partnerships.  Monitoring should be performed for internal 
tracking and accountability but also to provide credibility for the institution; ideally, both 
monitoring and evaluation are also used to develop lessons other partnerships (or the 
partnerships’ own partners) can utilise to improve their own programs, projects and 
institutions (see, for example, UNDP 1997; Macro International Inc 2009).  Yet despite a 
multitude of toolkits and guidelines in this regard and their established significance, this is not 
the first work to note the gap between guidance and practice.  Nor is this something confined 
to PPPs or development-based programs, as a review of strategic alliances finds: “The biggest 
reason many alliances do not succeed is a simple one: most organisations do not employ 
performance measurement concepts” (Anslinger and Jenk, 2003, 7; in Druce and Harmer 
2004). 
Not only does the definition of monitoring vary across PPPs, but its actual use in practice 
often diverged greatly from the system’s stated intent.  While assessing PPPs internal 
performance monitoring systems in practice is not feasible across all PPPs, mainly due to their 
marked variation and lack of transparency, as a proxy this work first assessed the existence of 
performance tracking.  While not ideal, as it cannot be assumed that all PPPs that track 
performance also report performance or that all PPPs that report performance have solid 
internal tracking systems, there is obviously still a close relationship between the two; thus it 
is the best first indicator to use.   
 In this work, to classify as tracking or measuring performance, the PPP must explicitly 
report its performance to either the public at large, or its stakeholders, for example donors, 
funders, or host organisation.  The criterion was that a PPP stakeholder should be able to 
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discern by accessing the PPPs’ website, publications, donor reports or host publications what 
the PPP has achieved during the past year.   The form of this reporting on performance 
evaluation could occur through any of the following: 
 Annual reports with clear performance results noted  
 Newsletters or updates on progress and/ or measurement systems 
 Funder/donors memos, reports or letters 
 PPP websites which note the performance gains undertaken (and this information is 
accurate as to within a year of being noted) 
 Country/project reports on individual projects that track performance on a project basis 
Findings  
 Of the ITPs, 71% (104 partnerships) had discernable performance tracking and/or 
reporting.  The majority of PPPs report performance through producing annual reports with 
clear performance results (57%) and 32% (85%?) track performance through newsletters.  
Funder and donor memos are less common as the sole source of performance tracking.  PPPs 
also track performance via their website, as around half post progress updates directly onto 
their website in addition to publishing this information in newsletters or reports.  Doing so 
allows PPPs to communicate more directly with their web-enabled stakeholders, as the 
information is much more accessible and more readily found than searching through all of the 
PPPs’ publications and reports.  Some also track performance via country or project reports, 
which are updates and progress on individual projects the PPP is involved with, but these do 
not discuss performance of the organisation as a whole.  While most PPPs do some form of 
this, for 3% of PPPs in the sampling frame, for example, the Global Village Energy 
Partnership (GVEP) only tracks on a project basis.
196
   
 The main PPP publication of performance is an Annual Report, but these vary greatly 
and do not necessarily all mirror those considered standard in the private sector.  The most 
comprehensive account of performance out of all the methods of publication, annual reports 
tend to cover the previous fiscal year and can range from a limited document to over 100 
pages (average 40).  Most follow a rather typical format of introduction, activity reporting and 
progress updates while around 75% also publish basic financial information.  Interestingly, 
only 5% of the PPP’s annual reports also include a work plan for the future.  As previously 
noted, 38% of PPPs publish a separate strategic and/or business plan, though this is generally 
only updated every three to six years.   
                                                 
196 These PPPs are AED-SATELLIFE, EdInvest, Global Village Energy Partnership and Unicode Consortium. 
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Newsletters are the second most common source of performance evaluation but much 
more frequent overall in that the majority of PPPs publish one, generally on a quarterly basis 
though some are monthly and a few only bi-annually.  While all can be downloaded from the 
PPPs’ website, as mentioned, the ability to subscribe to the organisation’s newsletter is also 
available for 40% of the PPPs.  As newsletters are more frequent, they tend to have more 
detailed accounts of progress that the PPP has made on a particular project than annual 
reports, as they are the primary means of communicating project-based results.  A few PPPs, 
such as the Unicode Consortium, report much of their performance through in-depth case 
studies of actions or activities being taken out by its partner or members, and these function 
more as specific or targeted reports rather than stakeholder updates.   
 
Variation across PPPs: 
 Independent PPPs are more likely to track performance and publish performance 
updates than hosted partnerships.   Many hosted partnerships only have a brief mention of 
their performance within their host’s Annual Report rather than their own.  For example, this 
is the case for Clinton HIV/AIDS Initiative (CHAI),
197
 hosted within the Clinton Foundation 
as well as the Cisco Networking Academy Program.  Those PPPs hosted by the World Bank 
have a very high performance tracking rate, as do those hosted by private companies, but of 
the PPP’s hosted by a UN Organisation, only one-third (12 of 18) separately report 
performance. 
 Legal status and level of institutionalisation continue to matter in explaining variation.  
Those with higher levels are more likely to track performance, as are those registered as 501c3 
charities in the US.  PPPs that do not have their own website are less likely to have tracked 
their performance or at least made this publicly available, as only 45% of these do.  For those 
that do, the information on performance is found within the hosts’ website, such as is the case 
for Partners for Parasite Control which posts its quarterly newsletters on the WHO website. 
 Maturity also seems to matter, as the older the PPP the more likely performance is 
tracked.  For those that were launched in 2000 or before, 79% tracked performance (59 out of 
75), while for those PPPs established between 2001 and 2006, only 28% tracked performance 
(44 out of 159).  There are many possible explanations: more mature PPPs also tend to have 
more projects and partners/members which to update regarding performance.  They may also 
have more of an infrastructure in place for performance tracking.  PPPs with more FTEs are 
                                                 
197 As a note, as of January 1, 2010, the Clinton HIV/AIDS Initiative became a separate nonprofit organisation 
called the Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI).  
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also more likely to track performance: of the partnerships with confirmed FTEs (87% of the 
ITPs), over 80% have tracked performance.  This makes sense, as to publish progress or 
performance updates, PPPs’ would need a minimum institutional staff capacity.  If one 
considers this by number of staff, 42 PPPs have 30 or more full time employees, while 49 
have less than 30.  Of the PPP’s with over 30 employees (42), 95% track performance while 
this is only 65% for those PPPs which have less than 30 employees (49 PPPs).  There is also 
some variation by functional type (Table 7.10). 
Table 7.10: PPP Performance tracking and report by functional type 
Function Total PPPs Performance tracked/ 
measured 
Percent 
Total 
Total Hosted Independent 
Advocacy 18 12 5 7 67% 
Capacity Building 10 7 6 1 70% 
Capital Provision 1 0 0 0 0% 
Coordination 45 31 19 12 69% 
Facilitation 11 8 5 3 73% 
Info Exchange 24 18 8 10 75% 
Information Dissemination, or 
Transfer 
8 5 1 4 63% 
Operational 7 6 3 3 86% 
Setting Standards 16 13 4 9 81% 
Policy and/or (its) 
Development 
7 6 3 3 86% 
TOTAL 147 105 52 53 71% 
Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011 
 
Finally, it is noted that this work utilised a broad definition of performance tracking: 
this is a rather low standard PPPs must meet.  That is, PPPs only had to show highlights of 
performance or results, but projects and progress on activities, as well as activities undertaken 
by partners under the PPPs’ name were included in this definition if the PPP considered these 
as performance.  This is critical, as when moving forward analysing PPPs’ performance, those 
that report solely based on projects – or activities of their partners - should be kept distinct 
from those that report on the PPPs’ progress or performance for the organisation as a whole.  
Thus, that so many could not meet this minimum criterion is rather startling.  While internal 
performance reporting, as well as PPP to host communication no doubt takes place, many will 
not see this as sufficient, especially given the promoted role of PPPs in global governance.  
Another critical distinction reporting individual partner’s performance versus the PPP 
organisation itself, as the latter is more lacking.  While it is true that many PPPs may only 
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serve a role as a coordinating body, and consider their role as facilitating the work of their 
partners, this still raises questions as to PPPs’ value-add.   If PPPs’ only report on projects or 
partner work, how can one assess that these occurred only due to the PPPs’ existence?  Are 
they truly facilitating performance that would not have occurred in their absence?  These 
questions gain importance with this work’s findings that even basic attempts to demonstrate 
this are rarely made.     
 
7.4.2 Performance indicators  
An increasingly dominant tenet of partnership research and debate is the applicability, 
creation, implementation and then practical use of comparable metrics and performance 
indicators across PPPs.  This work has already dedicated ample time to these discussions, 
especially in its argument that comparable metrics to assess organisational outputs are more 
readily applied and useful at this stage than performance indicators, so these debates are not 
restated.  One key organisational output, however, is whether or not PPPs establish and utilise 
either common or specific indicators to monitor, track and report their own performance.  
Rather than review the indicators used by successful PPPs, or provide another summary of 
best practices regarding indicators, this work set out to assess what was actually in place 
across global PPPs.   
Based on both quantitative and qualitative information, indicators should be utilised to 
determine how well the PPP is doing in meeting its objectives and solving the problems at 
hand, and indicators should report this in an understandable fashion both internally to the 
PPPs’ staff and externally to its stakeholders.  As indicators are used to both track 
performance and facilitate evaluation, a distinction should also be made between monitoring 
and evaluation indicators.  Monitoring indicators involve those that set a baseline and report 
on progress.  As the GFATM’s recent evaluation and the IHP+ proposed common framework 
note, while the same indicators can be utilised for evaluation as well, with the former there is 
more emphasis on “the careful documentation of trends, with particular attention given to 
aspects such as attribution and equity.”  Core indicators are obviously needed for both, but the 
decisions regarding the investment to be made in data collection or the use of secondary 
sources of existing data (e.g. macro data on health impact and trends) may be more critical, 
especially as they are no doubt more time and cost intensive (IHP+ 2008). 
While there is certainly no standard template which PPPs follow for establishing 
indicators, many utilise commonly accepted practices and guides.  One common is the 
SMART framework (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Realistic and Timely 
260 
 
and/or Targeted) (see, for example, Crawford and Bryce 2003).  Given the multitude of 
toolkits and guides which profess their necessity as well as the qualities strong indicators or 
metrics entail, it would be assumed all PPPs are not only familiar with appropriate metrics but 
also using them to report and guide performance.  This work suggests that while common 
metrics are known and understood their practical use varies widely across PPPs.  Again, this 
work purposely sets a broad (and thus rather low) standard for meeting the criterion of 
establishing or utilising performance indicators.  To classify, the PPP must articulate specific 
indicators or metrics it uses to track performance; this must go beyond noting what it as a 
PPP did and showcase to some extent how it measures or determines performance.   
 
Findings  
Only around half (46%) of the ITPs had established and publically reported 
performance indicators on their progress; typically PPPs have between three and ten indicators 
and these generally do not vary much over time.  The low number is once again quite 
shocking, especially when considering the criterion used and that both organisational 
indicators and performance indicators were considered.  As per the other outputs tracked, it 
may be the case that PPPs internally report and track with established performance metrics, 
but this is harder to believe if these are not communicated in any of the PPPs’ documents or 
stakeholder/ external publications.  Also, 41 of the PPPs report or track performance in some 
way (see above section), but they do so without using indicators or metrics; this again speaks 
to the PPPs’ reporting performance through activities or updates.   
 While indicators are typically related to a PPP’s goals or mission, indicators that 
establish clear attribution are less common.  For example, the mission statement for the 
Alliance for the Global Elimination of Blinding Trachoma by the year 2020 (GET2020) is the 
“elimination of all avoidable blindness by 2020”, and its main indicator to establish progress 
is to estimate the number of people affected by trachoma and see how this number has fallen 
over the years.  But to show how this drops due to their efforts is obviously more challenging.  
The IHP+ Framework and is related work provide additional guidance an attribution (IHP+ 
2008), but it acknowledges this is still an area lacking for many global programs and 
partnerships. 
 One of the overriding findings is that when it comes to impact-related goals, many PPPs 
publish macro-based indicators and data, usually in line with their varying work streams or 
focus areas, but cannot establish clear attribution to their work.  Many do not try.  Other PPPs 
note how their efforts directly affect the program at hand, but still neglect to provide the link 
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or relationship between their work and results.  This is admittedly challenging, and an issue 
global development programs have long grappled with, but it seems despite their focus as 
more pragmatic, results-oriented institutions, clearly demonstrating these links is still an area 
where few global PPPs have made inroads.   
 From the management interviews it was discussed that PPP directors noted they have 
many opportunities to demonstrate outputs have occurred, mainly through review meetings, 
regular reports, and/or training sessions.  While many can easily cite a coherent set or at least a 
list of outputs and know what indicators are accepted and understood, they acknowledge that 
when it gets to outcomes, it becomes more intangible.  When considering the overall goal of 
the PPP and showing impact, staff and PPP directors admit how difficult it is to demonstrate 
progress, let alone that performance has occurred, especially when it comes to determining 
their degree of influence.  Most acknowledge their work is simply one input amongst many, so 
for many, the strategy most often taken, is to show which related activities PPPs conduct 
rather than results.  
 Certain PPPs have advanced performance monitoring systems and related performance 
metrics in place.  CGIAR, for example, has recently implemented a revamped system which 
notes its indicators across outputs (e.g. publications, capacity strengthening activities and data 
management strategies), outcomes and impact (Iskandarani and Reifschneider 2008).  The 
GFATM (Table 7.11) in particular has developed a comprehensive performance monitoring, 
reporting and indicator system, which it regularly reports upon and modifies (Global Fund 
2011).  Another example of a PPP that utilises multiple indicators to measure and report 
performance across broad spectrums is the E+Co, an organisation which aims to create energy 
businesses that mitigate climate change and reduce poverty while generating financial returns, 
which has created a detailed methodology to determine and evidence its impact.  To calculate 
the return on investment, E+Co measures its enterprises across a menu of 34 social, 
environmental and financial indicators (Table 7.12).  
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Table 7.11 Global Fund performance indicators 
 
 Disease Indicators for routine Global Fund reporting 
1  HIV  Number of adults and children with advanced HIV infection currently receiving 
antiretroviral therapy  
2  TB  Number of (a) new smear-positive TB patients detected, (b) new smear-positive TB 
patients who were successfully treated and (c) laboratory- confirmed MDR-TB 
patients enrolled in second-line anti-TB treatment  
3  Malaria  Number of (a) insecticide-treated nets or re-treatment kits distributed to people and (b) 
households (or structures or walls) in designated target areas sprayed by indoor 
residual spraying in the past 12 months  
4  Malaria  Number of people with fever receiving antimalarial treatment according to national 
policy (specify artemisinin-based combination therapy versus other therapy)  
5  HIV  Number of women and men aged 15–49 years who received an HIV test in the last 12 
months and who know their results  
6  HIV  Number of HIV-positive pregnant women who received antiretrovirals to reduce the 
risk of mother-to-child transmission  
7  HIV  Number of condoms distributed  
8  HIV, TB 
and 
malaria  
Number of people benefiting from community-based programs: specify (a) care and 
support including orphan support, home-based management of malaria and directly 
observed therapy (DOT); (b) behavior change communication outreach activities 
including specific target groups; and (c) disease prevention for people most at risk 
(except behavior change communication)  
9  HIV/TB  Number of TB patients who had an HIV test result recorded in the TB register  
10  HIV, TB 
and 
malaria  
Number of people trained  
Source: Global Fund, 2011  
 
Table 7.12 E+CO example performance indicators form 
Social and Economic Indicators Environmental Indicators Financial Indicators 
 People with access to energy services  
 Households served with access to 
energy  
 Clean energy generated  
 Energy saved through efficiency 
measures  
 Jobs Sustained  
 Income Improved  
 Number of Investee Enterprises -
Women ownership  
 Entrepreneurs trained  
 Customers and employees trained 
 Carbon Dioxide Offsets  
 Value of Carbon Dioxide 
Offsets  
 Reforested land  
 Clean water provided  
 People with clean water  
 Charcoal displaced  
 Firewood displaced  
 Liquefied Petroleum Gas 
displaced  
 Kerosene Displaced  
 Oils displaced  
 Dollar Value of Oil displaced  
 Investment Funds disbursed by 
E+Co  
 Amount invested by entrepreneurs  
 Amount leveraged from third 
parties  
 Potential Growth Capital  
 Portfolio Return after write-offs  
 Amount repaid to investors 
 
Source: http://eandco.net/impact/monitoring-and-evaluations-program/ 
 
Others have established PPP-specific indicators.  For the community water initiative, 
the SGP has established ratings of effectiveness to measure success in that they rate all their 
different projects on a scale of one to six, where  six is highly satisfactory and one is highly 
unsatisfactory.
198
 On the other hand, it is also the case that while macro indicators are 
published, the indicators collected and tracked by the PPP are these organisational-specific 
                                                 
198http://www.undp.org/evaluation/documents/thematic/sgp/Country%20Case%20Studies/Kenya%20SGP%20Case
%20Study.pdf 
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ones, and either partners or even overriding institutions (such as the WHO) are relied upon for 
the macro indicators.   
Perhaps one of the most striking findings is that while PPPs articulate goals and 
objectives along performance lines, the majority of the indicators tracked were more 
organisational rather than performance, or even project, based.  Many PPPs tracked indicators 
or set main milestones related to websites, increasing the number of partners involved and 
related business-type metrics such as publishing organisational documents.  For example, the 
Equator Initiative or the Global Vaccine Alliances both had main indicators which revolved 
around creating the business plan and increasing partners/ members.  For some PPPs, the main 
indicators relate to tracking the program’s growth, such as the Cisco Networking Academy 
Program, or how many new partners joined.  Also, as mentioned above, the partnering process 
or nature of collaboration are also assessed with metrics more so than actual performance 
dimensions, which reinforces existing findings regarding the persistent partnerships tendency 
to measure success through soft, qualitative metrics that measure the partnering process more 
so than the outcomes it generates (Witten Streck and Benner 2003).  
Finally, many PPP specific evaluations are rather critical of the indicators in place.  
For example, an external evaluation done by the European Commission found that the 
Generation Challenge Program (GCP), which is one of the PPPs that receives funding from 
DFID, cited it does not have proper indicators in place.  The European Commission stated that 
what the GCP notes as indicators are actually output milestones, and it was also criticised for 
not utilising the Logical Framework approach to management.  A 2001 review of CGIAR was 
also critical of the practice in place, and the findings launched part of the reform effort that led 
to a revamped performance management systems and appropriate indicators, set across 
outputs, outcomes and impacts (Reifschneider et al. 2007).  This same lack has been issued 
against many GHPs (Buse and Tanaka 2011), such as Stop TB, whose evaluation accused its 
deficits in performance management and monitoring to plague it the most PPPs (McKinsey 
2008).  This same critique could no doubt be applied to many of the global partnerships 
assessed here. 
   
 
Variation across PPPs 
Main partners and funders involved in the PPP have great weight in the indicators 
tracked.  For example, of the 25 PPPs in the sampling frame which receive funding from the 
BMGF all track performance with specific indicators and also perform internal evaluations.  
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Nineteen of these are related to global health initiatives, and 90% of these follow progress 
along specific drug pipelines, clinical trial reports and related metrics.  Of the 14 PPPs in the 
sampling survey that have received funding from the DFID, 11 track their performance, but 
only five of these PPPs have internal performance indicators established (of these four are in 
the health sector). In general, PDPs as a group stand apart in terms of performance indicators.  
Most establish clear indicators and metrics to track progress of their drug pipelines, project 
management metrics, reporting metrics and more recently metrics regarding communication 
and advocacy.  As it is argued that performance metrics are more appropriate by PPPs 
engaged in similar functions and areas of focus, a state of play snapshot seems in order to 
determine if this is occurring now across PPPs.  As such, this work conducted a brief meta-
review of all indicators in place across the 147 sampling frame PPPs (Table 7.13). 
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Table 7.13  Variation in performance indicators, by sector and focus 
area
Sector of focus Establish 
IPI/ 
Total 
Examples of Internal Performance Indicators (IPIs) 
 
PPPS within this sector tracked indicators relating to the 
following.... 
 
Agriculture 3 of 10 Quality of goods/products/food,  response to global food crisis, 
response to handling disease in food outbreaks, success rate of 
seed development, measures of centre governance, culture of 
learning and change, and diversity (which indicate institutional 
health), greenhouse gas emissions, the number of new farms 
established 
 
Business and Finance 3 of 7  Reach of social mission, general outreach, clients, information 
transparency, commodity market indicators (both domestic and 
international), supply chain structure, risk data 
 
CGAP, for example, uses a methodology called CAMEL to 
measure performance: (Capital adequacy, Asset quality, 
Management, Earnings, and Liquidity management)  
 
Disaster management 
(Awareness and Preparedness 
for Emergencies at the Local 
Level (APELL)) 
1 of 1  Number of countries and communities that have adopted the 
APELL process; number of communities that have reached the 
stage of a full-scale practical drill  
 
An external evaluation performed by the Association Nacional 
de Industriales (ANDI)identified other indicators could/should 
be response time of emergency services and industrial brigades, 
amount of equipment available for monitoring concentrations of 
chlorine, how well the alarm sounds can be heard, and how 
long ambulances took to reach victims   
 
Education 2 of 6  Growth of education programs, number of students enrolled in 
educational activities, number of instructors, the number of 
private schools created, costs per student, test scores of students 
and retention and dropout rates 
 
Energy 6 of 9  Most are macro-based, such as of energy consumption ; value-
add or “are people getting their money's worth” from 
investments in energy efficiency 
 
Other indicators include determining savings potentials from 
switching to different energy systems, the number of homes that 
have a particular type of energy system installed, assessments 
of the actual energy consumption of the regulated products, the 
level of consumer satisfaction with new energy-efficient 
models, and the impact of the program on individual 
manufacturers and their industry 
 
Growth in renewable energies, growth in wind power, growth 
in photovoltaics, and  power plant capacity for generating 
power from renewable sources  
 
Environment 6 of 25  Benchmarking air quality, low carbon emissions legislation, 
levels of CO2 emissions, number of power sector upgrades, 
levels of promoting greater awareness, accountability, and  
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Good governance 2 of 2  Access to information/transparency and reducing corruption, 
whether or not country has a functional normative/regulatory 
body, existence of institutional development capacity, the 
country’s procurement operations and practices are efficient, 
the country has effective control and audit systems, efficiency 
of appeals mechanism, degrees of access to information, the 
country has ethics and anticorruption measures in place, and 
the effectiveness of internal anti-corruption programmes   
 
Health  29 of 45 PDPs (around 50% ) drug pipeline status and guidelines (e.g. 
various stages and phases, Pre-clinical development and clinical 
development) 
 
Number of people affected with a particular disease,  the number 
of people who have access to treatment, number of health 
professionals that have been trained, the development of particular 
diagnostic tests  
 
Sustainable development 3 of 13  Number of biodiversity projects implemented, levels of energy 
greenhouse gas emissions, number of electric vehicles with 
available technologies in different countries, amount of educational 
campaigns on sustainable development, progress with lobbying 
governmental and non-governmental organisations to take up 
sustainable development issues and number of people involved in 
sustainable development activities 
 
Tourism 
Tour Operators Initiative 
1 of 1  
 
Tour Operators Initiative has been collecting from the individual 
members 'good' examples of how a tour operator can effectively 
integrate the principles of sustainability into its various areas of 
operation 
Transportation 2 of 3  City development plans, comprehensive mobility plans, 
comprehensive traffic and transport studies, creation of new 
transport systems, establishment of city partnerships, and risk 
factors such as seat belts, helmets, speed traveled and drunk-
driving rates.   
 
Water and Sanitation 5 of 8  Assessing water poverty and water productivity in terms of 
methodological developments, decision support information, and 
knowledge management, capacity strengthening, number with 
people with access to water supplies, sustainability of water 
services, and national and regional policy maker “awareness” of 
water and sanitation issues  
 
 
 
Note: Insufficient indicators for PPPs involved the following sectoral areas: Cultural (0 of 1); Humanitarian (0 of 2); 
Infrastructure (0 of 2); Labour (0 of 1); Marine conservation (0 of 1) and Science and technology (0 of 1).  
Source: PPP publications and reports  
 
Applying common metrics: 
 Finally, a continued and at times heated debate regarding partnerships concerns the 
necessity of common performance metrics or indicators.  While the development of 
partnership performance indicators is seen as a key step in moving towards evaluating 
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partnership effectiveness, there is not a set of consistent or comparable indicators across 
partnerships, even those operating in similar focus areas.  Not only are these difficult to 
define, it is not certain that partnership directors themselves want these in place (FSG Social 
Impact Advisors 2007).   
Defining comparable partnership performance metrics is often seen as the holy grail of 
partnership research, but most acknowledge no one is close yet.  Though researchers have 
attempted to make strides in this area for specific types of PPPs,
199
 few have made much 
progress towards consistently applicable, feasible and measurable common indicators across 
PPPs.  That said these are continually called upon to better compare and evaluate PPPs, 
provide guidance to donors and funders and enable a more common playing field of 
discussion to be laid.  While there is little consensus around how to compare PPP 
effectiveness or even how this should be measured, there is more recent convergence around 
the possible success factors or best practices key performing PPPs employ.  This work cannot 
give ample space or attention to the issues of common metrics, these are issues briefly 
returned to in the concluding chapter.
200
 That said, it is difficult to know if factors relevant for 
some PPPs will hold value across sets of PPPs, or the universe as whole.   
Another main question that arises from these discussions is whether there should be a 
main body or organisation responsible for setting PPP indicators, tracking and reviewing 
these and possibly issuing guidance or censure.  For example, in the conclusion to their 2007 
review of 28 GHPs, Buse and Harmer call for “simple assessment mechanisms [to] be devised 
to score GHPs on performance across a range of indicators” and they suggest the Centre for 
Global Development’s Commitment to Development index as one such model.  The work also 
suggests the Global Forum for Health Research as one body that could serve as a coordinator 
and/or convener (Buse and Harmer 2007, 270).  That said, this is perhaps a role few staff of 
the Global Forum for Health Research profess they wish to hold (PPP Stakeholder 
InterviewG).  For environmental partnerships, there have been calls to create a new “world 
environment organisation to integrate existing international regimes and organisations into a 
coherent whole (Biermann 2000, 22-31).  Pattberg (2010) also suggests creating a 
clearinghouse that could even be hosted within the CSD “that essentially would provide an 
                                                 
199 For global health partnerships, see Faster Cures/ Social impact advisors 2007, International Health Partnerships+ 
and the Health Metrics Network (http://www.who.int/healthmetrics/).  For agency specific PPPs, see Kaplan and 
USAID 2008 regarding USAID.   See also Druce and Harmer 2004; OECD 2006 and Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 
2010, among others. 
200As furthered in the conclusion, the PPP Platform Project at globalppps.org resource library includes a body of 
toolkits, guides and relate performance, monitoring and evaluation resources in place within these PPPs as well as 
summary results of meta-reviews of these. 
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authoritative overview of the current landscape of transnational climate governance” (Pattberg 
2010, 285).   
 
7.4.3 Internal evaluation 
 Internal evaluation is distinct from monitoring of progress and involves whether or not 
the PPP subjects its performance to some criterion or system of evaluation.  The criterion used 
by this work to classify is as follows: a PPP as subjecting its performance to some criterion of 
evaluation if there has been evidence that the PPP has been internally evaluated, has 
conducted internal evaluations or has a monitoring and evaluation system in place that is 
utilised (i.e. not just that done by an external or independent body).  From the onset it is noted 
that this work is probably not capturing the full range of internal evaluations conducted within 
PPPs as many of these will not be documented or published external to the PPP. 
 While all PPPs who conduct internal evaluations must by definition monitor and track 
performance, the relationship does not hold both ways.   Rather, despite the arsenal of toolkits 
and resources at their disposal to guide these processes, internal evaluation seems to be a 
persistently weak area for PPPs.  Overall, 68 of the PPPs conducted or performed internal 
evaluations.  Determining this was most accessible for PPPs which had internal Monitoring 
and Evaluation (ME) group/ departments, which only around 10% of the PPPs did (Table 
7.14).  These range considerably, though, as some are full departments within the 
organisation, others just dedicated staff time set aside for ME and a set of PPPs have 
overriding bodies of either partnership staff or governing members who advise on matters 
relating to monitoring and evaluation of the organisations’ activities and initiatives.  Often this 
group provides technical advice on establishing indicators and data collection or even how 
branch organisations or partners can structure their own ME groups.   
Those without ME groups often still conduct internal evaluations, though more 
common is to hold regular (quarterly or annual) evaluation and review meetings, which tend to 
coincide with board update meetings.  Many PPPs also conduct impact assessment or regular 
internal evaluation events around workshops or retreats.  Other examples are PPPs which 
publish program-specific evaluations, such as CLASP's Evaluate the Labelling or Standards-
Setting Program, which monitors the program's performance to gather information to guide 
adaptations to changing circumstances and to clearly demonstrate to funding agencies and the 
public that the expected benefits are actually being achieved. 
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Table 7.14: ITP with Monitoring and Evaluation groups and/or departments 
Partnership  Hosted? Function 
Agricultural Risk Management Team Y Facilitation 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor Y Information dissemination & transfer 
EdInvest Y Facilitation 
Forest Stewardship Council N Setting Standards 
Global Polio Eradication Initiative Y Coordination (of resources, expertise) 
International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups Program Y Info Exchange and/or Research 
International Water and Sanitation Center  N information dissemination & transfer 
Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS  Y Coordination (of resources, expertise) 
Marine Stewardship Council N Setting Standards 
Pediatric Dengue Vaccine Initiative  Y Info Exchange and/or Research 
Project Hope N Operational 
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership N Policy and/or (its) Development 
Universal Flour Fortification Initiative N Facilitation 
Vision 2020 Y Coordination (of resources, expertise) 
World Economic Forum - Partnering Against Corruption 
Initiative Y Setting Standards 
 
 
Source: PPP publications and reports  
 
Variation across PPPs: 
The number of PPPs noted to have this organisational output is expected to be lower 
than simply tracking performance, but across types of PPPs there are a few noticeable trends.  
Independent PPPs make much more of an effort in internal evaluation, as information is 
verified for 53% while this is only 43% for hosted PPPs (only 22% of those hosted by a UN 
organisation published internal evaluation details.  This is not to say that the PPP is not 
evaluated, many have been subject to external or independent review, but the PPP itself does 
not make transparent any means or efforts taken to internally evaluate its work.  Regarding 
institutional structure, there are much higher rates for 501c3’s, of which 58% published 
internal evaluation methods than for most other structures.  Regarding function, those PPPs 
whose main function is Information Exchange, Operational and Information Dissemination 
have a much higher performance tracking rate (Table 7.15).  
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Table 7.15: Internal evaluations conducted: Variation by functional type 
Function 
Total 
PPPs 
Performance subject to some criteria 
of internal evaluation 
Percent 
Total Hosted Independent Total 
Advocacy 18 2 3 5 28% 
Capacity Building 10 0 4 4 40% 
Capital Provision 1 0 0 0 0% 
Coordination 45 10 12 22 49% 
Facilitation 11 3 0 3 27% 
Info Exchange 24 7 8 15 63% 
Information Dissemination 
or Transfer 8 1 3 4 50% 
Operational  7 3 1 4 57% 
Setting Standards 16 2 5 7 44% 
Policy and/or (its) 
Development 7 3 0 3 43% 
TOTAL 147 32 37 69 47% 
 
 
Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011 
 
 The state of play in partnerships’ internal performance tracking and review – as 
accessible by a stakeholder – is rather bleak.  Though this work tracked partnership and funder 
documents, websites, publications and related resources, it is still difficult to find noticeable 
partnership performance, and even less so regarding evaluations conducted internally.  A few 
expected trends emerged, mainly the higher rates for independent versus hosted PPPs as well 
as a correlation between level of institutionalisation and organisational-based performance 
outputs.  Similar to financial trends mentioned above, PPPs with a formal legal status, notable 
those that are incorporated or 501c3 charities are also more likely to track performance with 
indicators.  There are less noticeable trends in the tendency to track in function and sector than 
perhaps expected, but this could also reinforce that there is marked variation across PPPs even 
within specific functional or sectoral-focused types.  The exception, of course, are those PPPs 
engaging in information/ research – notably the PDPs, who were stronger.  That said, a few 
policy-based PPPs, such as the Alliance to Save Energy also had strong systems in place.  
While there was slight variation by main actors involved, it was hard to draw meaningful 
conclusions outside of those who partner with the BMGF and World Bank. 
 Regarding the low number of global PPPs with solid performance outputs in place, there 
are a few potential scenarios to explain these trends.  One likely story is that many of these 
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PPPs do track and report on performance, but either due to not having an operational website, 
relying on the host organisation, or simply lack of PPP resources there is not an effort to make 
this information public.  That said, this work’s extensive internet searching, background 
academic and practitioner literature searches and review of the hosts’ documents should have 
been more fruitful than they were if this was the case.   
 Many factors are certainly at play aside from the transparency of these processes, as part 
of the disconnect stems from many factors fundamentally tied to the nature of PPPs, mainly 
lack of staff resources, internal constraints or motivations.  Another explanation is more 
pessimistic and draws as well on insights from the management interviews.  One aspect that 
became apparent was that outside of a few notable exceptions of PPPs with best-practice 
indicator tracking systems in place, most PPPs tracked only basic indicators and generally in a 
less sophisticated and coherent fashion.  Even those PPP’ with comprehensive systems in 
place relied in practice on much more ad-hoc systems of tracking, and even less is done on the 
review. 
 Why is this the case?  One emerging story in larger PPPs was that this was seen as 
removed from the Director/ leaders’ roles and left to the project managers; thus, while it may 
be occurring, it would be very much dependent on the point person in charge and as such is 
more project based.  Another reason often noted is difficulty in obtaining reliable data and 
indicators, which is certainly seen as a key impediment for better results and accountability 
tracking for health partnerships (Chan et al. 2010).  That said, another common cited response 
was the existence of too much data.  PPP managers know the sets of indicators that they 
should be tracking, but feel either there that are other organisations which can publish this data 
or that the macro indicators are too removed from their work.   
 Overwhelmingly, time and resource constraints are raised.  Even more than lacking staff 
time and institutional capacity, however, these trends sometimes simply relate to the 
underlying motivations of the staff at hand, what is known as the “do tank versus think tank” 
argument.  These motivated partnership staff want to be actively working on achieving the 
mission at hand, rather than documenting and reporting.  This desire to be “doing” rather than 
“reviewing,” can also lead to a constant state of activities, which may or may not be related to 
eventual PPP effectiveness.  Further, the time meeting donor requirements on reporting 
performance metrics entails as well as the inherent nature of PPP work also often mean little 
to no time is dedicated to internal evaluation outside of monitoring and reporting.  These are 
relevant and pressing issues, as the current trend from donors, funders and host organisations 
is to push for more performance reporting and tracking.  While this work acknowledges there 
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is a severe gap in current practice and more should be published, a few considerations are 
worth raising: How much of this is lack of knowing what indicators to track versus lack of 
institutional capacity, or perceived necessity, to do so?  On the other hand, there may be 
unexpected implications of an overly strong push for metric reporting as it can lead to the 
tendency to do only what must be reported.  This could only further the activity versus focus 
disconnect just mentioned.  Finally, though it is much less common, another possible 
implication cited by many as the more recent trend for PPP staff and leaders to leave the 
initiative, as they feel too much time is being forced to be report on metrics and indicators 
unrelated to core work.  There are no easy remedies to these challenging issues, but they 
certainly deserve attention. 
 
7.4.4 External and independent evaluation  
 While internal evaluation and review is critical, more attention is paid to the necessity of 
external evaluations and independent review, and the related lack of depth and quality of 
evaluation for global PPPs.  External evaluations are those reviews conducted by an external 
or independent source in order to evaluate the quality or standards of the work of a particular 
programme or organisation.  As defined by UNESCO: “The process whereby a specialized 
agency collects data, information, and evidence about an institution, a particular unit of a 
given institution, or a core activity of an institution, in order to make a statement about its 
quality” (Vlãsceanu et al. 2007, 56).  Being subject to independent or external evaluation 
should be seen as critical to establishing and enhancing global PPPs’ accountability, both to 
their donors/funders as well as stakeholders at large.  It is also perhaps only through respected 
and thorough evaluation that partnerships will establish themselves as effective and legitimate 
means of governance.  
 A macro view of the evidence as to whether PPPs are undergoing this formal review is 
not encouraging: this work finds that just 33% of the sampling frame PPPs had been 
externally evaluated AND this evaluation was either published or accessible or sent upon 
request (Full listing of evaluations in AppendixF).  It is possible that more PPPs had 
commissioned an evaluation and/or an external review was conducted that this work could not 
assess;
201
 that being said, this would question the transparency and perhaps ultimately the 
legitimacy of the evaluation.  Interestingly, only around 30% of the time could this evaluation 
                                                 
201 For instance, during the process of the management interviews, this work discovered four partnerships which 
had an independent evaluation or review but this was not published or it had already been removed from the 
website (e.g. Lily MDR-TB Partnership) or it was only accessible to PPP members or a subscription base.  While 
most of these works were willingly sent to the author after inquiry and during the course of the work, they are not 
tracked in the Accountability/ Transparency indicators. 
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actually be found within the PPPs’ own website or publications, as most had to be sourced 
from publically available resources, internet searching or the evaluators’ own websites and 
publications.  In terms of the evaluators, there is no overreaching trend on who did the 
evaluations as many different organisations have been involved, for example DFID and the 
World Bank were involved in seven of them.
202
  External evaluations are 96% of the time 
found in an official report, but in two cases (ACCION International and E+Co) the external 
evaluation was done by Charity Navigator, which only produces a summary sheet of overall 
ratings. 
Of those that had been evaluated, less than a third (26%, or 14 out of 53) had more 
than one evaluation conducted, but a few of the PPPs had been subject to numerous review.  
Of those 14 PPPs that were evaluated more than once, the majority (93%) have an operational 
website, 86% produce annual reports and 93% publish regular newsletters or updates.  All also 
have a governance system established.  Interestingly, hosted PPPs are subject to just as much, 
if not more external evaluations, 39% of hosted had at least one conducted versus 31% of 
independent.  There was a slight variation by functional type, with at least 40% of those 
involved in coordination, policy, information exchange, setting standards and information 
dissemination and transfer being evaluated compared to 10% or less for the other functional 
types.  Age is another variable that exhibits strong correlation, as interestingly those between 
11 and 20 years old have been evaluated more than younger or much older partnerships 
 
Key aspects of evaluations: The evaluations ranged considerably in depth and aspects 
covered, but the majority covered the following: 
 Activities – How well is the PPP achieving its goals?  How successful has the PPP 
been at measuring their indicators?  Are there indicators at all? 
 Organisational structure – What is the governance structure?  Is it effective?  How 
often does the board of directors meet and is this sufficient?  If the PPP is hosted, 
what is the relationship like between the partnership and its host? 
 Internal performance review – How well does the PPP monitor its own work and 
progress?  Is the PPP creating useful and practical indicators which can reveal 
progress?  How transparent is the PPP in relaying information to its stakeholders, and 
to the public?   
                                                 
202 These were evaluations of the following: GVEP, Global Water Partnership, IAVI, MMV, Stop TB Partnership, 
Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor and the CGIAR.     
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The most common themes noted in independent evaluations are measuring impact, 
effectiveness and efficiency of the PPP at hand.   Though the term effectiveness is used in 
varying ways, it generally referred to efforts to review basic performance and results achieved 
rather than those achieved against a set standard.  While mission and strategy, organisational 
structure, and effectiveness of programs appear in all external evaluations, reporting on 
financial indicators is less common and only reported in around 40%.   All independent 
evaluations are also accompanied with a set of recommendations, ranging from a few bullet 
points of recommendations to an in-depth report.  
 Findings: What is obviously more difficult to ascertain is whether or not these 
recommendations are taken into account.  For most PPPs, this can only be tracked by noting 
references to changes implemented that are referenced in PPPs’ next external review, which is 
the case for example, for MMV. However, in addition to the evaluations, seven of the PPPs
203
 
tracked explicitly responded with a management response, or noted later specific ways in 
which advice and recommendations of the external evaluations were taken on board.  The tone 
from management was generally accepting of the evaluation, and in all cases confirmed that 
the evaluation was beneficial and that the PPP would work to improve upon the 
recommendations given.  For example, the Generation Challenge Program (GCP) responded 
to an evaluation conducted by an External Review Panel by issuing a formal response 
describing ways in which it would take the recommendations from the review into account, 
especially in the areas of creating a clearer definition of indicators of success to facilitate 
monitoring the progress of the Programme, doing more to monitor and carefully manage 
indirect costs, and ensuring the sustainability of GCP products after GCP’s lifetime.  IPM also 
responded to its evaluation by, among other changes, making noted reforms to its scientific 
and technology advisory committee.   
IAVI is another example of a PPP who not only consistently tracks and monitors 
performance, but it also reiterates its efforts towards constant improvement from the 
information given to them by external evaluators.  IAVI has honed systems for monitoring and 
evaluation at multiple levels, but these were developed over time and are still a work in 
progress – a fact its directors admit to204 – and often were altered in light of either internal or 
external review.  That said, a recent five-year evaluation commissioned by the World Bank 
noted IAVI’s strong learning environment intent on continuous improvement as well as 
                                                 
203 These were Roll Back Malaria Global Partnership; IPM; IAVI; Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency 
Partnership; Generation Challenge Programme; Forest Stewardship Council; and AED Satellife. 
204 As noted in MM Interview7. 
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IAVI’s unusual degree of willingness to review its internal operations and compare itself to 
other organisations.  
 
 
7.5 Concluding remarks 
 Despite the vast amounts of attention and resources devoted to PPPs, we are far from 
having conclusive evidence as to their demonstrated effects.  This work presents a common 
partnership framework to address this and focuses on the operational notion of effectiveness as 
effects, though the focus remained on outputs considered as both organisational and 
performance-based.   
This chapter presented a comprehensive view of both aspects of effects across the 
sampling frame of transnational partnerships.  On goal attainment, while all PPPs articulated a 
mission statement, they were less likely to have a guiding vision, which was at first surprising.  
The majority of PPPs did articulate their goals along more than one dimension of outputs, 
outcomes or impacts, though outcomes were the most lacking.  As articulated in other reviews, 
large-n results reveal few made efforts to show how they would reach these impact-goals or 
attribute their work to any resultant performance.  
What emerges is that even when it comes to organisational effects, evidence is quite 
limited.  As expected, independent PPPs, especially those with higher levels of 
institutionalisation, were more likely to produce outputs, though variation in partnership age 
and main partners involved were noted.  As a group, PDPs stood apart regarding many aspects 
of organisational outputs, though there were top and weak performers across all functions and 
sectors.  Further, while the argument is often made that assessing partnerships is “best initiated 
and conducted as a conversation owned first and foremost by the partners themselves” (Caplan  
et al. 2007, 4), the ability of PPPs to track and report on their performance was found to be 
rather lacking.  Striking findings regarding lack of PPP transparency also emerged, especially 
regarding financial reporting; however, even when it came to basic performance updates, 
many PPPs were also lacking.  
These findings raise pressing questions, which should perhaps even caution the 
continued promotion of PPPs until more is known (and published).  As a caveat much of the 
analysis here is based on reported information, or what is available in the public domain (or 
not held confidentially in the case of many reports when PPP directors were happy to share).  
Finding this information was an incredibly time consuming and frustrating task, not the least 
because this information changes so rapidly for the PPPs.  So while one is cautious to be seen 
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as rewarding or punishing PPPs for having updated websites, if these institutions are indeed 
supposed to represent more legitimate forms of governance, then it follows that basic 
accountability, transparency and outputs should be established.   
Finally, as continually articulated, what is lacking is a comprehensive review of the 
universe, or at least a non sector specific, large-n review of transnational partnerships.  The 
many practical, methodological and theoretical difficulties remain, but these initial findings 
regarding input legitimacy and organisational effectiveness are not overly encouraging as to 
the current state of play.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT:  
Towards an understanding of public-private partnerships:  Promise, practice 
and potential of partnering 
 
Transnational partnerships launched onto the global stage with overriding aims of 
effectively addressing pressing challenges and filling governance deficits – gaps left where 
existing institutions and governing arrangements were inadequate.  The problems and foci 
they addressed were ranging, and the forms these PPPs took were many and varied, but that 
transnational partnerships have now reached a rather prominent place within global governing 
arrangements is largely undisputed.  
As introduced at the onset, transnational partnerships harbour overriding concerns 
regarding legitimacy.  They are promoted for their promised enhanced problem solving 
abilities while simultaneously attacked for only lessening democratic principles, such as 
accountability or transparency, or even failing to deliver on their implementation goals.   
While there is evidence that global PPPs have indeed met some of their promised goals, the 
nature of these arrangements, their individual and collective impact and their role moving 
forward is highly debated.    
This work did not set out to solve these debates or provide definitive answers to these 
overriding questions, but it certainly addressed them.  Evaluating PPPs is both an analytical 
and an empirical endeavour, concerned with operations at multiple levels.  Legitimacy and 
effectiveness are key concerns at all levels, and this work constructed a framework which 
encapsulated ranging foci of operating, from the micro to meso to macro levels.  The resultant 
findings represent a solid evidence base to discuss notions of partnership variation, 
functioning and effects.   
This concluding chapter proceeds by first reviewing this work’s main findings while 
the next section addresses persisting theoretical, methodological and analytical considerations.  
The third section returns to the main questions posed at the onset: are PPPs effective and 
legitimate tools of governance?  The next part reviews the limitations of this work and 
explores its unused potential as well as broader avenues for further research.  The final section 
provides summary remarks on future directions for transnational PPPs and their study. 
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8.1 Key Findings 
This work conducted a systematic study of partnerships to assess and compare the 
influence of PPPs at the macro, meso and micro level with varying levels of outputs.  
Analysing different levels obviously necessitated varying research strategies, and while this 
section reviews the main findings from component, one overriding insight that emerged from 
this work was the disconnect between the “published” and the “practice” level, which is to say 
that static listings and information sources, while valuable, are only a snapshot of the 
inherently complex picture that is the practice of transnational partnering.   
 
8.1.1 Transnational partnership universe  
One of the overriding empirical findings from this work speaks directly to the notion 
of transparency: there is simply too little that is known, or can feasibly be uncovered, 
regarding the universe of global PPPs.  This relates to another striking finding concerning the 
state of operations of transnational PPPs.  Considering that it has been six years since the 
Initiative on PPPs for Health (IPPPH) ceased operations; that almost 30% (114 of the original 
404) PPPs sourced for the New Public Finance (NPF) Database have no evidence of 
operational activity post 2008; and 169 of the 348 PPPs hosted within the CSD-database have 
no information available outside of this (self-reported) listing, it is clearly time that as a 
research field we move forward from citing these now sorely outdated database listings.  
While some of these partnerships began with limited timeframes or completed their set 
mandate, for most there was simply no information to verify any form of operations or even 
mere existence.  This is especially troubling considering the CSD-database, as so much of the 
current academic lexicon is based on this. 
It is worth considering these initial TPD findings as intriguing in themselves.  
Questions emerge: are certain types of PPPs more or less likely to be operational than others? 
Are certain functional type PPPs more likely to have limited time frames?  Does actor 
involvement seem to make a difference in terms of PPPs lasting?   While caution is noted 
given these are merely correlations and all TPD findings have an overall transparency 
component built into the results, there are preliminary insights worth briefly noting.  
For instance, over 60% of those PPPs originally engaged in capacity building are no 
longer operational, versus an average of 40% for all.  Over 50% of PPPs that involved only 
government actors from the South are no longer operational, compared to 39% from the North 
only and 36% of those PPPs that initiated without any government actor.  PPPs that were 
incorporated as charities or foundations, regardless of start year or sector focus, were more 
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likely to be operational and exhibit activity over their hosted counterparts.  This is merely a 
snapshot; clearly there is some research potential within these findings alone. While 
continuance should not be associated with success, there are certainly underlying lessons 
regarding this large set of PPPs no longer operating.   
 
Scope and focus: 
With this updated picture on the state of global partnering, another key finding was 
that the highest percentage of the PPPs have a primary function of coordination of resources 
(14%) and another 7% of advocacy.  This raises the question regarding if PPPs are truly 
performance driven if a large majority do not even aim to deliver tangible performance 
outputs?  These issues have been raised before in regards to the CSD-based partnerships 
(Andonova 2006; Bäckstrand 2006; Szulecki, Pattberg and Biermann 2010), but the results 
from the universe at large only amplify this disconnect between the promise of PPPs as 
implementation vehicles (Kara and Quarless 2002) and practice.   
While this work cannot unambiguously address country or region of implementation 
since this is not tracked synonymously across PPPs, the TPD shows that close to two-thirds of 
the PPPs are located in Europe or North America.  Of the sampling frame ITPs, almost half 
are located in Geneva, Washington, D.C. or London alone.  Yet base location is only one 
element of the larger picture, as most PPPs have multiple operating sites, many of which are 
located in developing countries and the base from which operations take place.   
As TPD data can now speak to issues of scale and scope on a new level, an avenue it 
provides is the ability to perform detailed PPP mappings; this means researchers can use the 
database to cross sector, function, scope, as examples, to reach categorisations of PPPs.  For 
those concerned with possible PPP overlap and competition, this is significant as better 
information will not only show the state of play but also further address debates regarding if 
too many PPPs operating can lead to unnecessary overlap and struggles for a limited resource 
pool.  Recall from chapter five that over 15% of the universe of PPPs performed only three 
categorical types: Health/ Information production; Health/ Coordination and Business and 
Finance/Capital provision.  This is a bit alarming, especially if we consider the number of UN 
and IGO agencies and teams dedicated to the former two. 
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Actors and institutionalisation  
From the onset, the TPD shows that 42,175 partners are engaging within (operational) 
PPPs,
205
  an incredible level of involvement in global partnering arrangements.  It is left to the 
reader’s discretion, however, to determine whether or not the finding that only half of 
operational partnerships were tri-sectoral (45% of all PPPs) was expected – or acceptable.  It 
is also worth recalling that when considering representation on main decision making bodies, 
this percentage dropped to 21% for operational PPPs (16% of all).  One finding that emerged 
was the perhaps heavier than expected representation of social actors, as close to 20% had 
public and social partners but no private.  When further considering that this is based on 
claimed numbers and in reality many PPPs work with additional NGOs on the ground, this is 
perhaps more social sector participation than often argued, though the nature of this 
participation is obviously not discernable from documented sources.    
A few other insights were immediately apparent, especially regarding the low level of 
institutionalisation across the universe of PPPs.  This was especially related to the 
predominance of hosted partnerships over independent ones, as three-fourths were the former.   
Perhaps even more surprising was the limited information available to determine even the 
legal status or form of these initiatives.  While an absence of legality may be proclaimed as 
one key feature of partnerships, lacking any formal base it seems that many of these initiatives 
also have relatively short time frames.  PPPs can purposely be less institutionalised, as there 
are advantages to their flexible, networked forms, as expressed by many PPP directors.  
However, to perform effectively within these settings may require much stronger management 
capacity than is currently in place,
206
 as furthered below. 
 
8.1.2 Partnership Management 
This work’s heightened emphasis on management bridges existing empirical, 
evaluative based partnership research that emphases its significance (Lele et al. 2004; Buse 
and Tanaka 2011) with traditional theoretical constructs which point to its relevance. As the 
sixth chapter discussed, while long a factor in models accounting for regime variation, the 
significance of management procedures and processes was an overriding finding from the 
International Regime Database (IRD) project, which argued for the significance of procedural 
                                                 
205 There are overlaps within this number, for example this will count all PPPs in which the UNDP or World Bank 
are involved.  
206 While this was a key finding from the MM interviews, see Buse and Tanaka 2011 who make a similar argument 
regarding GHPs.  
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elements in influencing regime effectiveness (Breitmeier, Young and Zurn 2006; Breitmeier, 
Underdal and Young 2009). 
This work conducted a structured management interview based on a global 
management methodology to evaluate the internal management across 25 dimensions of 
practice.  The findings were intriguing: overall, management varied greatly across the PPPs, 
but it was especially weak for hosted PPPs.  PPPs were weaker on operational elements, but 
two areas in particular: 1) Operations management: adopting best practices and 2) 
Performance management: holding performance dialogues were the worst scoring across all 
PPPs.  This is critical as it goes to the core of arguments that partnerships have a key role in 
enhancing learning and knowledge sharing.  PPPs are promoted for their capabilities as 
learning forums, yet one of their two most noted weaknesses are learning/ sharing from other 
organisations. 
Another finding that resonated was hosted PPPs’ weaknesses in target-setting and 
planning, especially regarding performance and strategic issues, the latter being particularly 
weak.  Perhaps contrary to popular perceptions, however, performance tracking was relatively 
strong across PPPs.  That said, even the most institutionalised ones lacked the resources and/or 
capacity to review and discuss these performance metrics and reports, the stakeholder 
dialogues mentioned above.  This is significant for PPP stakeholders, especially funders and 
hosts, as it implies there will be much less value in applying common metrics if they are not 
being utilised in ways which feed back into and improve the PPPs’ work. 
Those PPPs that were better managed shared a few characteristics, in general they 
were independent, had higher levels of institutionalisation, and more than one layer or body of 
governance.  The relationships between the boards and operational staff also seemed to matter, 
as the better performing PPPs were provided with guidance on strategic and technical issues 
but had an appropriate amount of autonomy which allowed them to make necessary 
operational decisions in a timely manner.  These are not necessarily surprising findings, but 
what is striking is how much these were exemplified in varying ways across the partnerships.  
Finally, though this work did not set out to explicitly do so, there is a constant quest to 
compare performance across PPPs, or output legitimacy more broadly.  In addition to its 
existing value, it could be argued that the findings from the MM interviews are another proxy 
that speaks towards comparative performance.  It is firmly established that well managed 
institutions, in both the public and private sector, perform better, across multiple indicators of 
performance (Bloom and Van Reenen 2010).  Better managed firms have higher profitability, 
sales growth and – significantly – survival rates (Homkes 2011).  Hospitals with strong 
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management are safer, better performers financially and have higher levels of patient and 
employee satisfaction levels (Bloom et al. 2010b).  It is perhaps not too much of a stretch to 
suggest that practices that matter in the public, private and social sectors also matter when 
combining these sectoral-based actors together in an institution.   
 
8.1.3 Effects 
Though the focus remained on tangible effects in this work, the findings speak 
directly towards PPPs’ efforts towards both problem solving and goal attainment 
effectiveness.  Since it is argued that PPPs are increasingly justified based on their ability to 
achieve goals set out (Bull and McNeill 2010), the Goals database was a necessary exercise.  
PPPs are promoted as development engines focused on pragmatic delivery and 
implementation (Inanova 2003; Andonova and Levy 2003; Mert 2008), yet the Goals findings 
showed that many PPPs do not articulate goals or mission in these terms.  The analysis also 
revealed lacking precision in articulation of goals and missions, clarity obviously necessary to 
further assess PPPs’ actual goal attainment.  As most existing frameworks, both academic and 
practitioner focused, segment effectiveness into outputs, outcomes and impacts (Biermann et 
al. 2007b; OED 2004; IHP+2008), whether or not PPPs’ articulate their goals in these ways 
should be understood.  Not only did this work show that only 44% of PPPs aim towards all 
three, the majority struggled most to clearly articulate outcome, or behavioural level, goals.   
More fundamentally, this work’s findings revealed two clear disconnects.  The first is 
a mismatch between articulated goals and the activities in which the PPPs’ focused the 
majority of its time and effort.  The other striking and related finding is that when considering 
PPPs’ articulated goals against their institutional setting and organisational outputs, there is an 
exemplification of the “expectations-capacities gap” (Elsig and Amalric 2008, 403), which is a 
disconnect as despite the overarching aims expressed by PPPs (72% articulated impact 
oriented goals), many had not established the institutional capacity to realistically work 
towards these.   
Organisational outputs - such as developing a business plan or articulating rules for 
partners joining - speak to problem solving, as these reflect PPPs’ capacity towards 
performance delivery.  That across all PPPs, especially those that were hosted, these elements 
of institutional effectiveness were so lacking (Bäckstrand  2010), is clearly an issue when 
addressing whether or not PPPs will gain legitimacy based of their performance.  A significant 
finding was that the PPPs that were the most institutionalised were also those that produced 
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the most organisational outputs, had highest levels of transparency and accountability and 
tracked and reported their performance. 
 Though this work argued that assessing and comparing problem-solving performance 
is perhaps best done at the functional level, the applicability of organisational effects in 
speaking towards these was clear.  This is especially the case as organisational outputs could 
be tracked across PPPs, regardless of sector, function, duration or partners involved.  When 
this work did speak to performance, the findings were not optimistic.  
Though PPPs are promoted as delivering results-based government, reviews 
consistently note the strikingly low number of GHPs or CSD-based partnerships that conduct 
internal evaluations or impact assessments (Utting and Zammit 2006; Buse and Harmer 2007); 
a finding this work confirms across the universe of PPPs.  While 70% tracked or articulated 
performance in any form, this could have been as limited as their organisational-based goals or 
activities completed.   Only one-third of the PPPs had been externally evaluated, and while the 
majority reported or tracked performance in some way, fewer did so with well articulated 
metrics. 
There is still a lot to be said.  At the end of the day, effects and outputs are variables, 
and these do not get to the question of whether or not PPPs have made (or make) a real 
difference.  To get closer to this, one could do a meta analysis of the external and internal 
evaluations, which as briefly mentioned in the second chapter is included as part of the online 
resource library of the PPP Platform Project.
207
  Even this or similar exercises, however, self-
selects PPPs that have been evaluated, which in itself may bias the results towards those that 
are better performers. 
 
8.2 Theoretical implications, analytical tensions and methodological consideration 
 While this work does not explore PPP effectiveness on a large-n basis, the findings 
and analysis certainly suggest it is time to move PPP studies from general discussions 
regarding reasons for PPP emergence and their resultant diversity and instead place more 
emphasis on analysing the specific drivers of this variation, especially as to how this variation 
impacts the degree to which PPPs matter.  This present subsection discusses the relevant 
analytical, theoretical and methodological considerations this analysis entails.   
 
 
                                                 
207 As mentioned in earlier chapters, this analysis was not included within this work due to space and fit, but from 
January 2012, all PPP external and internal evaluations as well as financial and annual reports can be directly 
downloaded from globalppps.org.    
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8.2.1: Analytical considerations  
Despite ongoing normalisation of PPPs within global public policy, they continue to 
be approached from varying perspectives and diverging schools of thought.  While this has led 
to conceptual and certainly terminology-based disarray, it also represents a real opportunity.  
Substantial progress towards understanding and evaluating partnerships has been made within 
the fields of public administration (especially that associated with New Public Management), 
political science, economics, management and organisational studies and international 
relations more broadly.  Yet, with the exception of a few recent edited volumes which draw 
together varying approaches (Glasbergen, Biermann and Mol 2007; Bexell and Mörth 2010) 
and a few exceptions in health partnership evaluations (Buse and Harmer 2004), utilising 
mixed approaches is still rare.   
This is puzzling: the set of academics, practitioners and scholars studying partnering 
institutions, which are based on resource sharing and cross-sector learning, is lagging in 
applying these collaborative principles to their own research!  Rather than contradictory, 
however, these approaches should be seen as complementary.  There is considerable value to 
be gained by broadening the sense of applicable analytical tools and methods. Indeed, the 
marked diversity of PPPs and their complex character necessitate a cross-disciplinary focus, as 
this work attempted with its multidisciplinary approach. 
A few analytical limitations regarding the approaches taken are worth noting.  First, it 
could perhaps be questioned whether or not the process of TPD creation was even necessary.  
Since PPPs are so divergent, often temporary and lacking in common or consistently utilised 
terminology, is there even a need to attempt to numerate and define the universe?  Many 
would suggest not.  Yet this work argues that to move the study of partnerships forward, this 
empirical exercise was necessary.  In order to advance both the theoretical and normative 
understanding of PPPs, researchers should start from a more informed base of what truly 
constitutes the current practice of transnational partnering, even if this is subject to change.  
This means not only updating our knowledge base but also moving comparative studies 
beyond those that are only CSD-based (Biermann et al. 2007a), health-focused (Caines 2005) 
or UN-Business partnership centered (Martens 2007; Gregoratti 2010). 
Another overriding analytical concern relates to the partnership unit of focus.  Given, 
the varied terms and notions surrounding what constitutes a partnership – even to the PPP 
directors themselves - conceptual clarity is lacking.  While this work attempted to focus on the 
PPP institution itself, this was challenged throughout, not the least due to the role many PPPs 
take as facilitators and convenors across partners and other institutions.  Definitional precision 
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and a narrowed conception were obviously necessary.  However, this implies the findings are 
limited in their explanatory power, as this work cannot capture effects across the respective 
partners or those stemming from branch or country operations, as examples.   
Also critical is that partnerships, like regimes, “make a difference by shaping the ways 
participants frame issues, define problem solving strategies and evaluate results” (Breitmeier 
Young and Zurn 2006, 234).  It is difficult to firmly say we have the right techniques to 
account for this, though the relevance of doing so became apparent throughout, especially as 
so many PPPs saw their role purely as facilitators of relevant partner actions.  Though the 
organisational outputs assessed did not reach these conceptions, the MM interviews may have 
a role to play in capturing these elements.  Yet it is critical to remember that the MM analysis 
clearly showed the difficulty many PPPs face in capturing knowledge learned from other 
institutions, or even their own partners.  Most struggled to facilitate interaction on their own 
terms rather than those mandated by donors or host organisations.   
While the pragmatic approach utilised had the advantage of separating the process of 
identifying effects from making judgements regarding relative effectiveness.  That said, one 
could debate whether these organisational features should be considered outputs at all.  For 
one, these were comparable assessments of institutional effectiveness which assessed aspects 
of PPPs institutional capacity.  That they were lacking in so many PPPs, implies that not only 
are these justifiable, but they are a needed starting point in assessing effects.  This is especially 
true as these speak both towards procedural or input legitimacy as well as the partnership’s 
performance-delivery capacity. 
Given this work’s framework, many of the findings and exhibited correlations were 
expected.  Since the outputs assessed were organisational-based, it is not surprising that PPPs 
with higher levels of institutionalisation exhibited higher levels of outputs.  Another issue is 
that given the methods utilised for information collection, overriding elements of input 
legitimacy – especially transparency and external accountability - are necessary to assess 
PPPs.  Gathering the related information or determining operational activity is only possible 
with published information, websites or verifiable contact information.  Thus a strong 
correlation between input and output legitimacy is not just expected, it is largely 
predetermined.   
This is not necessarily an issue, though, as this work did not set out to evaluate 
performance but only speak towards performance with its maintained focus on institutional 
effectiveness.  Further, this work was not looking specifically to test hypotheses but rather to 
expose and analyse variation across PPPs.  Moving forward, studies will hopefully feed this 
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information back into more refined models that do speak towards the relationship between 
inputs, input legitimacy, processes and outputs in a more targeted fashion.    
Those who approach these governance entities from a constructivist perspective may 
argue that as PPPs are so deeply embedded within a broader institutional or societal setting, 
keeping the focus at the individual level is insufficient.  This limitation is certainly 
acknowledged, and this also entails that this work is not able to consider partnerships’ 
interactions with other institutions and PPPs, or institutional interplay.  PPPs by nature are 
embedded within complex governance systems, where roles, aims and foci may not only be 
overlapping but also competing.  Institutional linkages and the embeddedness within system 
more broadly are areas of significant and growing concern (Young et al. 1999/2005; see also 
Selin and VanDeever 2009), especially in relation to health system impacts of GHPs, which 
this work is not able to fully reach.   
As the key focus in this work was on explaining variation, and not evaluating 
effectiveness, some of these analytical tensions may be slightly less of a concern, but the 
significance of understanding linkages, especially as they may lead to cumulative impacts, 
should not be understated.  While the general shift is moving towards evaluating system-wide 
versus PPP specific effects (Stillman and Bennett 2005), this is still in early days and largely 
regulated to GHPs.  While analysing multiple dimensions across many PPPs which this work 
does holds value, there is a need to develop knowledge regarding the effects of PPPs together.   
 
8.2.2 Theoretical implications 
PPPs sit at a crossroads of crosscutting research motivated by fundamental questions 
regarding the role institutions play as determinants of societal outcomes.  While PPPs do not 
fit clearly within the lexicon of institutions, organisations and regimes, they are not radical 
departures from these traditional conceptions.  Given that partnerships are promoted to meet 
specific governance demands created by gaps where existing, traditional governing 
arrangements are lacking, it quite naturally followed to conceptualise partnerships as social 
institutions.  Doing so provides a clear linkage to social sciences theories associated with the 
new institutionalism, from which this work drew heavily in developing its theoretical 
framework.  Such perspectives not only highlight the roles institutions play, but they also 
further support the need for ongoing studies and assessments to account for the variation that 
institutions exhibit, especially as it relates to their outcomes. 
It is worth now reflecting on the theoretical implications of this work’s findings, 
especially given the developments of institutionalist theory more broadly in the past decade.  
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This discussion proceeds by revisiting these traditional constructs; linking partnership studies 
to more recent developments within institutionalist studies; and finally placing transnational 
partnerships within broader theoretical pictures while highlighting additional possibilities for 
further theoretical synthesis. 
Revisiting constructs: At the onset, it was suggested that while general debates about 
power, interests and ideas, or realism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism have a 
role to play, alone these constructs could not fulfil the theoretical needs or analytical task at 
hand.  This was not startling: regime theorists have long called for institutional research to 
move towards understanding the “specific causal mechanisms” which would lend more value 
to analysis than “general appeals to the role of power, interests or ideas as master variables” 
(Breitmeier, Young and Zurn 2006, 248).   
As neorealist accounts give less credence to the role of institutions, they are perhaps less 
useful when attempting to explain variation in design and effects (Waltz 1979).  However, the 
relevance of power approaches cannot be cast aside, as “questions of power go to the heart of 
much that is contentious about PPP[s]” (Buse and Harmer 2004, 50).  Power-based accounts 
consider institutions as steering instruments, whose purpose is in furthering the interests of 
their most powerful actors. As the second chapter discussed, these approaches align with 
critics who accuse PPPs of being vehicles through which these power players shape the global 
health agenda; some say this is in furtherance of neoliberalism that promotes corporate 
globalisation (Utting and Zammit 2009).  Power and interests are obviously inherently linked 
in these accusations, as it is argued PPPs are mechanisms through which dominant players 
reinforce their hegemony.  This is especially articulated regarding the UN and its relevant 
agencies (Utting 2002) as well as top funders, notably the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
(BMGF) (McCoy and McGoey 2011).   
Unfortunately, the macro-level, systemic elements of this work cannot speak directly to 
these arguments, except as to relative actor involvement and decision making structures.  Yet 
while these macro pictures speak towards these debates in terms of statistics and positions, the 
reality is that the relationships between members, the dynamics involved and influence of both 
internal processes and practices and external environmental context matter to a great extent.
208
  
                                                 
208 As introduced in the fourth chapter, in addition to the MM interviews, this work also conducted a set of semi-
structured interviews with the directors/managers of four PDPs.  While this discussion and related analysis is not 
included within the current work, these detailed conversations allowed for this work’s basic framework to be 
empirically drawn out on a micro level.  Even within this narrow set of PDPs there was marked variation in 
organisational design, partner requirements, management practices, and perceived level of effects, as examples.  
The process of conducting set MM interview as an initial diagnostic and then following up with these interviews 
was also revealing and married the overriding theoretical base of the approach with focused empirical study.  These 
are areas this work is continuing to explore.   
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These internal partnering dynamics manifest themselves in varying ways, many of which this 
work’s MM interviews were able to capture. Clearly there is a need for more comparative, 
empirical works capable of assessing this systematically, which would allow us to move 
forward from partnering rhetoric and to get to the practice level, as furthered below. 
Certainly retaining value, neoliberal institutionalist perspectives lent much in building 
the utilised framework.  Specifically, this work drew from a well developed body of literature 
that explains variation in institutional scope, centralization, decision-making rules and 
flexibility as a function of distribution and enforcement problems, the number and asymmetry 
of actors involved, and uncertainty (Koremenos et al. 2004).  While on a large-n basis, these 
variables could not be fully explored within each PPP, clear relationships emerged between 
types and number of actors involved in the PPP and the issue area of focus with different 
governance and decision making structures, and notably, different choices made regarding 
institutional design.  The impact of institutional design, especially related to entity type 
(hosted vs independent) and level of institutionalisation were overriding explanatory variables 
in this work’s findings.  For example, higher levels of institutionalisation were most strongly 
correlated with organisational outputs, financial performance and PPPs’ tendency towards 
performance tracking indicators.    
This work’s findings reinforced its earlier arguments regarding the necessity to move 
beyond rational actor calculations.  Actors do not always choose to join or interact within 
PPPs according to well-defined models.  These accounts would expect rational, efficiency 
seeking actors to create fairly similar institutions; the universe of PPPs shows this is clearly 
not the case.  Partnerships were often operating in the same functional area with similar actors, 
yet exhibited great variation regarding institutional design, organisational structure and 
certainly level of outputs and effects produced.  Even the cases of PDPs, with narrowly 
defined foci and the same actors, designed themselves in highly divergent ways and have also 
achieved varying levels of perceived and actual performance.   Thus, while power and 
interests are critical elements, both in describing the partnering phenomenon itself and in 
understanding its internal dynamics and workings, they are less valuable as explanatory 
constructs.  Especially on a large-n basis, they have less predictive value when it comes to the 
resultant forms taken, decisions made and effects produced by PPPs.   
As the second chapter discussed, constructivists bring ideas into the picture.  These 
accounts conceptualise the emergence of PPPs not as the product of most powerful interests, 
nor the result of self-calculating actors pursuing more legitimate and effective governance 
outcomes, but rather due to the evolution of shared ideas (Wendt 1999). These accounts 
289 
 
associate PPPs with a dominant discourse which pushes a “win-win” synergistic relationship 
between public and private actors.  Once these overriding ideas become fixed within the 
popular lexicon, they are rarely questioned, and this prevents the proper assessment of 
alternative approaches (Buse and Harmer 2004, 51).    
It is becoming more common to apply these approaches, and there is clear explanatory 
value in these, especially where functional accounts fail to fully account for PPP 
emergence.
209
  Considering the surge of PPPs, especially in the three year period following the 
WSSD, despite lacking evidence of their effects – or even their mere operation – furthers these 
arguments.  Bäckstrand  further argues that CSD-based partnerships represent a partnership 
discourse which (still) does not manifest itself in practice,
210
  and while the CSD partnerships 
have furthered transnational activity, they remain “business as usual” (Bexell and Mörth 2010, 
218), a finding echoed most notably when considering GHPs (Jonsson 2010).    
When it comes to explaining the PPPs’ resultant variation and internal workings, these 
accounts add less value.  Still, the utilisation of discourse analysis
211
 in partnership studies is 
proving increasingly relevant, especially as more recent work on CSD-based partnerships 
(Mert 2008) argues that discourse can account not only for their emergence but also the 
varying institutional forms they take.  Outside of CSD-based partnerships or subsets of GHPs, 
however, these accounts have not been fully tested empirically.  It is also likely they will 
continue to be insufficient alone in attempting to explain institutional variation, especially 
when it comes to effects or performance more broadly.   
There are intriguing possible applications moving forward.  This work’s MM 
interviews are tangentially linked to similar constructs, and as continued works reveal the 
relevance of these approaches to partnership analysis, the ability to incorporate this more 
solidly into the theoretical framework would be significant.  Similar linkages have been made 
regarding regimes, such as Litfin’s (1994) work on stratospheric ozone, which showed how 
programmatic activities played a role in altering the discourse in terms of which problems are 
discussed. Clearly partnerships, as regimes, engage in problem definition, but it is through the 
internal workings and management that the full “content of the set of problem solving 
strategies considered” (Breitmeier Young and Zurn 2006, 233).  Moving forward, it would be 
                                                 
209 See Andonova 2006 and 2007 among others for arguments debunking functional arguments regarding PPP 
emergence, as discussed in chapter two.  The fifth chapter of this work furthered this argument, especially in that 
sectoral breakdown and actor involvement across the universe of PPPs. 
210 Bäckstrand also argues that rather than the rise of privatisation, the CSD partnerships only further reflect, 
continued power of IGOs, who “have found new tasks in being facilitators and administrators,” a finding this work 
reinforces over the universe of PPPs (2010, 163-164). 
211 See, among others, the edited volume by Böcher, Giessen and Kleinschmit 2007 as well as Van Huijstee and 
Glasbergen 2008 as applied to CSR.  
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interesting to investigate ways for the integration of these IR-based constructs and 
perspectives into a revamped MM grid to clearly speak to this theoretical camp.
212
  
Since these theories suffer most when considering partnerships’ inner workings, this work 
incorporated organisational studies, management perspectives and behavioural economics 
constructs, which allowed for a more robust exploration of variation in and across PPPs.  The 
applicability of this work’s MM interviews, which probe into these dimensions in a structured 
way would allow for a more grounded integration of these studies.  As an analytical tool and 
methodological exercise, these could perhaps allow the discipline to bridge between current 
IR-based attempts and a set of useful models and theories linking organisational design, 
management and performance. 
From institutions to governance:  While the new institutionalism is approached from 
several distinct analytical strands,
213
  the intellectual capital these approaches provide was 
obviously critical in developing this work’s underlying framework.  Two particular strands on 
the role of institutions, the collective-action perspective and the social-action perspective 
(Young 2002b) were explored, especially in the sixth chapter when discussing the 
management versus enforcement approach to compliance (March and Olsen 1998).  The logic 
of appropriateness versus the logic of consequences have long been tenets of institutional 
research, ongoing work on the institutional dimensions of environmental change (Young, 
King and Schroeder 2008) has more recently found increasing relevance of a third strand, 
termed the knowledge-action perspective.  This emphasises the role of leadership, knowledge 
brokers or “partner champions,” and governance systems more broadly (Breitmeier, Young 
and Zurn 2006).  While these three perspectives have not yet been fully merged into a unified 
theory of institutions, researchers are beginning to use all three simultaneously to explain 
variation in institutional success or failure. Developments of the knowledge action approach, 
especially if married with current ongoing research on PPPs, could prove of considerable 
value in providing a more coherent contextual base for partnership analysis, as well as lend 
much more value in explaining not only institutional variation but persistence.   
These constructs sit with partnership research in a broader stream of studies considering 
the success and failure of governance systems.  Partnerships, as institutions, emerge to fill the 
“demand for steering mechanisms to guide societies toward outcomes that are socially 
beneficial and away from outcomes that are harmful” (Young 2008, 14), and in doing so, 
become elements of governance systems more broadly.  Perhaps the most critical application 
                                                 
212 As discussed in chapter six, the MM interviews provide a clear structured, conceptually sound way of capturing 
these responses, coding, scoring and comparing them. 
213 See, for example, March and Olsen 1989 and Scott 1995. 
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relates to recent developments within institutional research associated with the trend to move 
concern from institutions to “governance,” involving the consideration of beliefs, norms, 
cultures, and wider stakeholder interests as well as the institutional and environmental setting 
(ibid, 15).  This implies, as this work also argues, that while the transnational partnerships 
analysed throughout this work have a governing role to play, their forms, functioning and 
ultimately performance will be strongly conditioned by the environments in which they 
operate.   
Broader context:  In attempting to place PPPs within broader debates, the issue of 
defining the interests at play emerges.  This work has argued that hybrid forms of 
transnational governance challenge existing frameworks, but the terminology behind this 
hybridization – the public versus private distinction – should perhaps also be challenged.  The 
findings emerging throughout this work support Dingwerth and Henrieder’s (2010) more 
recent argument that focus should be on normative spheres of governance rather than sharply 
defining public and private actors as those holding public and private interests.
214
  This is a 
critical distinction, and one this work supports, as the macro level analysis here showed the 
necessity of separating terminology from practice when defining sectoral actors.   
That said, perceived moral authority, which stems from these held distinctions, cannot 
be understated.  Many PPPs partner with certain institutions, notably the WHO for PDPs, 
because they feel that given the political or socioeconomic environmental context in which 
they operate, having this partner named is necessary.  Thus most of the PPPs noted that 
rhetoric and labels still mattered on a macro basis. 
At the same time, should we still be considering democratic notions from a state-
centered perspective, especially considering many PPPs had very little state involvement in 
the actual workings?  Should we still start with these traditional IR constructs as a base if the 
borders between state and society continue to blur?  This echoes arguments made by Bexell 
and Mörth (2010) who argue that we need to rethink fundamentally the locus of democratic 
responsibility and let go of its state-centric focus” (2010, 223).  If there is truly a 
reconstitution of the public domain (Ruggie 2004), and the notions of public and state can no 
longer be assumed, then there is a need to deepen our understanding of these implications.  
Especially as we should perhaps no longer use public and state interchangeably (Bexell and 
Mörth 2010, 223), it may be time to move the field forward.  This would require more micro-
level, large-n, comparative research, however, a point section 8.4 returns to. 
                                                 
214 This work’s MM interviews reinforced this point, as though the distinction between public and private, both in 
terms of staff and donors, often arose it was almost always in relation to ways and modes of working rather than 
normative ideals and values.   
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Expanding the toolkit:  Finally, research is obviously dynamic, both as to its subject 
matters and the body of theory which surrounds it.  Though there is an inherent risk in 
expanding one’s theoretical toolkit, it is worth further considering the relevance of existing 
bodies of theories from the management disciplines, specifically on corporate alliances in 
transnational partnership research.   
This is certainly not the first work to point to their relevance, but as partnerships 
become more “firm” focused, and as donors push for more tangible, organisational outputs, it 
is fair to argue these models will continue to gain more credence.  As the third chapter argued, 
there are many applicable frameworks speaking towards firm organisation, structuring and 
organisational dynamics, and specifically how these speak to variations in performance, which 
should rightfully be brought more fully into PPP works, especially as these are more 
developed on the national level.
215
   
What is also interesting, and only emerged throughout the course of this work, 
specifically through the conversations surrounding the MM interviews
216
 is the relevance of 
emerging body of works focusing on theory and practice of private-sector based start ups.  It is 
intriguing how many characteristics PPPs and these firms share, in terms of size, scope and 
learning phases, as well as heightened level of “death” (lack of existence).   Are there 
applicable lessons, in both theory and practice?  As an interesting example, while it is often 
argued PPPs’ need clear, well articulated business and strategic plans, a recent study of three 
hundred private sector start-ups found that sticking with the initial business plan without 
revision was one of the greatest predictors of failure (Roberts and Tempest 1998)!  Moving 
PPP analysis forward, especially in areas where institutional literature fails, gaps could readily 
be filled with these developing, albeit young, theories.  
 
8.2.3 Methodological considerations  
This thesis had methodological as well as substantive goals.  Facilitating research in 
an area wrought with conceptual and vocabulary-based ambiguities is no easy task.  Designing 
and building the TPD and its sub-databases was a challenging undertaking that required 
ongoing process definition and decisions, which this work tried to make clear.  While the 
methodological contributions are significant, there are limitations worth noting.  
                                                 
215 See Rosenau 2000 on national partnerships and Benz and Papadopoulous 2006 for discussion of democratic 
governance at different levels of operating. 
216 The semi-structured interviews with four product development partnerships were also insightful in pulling in 
these perspectives, as these PPPs functioning between public actors, biotechnology startups, research institutions 
and NGOs on the ground provide a fruitful venue for more applications of this emerging body of research.   
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There are obviously methodological implications inherent to large-n studies as they 
are limited to an extent in their explanatory power.  They involve the inherent trade-off that 
they can identify what happens across partnerships, but they cannot go deeply into individual 
partnerships nor present more than initial analysis on effectiveness.  The value they provide is 
in putting existing qualitative, case-study based research into context, which cannot be 
overstated considering the lack regarding PPP studies. 
During this research, while the tendency for scope-creep was persistent, during the 
process the scope had to be re-focused given the realms of feasibility.  It also became apparent 
that this research stood to contribute more through large-n empirical assessment of 
partnerships and by the systematic approach taken to the measurement of inputs, practices and 
outputs.  Given this, the decision was made to focus on comparison of effects rather than the 
more subjective nature of effectiveness. 
The analytical techniques used, especially when considering the relationships between 
inputs and outputs, were also basic and mainly involved establishing simple correlations and 
explaining exhibited relationships.  This was mainly due to feasibility of scope, though the 
exception relates to the MM interviews, in which basic OLS regressions were performed with 
management as the dependent variable and various factors, such as institutionalisation or age, 
as explanatory variables.
217
   
Considering the wealth of information and variables tracked within the TPD and 
Outputs, there are considerable opportunities to bring more powerful statistical tools to the 
table.  Of course, this would involve addressing a host of issues common to regime 
researchers.  One worth noting is the high degree of multicollinearity among independent 
variables in the analysis.  This is a strong caution, as this high correlation between variables 
was established.  For example, PPPs with higher levels of institutionalisation are not only 
more likely to produce outputs or effects, certain types of PPPs, notably independent ones or 
those focused on research and development were generally scaled at high levels.  Thus while 
there was a degree of convergence across functional types, certain inputs will no doubt be 
impossible to fully disentangle. 
Qualitative techniques also have a role to play, and here the potential of the MM 
interviews is promising.  Conducting this structured interview across the full sampling frame 
would substantially advance the understanding of PPP management and governance, and also 
                                                 
217 This is largely as this set of statistical procedures is accepted and proven across industries (Bloom and Van 
Reenen 2010; Bloom et al. 2010b), so there a knowledge base to draw from, as well as within feasible ranges of a 
single researcher.  See Mitchell 2008 for useful overview and Breitmeier, Underdal and Young 2009 for recent 
advances in quantitative techniques as applied to regime analysis.   
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give greater credence to claims of generalisability regarding these preliminary findings.  A 
methodological strength of the MM interviews it that these allow for both types of techniques 
to be used simultaneously.  By combining methodological tools, we are in a better position to 
identify patterns, assess alternative interpretations and enhance understanding more broadly. 
It is always necessary to address issues of generalisability or how much this work’s 
findings could be considered more broadly relevant.  As it was large-n versus case study 
oriented, this is a different - though not lacking - concern.  At issue are the PPPs that 
underwent additional analysis: the 147 within the sampling frame, a subset of which 
underwent MM interviews. The sampling frame represented a specific set of institutionalised 
partnering interactions, yet their distinguishing characteristics were their tri-sectoral, 
transnational nature, rather than sector, function, location or key funder/host partner, so the 
findings can be considered relevant across universe.  Further, their diversity in institutional 
form and function was remarkable, though this in itself limited the analysis that could be done 
on comparable effects, it emerged other insights noted above. 
Regarding the MM interviews, it was acknowledged that PPPs without a centre point 
or evidence of operational activity obviously self-select themselves out of consideration.  
While this was a concern going in, as the sixth chapter discussed, analysis, in line with the 
global methodology, was conducted to ensure a representative subset as compared to the 
sampling frame broadly.  More so, there was remarkably no bias in terms of response rates for 
high performing or low performing partnerships.  There was great variety in country of 
operations (PPPs were interviewed that were based in Nairobi and New York City), sector of 
focus and level of institutionalisation, as these breakdowns of the subset were in line with the 
sample frame more broadly.
218
 
 
8.3 Effective and legitimate tools of governance?  
 Returning now to the overriding questions which fuelled this work, what are the 
contributions of PPPs to global governance?  Are the promises of effective and legitimate 
governance actors being fulfilled?  Admittedly, this work is just a start, and it was not 
attempting to provide definitive answers or sound conclusions, but a few remarks are worth 
presenting on the practice of PPPs in these regards.   
What does the information presented here tell one regarding the current state of the 
universe of PPPs, especially in regards to their ability to address these noted governance gaps?  
The now familiar notion suggests that legitimacy stems from democratic (input) legitimacy, 
                                                 
218 As discussed in chapter six, only three functional areas were targeted.   
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effectiveness (output legitimacy), expertise or knowledge and moral authority (Bull and 
McNeill 2007, 32-5; Steets and Blattner 2010; Bexell and Mörth 2010).  While this work 
focused most on the tradeoffs between the former two, the research addressed these latter 
issues throughout the discussion.   
While PPPs are promoted given their ability to address these pressing governance 
deficits, achieving legitimacy will be essential if partnerships wish to become accepted and 
established global governance arrangements (Glasbergen 2007, 14).  The democratic pitfalls 
of PPPs are increasingly criticised, which questions some of these firmly held premises 
regarding their rise to power.   
There are long-standing debates over enhancing the participation of a variety of 
stakeholders in global governance.  Should these institutions be designed to guarantee a 
balance of diverse perspectives, representatives from North and South?  Does the private 
versus public interests involved matter?  Are traditionally marginalised groups included within 
PPPs, as their promoters promise?  Though perhaps it is representation which matters more, 
an argument the discourse from the MM interviews clearly supported.  Do PPPs take care to 
ensure equitable interest representation on governing bodies? More fundamentally, do 
stakeholders know who these members are and what decisions are taken?  This relates to the 
matter of accountability: should, PPPs be accountable to their partners/ members or their 
funders?  Did PPPs exhibit basic notions of accountability standards in these regards? 
 These questions which this work addressed return to the notion of transparency, 
which reigned throughout as an overriding concern.  This obviously impacted the entire study, 
as without accessible information, not least to say timely or relevant information, little could 
be collected and assessed across PPPs.  As these debates were furthered throughout the work, 
only a synopsis of the universe of PPPs is provided here.
219
 (Table 8.1) 
It is certain that PPPs challenge traditional conceptions of these terms, and more 
fundamentally for research purposes, different partnership can require different forms of 
legitimacy and accountability (Steets and Blattner 2010, 64-7). It has been argued that 
institutions lacking input legitimacy can address this by enhancing their output legitimacy and 
related problem-solving capacities (Scharp 1997; 1999).  Thus, if PPPs are lacking in terms of 
procedural legitimacy, as long as they are effectively providing collective goods, dealing with 
problems of global commons (e.g. Kaul, Grunberg and Stern 1999) or addressing global health 
concerns, as examples, this could compensate for deficits in procedural elements.  Especially 
if one adheres to the argument that partnerships were furthered as implementation vehicles and 
                                                 
219 See Bäckstrand (2010, 154) on which this framework is loosely based. 
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pragmatic responses, rather than as means to enhance global stakeholder participation (Mert 
2008), this would be defensible.  So, is there evidence on the implementation side? 
This work approached this by analysing effectiveness as goal attainment and problem 
solving. The findings across the universe highlight that there is a clear lack of clarity and 
articulation when it comes to goals set, and for many PPPs even the goals are difficult to track 
due to lacking transparency, which will obviously hinder eventual assessment.  Further, this 
work’s MM interviews showed that for many PPPs, the focus remained on organisational 
elements, not performance-based ones. Many PPPs functioned as facilitators and aimed for 
little to no activity on their own, relying on coordinated partners to do this.  This point is 
worth raising once more because that PPPs lack the internal mechanisms and staff/ capacity 
resources to effectively coordinate their partners and capture best practices emerged 
throughout this work.   
The analysis of organisational outputs showed a mixed state of play with some top 
performers, but many are struggling to produce and publish basic organisational documents.  It 
was intriguing that the better performing PPPs in terms organisational effectiveness were 
independent with high levels of institutionalisation and limited hands-on control from either 
IGOs or donors, at least in the operational activities.  If the most effective, producing, PPPs 
are those with the highest levels of institutionalisation, are PPPs as flexible, innovative 
institutions still representing added value?  Again, this is not to deny the role that the adept 
nature of PPPs institutional structure plays, nor is this to say PPPs must be highly 
institutionalised to be effective.  What resonates, however, is without a minimum level of 
institutionalisation, it appeared that transparency and accountability were lacking, 
organisational outputs were few and there was little to no evidence of performance. 
Debates regarding PPP legitimacy and effectiveness will and should continue.  As an area 
of partnership research, it is receiving heightened attention that is still raising more questions 
than solid conclusions, especially as most work focuses on CSD-based or GHPs in these 
regards.   
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Table 8.1 Transnational PPPs: Legitimate tools of governance? 
Snapshot of preliminary analysis regarding input legitimacy for universe of PPPs (757 
partnerships)  
Input legitimacy 
Inclusiveness Accountability Transparency 
-45% of PPPs had tri-
sectoral partner base; 51% 
for those still operating 
 
-70% had at least one 
government partner while 
50% had at least one 
business and 50% at least 
one NGO 
 
-The UN or one of its 
agencies partnered in over 
half of PPPs but less than 
20% had a social-sector 
partner that was not an 
NGO or academic institute 
 
-Less than 40% of PPPs had 
at least one partner from 
the south 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-Very little evidence that 
PPPs had accountability 
mechanisms in place 
 
-No formalised systems for 
internal or external 
accountability established 
 
-Only 13% of PPPs 
published guiding legal 
documents (22% for 
operational) 
 
-For 20% of the hosted 
PPPs, no information could 
be found on governance 
structure or governing 
members 
 
-Only 49% of the PPPs had 
an operational website; 
though this is 85% when 
considering only 
operational PPPs 
-Overall transparency was 
weak 
 
-Only 32% published an 
annual report (46% for 
operational) 
 
-Financial statements and 
reports were only available 
for 17% of PPPs and 27% 
operational 
 
-For only 13% of PPPs was 
a guiding legal document 
published; 22% for 
operational 
 
-For 169 of the 352 CSD-
based partnerships, no 
information could be 
found outside of their 
original CSD entry 
 
  
 
 
Source: TPD, 2011 
 
These are complex challenges.  There are - and will continue to be - tradeoffs between 
these inputs, procedural elements and outputs, as well as performance more broadly.  This 
work showed lacks on both ends.  This is certainly not to discredit the substantial gains many 
of these PPPs are making, but we do not know nearly enough; the evidence has not yet 
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substantiated the partnering promise.  This work does not wish to conclude on an overly 
pessimistic note, but it at best offers a cautious one.   
 
8.4 Future avenues and research directions 
 Admittedly this work had hoped to go much farther; the limitations highlighted above 
are known, and perhaps frustrating.  One consequence of this thesis being written by a sole 
researcher is that there is much unexplored potential, some of which could not be included 
within this current work due to practical space limitations.  As databases are tools that reach 
far beyond what is included here, there is ample room for others to use. This subsection first 
concentrates on these avenues and then PPP research more broadly. 
As the introduction prefaced, as of October 2011, the information and research which 
drove this study is transitioning to an online portal, hosted at globalppps.org.  Here, the TPD 
will be available in its entirety and fully searchable online, as will the statistical analysis and 
background works and appendixes that made up much of this work.
220
   
Moving forward, there is clearly a need to explore these framework components in 
more detail.  This work only touched on the potential tradeoffs between procedural and output 
legitimacy, but there are clear avenues to pursue in analysing this across sets of PPPs as well 
as the universe.  The large number of no longer operating PPPs is another pressing concern, 
and it is worth exploring these in more detail to garner possible lessons.  Further, as 
mentioned, there is ample scope not only for more sophisticated techniques to be employed on 
existing data but also to integrate additional information and insights into these for fuller 
analysis.  While this work and the TPD creation maintain a strict process for adding 
information, there is obviously scope to supplement this information with details pulled from 
the individual partnerships.   
The significance of further assessing management practices within these PPPs should 
be considered.  There have been many calls for more research at the micro level, especially on 
a comparable basis (Bexel and Mörth 2010), and this is something this work’s MM interviews 
can speak directly towards (As a note, the MM interview grid utilised will also be available at 
globalppps.org).  As a next step, there is significant value to be gained by conducting this set 
interview with the entire sampling frame of ITPs, as these full management datasets could be 
merged fully with TPD-Outputs, providing a wealth of information on partnership variation, 
management, governance and effects.  
                                                 
220 The website and related publication were made possible by a knowledge transfer grant from the HEIF4+ fund at 
the London School of Economics (LSE). 
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Further, while the outputs tracked here were limited, all information sources contained 
within the database have also been transitioned into an online library, which will consist of 
downloadable annual reports, finances and evaluations across the entire sampling frame of 
PPPs. This is another launch point for those who wish to proceed towards understanding the 
outcome and impact-oriented effects of PPPs, such as through meta-analysis of these reviews. 
From a broader perspective, it is time to move beyond general debates about 
terminology or generalisations and conduct more large-n empirical studies.  This work echoes 
repeated calls for more comparative research (Elsig and Amalric 2008; Schäferhoff Campe 
and Kaan 2009).  While there is value in advancing our conceptual understanding of 
partnerships, moving forward it is more relevant to see how these empirically evidenced.  The 
value of a broad definition of partnerships was useful for getting a state of play, but it became 
clear throughout the work that there may be less value in comparing a small, single staffed 
project within an IGO to a large, fully functioning entity, as such as IAVI.
221
  The most useful 
understanding of partnerships moving forward is not to be based on sectoral lines but 
functional and institutional, which suggests typologies should be refined in those ways. 
There are also many well-developed analytical frameworks and techniques, many of 
which have proven valuable in sole PPP work which should now be applied on a cross-
partnership basis.  This requires more structured analysis and research to focus on specific 
characteristics or even mechanisms that lead to different levels of outputs.  More empirical 
research would further the understanding of how these legitimacy tradeoffs manifest across 
PPPs and across time.  It is this latter element than is still underdeveloped outside of single 
case studies.  The TPD is itself a moment in time, and even in the few months between final 
data verification and transition to an online tool, many PPPs changed partners, scope or even 
operational activity.  Notwithstanding, there is incredible value in analysing variation over 
time so it could also be time to start to conduct more informed, longitudinal panels.    
Given the dynamic nature of the subject matter, and social sciences research more 
broadly, there will be new questions emerging, new theories to apply, and evolving analytical 
or statistical techniques to be utilised.  At both the macro level of partnership operations and 
the micro level of functioning, these have ample room to play. 
 
 
 
                                                 
221 All three types were included within the NPF database, for example, and the TPD represents even more 
diversity.   
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8.5 Concluding remarks   
This work systematically advanced the study of the variation of transnational 
partnering arrangements by especially focusing on their input and output legitimacy.  Through 
detailed partnership information on the universe of transnational partnering as well as a range 
of detailed methodological and analytical techniques this work assessed and compared the 
influence of PPPs at large and also considered links between various explanatory factors, 
based at the partnership macro, meso and micro level with varying levels of outputs. 
Partnerships cannot be cast away as a fading trend, nor can they be hailed as effective 
governing entities.  Though the quest for more legitimate and effective governance may be 
met by transnational PPPs, it will continue to be rendered more complex given the governance 
challenges they pose.  Thus as partnerships become recognised governance models, the 
evidence base to support their contributions to effective and legitimate global governance 
must be substantiated.  It is time therefore to move the debate forward, and to apply evidence 
to a body of well developed theoretical and analytical constructs.  The PPP Platform Project, 
now available at globalppps.org will hopefully be a part of this ongoing effort towards further 
research.   
 
301 
 
APPENDIX 
List of contents: 
A. Transnational Partnership Database (TPD): Variables Tracked 302 
B. TPD Coding process and definitions used    304 
C. Output variables tracked       305 
D. PPPs in the Sampling Frame (ITPs)     309 
E. PPPs: Goals and vision      313 
F. PPPs: External Evaluations conducted    340 
G. Management interviews: Organisational variables tracked  343 
H. Management interviews: Autonomy specification   344 
I. Management Interview Guide: Complete question and scoring grid 345 
J. Listing of Management Interview interviewees   352 
K. Listing of Stakeholder interviews     354 
L. PPPs: Financial statements      356 
 
302 
 
 
 APPENDIX A: Transnational Partnership Database (TPD): Variables 
Tracked 
Basic Information 
Number Unique number assigned to each partnership 
Name Name of the partnership 
Abbreviation Abbreviation of the partnership name 
Source Original source for the partnership name 
Code  * TPD classification of the partnership (e.g. HITP/ITP/XS/XD) 
Hosted Is the PPP hosted or independent? 
Sampling frame? Does the PPP fall within the Sampling Frame? 
Operational Status 
Website The main source for information 
Status Operational status of the partnership 
Updated Year of most recent website update 
Partnership Scope 
Scope Geographic scope of the partnership operations (e.g. Global/Regional) 
Regional List of regions within scope 
Country list List of countries within the scope 
Functional type 
Type    Type of partnership functions (e.g. Advocacy/Research) 
Details Detailed information about type of partnership functions 
Source Link to supporting information 
Sector Focus222 
Main theme PPP main focus (e.g. Water/Health) 
Details   Detailed information about main theme 
Operations 
Year founded Year the PPP was founded 
Years Op. (through Dec 2009) Total number of years PPP has been operational 
Years Op. (ceased PPPs) Total number of years PPP was operational 
Website last updated Year of most recent website update 
Partner Organisations 
UN Public partners: UN organisations (e.g. UNDP/WHO) 
Other IGOS Public partners: Other Inter-Governmental partners (e.g. World Bank) 
Government partners Public partners: Government organisations (e.g. USAID) 
Corporate partners Private partners: Corporations 
Bus/industry associations Private partners: Business/industry Associations 
Philanthropic foundations Social partners: Philanthropic foundations 
NGOs Social partners: Non-governmental organisations 
Other PPPs Social partners: Other public-private partnerships 
Academic/research institutions Social partners: Academic/research institutions 
Social partners Social partners: Other social partners 
Other partners Partners not in any of the previous categories 
Notes Other relevant information 
Split Sectoral split of the partners 
Partner count Total number of claimed partners 
                                                 
222 The 23 sector areas are as follows: Agriculture, Biodiversity, Business & Finance, Cultural, Disaster 
Management, Education, Energy, Environment, Forest Management, Good Governance, Hazardous Materials, 
Health, Humanitarian, Infrastructure, Labor, Marine Conservation, Natural Resources, Science & Technology, 
Security, Sustainable Development, Tourism, Transportation and Water & Sanitation. 
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APPENDIX A (CONTINUED) 
Governance and Decision Making (GDM) 
Type Main decision making body (e.g.: Board/Host) 
If hosted, then how? Decision making body sub-type for hosted PPPs 
Split Sectoral split of the decision making body 
Details Details about decision making body and split 
Source Link to supporting information 
Funding Sources 
Public funding Public funders (UN organisations, other IGOs, governments) 
Private funding Private funders (Private corporations, business associations) 
Foundations Social funders (Philanthropic foundations) 
Social funding Other social funders 
Split Sectoral split of the funding base 
Legal Status 
Legal status For-profit / Not-for-profit 
Details Detailed information about Legal status (e.g. 501c3 organisation) 
Source Link to supporting information 
Legal structure 
Legal structure Type of organisation or host 
Guiding legal document Does the PPP have a guiding legal document? 
Type of legal agreement Bylaws, Memorandum of Understanding, etc. 
Transparency 
Annual Report available Annual report is available 
Year The year of the last annual report 
Finances Financial information available 
Contact 
Contact point: city Location of contact point 
Contact point: country Country location of contact point 
Host country income status World Bank classification (April 2009) 
Additional notes Other additional, relevant notes on PPP e.g. CSD database info only 
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APPENDIX B: TPD Coding process and definitions used 
Coding process narrows from universe to sampling frame 
Code*** Details  
ITP* Sampling frame, Institutionalised, transnational partnership  
HITP*  Sampling frame, Health-based ITP 
XD** 
 Sampling frame, but not an ITP because only one type of partner on 
decision making body OR host 
HXD** 
Sampling frame, but not an HITP because only one type of partner on 
decision making body OR host 
 
XS 
Not in the sampling frame because it does not fit the scope restriction (NS 
or Global) 
XO Not in the sampling frame because it is no longer in operation 
XAO Not in the sampling frame because it exists as announcement only  
XR 
Not in the sampling frame because it is a project only, or incorporated as 
project/program in existing inst 
XP Not in the sampling frame because does not fit the partner restriction 
XA 
Not in the sampling frame because its aim is for profit or not public policy 
related  
XPP 
Not in the sampling frame because it does not fit the Partner restriction 
BUT it is on organisation which partners with trisectoral base of partners 
*Sampling frame  
**Falls within the sampling frame but not an ITP 
*** Partnerships can have multiple codes, e.g. XA, XS (implies for profit, non global 
PPP that is operational and has a tri-sectoral partner split) 
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APPENDIX C: Output variables tracked 
Basic Information 
Unique ID Unique ID of PPP 
Name Name of PPP 
Abr. Abbreviation of PPP 
Source The source from which PPP was added into the Database 
Code How the PPP is coded in terms of governance 
Website Main website and source of information 
Function 
Main Function The main function the PPP performs 
Secondary Function If relevant, the secondary function the PPP performs 
Vision and Goals 
Defined vision of partnership 
Does the Partnership articulate a vision, yes or no? 
Describe the vision 
Defined mission of  partnership 
Does the Partnership articulate a mission, yes or no? 
Describe the mission (statement) 
Defined goal of partnership Describe the stated goals of the partnership 
Defined breakdown/ responsibility of goal 
(IA) 
Describe the stated breakdown of responsibilities between partners to that end (if 
available) 
Defined goal milestones/ timeframes Describe the stated milestones and/or timeframe to that end (if available) 
Operations 
Date Launched (and independent) Date the PPP was launched, and in parentheses and if applicable, when it became 
independent 
Existence of current operations Do current operations exist, yes or no? 
Publication/notification of latest operating 
results 
Does the PPP make available operating results, yes or no? 
What type of document offers the latest operating results? 
What year was the document offering the latest operating results published? 
What was the year of the most recent Annual Report published? 
Position of CHQ (Central Headquarters) 
Does the PPP make clear that a Central Headquarters is established, yes or no? 
Details the TYPE of position of the CHQ, see notes column 
If yes, what is the given name of this Central Headquarters? - Full details 
Provide an internet link that describes the PPP Central Headquarters 
Role of CHQ and/or head Describe the declared role of Central Headquarters - SEE NOTES 
CHQ accountable to Host or Partnership? 
Describe whether the Central Headquarters is directly accountable to a Host 
organisation, or to the wider partnership governance? 
Operations team in place Does the PPP make clear that an Operations Team is in place? 
Operations staff structure established / if 
secretariat, (name of office) Does the PPP describe the structure of the Operations  
Number of staff 
If website notes this clearly, number of FTEs, pull from MM interview or put "E" 
if established working staff (rather than only point person) 
Total sites of operation 
Count the number of sites of operations for the PPP 
List the sites of operations for the PPP 
Strategic/Business Plan articulated 
Does the PPP articulate a Strategic or Business plans? 
Provide an internet link to these plans 
Technical Committees (not advisory) 
Count the number of technical (i.e. not governance related) committees that 
support the PPP 
Name these technical committees 
Members/Partners 
Types of partners Count the different types or classes of partners a PPP declares 
List of types List the different types or classes of partners a PPP declares 
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Compulsory Membership Fee Does the PPP incur a compulsory membership fee on its partners? 
Criteria for Junior Partners 
Does the PPP declare and articulate criteria for a junior class of partner, yes or no? 
If yes, describe the body that approves partnership entry 
If yes, describe the document that outlines the criteria, if available? 
If available, provide an internet link to that document 
Entry Rules for Senior Partners 
Does the PPP declare and articulate criteria for a senior class of partner, yes or 
no? 
If yes, describe the body that approves partnership entry 
If yes, describe the document that outlines the criteria, if available? 
If available, provide an internet link to that document 
Total number of partners Count the total number of partners in a PPP 
Division of partners: public 
What percentage of public body partners make up the total partner membership of 
a PPP? 
How many partners make up this percentage? 
Division of partners: private 
What percentage of private body partners make up the total partner membership 
of a PPP? 
How many partners make up this percentage? 
Division of partners: social 
What percentage of social organisation partners make up the total partner 
membership of a PPP? 
How many partners make up this percentage? 
Stakeholder meetings 
Does the PPP hold a regular meeting for all partners to attend, yes or no? 
If yes, what is the name of this regular meeting? 
Number of funders 
Count the current funders of the PPP 
Count the amount of current funders that are also considered partners 
Division of funding: public 
What percentage of current income was funded by the public sector? 
How many public sector bodies provided funds? 
How much money was provided? 
Division of funding: private 
What percentage of current income was funded by the private sector? 
How many private sector bodies provided funds? 
How much money was provided? 
Division of funding: social 
What percentage of current income was funded by the social sector? 
How many social sector bodies provided funds? 
How much money was provided? 
Institutional/Structural 
Entity type Says whether or not the PPP is hosted or independent. 
Institutional structure of partnership 
(5013c; Foundation, etc) 
Describe the legal status of the PPP (i.e. Hosted in a host organisation, 
Incorporated [country]) 
Claimed structure of partnership Describe how the PPP describes the nature of its partnership 
Guiding legal document Does the PPP make available the legal document that outlines the rules of that 
PPP? (Constitution, Bylaws, Terms of Reference, Statement of Incorporation) 
Type Describe the type of legal document made available by the PPP 
Source Provide an internet link to this document 
Level of Institutionalisation Scales the PPPs' level of institutionalisation as high, medium or low 
Justification Provide an internet link to this document 
Governance and Decision Making 
Governance system established 
Does the PPP describe its governance system, yes or no? 
Provide an internet link to the webpage that articulates this 
Layers of Governing Bodies 
Count the number of governing bodies  
Describe the different governing bodies 
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Assembly exits? yes or no 
Number of Members on Assembly-type 
Decision-making body Count the number of members on an Assembly type governance body 
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Number of Members on main non-
Assembly body (i.e. board, council) 
Count the number of members on a non-Assembly, Board type of governance 
body 
Number of Members on Advisory body 
(besides Board) Count the number of members on an Advisory type of governance body 
Dispute resolution system in place Does the PPP declare that it has a dispute resolution system in place, yes or no? 
If yes, and if articulated, describe the dispute resolution system of the PPP 
Type of main governing body Describe the type of the main governance body of the PPP 
Sub-Type (if hosted) If hosted, describe the type of the key governance body 
Split Describe, with TPD codes, the split of sectors on this body 
Member Break Down: public 
What percentage of the main governance body is made up of members from the 
public sector? 
Count the number of public sector members on the main governance body 
Member Break Down: private 
What percentage of the main governance body is made up of members from the 
private sector? 
Count the number of private sector members on the main governance body 
Member Break Down: social 
What percentage of the main governance body is made up of members from the 
social sector? 
Count the number of social sector members on the main governance body 
Member Break Down: independent 
What percentage of the main governance body is made up of individuals 
representing themselves, or PPP executive officers (ex officio)? 
Count the amount of individuals representing themselves, or PPP executive 
officers (ex officio) on the main governance body 
North South Divide (World Bank 
definitions - see PPP folder) 
What percentage of the main governance body is made up of organisations or 
individuals from the "North"? 
Count the number of members from the "North" on the main governance body 
What percentage of the main governance body is made up of organisations or 
individuals from the "South"? 
Count the number of members from the "South" on the main governance body 
Total Count the total number of members on the main governance body 
Internal Evaluation 
Performance subject to some criteria of 
evaluation  
yes or no 
Describe 
Internal performance indicators 
established 
yes or no 
Describe 
Performance tracked/ measured 
yes or no 
Describe 
Date of last internal review   
External Evaluation 
Conducted (most recent) Has the PPP conducted any independent evaluations of activities, yes or no? 
Date What is the date of the most recent evaluation carried out? 
Source Provide the internet link to this evaluation 
By Who conducted the evaluation? 
Total  conducted (2004 onward) How many evaluations have been conducted in total, since 2004? 
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Resources 
Public availability of finances 
Does the PPP make available (or can you find from another source) details of the 
PPP's finances, yes or no? 
Provide an internet link to these finances 
External Auditors If available, name the auditor of the PPP 
Currency Note the currency in which the finances are stated 
Income 2007 Note the total revenues of the PPP in 2007 
Grants & Donations 2007 Note the total grants and donations received by the PPP in 2007 
Expenditure 2007 Note the total expenditures of the PPP in 2007 
Income 2008 Note the total revenues of the PPP in 2008 
Grants & Donations 2008 Note the total grants and donations received by the PPP in 2008 
Expenditure 2008 Note the total expenditures of the PPP in 2008 
Breakdown? 
Does the financial statement provide a detailed breakdown linking expenditures to 
activities, yes or no? 
Assets 2007 Note the total assets owned by the PPP in 2007 
Liabilities 2007 Note the total liabilities owned by the PPP in 2007 
Net Assets (Reserves) 2007 Note the net assets (or reserves) owned by the PPP in 2007 
Assets 2008 Note the total assets owned by the PPP in 2008 
Liabilities 2008 Note the total liabilities owned by the PPP in 2008 
Net Assets (Reserves) 2008 Note the net assets (or reserves) owned by the PPP in 2008 
Change in Grants/Donations 08-07   
Change in Income 08-07   
Accountability/Transparency 
Strategic and annual plans  Does the PPP make available strategic or annual plans, yes or no? 
Annual performance reports Does the PPP make available annual performance reports, yes or no? 
Annual Budget Does the PPP make available annual budgets, yes or no? 
GB Meeting agendas (and/or background 
papers) 
Does the PPP make available the agendas to governance / executive meetings, yes 
or no? 
GB Meeting Press release / summary Does the PPP make available press releases or summaries related to governance / 
executive meetings, yes or no? 
GB Meeting action points / decisions by 
board and any other executive body 
Does the PPP make available full minutes / detailed summaries related to 
governance / executive meetings, yes or no? 
Financial Statements/Reports Does the PPP make available financial statements and reports? 
Statement of Performance, Results, or 
Highlights Does the PPP make available Statement of Performance, Results, or Highlights? 
Regular Newsletters or Updates Does the PPP make available regular newsletters, yes or no? 
Subscribed Can a stakeholder subscribe to these, yes or no? 
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APPENDIX D: PPPs in the Sampling Frame (ITPs) 
Name Abr. Host Main Function Sector 
Aeras Global TB Vaccine Foundation AERAS N Info Exchange / Research Health 
Alliance for Health Policy and 
Systems Research AHPSR Y Policy and/or Development Health 
Drugs for Neglected Diseases 
Initiative DNDi N Info Exchange / Research Health 
European Malaria Vaccine Initiative 
(Now the European Vaccine Initiative) EMVI N Coordination Health 
Foundation for Innovative New 
Diagnostics FIND N Info Exchange / Research Health 
Global Alliance for Improved 
Nutrition GAIN N Coordination Health 
Global Alliance for TB Drug 
Development TB Alliance N Info Exchange / Research Health 
Global Alliance for the Elimination of 
Lymphatic Filariasis  GAELF Y Info Exchange / Research Health 
Global Alliance for Vaccines and 
Immunization GAVI N Coordination Health 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and 
Malaria GFATM N Coordination Health 
Global Health Council 
 
N Advocacy Health 
Global Media AIDS Initiative GMAI Y Advocacy Health 
Global Public-Private Partnership for 
Handwashing with Soap GPHW Y Advocacy Health 
Global Vaccine Enterprise 
 
N Info Exchange / Research Health 
Institute for OneWorld Health IOWH N Coordination Health 
International AIDS Vaccine Initiative IAVI N Coordination Health 
International Trachoma Initiative ITI N Coordination Health 
Malaria Vaccine Initiative  MVI Y Info Exchange / Research Health 
Medicines for Malaria Venture MMV N Info Exchange / Research Health 
Micronutrient Initiative MI N Coordination Health 
Network for Sustained Elimination of 
Iodine Deficiency (Iodine Network) 
Iodine 
Network Y Advocacy Health 
Partners for Parasite Control PPC Y Coordination Health 
Project Hope HOPE N Operational Health 
Roll Back Malaria Global Partnership  RBM Y Coordination Health 
Stop TB Partnership StopTB Y Coordination Health 
Strategies for Enhancing Access to 
Medicines for Health SEAM Y Coordination Health 
Universal Flour Fortification Initiative FFI Y Facilitation Health 
World Economic Forum's Global 
Health Initiative GHI Y Advocacy Health 
AED-SATELLIFE SATELLIFE N Coordination Health 
Alliance for the Global Elimination of 
Blinding Trachoma by the year 2020 GET 2020 Y Coordination Health 
BIO Ventures for Global Health BVGH N Info Exchange / Research Health 
Clinton Foundation AIDS Initiative 
(Now the Clinton Health Access 
Initiative) CHAI Y Coordination Health 
Eli Lilly Multi-Drug Resistant 
Tuberculosis Partnership MDR-TB Y Info Exchange / Research Health 
EuroVacc Foundation  
 
N Info Exchange / Research Health 
Global Business Coalition on 
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria GBC N Advocacy Health 
Global Elimination of Maternal and 
Neonatal Tetanus MNT Y Coordination Health 
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Global Polio Eradication Initiative GPEI Y Coordination Health 
Health Academy, The 
 
Y Operational Health 
Health Internetwork Access to 
Research Initiative HINARI Y Operational Health 
Infectious Disease Research Institute IDRI N Info production / Research Health 
International Cooperative Biodiversity 
Groups Program ICBG Y Info production / Research Health, Biodiversity 
International Partnership for 
Microbicides IPM N Info production / Research Health 
MAC AIDS fund MAF Y Capital Provision Health 
Novartis Institute for Tropical 
Diseases  NITD Y Info production / Research Health 
Pediatric Dengue Vaccine Initiative  PDVI Y Info production / Research Health 
Safe Injection Global Network SIGN Y Advocacy Health 
Vision 2020 Vision 2020 Y Coordination Health 
Joint United Nations Program on 
HIV/AIDS  UNAIDS Y Coordination Health 
Alliance to Save Energy ASE N Advocacy Energy 
Building Partnerships for 
Development in Water and Sanitation BPD-WS N Info dissemination/ transfer Water & Sanitation 
Clean Air Initiative CAI N Info dissemination/ transfer Environment 
Community Watersheds Partnership 
Program Global Development Alliance 
(Formerly the Coca-Cola/USAID 
Water and Development Alliance) WADA Y Coordination Water & Sanitation 
Collaborative Labeling and Appliance 
Standards Program CLASP N Setting Standards Energy 
Forest Stewardship Council FSC N Setting Standards Environment 
Generation Challenge Programme 
(Former CGIAR Partnership 
Challenge Program: 'Unlocking 
Genetic Diversity in Crops for the 
Resource-Poor') GCP Y Info production / Research Agriculture 
Global Compact UNGC Y Setting Standards Sustainable develop, Labor 
Global Crop Diversity Trust 
 
Y Coordination Agriculture 
Global e-Sustainability Initiative GeSI N Setting Standards Environment 
Global Master Plan for Cycling 
 
Y Policy and/or Development Environment 
Global Reporting Initiative GRI N Setting Standards Sustainable develop 
Global Road Safety Partnership GRSP Y Coordination Transportation 
Global Village Energy Partnership GVEP N Coordination Sustainable develop 
International Center for Sustainable 
develop ICSD N Operational Environment 
International Center for Tropical 
Agriculture CIAT N Info production / Research Agriculture 
International Electrotechnical 
Commission IEC N Setting Standards Infrastructure 
International Road Transport Union IRU N Advocacy Transportation  
International Service for the 
Acquisition of Agri-biotech 
Applications ISAAA N Info dissemination/ transfer Agriculture 
International Solar Energy Society 
 
N Advocacy Energy 
International Youth Foundation IYF N Facilitation Education 
Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers ICANN N Setting Standards Science & Technology 
Marine Stewardship Council MSC N Setting Standards Environment 
Partners for Environmental 
Cooperation in Europe PECE Y Coordination Environment 
Partnership for Clean Fuels and 
Vehicles PCFV Y Policy and/or Development Environment 
Project Proteus 
 
Y Info dissemination/ transfer Environment 
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Public Interest Intellectual Property 
Advisors PIIPA N Facilitation Sustainable develop 
Renewable Energy and Energy 
Efficiency Partnership REEEP N Policy and/or Development Energy 
Renewable Energy Policy Network for 
the 21st Century REN21 Y Advocacy Energy 
Water and Sanitation for the Urban 
Poor WSUP N Coordination Water & Sanitation 
World Economic Forum - Partnering 
Against Corruption Initiative PACI Y Setting Standards Good Governance 
World Energy Council 
 
N Policy and/or Development Energy 
World Resources Institute WRI N Policy and/or Development Environment  
World Vegetable Centre AVRDC N Info production / Research Agriculture 
Mectizan Donation Program Mectizan Y Coordination Health 
Global Ballast Water Management 
Programme 
 
Y Coordination Marine Conservation 
Efficient Energy for Sustainable 
develop  EESD Y Coordination Environment 
World Institute for Sustainable 
Humanity (AWISH) - Hellas -
Mesogeios 
 
N Coordination Sustainable develop 
Access to Global Online Research in 
Agriculture AGORA Y Coordination Agriculture 
Awareness and Preparedness for 
Emergencies at the Local Level  APELL Y Capacity Building Disaster Management 
BE THE CHANGE!  
 
Y Capacity Building Sustainable develop 
BioCarbon Fund 
 
Y Coordination Environment 
Biotrade Initiative BTFP Y Capacity Building Environment 
Capacity Building Task Force on 
Trade, Environment and Development CBTF Y Capacity Building Environment 
Cement Sustainability Initiative CSI Y Operational Sustainable develop 
CGIAR Challenge Program on Water 
and Food CPWF Y Info production / Research Water & Sanitation 
Cisco Networking Academy Program 
 
Y Operational Education 
Climate Investment Partnership 
 
Y Coordination environment 
Community Water Initiative CWI Y Capacity Building Water & Sanitation 
Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research CGIAR Y Info production / Research Agriculture 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor CGAP Y Info dissemination/ transfer Business & finance 
E+Co 
 
N Coordination Energy 
e8 (Formerly e7) e8 N Coordination Sustainable develop 
Ecoagriculture Partners 
ECOAGRIC
ULTURE N Coordination Agriculture 
Ecological Sanitation Research EcoSanRes Y Capacity Building Water & Sanitation 
EdInvest EdInvest Y Facilitation Education 
Embarq 
 
Y Operational Transportation 
Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems EOLSS Y Info dissemination/ transfer Education 
Equator Initiative 
 
Y Coordination Environment 
EU Water Initiative: Water for Life EUWI Y Coordination Water & sanitation 
EVE-olution Foundation 
 
N Capacity Building Sustainable develop 
Global Facilitation Partnership for 
Transportation and Trade 
 
Y Facilitation Business & finance 
Global Gas Flaring Reduction GGFR Y Setting Standards Environment 
Global Partnership for Capacity 
Building to Implement the Globally 
Harmonized System for Chemical 
Classification and Labelling GHS Y Setting Standards Environment 
Global Water Partnership GWP N Coordination Water & Sanitation 
GlobalGiving 
 
N Facilitation Humanitarian 
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Great Apes Survival Project  GRASP Y Advocacy Environment 
International Livestock Research 
Institute ILRI Y Info production / Research Agriculture 
International Navigation Association PIANC N Setting Standards Infrastructure 
International Partnership for 
Sustainable develop in Mountain 
Regions 
Mountain 
Partnership Y Facilitation Sustainable develop 
International Partnership for the 
Hydrogen Economy IPHE Y Facilitation Environment 
International Water and Sanitation 
Center  IRC N Info dissemination/ transfer Water & Sanitation 
Local Capacity-Building and Training 
on Sustainable Urbanization: a Public-
Private Partnership 
 
Y Capacity Building Sustainable develop 
Methane to Markets 
 
Y Facilitation Energy 
New Ventures 
 
Y Coordination Business & finance 
Online Access to Research in the 
Environment OARE Y Info production / Research Education 
Partnership for Clean Indoor Air PCIA Y Coordination Health 
Population and Sustainability Network 
 
Y Advocacy Sustainable develop 
Refrigerants Naturally Initiative 
 
Y Advocacy Environment 
Sister Cities Network for Sustainable 
develop SCNSD N Facilitation Cultural 
Sustainable Forest Products Global 
Alliance 
 
Y Coordination Environment 
Tour Operators Initiative 
 
Y Advocacy Tourism 
Transparency International TI N Advocacy Good Governance 
Travel Foundation 
 
N Advocacy Environment 
Unicode Consortium 
 
N Setting Standards Science & Technology 
UNIDO Cleaner Production 
Programme CP Y Coordination Environment 
United Nations Center for Trade 
Facilitation and Electronic Business 
UN-
CEFACT Y Setting Standards Business & finance 
World Alliance for Decentralized 
Energy WADE N Info production / Research Energy 
World Business Council on 
Sustainable develop WBCSD N Advocacy Sustainable develop 
World Economic Forum Disaster 
Resource Network WEF DRN Y Coordination Humanitarian 
World Links   N Capacity Building Education 
World Tourism Organisation UNWTO Y Policy and/or Development Sustainable develop 
Youth Business International 
 
N Capacity Building Business & finance 
Ethical Trading Initiative ETI N Setting Standards Labor 
4C Association: Common Code for the 
Coffee Community 4-C N Setting Standards Agriculture 
Global Environment Facility  GEF Y Coordination Environment 
ACCION International ACCION N Coordination Business & Finance 
Agricultural Risk Management Team ARMT Y Facilitation Business & finance 
Golden Rice 
 
N Info production / Research Health 
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APPENDIX E: PPPs: Goals and vision  
PPP Name  
Defined 
vision 
partnership 
Defined 
mission 
partnership 
Level of Goal-Setting 
Output 
Out-
come 
Impact 
Aeras Global 
TB Vaccine 
Foundation NA 
The Aeras Global TB 
Vaccine Foundation aim to 
develop effective TB vaccine 
regimens that will prevent 
tuberculosis in all age groups 
and will be affordable, 
available and adopted 
worldwide. Y N Y 
Alliance for 
Health Policy 
and Systems 
Research NA 
AHPSR aims to stimulate the 
generation and synthesis of 
policy-relevant health 
systems knowledge, promote 
the dissemination and use of 
health policy and systems 
knowledge, and strengthen 
capacity for the generation, 
dissemination and use of 
health policy and systems 
research knowledge among 
researchers, policy-makers 
and other stakeholders. Y Y N 
Drugs for 
Neglected 
Diseases 
Initiative 
DNDI's vision is to improve 
the quality of life and the 
health of people suffering from 
neglected diseases by using an 
alternative model to develop 
drugs for these diseases and by 
ensuring equitable access to 
new and field-relevant health 
tools. 
DNDI aims to develop new 
drugs or new formulations of 
existing drugs for patients 
suffering from the most 
neglected communicable 
diseases. Y Y N 
European 
Malaria Vaccine 
Initiative  
The vision of the European 
Malaria Vaccine Initiative 
(EMVI) is a world free of the 
intolerable disease burden of 
malaria within the coming 
decades. 
 EMVI aims to contribute to 
the global efforts to control 
malaria by providing a 
mechanism for accelerated 
development and clinical 
trials of malaria vaccines in 
Europe and Developing 
Countries, promoting 
affordability and 
accessibility of malaria 
vaccines in Developing 
Countries. Y Y Y 
Foundation for 
Innovative New 
Diagnostics 
FIND's vision is a world where 
everyone will have equitable 
access to high quality 
diagnosis. 
FIND's aim is to drive the 
development and 
implementation of accurate 
and affordable diagnostic 
tests that are appropriate to 
patient-care in low-resource 
settings. Y Y Y 
Global Alliance 
for Improved 
Nutrition 
GAIN is an alliance driven by 
the vision of a world without 
malnutrition. 
GAIN's aim is to reduce 
malnutrition through food 
fortification and other 
sustainable strategies aimed 
at improving the health and 
nutrition of populations at 
risk. N Y Y 
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Global Alliance 
for TB Drug 
Development NA 
The TB Alliance aims to 
accelerate the discovery and 
development of faster-acting 
and affordable drugs to fight 
tuberculosis. Through 
innovative science and with 
partners around the world, 
we aim to ensure equitable 
access to faster, better 
tuberculosis cures that will 
advance global health and 
prosperity. Y Y Y 
Global Alliance 
for the 
Elimination of 
Lymphatic 
Filariasis  NA 
The Global Alliance to 
Eliminate Lymphatic 
Filariasis aims to bring 
together a diverse group of 
private health partners to 
support the Global 
Programme to Eliminate 
Lymphatic Filariasis by 
mobilising political, financial 
and technical resources to 
ensure success. Y Y Y 
Global Alliance 
for Vaccines and 
Immunization NA 
The GAVI Alliance aims to 
save children’s lives and 
protect people’s health by 
increasing access to 
immunisation in poor 
countries. Y Y Y 
Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, TB 
and Malaria NA 
The Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria aims to dramatically 
increase resources to fight 
three of the world's most 
devastating diseases, and to 
direct those resources to 
areas of greatest need.  Y Y Y 
Global Health 
Council NA 
The Council aims to ensure 
that all who strive for 
improvement and equity in 
global health have the 
information and resources 
they need to succeed. N Y N 
Global Media 
AIDS Initiative NA 
GMAI aims to leverage the 
power of media to help 
prevent the spread of HIV 
and reduce the stigma facing 
those already living with the 
disease. Y N Y 
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Global PPP for 
Hand-washing 
with Soap NA 
The PPPHW aims at 
reducing the incidence of 
diarrheal diseases and 
respiratory infections in poor 
communities through 
promoting handwashing with 
soap; 
implementing large-scale 
handwashing interventions 
and using lessons to promote 
the approach at the global 
level; sharing scientific 
evidence showing that 
handwashing with soap is an 
exceptionally cost-effective 
health intervention.  The 
PPPHW also seeks to 
promote awareness, build 
political commitment, and 
trigger action on this critical 
issue at local, national, and 
international levels. Y Y Y 
Global Vaccine 
Enterprise 
The Global HIV Vaccine 
Enterprise is working with 
scientists, researchers, funders, 
government and industry 
representatives, and advocates 
from around the world to 
accelerate the development of 
an effective and safe HIV 
vaccine through a shared 
Scientific Strategic Plan. Full 
implementation of the 
Enterprise 2010 Scientific 
Strategic Plan requires the 
increasing commitment and 
participation of many 
organisations, from 
industrialized and developing 
countries, from the public and 
private sectors, and civil 
society. 
The Global HIV Vaccine 
Enterprise aims to accelerate 
the development of an HIV 
vaccine is an international, 
wide-ranging, scientific 
assessment of the current 
state of the field and future 
challenges and opportunities. Y Y N 
Institute for 
OneWorld 
Health 
The Institute for OneWorld 
Health will serve as a positive 
agent for change by saving 
lives, improving health, and 
fulfilling the promise of 
medicine for those most in 
need. 
The Institute for OneWorld 
Health aims to find 
promising potential 
candidate medicines in areas 
of great unmet medical need; 
partner with the right experts 
and institutions to take these 
medicines through 
development, clinical trials, 
and regulatory approval; and 
finally, deliver safe, 
effective, and affordable 
medicines to the patients 
who need them. Y N N 
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International 
AIDS Vaccine 
Initiative 
IAVI's vision is a world 
without AIDS. 
IAVI aims to support in 
every way the development 
of preventive AIDS vaccines 
that are not only safe and 
effective, but also accessible 
to all people. Y Y Y 
International 
Trachoma 
Initiative 
ITI's vision is a world free of 
blinding trachoma. 
ITI aims to eliminate 
blinding trachoma by 2020 
through managing the 
Zithromax donation and 
collaborating with partners 
for the implementation of the 
full SAFE strategy. Y Y Y 
Malaria Vaccine 
Initiative  
The Malaria Vaccine Initiative 
envisions a world free from 
malaria. 
MVI aims to accelerate the 
development of malaria 
vaccines and ensure their 
availability and accessibility 
in the developing world. Y Y Y 
Medicines for 
Malaria Venture 
MMV's vision is a world in 
which these innovative 
medicines will cure and 
protect the vulnerable 
populations at risk from 
malaria, and help to ultimately 
eradicate this terrible disease. 
MMV aims to bring public, 
private and philanthropic 
sector partners together to 
fund and manage the 
discovery, development and 
delivery of new medicines 
for the treatment and 
prevention of malaria in 
disease-endemic countries. Y Y Y 
Micronutrient 
Initiative 
Micronutrient Initiative's 
vision is a world free of hidden 
hunger 
The MI aims to develop, 
implement and monitor 
innovative, cost-effective 
and sustainable solutions for 
hidden hunger, in partnership 
with others. Y Y Y 
Network for 
Sustained 
Elimination of 
Iodine 
Deficiency 
(Iodine 
Network) 
The vision of the Network is 
of a world in which every 
child is born protected from 
iodine deficiency, which may 
result in brain damage. A 
world with the entire 
population protected from the 
loss of intellectual and 
physical resources through this 
easily preventable cause of 
mental retardation.  
The Network aims to support 
national efforts to eliminate 
iodine deficiency in a 
sustainable manner by 
promoting collaboration 
among public, private, 
scientific and civic 
organisations. We are 
committed to ensuring that 
universal salt iodization is 
sustained in all countries. 
Accelerated progress and 
better coordination to focus 
on priority populations and 
actions are needed to achieve 
the Network's vision within 
the next decade.  Y Y Y 
Partners for 
Parasite Control NA 
 PPC aims to regularly treat 
at least 75% of all school-
aged children at risk of 
illness from schistosomiasis 
and soil transmitted 
helminths by 2010. Y N Y 
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Project Hope NA 
HOPE aims to achieve 
sustainable advances in 
health care around the world 
by implementing health 
education programs and 
providing humanitarian 
assistance in areas of need. Y N Y 
Roll Back 
Malaria Global 
Partnership  
RBM's vision is of a world 
free from the burden of 
malaria. 
The RBM Partnership aims 
to implement coordinated 
action against malaria. It 
mobilizes for action and 
resources and forges 
consensus among partners.  Y Y Y 
Stop TB 
Partnership 
Stop TB Partnership's vision is 
a TB-free world: the first 
children born this millennium 
will see TB eliminated in their 
lifetime. Stop TB is a global 
movement to accelerate social 
and political action to stop the 
unnecessary spread of TB 
around the world. 
STOPTB aims to ensure that 
every TB patient has access 
to effective diagnosis, 
treatment and cure, to stop 
transmission of TB, to 
reduce the inequitable social 
and economic toll of TB, to 
develop and implement new 
preventive, diagnostic and 
therapeutic tools and 
strategies to stop TB.  N Y Y 
Strategies for 
Enhancing 
Access to 
Medicines for 
Health NA 
The Strategies for Enhancing 
Access to Medicines 
Program aims to improve 
access to and use of essential 
medicines, vaccines, and 
other health commodities in 
the developing world.  N Y N 
Universal Flour 
Fortification 
Initiative 
The FFI's vision is that 
individuals in public, private 
and civil society organisations 
at global and national level 
cooperate effectively by 
integrating and expanding 
existing programs.  
The FFI aims to stimulate 
partnerships between public 
and civic sectors and grain 
and flour industries to make 
fortified flour normal 
production.  N Y N 
World 
Economic 
Forum's Global 
Health Initiative NA 
World Economic Forum's 
Global Health Initiative has 
expressed the mission of 
"global health at the 
economic forum" that 
includes this initiative. Y N Y 
AED-
SATELLIFE NA 
AED-SATELLIFE aims to 
play a leadership role in 
responding to the needs of 
health care providers in the 
developing world, employing 
cutting-edge solutions to 
expand access to health and 
medical knowledge, putting 
information into the hands 
that heal. Y Y Y 
Alliance for the 
Global 
Elimination of 
Blinding 
Trachoma by the 
year 2020 NA 
GET 2020 mission is to 
eliminate all avoidable 
blindness by 2020. N N N 
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BIO Ventures 
for Global 
Health NA 
BVGH aims to save lives by 
accelerating the development 
of novel biotechnology-
based drugs, vaccines, and 
diagnostics to address the 
unmet medical needs of the 
developing world. BVGH 
has a unique perspective. N Y Y 
Clinton 
Foundation 
AIDS Initiative NA 
CHAI aims to Strengthen 
integrated health systems in 
the developing world and 
expanding access to care and 
treatment for HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and tuberculosis.  N Y Y 
Eli Lilly Multi-
Drug Resistant 
Tuberculosis 
Partnership NA 
The Lilly MDR-TB 
Partnership aims to save 
lives by preventing and 
treating multi-drug resistant 
tuberculosis (MDR-TB) - a 
terrible disease that afflicts 
millions of people in some of 
the poorest regions of the 
world. Y Y N 
EuroVacc 
Foundation  N 
EuroVacc aims at developing 
prophylactic vaccines against 
human immunodeficiency 
virus and to promote world-
wide accessibility to these 
vaccines. Y Y N 
Global Business 
Coalition on 
HIV/AIDS(, 
Tuberculosis 
and Malaria) N 
GBC aims to decrease the 
number of people dying from 
AIDS, TB, and Malaria and 
the support those affected by 
increasing business action 
against the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic. N N Y 
Global 
Elimination of 
Maternal and 
Neonatal 
Tetanus NA 
MNT's aim is to reduce the 
number of cases to such low 
levels that it is no longer a 
major problem. Y Y Y 
Global Polio 
Eradication 
Initiative NA 
GPEI aims to completely 
eradicate polio. N Y Y 
Health 
Academy, The 
The vision of the Health 
Academy is about creating a 
global health and technology 
reference system based on 
sound evidence and best 
practices. It aims at providing 
the knowledge of health 
specialists for all citizens of 
the world. It is about 
recognizing the huge impact of 
health on today's economy. 
The Health Academy aims to 
demystify medical and 
public health practices and to 
make the knowledge of 
health specialists available to 
all citizens of the world 
through Internet-based 
technology. It will promote 
good health by explaining 
essential public health 
functions in a language that 
all people can understand, 
taking into consideration 
their individual cultural 
sensitivities. Y Y Y 
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Health 
Internetwork 
Access to 
Research 
Initiative NA 
The HINARI aims to provide 
free or very low cost online 
access to the major journals 
in biomedical and related 
social sciences to local, not-
for-profit institutions in 
developing countries. Y Y N 
Infectious 
Disease 
Research 
Institute N 
IDRI aims to developing 
products to prevent, diagnose 
and treat tuberculosis (TB). Y Y N 
International 
Cooperative 
Biodiversity 
Groups Program NA 
The FIC-managed 
Biodiversity Program aims to 
guide natural products drug 
discovery in such a way that 
local communities and other 
source country organisations 
can derive direct benefits 
from their diverse biological 
resources. Benefit-sharing 
may provide clear incentives 
for preservation and 
sustainable use of that 
biodiversity. N Y N 
International 
Partnership for 
Microbicides NA 
IPM aims to provide women 
with an affordable and self-
initiated HIV- prevention 
strategy to reduce the cycle 
of infection which has led to 
the deaths of more than 25 
million people worldwide 
and orphaned more than 15 
million children since 1981. 
Like the promise of a future 
AIDS vaccine, microbicides 
represent an essential 
component of an integrated 
and comprehensive global 
response to the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. Y Y Y 
MAC AIDS 
fund NA 
The M·A·C AIDS Fund aims 
to serve people of all ages, 
all races and all sexes 
affected by HIV and AIDS. 
To partner with the bold, the 
visionary and the brave who 
confront the epidemic in 
countries and communities 
where people are most 
neglected, off the radar and 
at highest risk. Responsive, 
agile and alert, MAF funds 
innovative programs that 
deal directly with the most 
marginalized, stigmatized 
and under-heard victims. Y N Y 
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Novartis 
Institute for 
Tropical 
Diseases  NA 
The Novartis Institute for 
Tropical Diseases aims to 
discover novel treatments 
and prevention methods for 
major tropical diseases. In 
developing countries where 
these diseases are endemic, 
Novartis will make 
treatments readily available, 
without profit to poor 
patients. Y N Y 
Pediatric 
Dengue Vaccine 
Initiative  NA 
The PDVI aims to reduce the 
burden of dengue disease by 
accelerating the 
development, evaluation, 
introduction and sustained 
use of affordable dengue 
vaccines. Y Y Y 
Safe Injection 
Global Network NA 
SIGN aims to achieve safe 
and appropriate use of 
injections world-wide by 
concerted action under a 
common strategic 
framework. SIGN will 
initially focus on those 
procedures that contribute 
most to the transmission of 
blood borne pathogens. N Y Y 
Vision 2020 
The vision of Vision 2020 is a 
world in which no one is 
needlessly blind and where 
those with unavoidable vision 
loss can achieve their full 
potential.  The VISION 2020 
initiative is intended to 
strengthen national health-care 
systems and facilitate national 
capacity-building. 
Vision2020 aims to eliminate 
the main causes of avoidable 
blindness by the year 2020 
by facilitating the planning, 
development and 
implementation of 
sustainable national eye care 
programmes based on the 
three core strategies of 
disease control, human 
resource development and 
infrastructure and 
technology, incorporating the 
principles of primary health 
care. Y Y Y 
Joint United 
Nations Program 
on HIV/AIDS  NA 
UNAIDS aims to bring 
together the efforts and 
resources of ten UN system 
organisations in the AIDS 
response to help the world 
prevent new HIV infections, 
care for people living with 
HIV, and mitigate the impact 
of the epidemic. Y Y Y 
Alliance to Save 
Energy NA 
The Alliance to Save Energy 
aims to promote energy 
efficiency worldwide to 
achieve a healthier economy, 
a cleaner environment and 
greater energy security. Y Y Y 
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Building 
Partnerships for 
Development in 
Water and 
Sanitation NA 
BOD-WS aims  to promote 
the delivery of basic services 
to the poor in developing 
countries through enhancing 
institutional relationships 
between the public, private 
and civil society sectors. Y Y Y 
Clean Air 
Initiative 
UNEP and CAI-Asia 
developed a Long Term Vision 
on Urban Air Quality in Asian 
Cities. This vision will 
describe the desired state of 
AQM in Asian cities and can 
help inspire Asian cities and 
countries in the development 
of their AQM policies and 
programmes. 
The CAI-Asia Partnership 
aims to be a multi-sector 
forum on urban air quality in 
Asia where partners from 
different sectors can meet, 
exchange experiences and 
engage in dialogue on urban 
air quality with the aim to 
promote better urban AQM 
in Asian cities. Y Y Y 
Community 
Watersheds 
Partnership 
Program Global 
Development 
Alliance 
(Formerly the 
Coca-
Cola/USAID 
Water and 
Development 
Alliance) NA 
WADA aims to promote 
water resources management 
and service delivery in 
countries where partners 
operate. Y Y N 
Collaborative 
Labeling and 
Appliance 
Standards 
Program 
CLASP envisions a future in 
which governments worldwide 
ensure that: Energy consuming 
appliances, equipment and 
lighting products are designed 
and manufactured for 
maximum energy efficiency 
and the regulations governing 
the manufacture and 
distribution of these products 
worldwide are aligned or 
harmonized in order to 
maximize the economic and 
environmental benefits to 
consumers and create a more 
sustainable society. 
CLASP aims to serve as the 
primary international voice 
and resource for practitioners 
of energy efficiency 
standards and labeling (S&L) 
worldwide. Y Y Y 
Forest 
Stewardship 
Council 
FSC's vision is that the world’s 
forests meet the social, 
ecological and economic rights 
and needs of the present 
generation without 
compromising those of future 
generations. 
The Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC) aims to 
promote environmentally 
appropriate, socially 
beneficial, and economically 
viable management of the 
world’s forests. Y Y Y 
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Generation 
Challenge 
Programme 
(Former CGIAR 
Partnership 
Challenge 
Program: 
'Unlocking 
Genetic 
Diversity in 
Crops for the 
Resource-Poor') 
GCP's vision is a future where 
plant breeders have the tools to 
breed crops in marginal 
environments with greater 
efficiency and accuracy for the 
benefit of the resource-poor 
farmers and their families. 
The GCP's aim is to use 
genetic diversity and 
advanced plant science to 
improve crops for greater 
food security in the 
developing world.  Y N Y 
Global Compact NA 
The UN Global Compact 
aims to combine the best 
properties of the UN, such as 
moral authority and 
convening power, with the 
private sector’s solution-
finding strengths and 
resources, and the expertise 
and capacities of other key 
stakeholders. N Y N 
Global Crop 
Diversity Trust NA 
The Global Crop Diversity 
Trust aims to ensure the 
conservation and availability 
of crop diversity for food 
security worldwide.  Y Y Y 
Global e-
Sustainability 
Initiative 
GeSI's vision is to create an 
open and global forum for the 
improvement and promotion of 
products, services and access 
to ICT for the benefit of 
human development and 
sustainable development. 
GeSI aims to make a 
meaningful contribution to a 
global sustainable future, 
share experience and 
knowledge, work with 
stakeholders, manage 
operations sustainably, raise 
awareness of the contribution 
ICT can make to society 
overall, and contribute to 
benchmarking. Y Y N 
Global Master 
Plan for Cycling N 
The Global Master Plan for 
Cycling aims to enhance 
sustainable development and 
improve the quality of life in 
urban communities. Y Y Y 
Global 
Reporting 
Initiative 
GRE's vision is a sustainable 
global economy where 
organisations manage their 
economic, environmental, 
social and governance 
performance and impacts 
responsibly and report 
transparently. 
 GRI aims to provide a forum 
where those who take an 
interest in environmental, 
social and governance issues 
(ESG) and those 
organisations or individuals 
working in the Sustainability 
Reporting field can come 
together to advance the 
sustainability agenda. Y Y Y 
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Global Road 
Safety 
Partnership NA 
GRSP aims to find more 
effective and innovative 
ways of dealing with road 
safety in developing and 
transition countries. Through 
a comprehensive approach to 
road safety, GRSP partners 
collaborate and coordinate 
road safety activities. This 
approach aims to build the 
capacities of local 
institutions and to enhance 
the ability of professionals 
and communities pro-
actively to tackle safety 
problems. Y Y Y 
Global Village 
Energy 
Partnership N 
GVEP International aims to 
connect its wide network of 
partners to facilitate delivery 
of the finance, skills and 
knowledge they need to 
provide sustainable modern 
energy services in rural and 
peri-urban areas of the 
developing world. Y Y Y 
International 
Center for 
Sustainable 
Development NA 
ICSD aims to apply 
sustainable principles to 
development projects around 
the world in order to impact 
world development through 
practical projects that meet 
local needs and that are: 
community focused, 
environmentally friendly, 
financially healthy, and 
replicable.  
Y N N 
International 
Center for 
Tropical 
Agriculture 
CIAT will engage its key 
scientific competencies to 
achieve significant impact on 
the livelihoods of the poor in 
the tropics. Interdisciplinary 
and applied research will be 
conducted through 
partnerships with national 
programs, civil society 
organisations, and the private 
sector to produce international 
public goods that are directly 
relevant to their users. These 
goods include improved 
germplasm, technologies, 
methodologies, and 
knowledge. 
CIAT aims to reduce hunger 
and poverty, and improve 
human health in the tropics 
through research aimed at 
increasing the eco-efficiency 
of agriculture. Y Y Y 
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International 
Electrotechnical 
Commission 
IEC's vision is to have 
standards and conformity 
assessment programmes – the 
key to international trade.# 
IEC aims to promote 
international cooperation on 
all questions of 
electrotechnical 
standardization and related 
matters, such as the 
assessment of conformity to 
standards, in the fields of 
electricity, electronics and 
related technologies. 
Y Y N 
International 
Road Transport 
Union NA 
The IRU aims to facilitate 
road transport worldwide and 
use training to promote 
professional competence in 
the sector and to improve the 
quality of services it offers. Y Y Y 
International 
Service for the 
Acquisition of 
Agri-biotech 
Applications NA 
 ISAAA aims to contribute to 
the world efforts to help 
achieve agricultural 
sustainability and 
development. Y N Y 
International 
Solar Energy 
Society 
ISES's vision is Rapid 
Transition to a Renewable 
Energy World 
The ISES aims to provide 
scientifically credible and 
up-to-date Renewable 
Energy and Energy 
Efficiency information and 
networking opportunities to 
the global communities of 
scientists, educators, 
practitioners, industries, 
policy makers and to the 
general public. Y Y Y 
International 
Youth 
Foundation 
The vision of IYF is a world in 
which every young person has 
at least one responsible, loving 
adult committed to his or her 
well-being; a safe place in 
which to live, learn, work, and 
play; a healthy start and 
lifestyle; the chance to serve 
others; and the opportunity to 
learn marketable skills for 
adulthood. 
The International Youth 
Foundation aims to prepare 
the world’s young people to 
be healthy, productive, and 
engaged citizens. N N Y 
Internet 
Corporation for 
Assigned Names 
and Numbers NA 
ICANN aims to coordinate, 
at the overall level, the 
global Internet's systems of 
unique identifiers, and in 
particular to ensure the stable 
and secure operation of the 
Internet's unique identifier 
systems. Y Y Y 
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Marine 
Stewardship 
Council 
MSC's vision is of the world’s 
oceans teeming with life, and 
seafood supplies safeguarded 
for this and future generations. 
MSC aims to use our 
ecolabel and fishery 
certification programme to 
contribute to the health of the 
world’s oceans by 
recognising and rewarding 
sustainable fishing practises, 
influencing the choices 
people make when buying 
seafood, and working with 
our partners to transform the 
seafood market to a 
sustainable basis. Y Y Y 
Partners for 
Environmental 
Cooperation in 
Europe NA 
PECE aims to contribute to 
the protection and 
improvement of the 
environment, an 
improvement in people’s 
quality of life and the 
promotion of sustainable 
development in the EECCA 
region through tri-sector 
partnership projects 
involving government, non-
governmental organisations 
and the private sector. Y N Y 
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Partnership for 
Clean Fuels and 
Vehicles NA 
PCPV aims to help 
developing countries to 
develop action plans to 
complete the global 
elimination of leaded 
gasoline and start to phase 
down sulphur in diesel and 
gasoline fuels, concurrent 
with adopting cleaner vehicle 
requirements;  Support the 
development and adoption of 
cleaner fuel standards and 
cleaner vehicle requirements 
by providing a platform for 
exchange of experiences and 
successful practices in 
developed and developing 
countries as well as technical 
assistance;  Develop public 
outreach materials, 
educational programmes, and 
awareness campaigns; adapt 
economic and planning tools 
for clean fuels and vehicles 
analyses in local settings; 
and support the development 
of enforcement and 
compliance programmes, 
with an initial focus on fuel 
adulteration; and foster key 
partnerships between 
government, industry, 
NGOs, and other interested 
parties within a country and 
between countries to 
facilitate the implementation 
of cleaner fuel and vehicle 
commitments. Y Y Y 
Project Proteus NA 
Project Proteus aims to 
create and launch in 2008 a 
decentralised, user-friendly, 
up-to-date system for storing, 
managing, and reporting on 
trends in coverage for all the 
world’s protected areas – 
conforming to best practice 
techniques and providing a 
platform that allows for the 
easy integration of other 
conservation datasets and 
user opinion. Y Y N 
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Public Interest 
Intellectual 
Property 
Advisors NA 
PIIPA aims to make NO or 
LOW COST intellectual 
property counsel available 
for developing countries and 
public interest organisations 
who seek to promote health, 
agriculture, biodiversity, 
science, culture, and the 
environment. Y Y N 
Renewable 
Energy and 
Energy 
Efficiency 
Partnership NA 
REEEP aims to accelerate 
the uptake of renewables and 
energy efficiency technology 
as a means of reducing 
carbon emissions, increasing 
energy security, and 
improving access to 
sustainable energy for the 
poor worldwide. Y Y Y 
Renewable 
Energy Policy 
Network for the 
21st Century NA 
REN21 aims to provide a 
forum for international 
leadership on renewable 
energy. Y Y N 
Water and 
Sanitation for 
the Urban Poor NA 
WSUP aims to support local 
service providers around the 
world to deliver affordable 
and sustainable water and 
sanitation services to poor 
people in urban 
communities. Y Y Y 
World 
Economic 
Forum - 
Partnering 
Against 
Corruption 
Initiative NA 
The PACI aims to develop 
multi-industry principles and 
practices that will result in a 
competitive level playing 
field, based on integrity, 
fairness and ethical conduct. Y Y N 
World Energy 
Council NA 
The World Energy Council 
aims to promote the 
sustainable supply and use of 
energy for the greatest 
benefit of all people. Y Y N 
World 
Resources 
Institute NA 
WRI aims to move human 
society to live in ways that 
protect Earth’s environment 
and its capacity to provide 
for the needs and aspirations 
of current and future 
generations. Y Y Y 
World 
Vegetable 
Centre NA 
The AVRDC aims to reduce 
malnutrition and poverty 
through vegetable research 
and development. Y Y Y 
Mectizan 
Donation 
Program 
Mectizan's vision is a future 
free of the debilitating effects 
of onchocerciasis and 
lymphatic filariasis. 
Mectizan aims to provide 
medical, technical and 
administrative oversight for 
the donation of Mectizan for 
the treatment of river 
blindness. Y N Y 
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Global Ballast 
Water 
Management 
Programme 
The vision of the Global 
Ballast Water Management 
Programme is to spur global 
efforts to design and test 
technology solutions, and to 
enhance global knowledge 
management and marine 
electronic communications to 
address the issue. 
GBP aims to assist 
developing countries to 
reduce the risk of aquatic 
bio-invasions mediated by 
ships’ ballast water and 
sediments. N Y Y 
Efficient Energy 
for Sustainable 
Development  
EESD's vision is to assist 
developing and transitional 
economies reduce poverty and 
get ahead of their development 
curves. 
EESD aims to improve the 
productivity and efficiency 
of energy systems, while 
reducing waste and pollution, 
saving money and improving 
reliability through more 
energy efficient processes 
and technologies, and 
production modernization. N Y Y 
World Institute 
for Sustainable 
Humanity 
(AWISH) - 
Hellas -
Mesogeiou NA 
The AWISH aims to provide 
models and support for life 
sustaining activities that 
integrate solutions to poverty 
and the environment while 
fostering self-reliance. Y Y Y 
Access to 
Global Online 
Research in 
Agriculture 
AGORA is designed to 
enhance the scholarship of the 
many thousands of students, 
faculty and researchers in 
agriculture and life sciences in 
the developing world. 
AGORA aims to improve 
access to scientific 
information for agriculture 
sector institutions in 
developing countries. Y Y Y 
Awareness and 
Preparedness for 
Emergencies at 
the Local Level  NA 
APELL does not have its 
own mission but rather 
provides mission of UNEP, 
DEP, the umbrella 
organisation. Y N Y 
BE THE 
CHANGE! - 
youth-led action 
for sustainable 
development NA 
BE THE CHANGE aims to 
support and enable young 
people successfully to 
complete simple 
development projects with 
the minimum of financial 
resources and the maximum 
of peer/community support.  Y N Y 
BioCarbon Fund NA 
The BioCarbon Fund aims to 
provide carbon finance for 
projects that sequester or 
conserve greenhouse gases in 
forests, agro- and other 
ecosystems. Y N Y 
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Biotrade 
Initiative NA 
BTFP aims to stimulate trade 
and investment in biological 
resources to further 
sustainable development in 
line with the three objectives 
of the CBD: the conservation 
of biological diversity; 
sustainable use of its 
components; and fair and 
equitable sharing of the 
benefits arising from the 
utilisation of genetic 
resources.  N Y Y 
Capacity 
Building Task 
Force on Trade, 
Environment 
and 
Development NA 
The CBTF aims to combine 
the unique strengths of 
UNEP to build capacities on 
environmental aspects of 
trade, and of UNCTAD to 
build capacities on the 
development aspects of 
trade. Y Y N 
Cement 
Sustainability 
Initiative NA 
WBCSD aims to provide 
business leadership as a 
catalyst for change toward 
sustainable development and 
to promote the role of eco-
efficiency, innovation and 
corporate social 
responsibility. Y N Y 
CGIAR 
Challenge 
Program on 
Water and Food NA 
The CPWF aims to increase 
the productivity of water for 
food and livelihoods, in a 
manner that is 
environmentally sustainable 
and socially acceptable. Y Y Y 
Cisco 
Networking 
Academy 
Program NA 
Networking Academy aims 
to provide a consistently 
enriching learning 
experience by partnering 
with public and private 
institutions such as schools, 
universities, businesses, 
nonprofits, and government 
organisations to develop and 
deliver innovative ICT 
courses, improve the 
effectiveness and 
accessibility of the program, 
increase access to education 
and career opportunities, and 
help ensure that students and 
instructors have the 
resources they need to 
accomplish their goals. Y Y N 
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Climate 
Investment 
Partnership NA 
The CIF is a collaborative 
effort among the Multilateral 
Development Banks (MDBs) 
and countries that aims to 
bridge the financing and 
learning gap between now 
and a post-2012 global 
climate change agreement. Y Y Y 
Community 
Water Initiative NA 
CWI aims to support poor 
and marginalized populations 
to acquire one of the most 
basic human needs -water 
supply and sanitation, and to 
acquire one of the most basic 
human needs -water supply 
and sanitation. N N Y 
Consultative 
Group on 
International 
Agricultural 
Research 
The founders of the 
Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR) had a 
vision of agriculture and 
agricultural research enabling 
the world’s poor to begin their 
escape from poverty. 
CGIAR aims to achieve 
sustainable food security and 
reduce poverty in developing 
countries through scientific 
research and research-related 
activities in the fields of 
agriculture, forestry, 
fisheries, policy, and 
environment. Y Y Y 
Consultative 
Group to Assist 
the Poor 
CGAP works toward a world 
in which poor people are 
considered valued clients of 
their country’s financial 
system. 
CGAP aims to improve poor 
people’s access to 
convenient and affordable 
financial services so that they 
can improve their living 
conditions and build a better 
future. Y Y Y 
E+Co 
E+Co's vision is to build on 
demand for clean and 
affordable energy in 
developing countries and this 
demand can be satisfied by 
local entrepreneurs. 
E+Co aims to create energy 
businesses that mitigate 
climate change and reduce 
poverty while generating 
financial returns. Y Y Y 
e8 (Formerly e7) NA 
E8 aims  to play an active 
role in addressing global 
electricity issues and to 
promote sustainable 
development worldwide" Y N Y 
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Ecoagriculture 
Partners 
Ecoagriculture Partners strives 
for a world where current 
agricultural lands are 
increasingly managed as 
ecoagriculture landscapes to 
achieve three complementary 
goals: to enhance rural 
livelihoods; conserve 
biodiversity; and sustainably 
produce crops, livestock, fish, 
and forest products. 
ECOAGRIBUTLURE aims 
to support rural communities 
to produce food and enhance 
their livelihoods while 
protecting the biological 
diversity of plant and animal 
life, and we educate 
policymakers, institutions, 
and innovators in 
ecoagriculture management 
approaches to enable this to 
happen. We support diverse 
ecoagriculture innovators 
from the agriculture, 
conservation and rural 
development sectors to 
strengthen and scale up their 
ecoagriculture management 
approaches by strengthening 
understanding of 
ecoagriculture; facilitating 
collaboration amongst 
practitioners, and mobilizing 
strategic institutional change 
to enable ecoagriculture. Y Y Y 
Ecological 
Sanitation 
Research NA 
EcoSanRes (Ecological 
Sanitation Research) 
Programme aims to develop 
and promote sustainable 
sanitation in the developing 
world through capacity 
development and knowledge 
management as a 
contribution to equity, 
health, poverty alleviation, 
and improved environmental 
quality. Y N Y 
EdInvest NA 
EdInvest aims to provide an 
information portal for global 
developments in private 
education.  
Y N N 
Embarq NA 
EMBARQ aims to catalyze 
environmentally and 
financially sustainable 
transport solutions to 
improve quality of life in 
cities by reducing pollution, 
improving public health, and 
creating safe, accessible and 
attractive urban public 
spaces. N Y Y 
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Encyclopedia of 
Life Support 
Systems 
EOLSS's vision is to be the 
world’s largest, state-of-the-
art, educational, professional, 
informative, and integrated 
knowledge base dedicated to 
the health, maintenance, and 
future of the web of life on 
planet Earth, focusing on 
sustainable development in all 
its myriad aspects from 
ecological issues to human 
security. 
The Encyclopedia of Life 
Support Systems (EOLSS) 
aims to presents a 
comprehensive, 
authoritative, and integrated 
body of knowledge of life 
support systems. It is a 
forward-looking publication, 
designed as a global guide to 
professional practice, 
education, and heightened 
social awareness of critical 
life support issues.  Y Y N 
Equator 
Initiative NA 
The Equator Initiative aims 
to bring together the United 
Nations, governments, civil 
society, businesses, and 
grassroots organisations to 
build the capacity and raise 
the profile of local efforts to 
reduce poverty through the 
conservation and sustainable 
use of biodiversity. Y Y Y 
EU Water 
Initiative: Water 
for Life N 
Water for Life aims to half 
the number of people without 
access to safe water and 
basic sanitation.  N N N 
EVE-olution 
Foundation N 
The EVE-olution Foundation 
aims to empower women 
entrepreneurs in developing 
nations with the support of 
our worldwide network of 
retired successful executives 
as "coaches".  N Y Y 
Global 
Facilitation 
Partnership for 
Transportation 
and Trade NA 
The Global Facilitation 
Partnership for 
Transportation and Trade 
aims to pull together all 
interested parties, public and 
private, national and 
international, who want to 
help achieve significant 
improvements in transport 
and trade facilitation in 
World Bank member 
countries. N N Y 
Global Gas 
Flaring 
Reduction 
GGRF's vision is to work 
together with major oil 
companies and governments to 
minimize energy waste by 
jointly overcoming the barriers 
that inhibit more gas 
utilization. 
The GGFR partnership aims 
to be a catalyst for reducing 
wasteful and undesirable 
practices of gas flaring and 
venting through policy 
change, stakeholder 
facilitation and project 
implementation. Y Y Y 
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Global 
Partnership for 
Capacity 
Building to 
Implement the 
Globally 
Harmonized 
System for 
Chemical 
Classification 
and Labelling NA 
The Globally Harmonized 
System of Classification and 
Labelling of Chemicals 
(GHS) aims at ensuring that 
existing information on 
physical hazards and toxicity 
from chemicals is available 
in order to enhance the 
protection of human health 
and the environment during 
the handling, transport and 
use of these chemicals. N Y Y 
Global Water 
Partnership 
The Global Water 
Partnership's vision is for a 
water secure world. Its mission 
is to support the sustainable 
development and management 
of water resources at all levels. 
GWP aims to foster 
integrated water resource 
management (IWRM), and to 
ensure the coordinated 
development and 
management of water, land, 
and related resources by 
maximising economic and 
social welfare without 
compromising the 
sustainability of vital 
environmental systems. Y N Y 
GlobalGiving 
GlobalGiving's vision it to 
unleash the potential of people 
around the world to make 
positive change happen. 
GlobalGiving' aims to build 
an efficient, open, thriving 
marketplace that connects 
people who have community 
and world-changing ideas 
with people who can support 
them. N Y N 
Great Apes 
Survival Project  
The GRASP Partnership has, 
as an immediate challenge, to 
lift the threat of imminent 
extinction facing most 
populations of great apes. 
GRASP aims to work as a 
coherent partnership to 
conserve in their natural 
habitats wherever they exist 
wild populations of every 
kind of great ape and to 
make sure that where apes 
and people interact, their 
interactions are mutually 
positive and sustainable. N N Y 
International 
Livestock 
Research 
Institute 
ILRI envisions a world made 
better for poor people in 
developing countries by 
improving agricultural systems 
in which livestock are 
important.  
ILRI aims to work at the 
crossroads of livestock and 
poverty, bringing high-
quality science and capacity-
building to bear on poverty 
reduction and sustainable 
development for poor 
livestock keepers and their 
communities. Y N Y 
International 
Navigation 
Association NA 
PIANC aims to provide 
expert guidance and 
technical advice; To keep the 
international waterborne 
transport community 
connected; to support young 
professionals and countries 
in transition. Y N N 
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International 
Partnership for 
Sustainable 
Development in 
Mountain 
Regions 
The Mountain Partnership 
envisages the improved well 
being, livelihoods and 
opportunities of mountain 
people and the protection and 
stewardship of mountain 
environments around the 
world. 
The Mountain Partnership 
aims to achieve sustainable 
mountain development 
around the world. The 
Mountain Partnership 
addresses the challenges of 
mountain regions, by tapping 
the wealth and diversity of 
resources, 
knowledge(including 
traditional knowledge), 
information and expertise, 
from and through its 
members, in order to 
stimulate concrete initiatives 
at all levels that will ensure 
improved quality of life and 
environments in the world’s 
mountain regions. Y Y Y 
International 
Partnership for 
the Hydrogen 
Economy NA 
The IPHE aims to serve as a 
mechanism to organize and 
implement effective, 
efficient, and focused 
international research, 
development, demonstration 
and commercial utilization 
activities related to hydrogen 
and fuel cell technologies. Y Y N 
International 
Water and 
Sanitation 
Center  NA 
IRC aims to facilitate the 
sharing, promotion and use 
of knowledge so that 
governments, professionals 
and organisations can better 
support poor men, women 
and children in developing 
countries to obtain water and 
sanitation services they will 
use and maintain. Y Y Y 
Local Capacity-
Building and 
Training on 
Sustainable 
Urbanization: a 
Public-Private 
Partnership NA 
LDP aims to develop the 
capacity of local actors, 
through exchange of 
experiences and 
dissemination of best 
practices, as an effective way 
of achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) 
and reducing poverty at local 
level. Y Y Y 
Methane to 
Markets NA 
Methane to Markets aims to 
support advances in cost 
effective, near-term methane 
recovery and use as a clean 
energy source in four sectors: 
agriculture, coal mines, 
landfills, and oil and gas 
systems.  Y Y Y 
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New Ventures = 
XR? 
New Venture's vision is that 
Local Centers become 
nationally recognized hubs for 
sustainable entrepreneurship, 
around which a vibrant 
ecosystem of support is 
created. 
New Ventures  aims to help 
environmental 
entrepreneurship grow in 
vibrant emerging markets. Y Y N 
Online Access 
to Research in 
the Environment 
OARE's vision is for 
developing countries to gain 
access to one of the world’s 
largest collections of 
environmental science 
research. 
OARE aims to improve the 
quality and effectiveness of 
environmental science 
research, education and 
training in low-income 
countries. N Y N 
Partnership for 
Clean Indoor 
Air NA 
The Partnership for Clean 
Indoor Air aims to improve 
health, livelihood, and 
quality of life by reducing 
exposure to indoor air 
pollution, primarily among 
women and children, from 
household energy use. Y Y Y 
Population and 
Sustainability 
Network NA 
The Population and 
Sustainability Network aims 
to provide a 'space' in which 
different constituencies can 
learn from each other. Y Y N 
Refrigerants 
Naturally 
Initiative NA 
Refrigerators Naturally 
Initiative aims to combat 
climate change and ozone 
layer depletion by 
substituting harmful 
fluorinated gases ("F-gases", 
such as CFCs, HCFCs and 
HFCs) with natural 
refrigerants with a focus on 
their point-of-sale cooling 
applications.  Y Y Y 
Sister Cities 
Network for 
Sustainable 
Development 
Sister Cities International 
seeks to achieve a peaceful, 
orderly and just world by 
assuming leadership in 
bringing together communities 
around the world to create a 
worldwide sister city 
movement for peace. Every 
country will have active, 
prosperous and mutually 
beneficial relationships United 
States sister cities, counties, 
and states. Throughout the 
world, individuals and 
organized groups at all levels 
of society will commit 
themselves to serve as citizen 
diplomats for this purpose. 
SCNSD aims to promote 
peace through mutual 
respect, understanding, & 
cooperation — one 
individual, one community at 
a time. Y Y Y 
Sustainable 
Forest Products 
Global Alliance NA 
The Sustainable Forest 
Products Global Alliance 
aims to make markets work 
for forests and people.  Y Y Y 
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Tour Operators 
Initiative NA 
Tour Operators Initiative 
aims to advance the 
sustainable development and 
management of tourism; to 
encourage tour operators to 
make a corporate 
commitment to sustainable 
development.  Y Y N 
Transparency 
International 
Transparency International's 
vision is a world in which 
government, politics, business, 
civil society and the daily lives 
of people are free of 
corruption. 
TI aims to create change 
towards a world free of 
corruption.  N N Y 
Travel 
Foundation NA 
The Travel Foundation's aim 
is to protect and enhance the 
environment and to improve 
the well-being of 
communities in destination 
countries.  Y Y Y 
Unicode 
Consortium NA 
The Unicode Consortium 
aims to develop, extend and 
promote use of the Unicode 
Standard, which specifies the 
representation of text in 
modern software products 
and standards. Y Y N 
UNIDO Cleaner 
Production 
Programme 
UNIDO's holistic cleaner 
production approach is a 
preventive, integrated strategy 
that is applied to the entire 
production cycle to increase 
productivity by ensuring a 
more efficient use of raw 
materials, energy and water.  
They wish to promote better 
environmental performance 
through reduction at source of 
waste and emissions, and to 
reduce the environmental 
impact of products throughout 
their life cycle by the design of 
environmentally friendly but 
cost-effective products. 
The UNIDO Cleaner 
Production programme (CP) 
aims at building national CP 
capacities, fostering dialogue 
between industry and 
government and enhancing 
investments for transfer and 
development of 
environmentally sound 
technologies. Y Y N 
United Nations 
Center for Trade 
Facilitation and 
Electronic 
Business 
UN-CEFACT's vision is to 
create simple, transparent and 
effective processes for global 
business. 
The United Nations, through 
its Centre for Trade 
Facilitation and Electronic 
Business (UN/CEFACT), 
aims to support activities 
dedicated to improving the 
ability of business, trade and 
administrative organisations, 
from developed, developing 
and transitional economies, 
to exchange products and 
relevant services effectively.  Y Y N 
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World Alliance 
for 
Decentralized 
Energy 
WADE's vision is for the 
wider use of DE is a key 
solution to bringing about the 
cost-effective modernization 
and development of the 
world’s electricity systems.  
Existing decentralized energy 
(DE) technologies can reduce 
delivered energy costs and 
decrease emissions of CO2 as 
well as other harmful 
pollutants. 
WADE aims to increase the 
market share of DE 
technologies in the global 
power mix to create a cost-
effective, robust and 
sustainable electricity 
system. Y Y Y 
World Business 
Council on 
Sustainable 
Development NA 
The WBCSD aims to provide 
business leadership as a 
catalyst for change toward 
sustainable development, and 
to support the business 
license to operate, innovate 
and grow in a world 
increasingly shaped by 
sustainable development 
issues. N Y N 
World 
Economic 
Forum Disaster 
Resource 
Network NA 
The Humanitarian Relief 
Initiative aims to increase the 
global impact of private 
sector engagement in 
humanitarian relief. The HRI 
develops public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) that 
match the core competencies 
of the private sector with the 
priority needs of the global 
humanitarian community in 
advance of humanitarian 
crises. N Y Y 
World Links NA 
World Links aims to improve 
educational outcomes, 
economic opportunities, and 
global understanding for 
youth through the use of 
information and 
communications technology 
and novel approaches to 
learning. Y Y Y 
World Tourism 
Organisation NA 
The World Tourism 
Organisation aims to 
promote and develop tourism 
with a view to contribute to 
economic development, 
international understanding, 
peace, prosperity, and 
universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as 
to race, sex, language or 
religion.  N Y N 
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Youth Business 
International 
Our vision is that youth 
enterprise is recognised as a 
vital part of efforts to create 
employment and stimulate 
economic growth throughout 
the world. 
Youth Business International 
aims to champion youth 
enterprise by growing a 
global network which 
provides young people with 
the opportunity to start their 
own business.  N Y Y 
Ethical Trading 
Initiative 
ETI's vision is a world where 
all workers are free from 
exploitation and 
discrimination, and work in 
conditions of freedom, security 
and equity. 
ETI aims to improve 
working conditions in global 
supply chains by developing 
effective approaches to 
implementing the ETI Base 
Code of labour practice. Y Y Y 
4C Association: 
Common Code 
for the Coffee 
Community 
The long term objectives are 
higher efficiency, cost 
reduction, quality 
improvement and increased 
profitability in coffee 
production 
The 4C Association aims to 
create a beneficial situation 
for coffee producers, workers 
engaged in the coffee sector, 
rural communities, trade & 
industry, consumers and the 
environment. N Y Y 
Global 
Environment 
Facility  NA 
The Global Environment 
Facility (GEF) aims to 
provide a mechanism for 
international cooperation for 
the purpose of providing 
new, and additional, grant 
and concessional funding to 
meet the agreed incremental 
costs of measures to achieve 
agreed global environmental 
benefits in the areas of 
biological diversity, climate 
change, international waters, 
and ozone layer depletion. Y Y N 
ACCION 
International 
ACCION pursues a vision in 
which all people have access 
to a range of high-quality 
financial services that enhance 
their economic potential and 
the quality of their lives. 
ACCION International aims 
to give people the financial 
tools they need to work their 
way out of poverty. Y N Y 
Agricultural 
Risk 
Management 
Team 
ARMT has separate visions for 
each of their program areas, 
which include Supply Chain 
Risk Assessment, Price Risk 
Management, Weather Risk 
Management, Capacity 
Building and Training, and 
Forum for Agriculture Risk 
Management in Development 
(FARM). 
ARMT aims to assist clients 
to develop and apply more 
effective and sustainable 
strategies for managing 
agricultural risks through 
investment lending and 
technical assistance. Y Y Y 
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Clean Tech 
Fund NA 
The CTF aims to finance 
transformational actions by 
Providing positive incentives 
for the demonstration of low 
carbon development and 
mitigation of GHG 
emissions. This will be done 
though public and private 
sector investments Y Y Y 
Golden Rice NA 
Gold Rice aims to help 
mitigate the problem of 
vitamin A deficiency in the 
world by delivering the 
technology to the vitamin A-
deficient poor in developing 
countries in the most 
efficient way. Y N Y 
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PPP Name  Abv. 
No. of 
External 
Evaluations Conducted by:        Dates  
4C Association: Common 
Code for the Coffee 
Community 4-C 60 
Professional, independent third-party 
companies that are accredited against 
ISO/Guide 65 or equivalent 2009 
ACCION International ACCION 1 Charity Navigator 2008 
AED-SATELLIFE 
SATELLIF
E 1 
Centre of Informatics of the Universidade 
Eduardo Mondlane (CIUEM) 2010 
Aeras Global TB Vaccine 
Foundation AERAS 1 
The Directorate-General for International 
Cooperation (DGIS) of the Netherlands 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009 
Alliance for Health 
Policy and Systems 
Research AHPSR 1 
Epidemiology and Global Health, Umeå 
University, Sweden 2010 
Awareness and 
Preparedness for 
Emergencies at the Local 
Level  APELL 1 Asociacion Nacional de Industriales (ANDI) 2004 
Building Partnerships for 
Development in Water 
and Sanitation BPD-WS 1 PARC 2006 
Cement Sustainability 
Initiative CSI 1 Société Générale de Surveillance SA 2008 
Clean Air Initiative CAI 1 Synovate, Inc. 2004 
Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural 
Research CGIAR 1 Independent Review Panel 2008 
Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poor CGAP 1 
Sarah Forster, Klaus Maurer, Michael 
Mithika 2007 
Drugs for Neglected 
Diseases Initiative DNDI 1 See personal interview notes 2005 
E + Co 
 
1 Charity Navigator 2009 
Eli Lilly Multi-Drug 
Resistant Tuberculosis 
Partnership MDR-TB 2 Harvard University and INSEAD Both 2007 
Equator Initiative 
 
1 Fikret Berkes and Tikaram Adhikari  2006 
Ethical Trading Initiative ETI 1 
Institute of Development Studies, University 
of Sussex 2006 
Forest Stewardship 
Council FSC 1 
Quang Tri Smallholder Forest Certification 
Group, VIETNAM 2011 
Generation Challenge 
Programme  GCP 2 
European Commission and CGIAR Science 
Council Secretariat Both 2008 
Global Alliance for the 
Elimination of Lymphatic 
Filariasis  GAELF 2 
Izumi Foundation and Prepare/Test 
Foundation 2009 and 2005 
Global Alliance for 
Vaccines and 
Immunization GAVI 2 
Abt Associates, Harvard Initiative for Global 
Health 2007 and 2006 
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Global Ballast Water 
Management Programme 
 
1 Vousden & Okamura 2003 
Global Compact UNGC 1 GTZ 2008 
Global Crop Diversity 
Trust 
 
1 
Dr Maria Jose Amstalden Sampaio, Dr 
Regassa Feyissa and chaired by Dr Bob 
Clements 2009 
Global Environment 
Facility  GEF 1 Charlotte Streck, MIT 2006 
Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, TB and Malaria GFATM 18 
Conducted by multiple bodies, including 
the most recent by Macro International 2009 
Global Polio 
Eradication Initiative GPEI 2 International Spread Team, Michael Toole Both 2009 
Global Reporting 
Initiative GRI 1 Global Public Policy Institute 2006 
Global Road Safety 
Partnership GRSP 1 Henning Lauridsen and Torkel Bjørnskau 2004 
Global Village Energy 
Partnership GVEP 1 DFID 2009 
Global Water 
Partnership GWP 2 
Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of 
the World Bank and Joint Donor Group 
consisting of DFID, SIDA, Norad, DGIS, 
GTZ and Danida 2010 and 2007 
International AIDS 
Vaccine Initiative IAVI 1 Panel of Experts (WB commissioned) 2009 
International 
Cooperative 
Biodiversity Groups 
Program ICBG 1 Panel of Experts (FIC commissioned) 2002 
International 
Partnership for 
Microbicides IPM 1 FSG 2008 
International Water and 
Sanitation Center  IRC 2 
Directorate General for International 
Cooperation (DGIS) of the Netherlands’ 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and IRC 2005 and 2010 
Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and 
Numbers ICANN 1 One World Trust 2007 
Joint United Nations 
Program on HIV/AIDS  UNAIDS 2 
Oversight Committee and UNAIDS 
Programme Coordinating Board 2009 and 2007 
Marine Stewardship 
Council MSC 1 Wildhavens 2004 
Mectizan Donation 
Program Mectizan 1 
Department of International Health, Johns 
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public 
Health 2004 
Medicines for Malaria 
Venture MMV 3 FSG, World Bank, and DFID 
2010, 2007 and 
2005 
Micronutrient Initiative MI 1 CIDA 2000 
Partnership for Clean 
Fuels and Vehicles PCFV 1 UNEP 2010 
Renewable Energy and 
Energy Efficiency 
Partnership REEEP 1 
Consortium Le Groupe-conseil baastel ltée 
& Econoler International 2009 
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Roll Back Malaria 
Global Partnership  RBM 1 Dalberg Global Development Advisors 2009 
Stop TB Partnership StopTB 3 World Bank; McKinsey & Company 2009 
Tour Operators 
Initiative 
 
1 Leeds Metropolitan University 2003 
Transparency 
International TI 1 Channel Research 2011 
UNIDO Cleaner 
Production Programme CP 2 
Independent Evaluation Team (one in 
Mozambique, one in South Africa) Both in 2008 
United Nations Center 
for Trade Facilitation 
and Electronic Business 
UN-
CEFACT 1 Group of Experts 2005 
Water and Sanitation for 
the Urban Poor WSUP 1 DfID 2010 
World Vegetable Centre AVRDC 1 EPMR Panel 2008 
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APPENDIX H: Management interviews: Autonomy specification 
 
Specification 
1 
(low autonomy) 
3 
(medium autonomy) 
5 
(high autonomy) 
How would the decision to 
institute a strategic change / shift 
take place?    
The PPP has no 
authority, all takes 
place within the host 
or main partner 
Requires signoff from 
the host/ main partner; 
typically agreed 
Complete decision of 
the PPP or its partners 
in aggregate 
To the extent that the PPP entity 
decides over the above, who within 
the PPP makes that decision? 
The PPP main 
governing board/ 
chair decides entirely 
The PPP Board/Chair 
decides combined with 
the PPP committee  
The operations team 
makes the decision 
entirely 
How would the decision to change 
/ expand current operations or 
programs?   
The PPP has no 
authority, all takes 
place within the host 
or main partner 
Requires signoff from 
the host/ main partner; 
typically agreed 
Complete decision of 
the PPP or its partners 
in aggregate 
To the extent that the PPP entity 
decides over the above, who within 
the PPP makes that decision? 
The PPP main 
governing board/ 
chair decides entirely 
The PPP Board/Chair 
decides combined with 
the PPP committee  
The operations team 
makes the decision 
entirely 
How would decisions about key 
staffing decisions take place?   
The PPP has no 
authority, all takes 
place within the host 
or main partner 
Requires signoff from 
the host/ main partner; 
typically agreed 
Complete decision of 
the PPP or its partners 
in aggregate 
To the extent that the PPP entity 
decides over the above, who within 
the PPP makes that decision? 
The PPP main 
governing board/ 
chair decides entirely 
The PPP Board/Chair 
decides combined with 
the PPP committee  
The operations team 
makes the decision 
entirely 
How would decisions regarding 
funding and budget decisions take 
place?   
The PPP has no 
authority, all takes 
place within the host 
or main partner 
Requires signoff from 
the host/ main partner; 
typically agreed 
Complete decision of 
the PPP or its partners 
in aggregate 
To the extent that the PPP entity 
decides over the above, who within 
the PPP makes that decision? 
The PPP main 
governing board/ 
chair decides entirely 
The PPP Board/Chair 
decides combined with 
the PPP committee  
The operations team 
makes the decision 
entirely 
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APPENDIX I: Management Interview Guide: Complete question and scoring 
grid 
 
Pre-interview Questions: 
Partnership Name 
Date 
Time 
Position 
Tenure in Post (years) 
Tenure in Partnership (years) 
HOSTED? 
What is the main function of this PPP? 
When was the partnership initiated/ launched?  
 
 
 
PARTNERSHIP VISTION AND STRATGEY  
(1) Partnership vision 
Tests whether partnership leaders have the understanding of the broader set of challenges that the partnership, system and key actors face  
  a) How does the partnership define its vision?  How has this changed since partnership initiation?  
b) Who is involved in setting the vision/ strategies? When there is disagreement, how does the partnership leader build 
alignment? 
c) How well do partner members and PPP staff know and understand the vision? 
d) How is this vision communicated to the overall partnership community? 
 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: 
 
 
Partnership either has no clear vision, 
or one defined without substantial 
stakeholder collaboration  
 
  
Partnership has defined a vision that  
reflects key PPP strategy but either 
largely focused on meeting specific 
mandates or defined too loosely to 
resonate with meaning; usually defined 
with stakeholder collaboration at PPP 
onset  
Partnership defines and broadly communicate a 
shared vision and purpose for the partnership that 
focuses on adding distinct value (beyond those 
required by MOUs, etc); Vision and purpose is 
built upon a keen understanding of both PPP and 
wider system level needs, and defined 
collaboratively with a wide range of stakeholders  
 
  
(2) Partnership rationale and value add  
Tests whether the partnership and partnering organizations have articulated rationale for partnering and value add  
  a) What was the rationale that led to this partnering arrangement?  How was this communicated between partners?  
b) How often is this rationale reviewed amongst partners or funders?  How was this communicated?  
c) Who does your partnership consider to be your key stakeholders?   
d) Can you give an example of how your organization has proactively modified its activities based on stakeholder needs? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: 
 
 
Rationale not clearly stated or noted at 
PPP initiation only or as required for 
funding and/or support; stakeholder 
community only loosely defined and 
little action taken to assess its changing 
needs 
  
Rationale for partnering and the 
partnership articulated but  little to no 
follow through (e.g. rarely revisited);  
Data on the changing needs gathered 
but provides guidance only 
Partner managers can articulate clear rationale for 
partnering built on jointly defined problems and 
solutions and achieving distinct fit within system; 
PPP reviews its rationale  in response to 
stakeholder feedback and changing system wide 
needs; and modifies its proposition and services in 
anticipation of new and/or changed conditions    
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PARTNER  MANAGEMENT 
(3) Partnership selection strategy 
Test how well the partnership determines partner selection via appropriate model 
  a) What is the process for a new partner to join your organization? Where do you seek out and source new partners?  
b) What criteria do you use and/or pre-checks are performed before a new partner is admitted to the PPP?  How often 
does this occur? 
c) What defines a partner in your PPP, versus a member or a funder?  How is this communicated?  
d) How often do you review your partner selection model to test its effectiveness? Can you explain the results of the last 
review that occurred? 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Unclear distinction of partners; 
reactive only or more ad hoc process of 
new partners or members joining, e.g.  
focuses on geographical or financial 
based factors only  
 
Partnership may defines partnership 
criteria and processes  but is not linked 
with key drivers of PPP outcomes; 
attempt at due diligence performed at 
onset 
  
Partnership proactively controls the number and 
types of partners involved needed to meet goals; 
Partnership defines criteria and processes based on 
understanding of  strategic and performance-based 
fit; due diligence performed and monitored (i.e. 
follow ups performed)  
  
  
4)  Clearly defined partnership roles 
Tests how clearly the roles, responsibilities and required attributes of  members partners are defined within the partnership 
  a) How are the roles and responsibilities of the PARTNERS defined? Who determines these roles? 
b) How are these roles communicated and reviewed within the partnership and to hosts/funders and your SK community? 
c) How are they linked to partnership outcomes and performance? 
d) How are leadership responsibilities distributed across partners (and host organizations)?  What about risks? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Partnership does not define clear roles, 
responsibilities or accountability and 
desired of partners 
Partnership defines roles, 
responsibilities and desired 
competencies of partners,  but not 
necessarily linked with key drivers of 
PPP performance and outcomes; roles 
noted at joining only and 
responsibilities assigned on more ad hoc 
basis; centralised leadership 
Partnership defines clear roles, responsibilities and 
desired competencies of partners, built upon an 
understanding of what value add each partner has 
to contribute; Leadership and operational 
responsibilities are distributed across the 
partnership; clear notion of shared and assumed 
risks and responsibilities  
  
 
OPERATIONS MANGEMENT  
(5) Organization principles 
Tests how the partnership is organized 
  a) Can you briefly describe the basic organizational structure of the PPP? 
b) Why is the partnership structured the way it is? Can you think of other structures that would make more sense? 
c) Are there any significant opportunities in performance improvement that could be gained through a different 
organizational design? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: No visible or  clear organizational 
principles applied; organization never 
challenged, a “this is how it is” 
attitude 
 
Fundamentally right organizational 
setup, however often not effectively 
implemented and rarely challenged (seen 
as out of PPP’s control to change) 
 
Organization consciously designed and regularly 
challenged in order to attempt to improve (e.g. 
synergies fully captured where possible (methods, 
tools, resource bundling, etc.); largely 
decentralized operational activities while strategic 
activities are centralized 
 
  
(6) Scoping resources and resource management  
Tests whether the partnership has a coherent strategy for sourcing resources, knowledge of requirements and risk assessment  
  a) Can you describe the process for initiating contacts and obtaining additional funding or resources at your partnership? 
b) What proportion of your resources are committed prior to planning (e.g. budget year if applicable) versus those you 
must additionally seek? How much is repeat donors versus new?  
c) How do you determine how much resource will be needed to complete your PPPs work? How accurate are your 
estimations? 
d) How much can the PPP operations deal with shocks like a sudden increase / reduction in resources available (i.e. 
procurement process took much longer than expected to come into fruition)?  
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Partnership does not have a coherent 
resource sourcing strategy or relies 
heavily on its main funders; Few 
estimates performed or consistently 
estimates incorrectly; planning 
horizon is reactive to committed 
funds 
Partnership articulates resource strategy 
and has processes in place to support a  
steady funding stream but tends to rely 
on main funders, articulates major needs  
but estimates may not always match 
reality and feasibility 
Partnership has a steady and committed funding 
streamed that is managed as an integral part of PPP 
operations; Significant effort is made to ensure that 
work is not under or over resourced; Flexibility is 
built into the system to deal with fluctuating 
demand; LT planning horizon for funding 
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APPENDIX I(CONTINUED) 
(7) Good use of partner resources and internal collaboration and knowledge sharing 
Tests whether the organization ensures partners with the “right” fit/skills/resources are in place and able to work together and collaborate to share best 
practices 
  a) In planning for your PPPs operations, how do you know which partner organizations will contribute in which areas? 
b) How well are partners/ members matched to the requirements of their roles?  Does this flow down to the staff level?  
c) Within your basic PPP business operations model, how often should various partners work directly together on specific 
areas of PPP work?  How often do they? 
d) When a situation requires work across partners, does it happen seamlessly? Is there a process in place to facilitate 
this? 
e) How are lessons and best practices shared within the organization across partners/members? 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: No PPP centralised system for 
matching contributions and ability for 
partner organizations beyond what is 
noted at partnership onset; there is 
little or no regular formal or informal 
cooperation and knowledge sharing 
across units or  partners 
PPP reviews contributions and fit for 
certain projects and  some effort is 
made to better match these; Partners 
and units support each other and there 
is a fair level of interaction and 
knowledge sharing; The different units 
actively work together and the 
interviewee can easily give a few 
success stories  
PPP has a system or process in place to regularly 
review partner contributions and ensure match and 
fit and ensuring best contributions from members 
seen as integral to PPP success; frequently use 
formal and informal mechanisms to access 
resources or expertise in different PPP units to 
solve problems and then incorporate these 
learnings into PPP modes 
  
(8) Adopting Partnership Best Practices / External orientation  
Tests whether a partnership regularly reaches out to find ideas to improve performance and incorporates these into practice  
  a) How often does the division seek out ideas for best practices and innovations in service? What sources do you use? 
b) Can think of a recent lesson learned from another organization? How did you use it to improve operations or services 
within your organization? 
c) How are these learning or new practices shared across partners? What about across staff members?  
d) How does the PPP ensure that members and partnerships actors are utilizing these new practices? How often does this 
happen? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: The PPP rarely reaches out to other 
partnerships or organizations  
The PPP reaches outside the 
organization for ideas on a selective 
issue by issue basis; there is insufficient 
monitoring or implementation of these 
‘best practices’ but PPP may attempt to 
incorporate practices garnered from 
reactive means  
The PPP has formal mechanisms to gain ideas for 
improvement through forums, work with 
academics; provides leadership and staff with 
opportunities to collaborate and share best practice 
techniques and learnings with multiple methods to 
support their monitored implementation within the 
partnership (and level operations) 
  
(9) Continuous Improvement  and process documentation  
Tests attitudes to continuous improvement 
  a) When problems within partnership do occur, how do they typically get exposed and fixed? 
b) Can you talk me through the process for a recent problem that you faced? 
c) Who within the partnership gets involved in changing or improving process? How do the different staff groups get 
involved in this? 
d) Does the staff ever suggest process improvements? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Exposing and solving problems (for 
the partnership and staff) is 
unstructured; No process 
improvements are made when 
problems occur 
Exposing and solving problems  is 
approached in a  more ad-hoc way; 
resolution involves most of the 
appropriate staff groups 
 
Exposing and solving problems in a structured 
way is integral to individual's responsibilities, and 
resolution involves all appropriate individuals and 
staff groups; resolution performed as part of 
regular partnership management processes 
  
 
TARGET MANAGEMENT 
 
(10) Target Balance / Breadth  
Tests whether the PPP sets and  tracks meaningful targets tied to outcomes 
  a) What types of targets are set for the partnership? At which levels are the goals stated?  
b) How much are these determined by external factors or key host partners? Can you tell me about goals that are not set 
by those involved with funding and/or hosting? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Goals and related targets are very 
loosely defined or not defined at all; 
if they exist, they are activity rather 
than outcome based  
Goals defined for the partnership and 
units in terms of absolute measures of  
outcomes but related performance targets  
tend to be reactive measures; goals may  
tend to focus on partner/host goals  
Goals are balanced across range of measures;  
Performance targets are defined for the 
partnership and individual units and staff; targets 
include both absolute and value-added measures 
of outcomes and other metrics linked to key 
drivers of outcomes 
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APPENDIX I (CONTINUED) 
11) Target inter-connection  
Tests whether partnership and individual targets are aligned with each other and the overall system goals 
  a) How are these goals cascaded across the organization?  How do PPP-wide goals cascade down to the different partner 
organizations or operational groups/ units? (adjust as appropriately given PPP structure) 
b) How do you ensure your targets linked to global development goals or overriding principals on AID effectiveness (e.g. 
MDG or Paris AID or OECD DAC)? (Note: if applicable only) 
c) What about to country-level and unit-based operations? How are your targets linked to country based targets or goals 
(if applicable)? 
d) How are these goals cascaded down to the different partner organizations or staff groups or to individual staff 
members? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Goals do not cascade down the 
throughout the partnership or 
partnership system 
 
Goals are set with minimal or no 
system-wide effects taken into 
account 
Goals do cascade, but only to some units 
 
Goals may build in notions of system-
wide fit elements, but this is rarely 
reviewed or monitored 
Goals are aligned and linked at system level; 
goals increase in specificity as they cascade 
throughout the PPP, ultimately defining 
individual expectations,  
 
Goals are set to align with system and country 
level objectives and targets (if applicable) and 
ability to meet and align with these is seen as part 
of the PPPs goals 
  
(12) Time horizon of targets  
Tests whether partnership has a rational approach to planning and setting targets 
  a) What kind of time scale are you looking at with your targets?  What is this based upon? 
b) Which goals receive the most emphasis? 
c) Are the long term and short term goals set independently? 
d) Could you meet all your short-run goals but miss your long-run goals? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: The partnership’s main focus is on 
short term targets and individual 
programs 
There are short and long-term goals for 
all levels of the partnership system; As 
they are set independently, they are not 
necessarily linked to each other 
Long  term goals are translated into specific short 
term targets so that short term targets become a 
"staircase" to reach long term goals 
  
(13) Target stretch 
Tests whether targets are appropriately difficult to achieve 
  a) How tough are your targets? Do you feel pushed by them? 
b) On average, how often would you say that you and your partnership meet its targets?   How are your targets 
benchmarked? 
c) Do you feel that on targets all units/ departments across the partnership or teams receive the same degree of difficulty? 
Do some departments/ areas get easier targets? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Goals are either too easy or 
impossible to achieve; at least in part 
because they are set with little unit 
level involvement 
 
In most areas, partnership leaders push 
for aggressive goals, but with little buy-
in from the unit level; There are a few 
“sacred cows” that are not held to the 
same rigorous standard; little 
benchmarking 
Goals are genuinely demanding for all parts of the 
partnership organization and developed in 
consultation with senior PPP leaders and PPP 
operational units; goals grounded in solid 
economic based rationale 
  
 
(14)  Clarity and comparability of targets  
Tests how easily understandable performance measures are and whether performance is openly communicated 
  a) If I asked one of your PPP staff directly about individual targets, what would he or she tell me? 
b) Does anyone complain that the targets are too complex? Could staff across the partnership tell me what they are 
responsible for and how that will be assessed? 
c) How are these measures of performance communicated within the partnership? How about to stakeholders? 
d) How do people know about their own performance compared to other people’s performance?  (department/focus or 
country level -keep separate notes on level) 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Performance measures are complex 
and not clearly understood; 
Partnership internal performance data 
is not made public unless mandated 
 
Performance measures are well defined 
and communicated; Partnership 
performance data goes beyond 
requirements mandated, partly made 
public 
 
Performance measures are well defined, strongly 
communicated and reinforced at all reviews;  
Partnership performance include both quantitative 
and qualitative measures and are made public  
 
  
 
(15)  Clearly defined accountability 
Tests if there are clear single points of accountability for targets and whether these cover all necessary staff groups 
 
 
 a) Who is accountable for delivering on partnership targets?  
b) How is the responsibility for achieving targets shared among individuals from the various staff groups and committees? 
c) How is this accountability communicated and reviewed?  How are partners actually held to account?  What about unit 
levels and individual staff members? 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: There is little accountability on 
delivery of targets; accountability or 
single targets is either shared between 
multiple units/staff and/or some staff  
are not involved 
Single points of accountability for 
targets can be identified but managers 
are not involved and bought into them; 
little measures taken to hold to account 
Single points of accountability  for targets can be 
identified and is at an appropriate level; all staff 
groups are bought in and responsible for relevant 
parts of delivery 
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APPENDIX I (CONTINUED) 
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
(16) Performance tracking 
Tests whether staff performance is measured with the right methods and frequency (performance is tracked using meaningful metrics and with appropriate 
regularity) 
  a) What kind of main indicators do you use for performance tracking? What sources of information are used to inform 
this tracking and review? 
b) How frequently are these measured? Who gets to see this performance data? 
c) How are these metrics communicated (e.g. to management versus the governing board versus staff)? 
d) Are there more or better metrics that you feel you should be tracking? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Measures tracked do not indicate 
directly if overall objectives are being 
met; Tracking is an ad-hoc process or 
only done based on deliverables 
(certain processes aren’t tracked at 
all) 
 
Most performance indicators are tracked 
formally; Tracking is overseen by senior 
management only 
 
Performance is continuously tracked and 
communicated, both formally and informally, to 
all staff using arrange of visual management tools 
 
  
(17)  Performance review 
Tests whether performance is reviewed with appropriate frequency and follow-up 
  a) How often do you review (Partnership) performance —formally or informally—with staff and/or key partners/hosts?  
b) Could you walk me through the process you go through in a process review? 
c) Who is involved in these? Who gets to see the results of this review? 
d) What sort of follow up plan would you leave these reviews with?   
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Performance is reviewed infrequently 
or in an un-meaningful way, e.g. only 
success or failure is noted  
Performance is reviewed periodically 
with successes and failures identified; 
Results are only communicated to senior 
staff members (e.g. department heads); 
No clear follow up/action plan is adopted 
Performance is continually reviewed, based on all 
relevant indicators; All aspects are followed up 
ensure continuous improvement; Results are 
communicated to all staff and relevant partner 
members 
  
(18) Performance dialogue 
Tests the quality of review conversations 
  a) How are these reviewing meetings structured?  How is the agenda determined?  
b) Do you generally feel that you do have enough data for a fact-based review? 
c) What type of feedback occurs during these meetings? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: The right data or information for a 
constructive discussion is often not 
present or conversations overly focus 
on data that is not meaningful; Clear 
agenda is not known and purpose is 
not stated explicitly 
Review conversations are held with 
appropriate data and information present; 
Objectives of meetings are clear to all 
participating and a clear agenda is 
present; Conversations do not, as a 
matter of course, drive to the root cause 
of the problems 
Regular review/performance conversations focus 
on problem solving and addressing root causes; 
Purpose, agenda and follow-up steps are clear to 
all; Meetings are an opportunity for constructive 
feedback and coaching 
  
(19)  Consequence management    
Tests whether differing levels of performance (NOT only personal but process based) lead to different consequences 
  a) Let’s say you’ve agreed to a follow up plan at one of your meetings, what would happen if the plan was not enacted? 
b) How long does it typically go between when a problem is identified to when it is solved? Can you give me a recent 
example? 
c)  How do you deal with repeated failures in a specific department or area of process? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 
 
 
Scoring grid: Failure to achieve agreed objectives 
does not carry any consequences 
 
 
Failure to achieve agreed results is 
tolerated for a period before action is 
taken 
A failure to achieve agreed targets drives 
retraining in identified areas of weakness, moving 
individuals to where their skills are more 
appropriate 
  
 
350 
 
 
APPENDIX I (CONTINUED) 
LEADERSHIP AND TALENT MANAGEMENT 
(20) Clearly defined leadership roles 
Tests how clearly the roles, responsibilities and required attributes of leaders  are defined with the partnership 
  a) How are the roles and responsibilities of the partnership leader defined? How are they linked to partnership 
outcomes/performance? 
b) How are leadership responsibilities distributed across individuals and teams within the partnership? 
c) How often are these roles reviewed? What is the process in place for doing so?  
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: PPP does not define clear roles, 
responsibilities and desired 
competencies of PPP leaders  
 
PPP (not host) defines clear roles, 
responsibilities and desired competencies 
of leaders, but not necessarily linked 
with the drivers of performance and 
outcomes; concentrated leadership 
amongst host or main sectoral and/or 
partner base 
PPP (not host) defines clear roles, responsibilities 
and desired competencies of PPP leaders, built 
upon an understanding of what drives PPP 
performance and outcomes; Leadership 
responsibilities are distributed across sectoral and 
partner base  
  
(21) Leadership mindset  
Tests whether managers have the understanding of the broader set of challenges that the PPP faces and the right mindset to address them 
 
 
 a) How would you describe the attitude of partnership leaders toward the broader set of issues (financial, strategic, 
operational) that the PPP faces?  
b) How does the partner leader communicate this within the partnership? 
c) Do partner leaders generally share the concerns of managers and executives and engage with them in their resolution? 
d) How much does the leader’s style drive the operational functioning of the partnership? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid Limited interest or engagement 
beyond own specialty or central 
operations;  less willingness to see 
issues and challenges of other parts of 
the PPP 
 
Partnership leaders understand the 
broader issues the PPP faces and are 
willing to engage on managerial issues 
but still have a “convince me” attitude or 
are only partially bought in on the 
resolution of these issues 
Good understanding of system constraints and 
tradeoffs and ability to work constructively with 
staff and other stakeholders;  
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APPENDIX I (CONTINUED) 
TALENT/ PEOPLE MANAGEMENT 
(22)   Managing talent 
Tests how well the partnership identifies and targets needed teaching, leadership and other capacity in the partnership 
  a) Where do you seek out and source new staff?  Is this done within the PPP or purely from the partner organizations? 
What criteria do you use? 
b) How do you ensure you have enough staff members of the right type in the partnership?  
c) How do partnership leaders show that attracting talented individuals and developing their skills is a top priority?  
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Senior partnership staff do not 
communicate that attracting, retaining 
and developing talent throughout the 
organization is a top priority 
 
 
Senior partnership staff believe and 
communicate that having top talent 
throughout the organization is key; 
Partnership may defines hiring criteria 
and processes  but is not linked with key 
drivers of success 
Partnership proactively controls the number and 
types of staff and leadership and defines hiring 
criteria and processes based on understanding of 
what drives  PPP success; has focused on getting 
people with the right skills for each open position; 
senior partnership  staff are held accountable on 
the strength of the talent pool they actively build 
  
(23) Rewarding high performers 
Tests whether good manager performance is rewarded proportionately 
  a) How does your staff evaluation system work? What proportion of your employees' pay is related to the results of this 
review? 
b) Are there any non-financial or financial (bonuses) rewards for the best performers across all staff groups? How does 
the bonus system work? (For staff and managers) 
c) How does your reward system compare to that of other partnerships?  
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: People are rewarded equally 
irrespective of performance level 
 
 
There is an evaluation system to award 
performance related rewards that are 
non-financial at the individual level, but 
rewards are always or never achieved; 
evaluation system for senior staff only  
 
There is an evaluation system to award to 
performance related rewards, including personal 
financial rewards; PPP central and operational 
unit staff included in system  
 
  
(24)   Promoting high performers 
Tests whether promotion/career progression is performance based 
  a) Can you tell me about your career development and/or promotion system for staff?  How do you identify and develop 
your star performers? 
b) What types of professional development opportunities are provided? How are these opportunities personalized to meet 
individual needs? 
c) How do you make decisions about progression and additional opportunities within the partnership, such as 
performance, tenure, other? Are better performers likely to be promoted faster or are promotions given on the basis of 
tenure/seniority? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: People are promoted primarily upon 
the basis of  years of service; little or 
no professional development offered 
to staff 
People are promoted upon the basis of 
performance; Partnership provides career 
opportunities but usually based on non-
performance factors 
Partnership actively identifies, develops and 
progresses and promotes its top performers 
 
 
  
(25) Creating a distinctive partnership value proposition  
Tests how strong the employee value proposition is to work in the individual partnership 
  a) What makes your partnership distinctive, as opposed to your other similar partnerships? 
b) How do you monitor how effectively you communicate your value proposition? 
 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Other partnerships offer stronger 
reasons for talented people to join or 
organizations to back  
 
 
Our value proposition is comparable to 
those offered by other partnerships 
 
We provide a unique value proposition that 
encourages talented people join our partnership 
and a range of organizations and members to 
become involved with our work 
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APPENDIX J: Listing of Management Interview interviewees 
 
PPP Management Interview Summary
223
 
 # PPP Name Manager name Date 
 1 Drugs for Neglected Diseases 
Initiative 
Robert Don 21/01/2010 
 2 Drugs for Neglected Diseases 
Initiative 
Shing Chang 18/02/2010 
 3 Global Health Council Jeffrey Sturchio 26/03/2010 
* 4 Global Vaccine Enterprise Alan Bernstein 21/12/2009 
* 5 Global Vaccine Enterprise Myra Ozaeta 23/03/2010 
 6 International AIDS Vaccine Initiative Seth Berkley 25/02/2010 
 7 International AIDS Vaccine Initiative Frans van den Boom 6/4/2010 
* 8 Medicines for Malaria Venture Chris Hentschel* 16/12/2009 
* 9 Medicines for Malaria Venture  Diana Cotran 16/12/2009 
* 10 Micronutrient Initiative Evelyne Guindon;  4/12/2009 
* 11 Micronutrient Initiative Mark Fryars 4/12/2009 
* 12 Micronutrient Initiative Venkatesh Mannar 4/12/2009 
* 13 Eli Lilly Multi-Drug Resistant 
Tuberculosis Partnership 
Patrizia Carlevaro;  12/1/2010 
* 14 Eli Lilly Multi-Drug Resistant 
Tuberculosis Partnership 
Tristan Piguet 12/1/2010 
  15 Infectious Disease Research Institute Curtis Malloy 3/12/2009 
* 16 International Cooperative Biodiversity 
Groups Program 
 PPP Director 4/11/2009 
* 17 International Cooperative Biodiversity 
Groups Program 
PPP Director 4/11/2009 
  18 International Partnership for 
Microbicides 
Pamela Norick 26/03/2010 
  19 International Partnership for 
Microbicides 
Zeda Rosenberg 22/01/2010 
  20 PPP name withheld PPP Director 4/03/2010 
  21 Alliance to Save Energy Laura van Wie 17/11/2009 
  22 Alliance to Save Energy Brian Castelli 19/11/2009 
  23 Alliance to Save Energy Kateri Callahan 12/11/2009 
  24 Clean Air Initiative PPP Director 25/11/2009 
* 25 Collaborative Labeling and Appliance PPP Director 21/05/2010 
                                                 
223 Full list of PPP managers and names available for Viva purposes only.  
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Standards Program 
* 26 Collaborative Labeling and Appliance 
Standards Program 
PPP Director 21/05/2010 
  27 Forest Stewardship Council Alan Smith  8/6/2010 
  28 International Road Transport Union Umberto de Pretto 18/01/2010 
* 29 Partnership for Clean Fuels and 
Vehicles 
Mary Mmukindia 27/10/2009 
* 30 Partnership for Clean Fuels and 
Vehicles 
 Elisa Dumitrescu 27/10/2009 
* 31 Partnership for Clean Fuels and 
Vehicles 
Rob de Jong 27/10/2009 
  32 Renewable Energy and Energy 
Efficiency Partnership 
Binu Parthan 27/10/2009 
  33 PPP name withheld PPP Director 26/11/2009 
  34 PPP name withheld PPP Director 11/12/2009 
  35 PPP name withheld PPP Director 26/11/2009 
  36 World Energy Council Christoph Frei 20/04/2010 
  37 World Resources Institute Lauren Withey 14/12/2009 
  38 World Vegetable Centre PPP Director 14/01/2010 
  39 Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research 
PPP Director 15/03/2010 
  40 Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research 
PPP Director 24/03/2010 
  41 e8 PPP Director 11/2/2010 
  42 Equator Initiative Eileen de Ravin 18/01/2010 
  43 Online Access to Research in the 
Environment 
PPP Director 7/12/2009 
  44 UNIDO Cleaner Production 
Programme 
PPP Director 20/04/2010 
  45 PPP name withheld PPP Director 28/10/2009 
  46 World Environment Centre PPP Director 23/03/2010 
  47 PPP name withheld  PPP Director 2/11/2009 
  48 PPP name withheld PPP Director  27/5/2010 
 49 Drugs for Neglected Diseases 
Initiative 
Bernard Pecoul  19/4/2010 
 50 Foundation for Innovative New 
Diagnostics 
PPP Director  3/6/2010 
  51 Clinton Foundation AIDS Initiative PPP Director  30/3/2010 
    *  Signifies that interviews were conducted simultaneously with another manager 
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APPENDIX K: Listing of Stakeholder interviews 
 
Stakeholder interviews
224
: 
 
#A - Logan Borzel, Senior Health Specialist, Human Development Network (HDNHE), The 
World Bank; 3 July 2009, via phone 
#B - Sophia Drewnowski, Sr. Partnership Specialist, Partnership and Trust Fund Policy, The 
World Bank; 23 July 2009 , personal meeting, Washington, D.C.  
#C - Pasquel Villeneove (UNICEF), 7 October 2010, via phone 
 
#D - Alex Ross (WHO), 7 October 2010, via phone 
 
#E - Sophia Drewnowski (The World Bank), 7 October 2010, via phone 
 
#F - Roy Widdus, Consultant, Global Health Futures; 30 November 2010, via phone 
 
#G - Charles Gardner, Global Forum for Health Research; 31 March 2010, via phone 
 
Partnership specific 
Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative (DNDi) 
#H - Jean-Pierre Paccaud, Director Business Development 
15 April 2010, Geneva, Switzerland 
 
#I - Ralf de Coulon, Finance, Human Resources & Administration Director 
15 April 2010, Geneva, Switzerland 
 
Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV) 
#K - Diana Cotran, Executive Vice-President, Operations  
14 April 2010, Geneva, Switzerland 
#L - Joan Herbert, Business Development Manager  
14 April 2010, Geneva, Switzerland 
#M - PPP Director, confidentiality ensured    
15 April 2010, Geneva, Switzerland 
                                                 
224 Interview list a subset of interviews conducted but inclusive of all comments referenced within work. 
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#N - PPP Director, confidentiality ensured    
 14 April 2010, Geneva, Switzerland  
 
Eli Lilly Multi-Drug Resistant Tuberculosis Partnership    
 
#O - Patrizia Carlevaro, Head of the International Aid Unit at Eli Lilly and Company and  
 Team Leader for The Lilly MDR-TB Partnership,  
15 April 2010, Geneva, Switzerland  
#P - Tristan Piguet , Project Manager at Eli Lilly and Company 
15 April 2010, Geneva, Switzerland  
#Q- PPP Manager, confidentiality ensured       
15 April 2010, Geneva, Switzerland  
 
International Partnership for Microbicides (IPM) 
#R- Karen McCord, Executive Director for Operations and Plannings 
12 May 2011, Silver Spring, MD, USA 
#S - Mike Goldrich, Chief Operating Officer and Chief Financial fficer 
12 May 2011, Silver Spring, MD, USA 
#T - Kathleen T. Ross, Chief Human Resources Officer 
12 May 2011, Silver Spring, MD, USA 
#U - Pamela Norick, Chief of External Relations  
12 May 2011, Silver Spring, MD, USA 
#V - Zeda Rosenberg, Chief Executive Officer  
12 May 2011, Silver Spring, MD, USA 
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APPENDIX L: PPPs: Financial statements 
Hosted? 2007  ? 2008  ?
Aeras Global TB Vaccine Foundation N Y INA Y Y
Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research Y Y INA Y Y
Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative N Y Deloitte Y Y
European Malaria Vaccine Initiative (Now the 
European Vaccine Initiative) N Y Danish State Auditors Y Y
Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics N Y Deloitte Y Y
Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition N Y Deloitte Y Y
Global Alliance for TB Drug Development N Y BDO Seidman Y Y
Global Alliance for the Elimination of Lymphatic 
Filariasis Y N INA
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization N Y KPMG Y Y
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria N Y Ernst & Young Y Y
Global Health Council N Y INA Y Y
Global Media AIDS Initiative Y N INA
Global Public-Private Partnership for Handwashing 
with Soap Y N INA
Global Vaccine Enterprise N Y INA Y Y
Institute for OneWorld Health N Y INA Y N
International AIDS Vaccine Initiative N Y INA Y Y
International Trachoma Initiative N Y INA Y Y
Malaria Vaccine Initiative Y N INA
Medicines for Malaria Venture N Y KPMG Y Y
Micronutrient Initiative N Y PricewaterhouseCoopers Y Y
Network for Sustained Elimination of Iodine 
Deficiency (Iodine Network) Y N INA
Partners for Parasite Control Y N INA
Project Hope N Y KPMG Y Y
Roll Back Malaria Global Partnership Y N INA
Stop TB Partnership Y Y INA Y Y
Strategies for Enhancing Access to Medicines for 
Health Y N INA
Universal Flour Fortification Initiative Y N INA
World Economic Forum's Global Health Initiative Y N INA
AED-SATELLIFE N Y INA Y Y
Alliance for the Global Elimination of Blinding 
Trachoma by the year 2020 Y N INA
BIO Ventures for Global Health N Y INA Y Y
Clinton Foundation AIDS Initiative (Now the Clinton 
Health Access Initiative) Y Y INA Y Y
Eli Lilly Multi-Drug Resistant Tuberculosis Y N INA
EuroVacc Foundation N N INA
Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria N Y Marks Paneth & Shron LLP Y Y
Global Elimination of Maternal and Neonatal Tetanus Y N INA
Global Polio Eradication Initiative Y Y INA Y Y
Health Academy, The Y N INA
Health Internetwork Access to Research Initiative Y N INA
Infectious Disease Research Institute N Y INA Y Y
International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups 
Program Y N INA
International Partnership for Microbicides N Y INA Y Y
MAC AIDS fund Y Y Grant Thornton LLP Y Y
Novartis Institute for Tropical Diseases Y N INA
Pediatric Dengue Vaccine Initiative Y N INA
Safe Injection Global Network Y N INA
Vision 2020 Y N INA
Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS Y Y INA N Y
Alliance to Save Energy N Y McGladrey & Pullen Y Y
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Hosted? 2007  ? 2008  ?
Building Partnerships for Development in Water and 
Sanitation N Y Hartley Fowler Y Y
Clean Air Initiative N Y INA Y Y
Community Watersheds Partnership Prorgam Global 
Development Alliance (Formerly the Coca-
Cola/USAID Water and Development Alliance) Y N INA
Collaborative Labeling and Appliance Standards 
Program N Y INA Y Y
Forest Stewardship Council N Y INA Y Y
Generation Challenge Programme (Former CGIAR 
Partnership Challenge Program: 'Unlocking Genetic 
Diversity in Crops for the Resource-Poor') Y Y INA Y Y
Global Compact Y N INA
Global Crop Diversity Trust Y Y Deloitte & Touche Y Y
Global e-Sustainability Initiative N N INA
Global Master Plan for Cycling Y N INA
Global Reporting Initiative N Y Moore Stephens MSV BV Y Y
Global Road Safety Partnership Y N INA
Global Village Energy Partnership N Y INA N Y
International Center for Sustainable Development N Y INA Y Y
International Center for Tropical Agriculture N Y Deloitte Y Y
International Electrotechnical Commission N Y INA Y Y
International Road Transport Union N N INA
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-
biotech Applications N Y Sciarabba Walker & Co., LLP Y Y
International Solar Energy Society N N INA
International Youth Foundation N Y Gelman, Rosenberg & Freedman Y Y
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers N Y Moss-Adams Y Y
Marine Stewardship Council N Y Deloitte & Touche Y Y
Partners for Environmental Cooperation in Europe Y N INA
Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles Y N INA
Project Proteus Y N INA
Public Interest Intellectual Property Advisors N Y William E. Busch, CPA Y Y
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency 
Partnership N Y PricewaterhouseCoopers Y Y
Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st 
Century Y N INA
Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor N Y Sayer Vincent Y Y
World Economic Forum - Partnering Against 
Corruption Initiative Y N INA
World Energy Council N Y Horwatch Clark Whitehill Y Y
World Resources Institute N Y GrantThornton Y Y
World Vegetable Centre N Y INA Y Y
Mectizan Donation Program Y N INA
Global Ballast Water Management Programme Y N INA
Efficient Energy for Sustainable Development Y N INA
World Institute for Sustainable Humanity (AWISH) - 
Hellas -Mesogeios N Y INA Y Y
Access to Global Online Research in Agriculture Y N INA
Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at 
the Local Level Y N INA
BE THE CHANGE! - youth-led action for sustainable 
development Y N INA
BioCarbon Fund Y N INA
Biotrade Initiative Y N INA
Capacity Building Task Force on Trade, Environment 
and Development Y N INA
Cement Sustainability Initiative Y N INA
CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and Food Y Y Earnst and Young Y Y
Cisco Networking Academy Program Y N INA
Climate Investment Partnership Y Y INA N N
Community Water Initiative Y N INA
Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research Y Y INA Y Y
RESOURCES: TRANSPARENCY
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Hosted? 2007  ? 2008  ?
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor Y Y INA Y Y
E+Co N Y INA Y Y
e8 (Formerly e7) N N INA
Ecoagriculture Partners N Y INA Y Y
Ecological Sanitation Research Y N INA
EdInvest Y N INA
Embarq Y N INA
Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems Y N INA
Equator Initiative Y N INA
EU Water Initiative: Water for Life Y N INA
EVE-olution Foundation N Y INA
Global Facilitation Partnership for Transportation and 
Trade Y N INA
Global Gas Flaring Reduction Y N INA
Global Partnership for Capacity Building to 
Implement the Globally Harmonized System for 
Chemical Classification and Labelling Y N INA
Global Water Partnership N Y INA Y Y
GlobalGiving N Y INA Y Y
Great Apes Survival Project Y N INA
International Livestock Research Institute Y Y Deloitte Y Y
International Navigation Association N N INA
International Partnership for Sustainable 
Development in Mountain Regions Y N INA
International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy Y N INA
International Water and Sanitation Center N Y INA Y Y
Local Capacity-Building and Training on Sustainable 
Urbanization: a Public-Private Partnership Y N INA
Methane to Markets Y N INA
New Ventures Y N INA
Online Access to Research in the Environment Y N INA
Partnership for Clean Indoor Air Y N INA
Population and Sustainability Network Y N INA
Refrigerants Naturally Initiative Y N INA
Sister Cities Network for Sustainable Development N Y Gelman, Rosenberg & Freedman Y Y
Sustainable Forest Products Global Alliance Y N INA
Tour Operators Initiative Y N INA
Transparency International N Y KPMG Y Y
Travel Foundation N Y INA Y Y
Unicode Consortium N Y INA Y Y
UNIDO Cleaner Production Programme Y N INA
United Nations Center for Trade Facilitation and 
Electronic Business Y N INA
World Alliance for Decentralized Energy N N INA
World Business Council on Sustainable N N INA
World Economic Forum Disaster Resource Network Y N INA
World Links N Y Daniel R. Embody JR CPA Y Y
World Tourism Organization Y N INA
Youth Business International N Y Nexia Smith & Williamson Y Y
Ethical Trading Initiative N Y Kingston Smith L.L.P. Y Y
4C Association: Common Code for the Coffee 
Community N Y INA N Y
Global Environment Facility Y Y Deloitte Y Y
ACCION International N Y Grant Thornton LLP Y Y
Agricultural Risk Management Team Y N INA
Golden Rice N N INA
RESOURCES: TRANSPARENCY
Partnership Name
Public availability 
of finances
External Auditors
 
 
 
 
 
 
359 
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Aeras Global TB Vaccine Foundation 42,752,446 41,049,749 43,813,311 71,322,870 70,143,414 54,076,715 Y
Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research 6,054,583 5,970,917 5,042,699 3,396,008 3,837,490 3,018,432 N
Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative 22,066,688 22,066,688 16,458,141 27,939,723 27,938,331 24,449,868 Y
European Malaria Vaccine Initiative (Now the 
European Vaccine Initiative) 10,328,641 9,908,443 4,731,428 5,577,907 5,072,656 4,093,933 Y
Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics 19,267,250 18,392,263 17,784,981 27,786,276 27,370,155 28,858,130 Y
Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition 44,610,028 42,781,128 13,381,376 14,406,823 12,706,071 22,749,399 Y
Global Alliance for TB Drug Development 30,849,919 28,919,307 27,375,311 35,843,734 34,733,103 33,631,735 Y
Global Alliance for the Elimination of Lymphatic 
Filariasis INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization 803,044,524 112,032,522 1,208,776,592 945,179,236 225,396,095 1,137,139,231 Y
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria 3,153,383,000 2,963,751,000 2,713,271,000 3,920,213,000 3,714,202,000 2,530,454,000 Y
Global Health Council 3,849,275 1,081,967 6,880,817 12,536,164 10,395,423 7,269,339 Y
Global Media AIDS Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Global Public-Private Partnership for Handwashing 
with Soap INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Global Vaccine Enterprise 10,247,603 10,000,000 959,522 1,121,673 400,000 2,725,796 Y
Institute for OneWorld Health 28,454,315 27,521,745 26,089,298 29,740,131 29,294,601 30,049,107 Y
International AIDS Vaccine Initiative 100,000,000 100,000,000 87,000,000 90,985,614 90,985,614 96,300,964 Y
International Trachoma Initiative 7,494,032 6,810,741 6,428,535 5,403,253 5,075,925 5,650,677 Y
Malaria Vaccine Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Medicines for Malaria Venture 76,965,380 75,409,474 47,946,314 55,148,885 53,771,088 55,773,594 Y
Micronutrient Initiative 29,033,759 28,199,198 28,205,302 30,189,485 29,298,583 26,837,021 Y
Network for Sustained Elimination of Iodine 
Deficiency (Iodine Network) INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Partners for Parasite Control INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Project Hope 172,494,904 168,718,192 169,565,797 14,723,433 140,443,374 157,307,513 Y
Roll Back Malaria Global Partnership INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Stop TB Partnership 80,327,000 78,749,000 57,935,000 80,223,000 79,206,000 70,924,000 Y
Strategies for Enhancing Access to Medicines for 
Health INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Universal Flour Fortification Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA N
World Economic Forum's Global Health Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA N
AED-SATELLIFE 420,974 405,555 360,732 303,202 244,600 290,772 Y
Alliance for the Global Elimination of Blinding 
Trachoma by the year 2020 INA INA INA INA INA INA N
BIO Ventures for Global Health 1,763,694 1,717,735 2,172,282 3,198,695 3,187,964 2,158,746 Y
Clinton Foundation AIDS Initiative (Now the Clinton 
Health Access Initiative) INA INA 83,915,000 INA INA 140,047,000 INA
Eli Lilly Multi-Drug Resistant Tuberculosis INA INA INA INA INA INA N
EuroVacc Foundation INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria 126,525 6,686,246 6,788,878 557,072 7,894,622 7,507,004 Y
Global Elimination of Maternal and Neonatal Tetanus INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Global Polio Eradication Initiative INA INA 710,000,000 INA 775,000,000 850,000,000 N
Health Academy, The INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Health Internetwork Access to Research Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Infectious Disease Research Institute 42,484,181 39,496,980 10,984,249 16,268,636 12,021,833 15,919,333 Y
International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups 
Program INA INA INA INA INA INA N
International Partnership for Microbicides INA INA INA INA INA INA N
MAC AIDS fund 263,013 17,755,291 18,231,451 812,955 17,752,685 17,332,548 Y
Novartis Institute for Tropical Diseases INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Pediatric Dengue Vaccine Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Safe Injection Global Network INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Vision 2020 INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS INA INA INA 290,917,000 284,741,000 298,229,000 N
Alliance to Save Energy 9,523,396 6,275,239 10,019,840 10,479,858 7,933,150 10,620,034 Y
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Building Partnerships for Development in Water and 
Sanitation 627,254 581,703 522,129 362,836 338,833 518,322 N
Clean Air Initiative 675,148 668,469 581,836 1,521,900 1,521,264 1,657,085 Y
Community Watersheds Partnership Prorgam Global 
Development Alliance (Formerly the Coca-
Cola/USAID Water and Development Alliance) INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Collaborative Labeling and Appliance Standards 
Program 506,693 74,597 478,136 871,831 684,450 902,490 Y
Forest Stewardship Council 5,410,433 1,828,939 5,262,853 7,626,934 2,484,027 5,960,139 Y
Generation Challenge Programme (Former CGIAR 
Partnership Challenge Program: 'Unlocking Genetic 
Diversity in Crops for the Resource-Poor') 23,976,907 23,639,923 19,030,418 9,113,371 8,925,078 17,583,998 Y
Global Compact INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Global Crop Diversity Trust 11,311,497 1,569,896 4,801,381 11,520,669 1,014,149 8,105,148 Y
Global e-Sustainability Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Global Master Plan for Cycling INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Global Reporting Initiative 5,724,659 0 5,511,538 7,527,416 55,682 7,391,537 Y
Global Road Safety Partnership INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Global Village Energy Partnership INA INA INA 646,460 646,349 446,232 N
International Center for Sustainable Development 5,194 40,500 39,425 0 0 4,623 N
International Center for Tropical Agriculture 45,952,000 44,242,000 41,487,000 47,059,000 42,605,000 43,678,000 Y
International Electrotechnical Commission 19,144,171 INA 17,757,871 19,227,453 INA 17,322,796 Y
International Road Transport Union INA INA INA INA INA INA N
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-
biotech Applications 540,848 3,024,909 2,265,477 218,340 1,908,817 2,212,525 Y
International Solar Energy Society INA INA INA INA INA INA N
International Youth Foundation 1,359,690 22,164,126 22,210,502 -5,601,966 19,249,310 25,609,235 Y
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers 43,471,000 0 26,641,000 45,299,000 0 39,544,000 Y
Marine Stewardship Council 4,283,047 3,852,745 3,984,441 6,061,277 5,188,032 5,000,500 Y
Partners for Environmental Cooperation in Europe INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Project Proteus INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Public Interest Intellectual Property Advisors 108,236 20,250 130,114 12,099 19,750 7,688 Y
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency 
Partnership 9,227,232 9,081,426 4,598,593 8,279,525 7,909,578 6,246,713 Y
Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st 
Century INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor 1,499,527 1,056,765 1,476,777 3,206,541 2,590,738 2,092,809 Y
World Economic Forum - Partnering Against 
Corruption Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
World Energy Council 3,631,896 0 3,571,973 4,273,506 13,154 4,010,431 Y
World Resources Institute 33,184,681 25,223,788 23,627,482 12,665,294 21,994,209 26,403,890 Y
World Vegetable Centre 8,850,314 7,751,030 8,062,215 8,353,619 7,417,806 8,549,906 Y
Mectizan Donation Program INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Global Ballast Water Management Programme INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Efficient Energy for Sustainable Development INA INA INA INA INA INA N
World Institute for Sustainable Humanity (AWISH) - 
Hellas -Mesogeios 256,821 68,179 229,550 100,964 26,949 239,696 N
Access to Global Online Research in Agriculture INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at 
the Local Level INA INA INA INA INA INA N
BE THE CHANGE! - youth-led action for sustainable 
development INA INA INA INA INA INA N
BioCarbon Fund INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Biotrade Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Capacity Building Task Force on Trade, Environment 
and Development INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Cement Sustainability Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA N
CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and Food 16,914,000 16,914,000 12,953,000 10,198,000 10,198,000 12,797,000 N
Cisco Networking Academy Program INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Climate Investment Partnership INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Community Water Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research 520,000,000 495,000,000 506,000,000 553,000,000 531,000,000 542,000,000 Y
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Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 21,550,282 19,285,897 18,511,283 28,164,869 24,855,134 31,428,433 Y
E+Co 5,339,798 1,523,367 5,617,243 3,074,713 5,410,990 7,567,363 Y
e8 (Formerly e7) INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Ecoagriculture Partners 1,088,789 1,066,970 1,196,025 1,075,201 849,972 1,647,354 Y
Ecological Sanitation Research INA INA INA INA INA INA N
EdInvest INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Embarq INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Equator Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA N
EU Water Initiative: Water for Life INA INA INA INA INA INA N
EVE-olution Foundation INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Global Facilitation Partnership for Transportation and 
Trade INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Global Gas Flaring Reduction INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Global Partnership for Capacity Building to 
Implement the Globally Harmonized System for 
Chemical Classification and Labelling INA INA INA INA 261,000 INA N
Global Water Partnership 15,417,792 15,399,239 16,470,800 15,305,551 15,286,875 15,158,698 Y
GlobalGiving 4,278,812 3,336,767 3,077,027 8,110,587 7,418,503 4,278,334 Y
Great Apes Survival Project INA INA INA INA INA INA N
International Livestock Research Institute 38,544,000 34,703,000 40,144,000 43,781,000 39,616,000 42,308 Y
International Navigation Association INA INA INA INA INA INA N
International Partnership for Sustainable 
Development in Mountain Regions INA INA INA INA INA INA N
International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy INA INA INA INA INA INA N
International Water and Sanitation Center 6,507,808 INA 6,464,654 8,584,738 INA 8,513,744 N
Local Capacity-Building and Training on Sustainable 
Urbanization: a Public-Private Partnership INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Methane to Markets INA INA INA INA INA INA N
New Ventures INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Online Access to Research in the Environment INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Partnership for Clean Indoor Air INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Population and Sustainability Network INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Refrigerants Naturally Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Sister Cities Network for Sustainable Development 416,096 863,775 2,165,681 378,038 1,313,538 2,076,404 Y
Sustainable Forest Products Global Alliance INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Tour Operators Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Transparency International 836,619 12,895,899 12,498 341,051 13,928,796 13,259,223 Y
Travel Foundation 1,607,680 1,597,449 1,515,604 1,496,604 1,483,450 1,419,143 Y
Unicode Consortium 374,586 327,866 297,819 363,880 329,400 304,049 Y
UNIDO Cleaner Production Programme INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
United Nations Center for Trade Facilitation and 
Electronic Business INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
World Alliance for Decentralized Energy INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
World Business Council on Sustainable INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
World Economic Forum Disaster Resource Network INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
World Links 25,920 1,109,576 1,164,410 20,160 287,952 393,206 Y
World Tourism Organization INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Youth Business International 0 0 0 1,028,316 2,204,359 1,223,829 Y
Ethical Trading Initiative 1,768,388 548,073 1,718,188 1,954,265 730,764 1,936,863 Y
4C Association: Common Code for the Coffee 
Community INA INA INA 2,121,476 1,023,367 1,744,663 Y
Global Environment Facility 1,439,519,052 1,304,132,348 784,797,900 767,686,301 564,397,481 793,550,329 Y
ACCION International 148,750,643 5,041,969 21,176,576 18,619,431 7,981,410 28,522,116 Y
Agricultural Risk Management Team INA INA INA INA INA INA N
Golden Rice INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
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Change in 
Grants/Donatio
ns 08-07
Change in 
Income 08-07
Aeras Global TB Vaccine Foundation 42,150,991 8,933,457 33,217,534 63,086,882 12,409,420 50,667,462 29,093,665 28,570,424
Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research INA INA INA INA INA INA -2,133,427 -2,658,575
Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative 21,842,800 12,920,346 8,922,453 22,945,383 10,212,241 12,733,142 5,871,643 5,873,035
European Malaria Vaccine Initiative (Now the 
European Vaccine Initiative) INA INA 12,273,463 INA INA 13,757,437 -4,835,787 -4,750,734
Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics 20,513,297 17,123,080 3,349,787 25,967,003 23,657,640 2,277,933 8,977,892 8,519,026
Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition 42,492,098 10,273,013 32,219,085 37,840,241 36,804,815 23,876,509 -30,075,057 -30,203,205
Global Alliance for TB Drug Development 53,951,368 25,460,558 28,490,810 59,525,717 29,152,010 30,373,707 5,813,796 4,993,815
Global Alliance for the Elimination of Lymphatic 
Filariasis INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization 5,347,329,980 2,326,899,562 3,020,430,418 4,973,016,817 2,750,489,361 2,222,527,456 113,363,573 142,134,712
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria 5,508,328,000 2,950,959,000 2,557,369,000 7,054,122,000 3,106,994,000 3,947,128,000 750,451,000 766,830,000
Global Health Council 6,629,109 403,405 6,225,704 11,975,536 603,162 11,372,374 9,313,456 8,686,889
Global Media AIDS Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Global Public-Private Partnership for Handwashing 
with Soap INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Global Vaccine Enterprise 13,029,144 34,243 12,994,901 11,498,038 107,260 11,390,778 -9,600,000 -9,125,930
Institute for OneWorld Health 22,816,313 1,754,399 21,061,914 21,061,914 INA 20,752,938 1,772,856 1,285,816
International AIDS Vaccine Initiative INA INA INA INA INA 126,000,000 -9,014,386 -9,014,386
International Trachoma Initiative 21,383,751 352,648 21,031,103 21,338,907 555,228 20,783,679 -1,734,816 -2,090,779
Malaria Vaccine Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Medicines for Malaria Venture 47,556,753 9,437,041 38,119,712 46,563,523 9,068,520 37,495,003 -21,638,386 -21,816,495
Micronutrient Initiative 14,082,792 8,739,330 5,343,462 16,947,017 10,058,431 6,888,586 1,099,385 1,155,726
Network for Sustained Elimination of Iodine 
Deficiency (Iodine Network) INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Partners for Parasite Control INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Project Hope 66,934,716 12,017,757 54,916,959 49,488,936 19,723,390 29,765,546 -28,274,818 -157,771,471
Roll Back Malaria Global Partnership INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Stop TB Partnership INA INA INA INA INA INA 457,000 -104,000
Strategies for Enhancing Access to Medicines for 
Health INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Universal Flour Fortification Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
World Economic Forum's Global Health Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
AED-SATELLIFE 486,850 383,849 103,001 628,481 581,058 47,423 -160,955 -117,772
Alliance for the Global Elimination of Blinding 
Trachoma by the year 2020 INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
BIO Ventures for Global Health 1,236,208 210,208 1,026,000 2,222,197 156,248 2,065,949 1,470,229 1,435,001
Clinton Foundation AIDS Initiative (Now the Clinton 
Health Access Initiative) INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Eli Lilly Multi-Drug Resistant Tuberculosis INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
EuroVacc Foundation INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria 2,619,206 379,038 2,240,168 3,311,607 609,780 2,701,827 1,208,376 430,547
Global Elimination of Maternal and Neonatal Tetanus INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Global Polio Eradication Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Health Academy, The INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Health Internetwork Access to Research Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Infectious Disease Research Institute 61,297,784 1,310,056 59,987,728 62,533,150 2,196,119 60,337,031 -27,475,147 -26,215,545
International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups 
Program INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
International Partnership for Microbicides 104,308,875 90,203,249 14,105,626 121,126,028 97,624,348 23,501,680 INA INA
MAC AIDS fund 16,485,418 4,380,755 12,104,663 16,047,769 3,130,151 12,917,618 -2,606 549,942
Novartis Institute for Tropical Diseases INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Pediatric Dengue Vaccine Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Safe Injection Global Network INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Vision 2020 INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Alliance to Save Energy 3,819,034 1,978,661 1,840,373 4,989,131 3,288,934 1,700,197 1,657,911 956,462
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APPENDIX L (CONTINUED) 
Change in 
Grants/Donatio
ns 08-07
Change in 
Income 08-07
Building Partnerships for Development in Water and 
Sanitation 184,984 10,371 174,613 244,419 203,624 19,127 -242,869 -264,418
Clean Air Initiative 478,615 385,192 93,423 274,821 316,583 -41,762 852,795 846,752
Community Watersheds Partnership Prorgam Global 
Development Alliance (Formerly the Coca-
Cola/USAID Water and Development Alliance) INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Collaborative Labeling and Appliance Standards 
Program 131,514 13,459 118,055 203,872 83,419 120,453 609,853 365,138
Forest Stewardship Council INA INA INA INA INA INA 655,088 2,216,501
Generation Challenge Programme (Former CGIAR 
Partnership Challenge Program: 'Unlocking Genetic 
Diversity in Crops for the Resource-Poor') 12,287,524 INA 15,287,524 3,816,897 INA 6,816,897 -14,714,845 -14,863,536
Global Compact INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Global Crop Diversity Trust 92,217,794 5,232,219 86,985,575 95,514,946 9,297,391 86,217,555 -555,747 209,172
Global e-Sustainability Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Global Master Plan for Cycling INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Global Reporting Initiative 3,065,105 2,950,995 114,110 2,536,466 2,291,462 245,004 55,682 1,802,757
Global Road Safety Partnership INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Global Village Energy Partnership INA INA INA INA INA 200,229 INA INA
International Center for Sustainable Development INA INA -7,353 14,382 19,909 INA -40,500 -5,194
International Center for Tropical Agriculture 42,336,000 32,911,000 9,425,000 43,369,000 35,431,000 7,938,000 -1,637,000 1,107,000
International Electrotechnical Commission INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
International Road Transport Union INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-
biotech Applications 6,613,347 197,514 6,415,833 6,310,591 110,139 6,200,452 -1,116,092 -322,508
International Solar Energy Society INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
International Youth Foundation 29,096,843 8,820,051 20,276,792 33,296,592 8,744,227 24,552,365 -2,914,816 -6,961,656
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers 46,950,000 11,714,000 35,236,000 60,968,000 14,543,000 46,425,000 0 1,828,000
Marine Stewardship Council 3,522,078 1,002,545 2,519,533 5,106,616 1,526,307 3,653,386 1,335,286 1,778,230
Partners for Environmental Cooperation in Europe INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Project Proteus INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Public Interest Intellectual Property Advisors 12,748 0 12,748 23,585 0 23,585 -500 -96,137
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency 
Partnership INA INA INA 14,747,469 12,505,996 2,241,473 -1,171,848 -947,707
Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st 
Century INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor 917,741 445,988 471,753 2,259,381 673,887 1,585,485 1,533,974 1,707,014
World Economic Forum - Partnering Against 
Corruption Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
World Energy Council 2,781,287 808,225 1,973,062 2,972,747 705,918 2,260,983 13,154 641,611
World Resources Institute 66,256,010 4,720,248 61,535,762 54,179,655 6,381,889 47,797,766 -3,229,579 -20,519,387
World Vegetable Centre 14,092,755 10,733,902 3,358,853 11,514,749 8,593,162 2,921,587 -333,224 -496,695
Mectizan Donation Program INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Global Ballast Water Management Programme INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Efficient Energy for Sustainable Development INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
World Institute for Sustainable Humanity (AWISH) - 
Hellas -Mesogeios INA INA 151,367 INA INA 39,584 -41,230 -155,857
Access to Global Online Research in Agriculture INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at 
the Local Level INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
BE THE CHANGE! - youth-led action for sustainable 
development INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
BioCarbon Fund INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Biotrade Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Capacity Building Task Force on Trade, Environment 
and Development INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Cement Sustainability Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and Food INA INA INA INA INA INA -6,716,000 -6,716,000
Cisco Networking Academy Program INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Climate Investment Partnership INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Community Water Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research 571,729,000 334,283,000 237,446,000 624,946,000 379,686,000 245,260,000 36,000,000 33,000,000
Partnership Name
RESOURCES: FINANCES
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APPENDIX L (CONTINUED) 
Change in 
Grants/Donatio
ns 08-07
Change in 
Income 08-07
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 36,894,426 26,954,648 9,939,778 40,080,480 33,404,267 6,676,214 5,569,237 6,614,587
E+Co 29,371,997 15,979,955 13,410,769 31,495,196 20,261,393 11,254,396 3,887,623 -2,265,085
e8 (Formerly e7) INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Ecoagriculture Partners 585,288 155,725 429,563 140,827 283,417 142,590 -216,998 -13,588
Ecological Sanitation Research INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
EdInvest INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Embarq INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Equator Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
EU Water Initiative: Water for Life INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
EVE-olution Foundation INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Global Facilitation Partnership for Transportation and 
Trade INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Global Gas Flaring Reduction INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Global Partnership for Capacity Building to 
Implement the Globally Harmonized System for 
Chemical Classification and Labelling INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Global Water Partnership 7,761,942 6,037,769 1,724,173 5,142,689 3,614,597 1,528,092 -112,364 -112,241
GlobalGiving 5,722,325 134,637 5,587,688 9,584,034 164,093 9,419,941 4,081,736 3,831,775
Great Apes Survival Project INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
International Livestock Research Institute 47,277,000 23,673,000 23,604,000 53,675,000 28,701,000 53,675,000 4,913,000 5,237,000
International Navigation Association INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
International Partnership for Sustainable 
Development in Mountain Regions INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
International Water and Sanitation Center INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Local Capacity-Building and Training on Sustainable 
Urbanization: a Public-Private Partnership INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Methane to Markets INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
New Ventures INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Online Access to Research in the Environment INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Partnership for Clean Indoor Air INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Population and Sustainability Network INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Refrigerants Naturally Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Sister Cities Network for Sustainable Development 465,394 169,200 296,194 395,742 482,042 86,300 449,763 -38,058
Sustainable Forest Products Global Alliance INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Tour Operators Initiative INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Transparency International 8,080,074 805,199 7,274,876 12,179,194 902,107 11,277,087 1,032,897 -495,568
Travel Foundation INA INA INA INA INA INA -113,999 -111,076
Unicode Consortium 647,890 80,542 567,348 709,780 82,601 627,179 1,534 -10,706
UNIDO Cleaner Production Programme INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
United Nations Center for Trade Facilitation and 
Electronic Business INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
World Alliance for Decentralized Energy INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
World Business Council on Sustainable INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
World Economic Forum Disaster Resource Network INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
World Links 83,232 25,920 57,312 134,362 56,824 77,538 -821,624 -5,760
World Tourism Organization INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Youth Business International 0 0 0 1,755,993 765,763 1,028,316 2,204,359 1,028,316
Ethical Trading Initiative 688,284 255,574 432,710 771,610 325,035 446,576 182,691 185,877
4C Association: Common Code for the Coffee 
Community INA INA 832,232 1,452,015 242,970 1,209,045 INA INA
Global Environment Facility 4,520,511,441 1,961,665,895 2,504,779,298 4,646,007,362 1,965,464,107 2,664,501,393 -739,734,867 -671,832,751
ACCION International 340,025,332 8,248,231 331,777,101 234,241,596 10,003,449 224,238,147 2,939,441 -130,131,212
Agricultural Risk Management Team INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Golden Rice INA INA INA INA INA INA INA INA
Partnership Name
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APPENDIX L (CONTINUED) 
Aeras Global TB Vaccine Foundation N Y N N N N Y
Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research Y Y N N Y N Y
Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative Y Y N Y Y N Y
European Malaria Vaccine Initiative (Now the 
European Vaccine Initiative) Y Y Y N N N Y
Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics N Y N Y N N Y
Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition N Y N N N N Y
Global Alliance for TB Drug Development N Y N N N N Y
Global Alliance for the Elimination of Lymphatic 
Filariasis Y Y N Y Y N N
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Global Health Council N Y N N Y Y N
Global Media AIDS Initiative N N N N N N N
Global Public-Private Partnership for Handwashing 
with Soap N N N N N N N
Global Vaccine Enterprise Y N N Y N Y N
Institute for OneWorld Health N Y N N N N N
International AIDS Vaccine Initiative Y Y N N N N Y
International Trachoma Initiative Y Y N Y Y N N
Malaria Vaccine Initiative Y Y N N N N N
Medicines for Malaria Venture Y Y N Y N N Y
Micronutrient Initiative Y Y N N N N Y
Network for Sustained Elimination of Iodine 
Deficiency (Iodine Network) Y N N Y Y Y N
Partners for Parasite Control N N N N Y Y N
Project Hope N Y Y N N N N
Roll Back Malaria Global Partnership Y N N Y Y Y N
Stop TB Partnership Y Y N Y Y Y Y
Strategies for Enhancing Access to Medicines for 
Health Y N N N N N N
Universal Flour Fortification Initiative N N N N N N N
World Economic Forum's Global Health Initiative N N N N N N N
AED-SATELLIFE N N N N N N N
Alliance for the Global Elimination of Blinding 
Trachoma by the year 2020 N Y N Y Y Y N
BIO Ventures for Global Health N Y N N N N N
Clinton Foundation AIDS Initiative (Now the Clinton 
Health Access Initiative) N Y N N N N Y
Eli Lilly Multi-Drug Resistant Tuberculosis N N N N N N N
EuroVacc Foundation N N N N N N N
Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria N Y N N Y N N
Global Elimination of Maternal and Neonatal Tetanus Y Y Y N N N N
Global Polio Eradication Initiative Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Health Academy, The N N N N N N N
Health Internetwork Access to Research Initiative N N N N N N N
Infectious Disease Research Institute N N N N N N N
International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups 
Program N Y N N N N N
International Partnership for Microbicides N Y N N Y N Y
MAC AIDS fund N N N N N N N
Novartis Institute for Tropical Diseases N N N N N N N
Pediatric Dengue Vaccine Initiative N Y N N N N N
Safe Injection Global Network Y N N Y Y Y N
Vision 2020 N Y N N N N N
Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Alliance to Save Energy N Y N Y Y N Y
ACCOUNTABILITY / TRANSPARENCY
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Building Partnerships for Development in Water and 
Sanitation Y N N N Y N Y
Clean Air Initiative Y Y N Y Y Y Y
Community Watersheds Partnership Prorgam Global 
Development Alliance (Formerly the Coca-
Cola/USAID Water and Development Alliance) N Y N N N N N
Collaborative Labeling and Appliance Standards 
Program N N N N N N N
Forest Stewardship Council Y Y N Y Y Y Y
Generation Challenge Programme (Former CGIAR 
Partnership Challenge Program: 'Unlocking Genetic 
Diversity in Crops for the Resource-Poor') Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Global Compact N Y N Y Y Y N
Global Crop Diversity Trust N Y N Y Y Y Y
Global e-Sustainability Initiative N Y N N N N N
Global Master Plan for Cycling N N N N N N N
Global Reporting Initiative Y Y N N Y Y Y
Global Road Safety Partnership Y Y N Y N N N
Global Village Energy Partnership Y Y N N N N Y
International Center for Sustainable Development N N N N N N Y
International Center for Tropical Agriculture Y Y Y N N N Y
International Electrotechnical Commission Y Y N N Y Y Y
International Road Transport Union N Y N Y Y N N
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-
biotech Applications N N N N N N N
International Solar Energy Society N N N N N N N
International Youth Foundation Y Y N N N N N
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Marine Stewardship Council Y Y N N Y Y Y
Partners for Environmental Cooperation in Europe Y Y Y N N N N
Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles N N N Y Y Y N
Project Proteus Y N N N N N N
Public Interest Intellectual Property Advisors Y N N N N N N
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency 
Partnership N Y N Y N N Y
Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st 
Century N Y N Y Y Y N
Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor N Y N Y N Y Y
World Economic Forum - Partnering Against 
Corruption Initiative N N N N N N N
World Energy Council INA Y N N N N Y
World Resources Institute Y Y N Y Y Y Y
World Vegetable Centre Y Y Y N N N N
Mectizan Donation Program N N N N N N N
Global Ballast Water Management Programme N N N N Y N N
Efficient Energy for Sustainable Development N N N N N N N
World Institute for Sustainable Humanity (AWISH) - 
Hellas -Mesogeios N N N N N N Y
Access to Global Online Research in Agriculture N N N N N N N
Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at 
the Local Level N N N N N N N
BE THE CHANGE! - youth-led action for sustainable 
development N N N N N N N
BioCarbon Fund N Y N N N N N
Biotrade Initiative N N N N N N N
Capacity Building Task Force on Trade, Environment 
and Development N N N Y Y Y N
Cement Sustainability Initiative N Y N N N N N
CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and Food Y Y N N N N Y
Cisco Networking Academy Program N Y N N N N N
Climate Investment Partnership Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Community Water Initiative N N N N N N N
Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research Y Y N Y Y N Y
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Consultative Group to Assist the Poor Y Y N Y Y N Y
E+Co N Y N N N N Y
e8 (Formerly e7) Y Y N Y Y N N
Ecoagriculture Partners N N N N N N N
Ecological Sanitation Research Y N Y N N N N
EdInvest N N N N N N N
Embarq N Y N N Y N N
Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems N N N N N N N
Equator Initiative N N N N N N N
EU Water Initiative: Water for Life N N N N N N N
EVE-olution Foundation N N N N N N N
Global Facilitation Partnership for Transportation and 
Trade N N N N N N N
Global Gas Flaring Reduction Y Y Y Y Y N N
Global Partnership for Capacity Building to 
Implement the Globally Harmonized System for 
Chemical Classification and Labelling Y Y N Y Y Y N
Global Water Partnership Y Y N Y Y Y Y
GlobalGiving N Y N N N N Y
Great Apes Survival Project Y Y N Y Y Y N
International Livestock Research Institute Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
International Navigation Association Y N N Y Y N N
International Partnership for Sustainable 
Development in Mountain Regions Y N N N Y N N
International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy N N N Y Y N N
International Water and Sanitation Center Y Y N N N N Y
Local Capacity-Building and Training on Sustainable 
Urbanization: a Public-Private Partnership N N N N N N N
Methane to Markets N N N N N N N
New Ventures N Y N N N N N
Online Access to Research in the Environment N N N N N N N
Partnership for Clean Indoor Air N N N Y Y N N
Population and Sustainability Network N N N N N N N
Refrigerants Naturally Initiative N N N N N N N
Sister Cities Network for Sustainable Development Y Y Y Y Y Y N
Sustainable Forest Products Global Alliance N N N N N N N
Tour Operators Initiative N N N N N N N
Transparency International Y Y Y N N N Y
Travel Foundation N Y N Y Y N Y
Unicode Consortium N N N Y N N N
UNIDO Cleaner Production Programme N N N N N N N
United Nations Center for Trade Facilitation and 
Electronic Business Y Y N Y Y Y N
World Alliance for Decentralized Energy N N N N N N N
World Business Council on Sustainable N Y N N N N N
World Economic Forum Disaster Resource Network N N N N N N N
World Links N N N N N N N
World Tourism Organization N Y N Y Y Y N
Youth Business International Y Y Y N N N Y
Ethical Trading Initiative N Y N N Y N Y
4C Association: Common Code for the Coffee 
Community N Y N N N N Y
Global Environment Facility N Y N Y Y Y Y
ACCION International Y Y Y N Y N Y
Agricultural Risk Management Team N N N N N N N
Golden Rice N N N N N N N
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